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Preface
Communication and coordination among the groups involved in pre
paring, using, and regulating financial information is essential. Recognition
of that need led to a symposium that was organized and held in the fall of
1968 at Seaview, New Jersey, under the sponsorship of four professional
groups: the American Institute of CPAs, the Financial Analysts Federation,
the Financial Executives Institute, and the Robert Morris Associates. Its
objective was to foster continuing organized and informal contacts among
members of these groups to consider ways to improve the financial reporting
process. The papers and proceedings of the symposium were published in
1969 under the title Corporate Financial Reporting: Conflicts and Challenges.
In the years since that meeting continuing benefits have been felt. Joint
panels and discussions at the meetings of the four sponsoring organizations
have increased, and there has been greater coordination of research effort.
Also, personal relationships established at Seaview have been the basis for con
tinuing informal discussions. Thus, that meeting has been recognized as a
significant event in the developing cooperation among the organizations
involved.
Another by-product of that first meeting was the development into a con
tinuing organization of the symposium steering committee, which had
originally been established to organize and supervise the meeting. The group,
composed of eleven key members and staff of the four organizations, held
frequent meetings and served as a means for the organizations to keep up
to date on the activities of others and to plan other joint efforts.
In the fall of 1970, the steering committee concluded that a second sym
posium should be held on the topic of ethics in financial reporting. The papers
and proceedings of that symposium were also published in book form as
Corporate Financial Reporting: Ethical and Other Problems.
After the second symposium, the steering committee continued to meet
and, in the fall of 1973, decided that another symposium would be beneficial
if a suitable, interesting, and important topic could be identified. After much
discussion and debate, the steering committee selected the topic of the benefits
and problems of disclosure. After the meeting, the steering committee conv

eluded that the papers prepared for the symposium and an edited transcript
of the proceedings should also be made available and we agreed to undertake
the editing of this book.
Coordination of the arrangements and administration of the meeting was
the responsibility of Professor Carl Nelson of Columbia University. He served
as chairman of the symposium and coordinated the efforts of the speakers,
paper preparers, and discussion leaders. Physical arrangements at Seaview
were made by Douglas Heath of the AICPA. He deserves credit for the
smoothness with which the meeting was handled. Marie Bareille and George
McCloskey of the publications staff of the AICPA showed talent and patience
in dealing with the editors. Without these many effective efforts, the end result
would not have been possible.

D. R. Carmichael
Ben Makela
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Introduction
In the United States, substantial reliance is placed on corporate financial
disclosure to facilitate the direction of investment capital into productive
channels. Fair securities markets depend on adequate disclosure. Conse
quently, the benefits and problems of disclosure seemed to be a subject well
worth exploration by those with a keen interest in improving corporate finan
cial reporting.
Leading members of the four professional organizations most concerned
with corporate financial reporting held a two-day symposium on the subject
at Seaview, New Jersey, on November 21 and 22, 1974. The symposium
was attended by representatives of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, the Financial Analysts Federation, the Financial Executives
Institute, and the Robert Morris Associates. Also, invited guests from the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York Stock Exchange
participated.
The symposium provided an opportunity for representatives of the four
organizations to discuss, think about, and understand corporate financial dis
closure problems of mutual concern. As a basis for discussion, a series of
papers was prepared by members of the four groups from their perspectives
and by a few invited experts on specialized aspects of disclosure. Also, each
paper by a member of one of the groups was analyzed by members of the
other three groups. The papers and critiques were designed to stimulate
thought and focus discussion rather than to report research results. Except
for the opening presentation by Professor Roger Murray of Columbia Uni
versity the papers and critiques were not delivered at the symposium but were
considered in advance by the participants. Discussion of the papers and
critiques was led by a moderator from one of the four groups or, in some
cases, by the preparer of the paper. The moderators typically began with a
concise summary of the papers and critiques, and then they acted as catalysts
to stimulate interchange rather than as discussion leaders directing the group
to resolution of issues.
The participants left the symposium with increased understanding of the
subject and with a better appreciation of the views of others involved in
corporate financial reporting. We were faced with the task of communicating
the results of the symposium to those interested in the subject but not having
the advantage of first-hand participation. We had several hundred pages of
transcript and our own memories of the thought-provoking and spirited dis
cussions to help us.
After studying the transcript of the discussions and the papers and
critiques, we decided to present each discussion in conjunction with the
1

related papers and critiques. The discussions have been edited to improve
wandering syntax, to delete repetition or affirmation of expressed views, and
to condense where possible. However, the written word has been kept as
close as possible to the spoken word to retain the flavor and spontaneity of
the discussion.
If the original schedule had been adhered to, this book would have been
issued early in the summer of 1975. Unforeseen circumstances precluded
adhering to that schedule and the symposium steering committee did not re
quest us to undertake the editing until March 1976. We have not attempted
to update the material to include pertinent developments since November
1974. However, our review of the material convinced us that the issues dis
cussed at the symposium concerning the problems and benefits of disclosure
are as relevant today as they were when the symposium was held.

The Purpose and Objectives of Disclosure
The symposium began with an exploration by Professor Roger Murray
of the fundamental purpose and objectives of disclosure. Viewed broadly,
disclosure encompasses the entire system of providing information for invest
ment decision-making. Taking that broad perspective, Professor Murray
views corporate financial disclosure as the link between investment decisions
and the reality of what is happening to business corporations. The quality of
disclosure affects the ability of the securities markets to establish prices for
corporate securities that reflect their values. In his view, the disclosure sys
tem is not working adequately.
An uncoupling between events in the real world and securities prices has
reduced the level of confidence in corporate financial reporting. Enough
information is disclosed, but that information too often presents a distorted
view of reality. In addition, the quality of analysis applied to financial in
formation is sometimes deficient. Another factor contributing to the problem
is gamesmanship in earnings analysis and investment advice. Sometimes more
attention is focused on how other investors will think and react than on the
real implications of financial information disclosed.
The challenge to those with a stake in corporate financial reporting is to
restore the link between information used in decision-making and the under
lying realities of corporate performance. Better information needs to be
provided, and better analysis of the information is required.

Participants in the Disclosure System

The symposium provided information and raised questions about the
role of virtually all parties involved in the corporate financial reporting
process.
2

Regulators
Professor Robert Mundheim explained the use of disclosure as a regu
latory tool. The statutory objective of the federal securities laws is to protect
investors by providing that they are fully informed. Recent trends in the
use of disclosure by regulators include continuous disclosure and differential
disclosure. Also, disclosure requirements have been increasingly used to in
fluence the conduct of corporate management.
The trend toward continuous disclosure represents a shift in emphasis
to building a reservoir of information on companies kept up to date by public
release of material information when it first becomes available as well as the
periodic updating provided by quarterly and annual reports. The shift is
oriented toward disclosure for the trading market rather than in connection
with the distribution of a new security issue. In a trading market, both buyers
and sellers of securities need protection, so the traditional conservatism of
the prospectus is no longer appropriate. Negative aspects need not be em
phasized over positive aspects. One result is disclosure of more “soft” in
formation, such as forecasts.
The trend toward differential disclosure reflects the different needs of the
sophisticated user, such as securities analysts, and the ordinary investor. Some
disclosures, such as compensating balances and short-term financing arrange
ments, are specifically designed to aid the professional. With improved in
formation the professional analyst may be able to provide the better analysis
of information called for by Professor Murray. Differential disclosure can
also provide more information for the ordinary investor in the form of mean
ingful analytic summaries in understandable terms.
Disclosure requirements are also used as a means of control either to
restrict certain activities or to influence conduct. For example, the require
ment to disclose management compensation and transactions between man
agement and the company has a moderating influence on conflicts of interest.
Furthermore, the requirement to disclose some activities, such as illegal pay
ments, can cause those activities to cease. Insider trading rules have been
developed to assure equal access to information. Originally designed to
prevent corporate officials from using their position to take unfair advantage
of shareholders, the restrictions have been extended to any person with a
special relationship to the corporation who has access to nonpublic in
formation.

Analysts and Bankers
The trend toward differential disclosure means increased responsibility
for analysts and bankers. Both play an important role in the allocation of
resources in the economy. Bankers determine which corporations receive
capital. The recommendations of analysts direct capital to corporations.
Both bankers and analysts are concerned with the potential problem of
acquiring inside information as a result of their normal investigation to under
3

stand the earnings characteristics of a corporation. Diligent analysis may
bring into their possession material information about a corporation. If they
confirm that information with the corporation’s management, the insider
trading rules may preclude them from using the information.
Analysts and bankers would like less aggregation and more disclosure
of raw data. However, they recognize the problem of the ever increasing
amount of information disclosed and favor development of criteria for judg
ing the importance of information rather than the current emphasis on require
ments to disclose types of information.

Financial Executives
The preparers of information are faced with hosts of demands for specific
information. Generally, they feel beleaguered by what appears to be an
insatiable demand.
Apparently, there is push for more and more information because of a
fear on the part of analysts, bankers, and regulators that otherwise the neces
sary information will be deleted. Since specification of the information that
is essential is so difficult, disclosure of more and more information is required.
Financial executives favor some new approach to stemming the flow
of required disclosures.

Independent Auditors
The concern of independent auditors is with examining and reporting
on what is disclosed based on present requirements rather than the desir
ability of requiring more disclosure. However, participants in the disclosure
system seem to disagree about who is in the best position to exert pressure on
corporations for better disclosure. Some would like the auditor to exert pres
sure. Others believe the auditor’s role should be confined to adding to the
credibility of the information disclosed. Improved criteria for information
that should be disclosed would help auditors fulfill either role.

The Disclosure Dilemma

Generally, all symposium participants favored some better method of
identifying the meaningful, significant information that should be disclosed.

Quality of Information Rather Than Quantity
The basic problem is that not all available information can be disclosed.
Eventually, a point of overload is reached and most participants agreed that
point is fast approaching. As disclosure becomes more comprehensive, the
information becomes less comprehensible. Disclosure requirements have
4

tended to grow interminably. One layer of requirements has been applied
on top of another to keep pace with changes in the business environment.

The Notion of Earning Power
Users of financial information have a notion of earning power that is
difficult to pinpoint. Basically, it is related to the cash generating ability of
a corporation. Earning-power oriented disclosure would allow users to recog
nize variations in earnings persistence and the likely cash consequences of
corporate activities. Such disclosures would emphasize expected earnings
growth, uncertainty about earnings growth, and the volatility of earnings.

A Framework for Disclosure—Criteria
There is probably a basic core of information that should be reported by
all corporations. Beyond that core the particular makeup of information that
should be disclosed varies from company to company. Criteria are needed
for the information that should be disclosed beyond that core. Participants in
the symposium considered criteria for disclosure of earnings characteristics
in the following categories:

•
•
•
•

Sales Characteristics
Expense Characteristics
Competitive Environment
Accounting Methods

For example, information on sales characteristics includes product mix, new
product development, entry into new markets, major contracts, and order
backlogs. Information on expense characteristics includes information on
fixed and variable costs. Information on the corporation’s competitive
environment includes identification of its major competitors and market
share. Additional information on accounting methods includes expanded
explanation of revenue recognition policies.
While the participants in the symposium were not prepared to lend
their unqualified endorsement to this approach to establishing disclosure cri
teria, there was a strong consensus that general criteria for disclosure were
preferable to expanding specific disclosure requirements.

5
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The Role of Disclosure
in the Economy

Disclosure: The Security
Markets and the
Economic System
By Roger Murray, S. Sloan Colt Professor of Finance and Banking,
Columbia University
It is clear that we are living increasingly in a world of scarcities of
natural resources, including energy and clean air and water, which creates a
kind of pressure that we refer to as cost-push inflationary pressure.
And as we think about these basic, underlying forces at work in our
economic system, we say to ourselves that federal reserve policy and what
the Treasury does about the budget really don’t matter very much. The issue
before the house, if you will, concerning the efficiency of the operation of our
system is the question of whether we can sustain our long-term pattern of
growth in productivity. If we can’t do that, we know that the inflationary
pressures will persistently erode not just the capacity of the economic system
to grow, but our political and social environments as well.

Use of Capital Resources

This brings us, I think, to the question: How efficiently, in the interest of
maximizing productivity growth, are we allocating resources? And what
resources? The answer is: The resources in our market-directed economy
that are in the hands of private decision-makers.
I think it is fair to say that in our present situation, as we view our
dilemmas, there really isn’t any place to look for any degree of confidence or
expectation of solution to these matters beyond the private business sector.
Therefore, how effectively resources are allocated is a crucial issue.
We have committed ourselves to a system that we speak of as being
market-directed. Generally we call it private enterprise, or our version of a
modern capitalist society, and we say that the market will do the job. That is,
the market will decide where resources are allocated. This means, in essence,
the securities markets in which the cost of capital is determined and in which
capital funds are directed to the most productive uses. And, through this
9

market mechanism, certain ineffective or less productive uses are rationed out.
As students of the capital markets, or of the securities markets, it is not
just a question of whether we like the way our markets are working. We are
talking about how that basic lifeblood of economic growth flows into the
most productive areas.
One of the things that must bother us, as we contemplate the future, is
that this discipline—a market discipline—works; but, it works very, very
slowly indeed. Every time we see a case of a takeover of another company
by a tender offer, what is the message we get back? The message is that
resources have been employed less productively than the market has
demanded.
When we look at the number of companies across our nation that have
rested on dead center for extended periods of time before anything happened,
we have to say to ourselves that the discipline is not working as promptly and
as forcefully as it should in order to increase productive use of our resources.
Every once in a while a congressman proposes that we enact an undis
tributed profits tax; and we all respond immediately that this is a mischievous,
uneconomic, unfortunate approach. But what are the grounds for an un
distributed profits tax? You are saying, in effect, that the market discipline is
not acting, that it is indeed possible for corporate management to retain
earnings for relatively low profitability uses over extended periods of time.
And you say that we ought to make those corporate managements come right
out and face the market test by distributing their earnings and then com
peting in the marketplace for funds for expansion.
I think this would be very unfortunate because our previous experiences
with undistributed profits taxes really are very unpromising for their useful
ness. But don’t forget that there is an array of critics of the operation of our
securities markets who are prepared to offer these kinds of substitutes if we
cannot see the market working as an efficient allocator.

Evaluating Corporate Enterprise

Now, we live in a time when, in academia at least, we talk unendingly
about the efficient market hypothesis. We talk about random walks in security
prices, and we talk about the whole framework of the market. Very interest
ing! It is a delightful game, and I certainly would not want to discourage
anyone from engaging in it. But if, from the standpoint of current experience,
we ask ourselves about the market’s efficiency in evaluating corporate enter
prise, we have to ask ourselves, “Really, in a year or eighteen months, did the
value of major corporate enterprises like Avon Products or Polaroid really
shrink by 75 percent in any meaningful sense?” Of course not! Were they not
overvalued at one point and potentially, perhaps, undervalued at another?
When we look back at some of the casualties (and we can think of
some major companies), what about Boise Cascade that went from $85 to
10

$10 per share? A broadly-based, diversified corporate enterprise? Not to
mention the basic disasters like Penn Central.
How efficient, we must ask ourselves, is this kind of market mechanism
in accomplishing that valuation process which is critical to the cost and avail
ability of funds for expansion, whether they be new capital issues or retained
earnings?
If we ask ourselves whether greater disclosure would have, or in the
future might, contribute to an improvement in this valuation process, we
almost have to say yes. There are ways in which the presentation or the
completeness of basic information could improve the quality of decisions.
Perhaps we should not put all the blame for our misjudgments on the
quality of information. It seems to me quite demonstrable that the quality
of analytical work applied to financial information must share a major part
of the blame for the inaccuracy of the valuation process.
Just think about the analysts going through the process of accepting as
the wave of the future something that was referred to as a “free-formed
conglomerate.” Or, take an episode like the leasing companies. The in
formation was all there; what they told you was that they could create values
by changing the depreciation assumptions, and any analyst who didn’t recog
nize that for what it was, was obviously not a competent analyst. Or, take
the most recent episode in REITs. This is not a problem in disclosure, but a
problem in analysis and interpretation.
What we can say, though, about disclosure is that it is indeed helpful,
if disclosure requirements are determined by some analytical standard of use
fulness. There is really no decision that at one stage or another does not
involve some consideration of the effect on the valuation of the enterprise of
the action taken or not taken. Therefore, the presentation of financial in
formation in its raw state, rather than after it has been smoothed out, where
comparability is possible and where the elements presented are really sig
nificant and important to the analytical process, is indeed a desirable and
legitimate standard for disclosure requirements.
But, I sometimes think the deficiencies in financial information are not so
much what we fail to disclose, or what we fail to emphasize, but what we do
disclose or emphasize. Let me give you an example of what I have in mind.
It is not easy for an analyst to determine the rate of return being earned on the
total capital employed in the enterprise. There are all kinds of difficulties in
arriving at what that total capital is. For example, we are only beginning to
solve the problems of full disclosure on lease liabilities as a part of capital at
work. We still permit corporations to carry on the balance sheets things called
reserves, which are a “nothing” item in terms of analytical purposes. Either
they are liabilities or they are capital, and they can’t be something that is
analytically uncertain.
We still have on the asset side of balance sheets items that are described
in various ways, but that really reflect good will. I was looking at a statement
just yesterday of a major company that acquired a brewery at a substantial
11

premium over book value of the assets; the company has been working for
three years to get that brewery into the black. And I say to myself, Good
will? If that is good will, who needs to pay, in any form, for such an asset.
What we need, obviously, is a fair, clear, and comparable statement of
capital employed in the business. We have enough problems with the fact
that the statement is composed of dollars of different vintages and different
purchasing power, without the exclusion or inclusion of irrelevant items.
What we want to learn is the profitability of the employment of that total
capital. And yet, what do we give people? What do we give analysts? We
constantly offer them calculations of return on average net worth. That’s not a
useless figure, but if we are looking at the profitability of the enterprise,
we ought to be measuring that and not diverting ourselves with the question
of how much financial leverage has been employed to create what results
in terms of a leveraged return on equity.
Then we do something else that, it seems to me, adds nothing and
subtracts a great deal from clarity of thinking and decision-making, not only
among amateur investors, but among professional analysts. We constantly
put the spotlight on a figure called earnings per share. And, indeed, it has
been raised to a high level of respectability. It is the only measure I can think
of in which the unit of measurement is constantly changing; and yet,
we solemnly give people comparisons of ten-year results of earnings per
share and growth in earnings per share.
What shares? The one thing we know is that a share in each one of those
ten years is a different unit of measurement. In the solitary special case
where the company pays out all of its earnings in dividends across that span of
time, I will concede that “a share is a share is a share.” Otherwise, it is always
something different, and we compare things that really have no relationship
whatever.
You and I know that if we earn 12 percent on net worth across time, and
we retain 55 percent of our earnings and pay 45 percent in dividends, across
time our earnings per share will grow by 6.6 percent per annum. It’s easy—
55 percent of 12 is 6.6. Now, then, if I report 6.6 percent growth in earnings
across time, what is that? Is that growth? It is simply a reinvestment of
capital. Every shareholder has made a new subscription to additional capital
of the company, a fully subscribed, preferential rights offering to each share
holder, and that’s all that has happened. What do we do with this figure?
We report in illustrated brochures to shareholders that earnings are growing
at 6.6 percent per annum.
The American people, every time they are surveyed, are absolutely
convinced that the profit margin of American business runs on the order of
20 percent per annum. They have the notion that profits always rise and
climb, and that somehow the managers of corporate enterprise are living like
parasites on the economic system. No corporate executive ever says, “All we
did was get a 6.6 percent increase in our earnings this year, and that only
reflects the reinvestment of the earnings that we didn’t pay you in dividends
12

and, really, it was a lousy year.” On the contrary, he says, “One more year of
steady, sustained growth at a rate in excess of 6 percent per annum.”

The Value of Present Disclosure Policies

What kind of information are we generating for decision-making? It is
bad enough that our corporate managers keep reading their press releases
and their letters to shareholders that talk about the sustained growth of the
enterprise, but they ignore the recognition of capital employed, the eroding
effect of inflation, and such other factors. It is bad enough that decision
makers in business tend to become victims of the money illusion, and con
fuse current dollar increases with genuine growth. This would all be harmless
enough except that, unfortunately, other people read those same documents,
and they say, “The American business system is doing just fine; maybe, in
fact, they are doing so well that we ought to levy some kind of excess profits
tax, or, surely, we ought to tax these windfall gains that they make from price
level changes.”
Hopefully, in internal corporate decision-making we can separate the
real from the illusory, and make rational, logical economic decisions. How
ever, we are now talking about the full range of users of financial information.
When we transpose our flow of information to the investing public, what do
we find? It isn’t that we are not giving them enough information; we find
that we are all too often transmitting a distorted picture of reality.
If we look at our security markets today, we must ask ourselves, “How is
it that the common stocks of strong, financially solvent, and well-managed
enterprises are selling at the lowest relationship to earnings, or book values, in
a quarter of a century? (Some argue that in real terms they are at the lowest
prices in this century.) What has happened? Do our shareholders and inves
tors perceive what is really going on inside the corporate enterprise? Do they
understand that the creation of real values is still going on, is still proceeding
apace, in spite of all of the confusion and lack of credibility attached to current
reported earnings statements and balance sheets?”
They don’t seem to. They seem to feel that there has been an uncoupling,
that there are things called securities on one side and a real world on the
other, and the relationship between these two is not very clear to the investor
nor to the decision-maker. In fact, it is so unclear, and the investor has so
little confidence in the information and the contradictory statements with
which he is supplied, that he says, “Every time I have owned an equity security
in the last six years, I have regretted it. You’re not going to get me back
again into one of those mousetrapping situations.”
If we look across the whole array of investment decision-makers—the
professionals, as well as the casual individual investors—the fact is that the
level of confidence and the level of credibility in financial reporting is at an
all-time low.
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As a recent example, the duPont Company carefully explained that, by
shifting to the LIFO method of inventory valuation, they would not change
their position in the slightest, but would improve their cash flow position by
more than $100 million. It was thought that surely the duPont Company
would be worth more with that improvement in its cash position than it was
before. And yet, the shares of stock took a dive.
When the public reacts in this manner, they are saying what they have
said to us many, many times: “The only thing we know anything about is
reported earnings. And we’re not sure you analysts, who work them over
and tell us about all kinds of adjustments, know what you’re doing. We’re
not very sure about the reporting standards by which we receive these figures.”
What this means, then, is that there is an uncoupling, a loosening of the
link between the market operation in its evaluation of the enterprise and its
evaluation of changing circumstances of a corporation, and what is really
going on.
This is a very unhappy and bleak atmosphere at a point in time when in
the next decade we shall face the heaviest sustained demand for permanent
capital that our economic system has yet tried to meet. We are facing a
rebuilding of our capacity to supply either basic raw materials in the tra
ditional form or substitutes therefor. We are rebuilding our capacity to
provide energy in a variety of forms, any substitute for which is a tremendously
capital-intensive undertaking. And, finally, we have apparently come to the
end of the road in using our atmosphere, our waterways, and our environment
as though they were free goods with an inexhaustible capacity to renew
themselves, no matter what the abuse.
If we are going to use the market mechanism as our discipline, as our
resource-allocating mechanism, we have to reestablish, tighten, and strengthen
the links between the kinds of information on which people make their
decisions and the underlying realities of what is happening to the enterprise.
We must make very substantial strides in restoring the confidence of
decision-makers, the professionals, and the unsophisticated kinds of investors,
in the quality, the reliability, and the consistency of the disclosure of those
real kinds of events that determine the productivity and the efficiency of our
very scarce resource, which is capital in general and equity capital in
particular.
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Discussion
Of the Murray paper
Roger Murray, Discussion Chairman
CPA: You say that we have to restore the faith of shareholders and the
public in the information that they receive. And yet it looks to me, in the
case of duPont, that you are saying they have perfect confidence in the
earnings figures, because when the reported earnings figures go down, the
price of the stock goes down.
Maybe what we have to do is to destroy their confidence.
Chairman Murray: No. The duPont Company, it seemed to me, made
a very careful explanation of exactly what they were doing in extending LIFO
to the remaining sections of their inventory. And it seemed to me that, as I
read their statement, it was clear that the duPont management had made a
very logical decision. They were going to get the use of that $130 to 150
million in their capital construction, interest free, by changing the timing of
their federal tax payments.
Now, what bothered me about this is that the shareholders are saying,
“You know, I don’t really care what they tell me. If the earnings are down,
the stock is less, and don’t bother me about how earnings are determined.
This is all a kind of mumbo-jumbo, and partly it’s manipulation—so they
can’t tell me that I am better off by this decision.”
This is what I meant, the lack of credibility of corporate managements,
because this, it seemed to me, was a very clear case of where management
had a good story to tell.
Analyst : I want to give you a rebuttal. I think that if the SEC would
go back and look at who the sellers were on those two or three days when that
decline took place, they would find that the sellers were guided by intelligent,
well-informed analysts who cast their votes against because of a feeling of
uneasiness about the economy and the high interest rates. They were fearful
that somebody out there would misunderstand, that these lower earnings
were going to cause the stock to go down. They were not themselves afraid,
and probably appreciated the quality of the decision.
I don’t believe you are appraising the reason correctly.
Chairman Murray: I talked to a chap this morning who said when
he read the House Ways and Means Committee decision on presenting deple
tion changes, that he “went short” on a certain petroleum stock, knowing that
this particular company was not going to be affected. But he was confident
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that the market would be totally indiscriminate, and that the stock would sell
off just like all the others. And it did. It sold off about 9 percent yesterday
in this totally indiscriminate way.
So he was acting on the same basis; that is to say that “I am rational, but
I assume that other people won’t understand or will misinterpret, and that,
therefore, no matter how sure I am of my ground, I’m not going to fight that
market trend.”
All right, if that’s the way decisions are made, I’m still very much
disturbed because it’s not the quality of that basic decision—made by a
weighing of costs and benefits of a certain course of action—but it’s what I
think will be the reaction of an uninformed, or not well-informed, group.
So you could picture the duPont management saying, “Gee, you know,
if we do this, the stock will sell off. Therefore, we should not make the
change to LIFO inventory valuation.” In economic terms that’s a very bad
decision, isn’t it? But, perhaps it is symptomatic of the kind of atmosphere
in which, unfortunately, we are living, and in which business decisions are
measured.
And I guess that’s what makes me pretty unhappy about the quality
of our market-directing process.
Banker: I don’t think you should be unhappy, because you opened
your talk saying that the subject of discussion was the proper allocation of
capital resources of the country, and I suggest to you that a stock market
analyst is not really concerned about this. He’s concerned about what the
price of a stock will be. That’s the way the market works, and, if he is a good
analyst, he couldn’t care less about whether the duPont Company is doing
what’s right or wrong. What he is interested in is what the price of that stock
is going to be in the short term.
Now, I would also raise the question of whether, if what they did was
correct in the long run, it would reflect itself in earnings? And, I think the
answer has to be that, if they were properly using the tax money that they
have the free use of, it would be reflected in earnings in the long run—and in
the long run is where capital allocation enters.
You are not really talking capital allocation at all when you talk about
a decision that an institutional investor makes to take a short-term ride in the
market. He is just gambling. That isn’t investment.
Chairman Murray: This is a perfectly appropriate qualifier to any
one of these observations about what the market does, or does not, reflect.
One of the problems is that on the basis of all the studies we know how
to make and know how to test, we find that if you want to explain stock prices
you have to explain them in terms of a lengthening and shortening time
horizon. As we try to explain the behavior of stock prices, we can explain
them pretty well if we say that at certain points in time, within a long period of
expansion or contraction, the time horizon tends to lengthen; but at all turning
points, the time horizon shortens.
In other words, in peak areas of market levels or in trough areas you
can see this phenomenon repeatedly taking place—a shortening of the time
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horizon. And when you think about it, you say: “Well, that’s right. Of
course! By definition, at a peak and at a trough the outlook is very cloudy;
people are very uncertain as to whether the trend, either the decline or the
advance, is going to continue for any protracted period.”
So, around peaks or troughs in the stock market—and to some extent we
tend to get this also in the bond market—there is a very short time horizon.
And yet the resource allocation that we are talking about, as you properly
point out, is not what duPont is going to do with that money in the next
quarter. It is what they are going to do with it over the next five to ten years.
I think we could say that our market is working efficiently if we did not
run into these periods of very short time horizons. And if you want to find
fault with what is generally known as the performance syndrome, it is the
tremendous competitiveness about investment performance over very short
periods of time, when it is the long time horizon of the investment decision
that is being evaluated.
Now, what might one be able to contribute? Let’s call it the “stabilizing
of expectations in the evaluation of an enterprise as a going concern,” instead
of, “What do you think the stock is going to do in the next three weeks?”
It seems, clearly, that what we need to do is reestablish and strengthen
that linkage between real events—economic reality that is going on within
the business firm—and this process of determining stock values. And this is
a function of confidence. It is a function of, “How do you get people’s expec
tations moderated? How do you remove some of that pressure for instant
profitability on investing activities?”
Financial Executive: You didn’t say this, but did you intend to
imply by your comments that there should really be no flexibility in account
ing principles, or options open to the company?
For example, if there were no option on LIFO, FIFO, and so forth,
duPont wouldn’t have faced the situation you illustrated. Were you suggesting
that there should not be those options?
Chairman Murray: I would say that the wide range of alternative
choices of generally accepted accounting principles undermines that confi
dence and credibility, because I always think of Dr. Hammer’s statements for
Occidental Petroleum as gems. Some of you will remember that episode when
he met with the financial analysts who kept asking him about accounting
questions, and he said, “I believe in constructive accounting principles; and
by constructive accounting, I mean those accounting principles that produce
the best immediate result.”
After that, I used to try to study OXY’s financial statements as a kind
of a postgraduate test, and I flunked it over and over again because, as I went
through that complicated enterprise called Occidental Petroleum, with all of
its different activities, I said to myself: “What did he say? He said he was
going to make a choice.” And I wasn’t going to have any principle of com
pensating errors working for me. It was always going to be biased in one
direction.
So I had to come away from it. I don’t know what the earning power of
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that enterprise is. How can I tell anybody else the earning power of that
enterprise? What is it worth? What is it entitled to sell its securities for?
What kind of return should I anticipate as a holder?
Now, I realize, that every time we say: “Let’s reduce the range of options;
let’s tighten up in some sense,” we can always produce this tremendous number
of special cases that tell us that, “Well, no, we shouldn’t do it in this instance,
and if we do, it will create that other problem.”
No question! Narrowing the range of alternatives is going to create some
real problems. My only response to that is, “We’ve got real problems.” And
maybe the real problems we have now in some respects are worse than the
problems we would generate by a tightening, or a narrowing, of the range of
alternative generally accepted accounting principles.
But this is our perpetual problem, that we lose something in terms of
reliable reporting.
Analyst: I wonder if I could push your argument, perhaps, a little
farther than you meant it to go. You almost seem to be saying that it doesn’t
matter what financial statements say, because nobody is going to believe them
anyway. Investor confidence is at an extremely low level. So I wonder if
that isn’t a reflection in some sense of the fact that consumer confidence gen
erally is at an extremely low level. This reflects the economic uncertainty
of our times—what has gone on in Washington the last several years, the oil
situation, and you can go on and on.
It seems to me that confidence seems to move, particularly in the stock
market, with prices. When stock prices are up, everybody believes it will go
on forever. Right now, when stock prices are low, confidence is low. I
wonder if we aren’t worrying a little too much about the degree of investor
confidence; shouldn’t we be planning for more normal times, and trying to
make sure that financial statements are meaningful?
Chairman Murray: I was looking at another one of those surveys of
consumer confidence, and it was lower than anyone could possibly believe.
And this is consistent with the Michigan Survey Research Center. Every time
a Harris poll is taken on confidence in leadership, in business, in education, in
government, and in the legal profession, we are always hitting new lows.
There is no question about the fact that we are living in a time when credi
bility and confidence are at a low ebb. But in terms of financial information,
I would suggest that this really isn’t a new phenomenon. We had a lack of
confidence on many previous occasions. Six years ago we were playing games
in hot new issues, and the fashionable statement was: “Shall we go public, or
shall we go bankrupt?” This was an expression of a pretty cynical point of
view.
And, of course, we have been reading recitals of all sorts of questions
about corporate reporting. I have tried to follow the Mattel story, and when
I think I have just mastered it, the next version comes along, and I can’t
figure out now who sold what to whom when, what the returns were, and
what the company really did.
Here we are trying to reconstruct what happened in the toy business.
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It is not an elaborate, high-technology enterprise. This is the question: “Did
you sell toys, or didn’t you? And when did you recognize profits, or when
did you not recognize them, on a proper accounting basis?”
This is the sort of thing that really shakes confidence, because, after all,
people think that if it comes out in that lovely printed type, and it is on shiny
paper, and there is a clean certificate attached, that it has to be the gospel.
And if you find out that you can’t be sure. . . ?
Take the case that is going on in the fire and casualty insurance business.
We have watched these companies going along, doing business with a high
level of activity. Now somebody says, “Look, the reserves that these com
panies have accumulated are totally inadequate. They have been writing
excessive amounts of premium volume in relation to a capital base that has
been shrinking with the decline in equity prices. And now the only way you
are going to put yourself back in the insurance business is by making some
massive shifts from net worth to current liability accounts, in the form of
reserves for unreported losses, and the like.”
You look at this, and say, “You know, I didn’t know that this is what
was happening. I have been reading about those reported earnings, and every
body was doing just fine. What is there about the fire and casualty insurance
business?” And everybody says, “Oh, well, this is a kind of ‘special case.’ ”
When you add up all of the special cases, they cover quite an array.
Somebody with a kind of ghoulish instinct ought to make a catalog of write-offs
in that delightful area called “discontinued operations,” where corporate
managements are always explaining how intelligently and foresightedly they
are now moving to eliminate this business that doesn’t fit into their pattern, or
is operating at a loss. I can hardly wait to go back and read the annual report
where the same management told me that they had a new breakthrough, and
this represented new, great futures; but now they are eliminating that busi
ness. It is as though they are describing an unfortunate act of God that some
how destroyed their profitability this year, but, fortunately, those in the cur
rent generation of management have the intestinal fortitude to cut it off and
to eliminate this drain on corporate resources.
And not everybody has a short memory. Some can remember when
this diversification opportunity was described as one of the forward thrusts
in the expansion and diversification of our great enterprise, a part of our
long-term profit planning and development.
And so, we are in an environment that doesn’t get any easier. I don’t
have any simple kinds of ready-made solutions. I still think we have to get
our analytical apparatus and our professional analysts to do a much better
job, perhaps with somewhat better information for analytical purposes.
Financial Executive: You say that everybody is reading the re
ports and getting the wrong information on casualty companies. Does that
also include the so-called expert analysts of casualty companies? What kinds
of questions do they ask, and what kind of information are they getting that
would be in published materials where the wrong information or irrelevant
information is available?
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And are expert analysts, because they know the questions to ask, able
to get better information, and therefore also smart enough to get out of
casualty insurance stocks in time?
Chairman Murray: I would say that there is a cadre of able profes
sional insurance stock analysts who did see this coming. It is not because they
really had any information that wasn’t available to anybody else, but they did
their homework—they sat down and they examined the composition of that
portfolio, and they figured out what the exposure was to a declining stock
market. They watched the ratio of premiums written to capital funds, and
they did talk in the trade about reserves.
And the old test was an interesting test. If the IRS has not been on
your back for excessive accumulation of reserves, you probably may be in
some trouble, because this particular arm of government was hammering at
a number of the companies for setting aside excessive reserves. And so it’s
one of those things; if the IRS was not after you, you probably were not
reserving adequate amounts in a period of very rapidly escalating inflation
ary rises in claims.
But I would say that this situation was diagnosed. It was found by some
very able, long-experienced, competent insurance stock analysts.
But you keep asking yourself, “Is this the best way? That you have a
limited group of the very ablest, hardest-working, well-trained analysts, who
are adequately, or well informed, but the ordinary guy has no way of telling?”
Let me invite any of you to read the Franklin National Bank annual
report for 1973, in that lovely pink cover. Unless you are a very highlytrained, skilled bank stock analyst, I predict that you will go away from
reading that as a shareholder with a cheerful countenance and a spring in
your step, and say, “Well, thank goodness one of my investments is coming
along just fine!”
That report is very detailed; it gives you all kinds of tables of informa
tion. If, as someone has remarked, the Franklin National Bank had had to
write a prospectus at that particular point in time, experienced prospectus
readers would have found out that the bank was in a seriously strained earn
ings position. They wouldn’t have found out that the foreign exchanges losses
were taking place or things like that; but you would have had a solid clue.
And similarly the 10-K, available ordinarily after sufficient delay to make it
of doubtful assistance in this kind of a situation, also would provide that same
level of disclosure.
But here is the question: Can you get efficiency in the market process
by the delivery of information, reliable and complete, to the hands of a
limited number of highly experienced analysts, and have those markets work
efficiently?
I think there is some suggestion that this kind of process does lead to an
adjustment in prices, and it can lead to it, sometimes, quite rapidly. But when
individual investors say, “Where do I stand, and am I always going to finish
second to the professional, unless I let him manage my money?” you feel a
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little bit uncomfortable if you think, for any combination of reasons, you would
like to have widespread direct ownership.
We can always argue that it is better for individuals if they will just let
professionals manage it—maybe they will come out better, but maybe they
won’t. And maybe there are some by-product advantages of having a large
stockholder class who owns those shares directly and not through any financial
intermediary, or a pension fund, or something else.
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Trends in SEC Disclosure
for Public Corporations
by Robert H. Mundheim, Fred Carr Professor of Law and Financial
Institutions, University of Pennsylvania

Introduction

Disclosure has been a primary regulatory tool of the federal securities
laws. Disclosure of material information about companies whose shares are
distributed or traded in the market gives investors a basis on which to make
reasoned judgments about their comparative investment merits. Disclosure
of company information is, therefore, generally thought to enhance the al
locational efficiency of the markets. Disclosure concerning the costs of effect
ing investment transactions should contribute to the operational efficiency of
the market.
Disclosure also serves an important role in accomplishing the statutory
objective of protecting investors. If an investor is fully informed about a
transaction, he can often take steps to guard himself against fraud or over
reaching. Moreover, access to relevant information is indispensable to bar
gaining out of fair transactions. Full disclosure of company information also
has important consequences on the conduct of company managers. Exposure
to public view of conflicts of interest and questionable business practices
gives them what Justice Frankfurter called “a shrinking quality.”1 Equally
important, disclosure of company objectives and activities makes them
amenable to the pressure of public opinion.
Although these goals of disclosure do not seem to have been seriously
challenged as illegitimate or inappropriate, the Securities and Exchange Com
mission’s implementation of the disclosure philosophy has come under heavy
attack over the past few years. One line of attack argues that governmental
compulsion of disclosure imposes unnecessary costs (and shifts cost burdens
from where a free market would place them) without realizing the goals
sought by compelling disclosure. In one study, Professor Stigler measured
how investors fared before and after the SEC was given control over
the registration of new issues.12 He concluded that investor welfare had not
been increased as a consequence of the disclosure required pursuant to the
1
2
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Frankfurter, “The Securities Act: Social Consequences,” Fortune, August 1933, p. 53.
Stigler, “Public Regulation of the Securities Markets,” Journal of Business, vol. 37,
April 1964, pp. 117-142.

Securities Act of 1933.3 Recently Professor Benston sought to ask a similar
question with respect to certain company disclosures required under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. He concluded that disclosure requirements
had “no measurable positive effect” on the performance of the New York
Stock Exchange listed stocks which he studied.4 Finally, a study on the regu
lation of insider trading, published in the spring 1974 issue of The Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science, suggests that such regulation
is ineffective and, thus, of dubious value to society.5 Insider trading regula
tion, which is an offspring of disclosure regulation, has been severely criticized
in the past by Professor Henry Manne, not only as being ineffective, but as
being detrimental to the need to foster an entrepreneurial spirit in United
States industry.6
Another line of attack argues that the SEC has concentrated too much
of its attention and energy on disclosure and thus permitted itself to be di
verted from more important regulatory tasks. For example, the chairman
of the Governing Council of the Securities Industry Association assumes
that the SEC has achieved reasonably full disclosure, and that additional
efforts in this direction are expensive and unnecessary frills. He urges the
SEC to turn its energies towards “protection of the issuers’ ability to issue
[securities] and the markets’ ability to survive.”7 Other critics urge different
priorities—e.g., bringing about a central market system or providing for an
appropriate balance of opportunities and regulation for the different financial
organizations and institutions which serve investor and company needs.
A third set of critics believe that the SEC must reappraise its disclosure
policy because they have not sufficiently achieved the goals sought. Former
SEC Chairman Bradford G. Cook put the matter bluntly when he urged
the need for fundamental changes in the disclosure process because “the dis
3
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closure process must make more sense.”8 The call for a constructive reap
praisal of the role of disclosure under the federal securities laws has been
echoed by many practitioners and academicians.9 They have pointed out
numerous weaknesses in the present disclosure system and suggested a variety
of remedies. The SEC seems to be heeding this call for reform.
My major conclusion concerning the future of governmentally required
disclosure is that we will have more of it. The SEC will continue to rely on
disclosure as a primary regulatory tool, but the critics’ articulation of dis
closure goals should enable the SEC to mold disclosure requirements so that
they may serve the public interest more effectively.

The Shift Towards Disclosure of Company Information
Although disclosure has been a theme of the federal securities laws, tra
ditional SEC focus has been on the distribution of securities as the event
which triggers the need for special disclosure protection. This emphasis re
flects the concerns of the first federal securities statute, the Securities Act of
1933. The buyer in a securities distribution has a special need for protec
tion. Typically, a distribution must be effected rapidly, and salesmen are com
pensated more generously so that their enthusiasm for selling the securities
will be heightened. The need for protection is increased when a company
first goes public. Frequently, such offerings involve speculative ventures.
Moreover, such companies have not received the multisided scrutiny of the
investment community and management has not been subjected to the dis
cipline required in running a public company. Further, new issues of
securities seem to have a special economic significance, because flotation of
a new issue involves a direct allocation of capital to industry.
The SEC has devoted considerable attention to the production of the
prospectus, the disclosure document developed for distribution by an issuer
or by controlling persons of the issuer. It has stressed the joint responsibility
of the company, its directors, and the underwriter of the issue for the accuracy
of the prospectus.10 In addition, the staff of the SEC carefully reviewed the
Cook, “Introduction” in The SEC Speaks Again (New York: Practising Law
Institute, 1973), pp. 1-4.
9 See Cohen, “ ‘Truth in Securities’ Revisited,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 79, May
1966, pp. 1340-1408; Schneider, “Reform of the Federal Securities Laws,” University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 115, 1967, p. 1023. Mann, “Prospectuses: Un
readable or Just Unread?—A Proposal To Reexamine Policies Against Permitting
Projections,” George Washington Law Review, vol. 40, December 1971, pp. 222-243.
Kripke, “The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities,” New York
University Law Review, vol. 45, December 1970, pp. 1151-1205.
10 Richmond Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4584 (Feb. 27, 1963), CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. U 76,904 [1961-1964 Transfer Binder]. Recently the SEC has been
emphasizing the independent responsibilities of professionals such as lawyers and
accountants who participate in the preparation of prospectuses and other disclosure
documents.
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prospectus and suggested ways of correcting disclosure deficiencies. The
resulting document has won acclaim as a handy reference for reliable and
factual information about a company.
However, prospectus disclosure also has a number of weaknesses. Since
the prospectus is viewed, in part, as an antidote to enthusiastic selling efforts,
it tends to stress the risks and negative factors of the investment. For similar
reasons, it also tends to be limited to statements of apparently objective and
provable facts. As a consequence, it leaves out a good deal of information
which investors would want to know. For example, except for the use of the
proceeds section, the prospectus normally contains no direct information
about a company’s plans and expectations.11
Indeed, the prospectus began to be viewed not as a disclosure document
to be used by the investor, but as an insurance policy whose carefully drafted
language would protect participants in the distribution from liability for mak
ing false or incomplete disclosures. The result was often a document whose
readability was comparable to that of a liability insurance policy. This ten
dency was sharply criticized by Judge Weinstein in Feit v. Leasco Data Proc
essing Equipment Corp.:
In at least some instances, what has developed in lieu of the open
disclosure envisioned by the Congress is a literary art form calcu
lated to communicate as little of the essential information as possible
while exuding an air of total candor. Masters of this medium utilize
turgid prose to enshroud the occasional critical revelation in a morass
of dull, and—to all but the sophisticates—useless, financial, and
historical data. In the face of such obfuscations tactics the common
or even the moderately well-informed investor is almost as much at
the mercy of the issuer as was his pre SEC parent. He cannot by
reading the prospectus discern the merit of the offering.11
12

Even if the prospectus can be used by investors to assist them in the
evaluation of the securities being distributed, the prospectus was typically
delivered to the investor after he had become committed to the purchase.
The 1933 act only requires the prospectus to be delivered with confirmation
of the sale, at which point the sale is completed for all practical purposes.13
The statutory delivery requirement is now supplemented by an SEC expecta
tion that broker-dealers participating in an underwriting will distribute a pre

11 If the company’s plans or expectations create materially unfavorable implications
for the company, the plans probably would be disclosed.
12 Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F Supp 544, 565 (1971).
13 As a legal matter the buyer may be able to rescind the sale. State statutes of frauds
appear to give the buyer in a firm commitment underwriting ten days after receipt
of the confirmation to object to the transaction. If the buyer objects within that
period, the contract of sale would seem not to be enforceable. See, for example,
Pa. Stat. Ann. title 12A, § 8-319 (West 1970) and Uniform Commercial Code
§ 8-319(c).
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liminary prospectus to purchasers at least forty-eight hours prior to the time
that confirmations are to be mailed.14
The SEC’s concentration on prospectus disclosure may have been dis
proportionate in light of the limited number of all securities transactions to
which the prospectus requirements apply. The Wheat Report estimated that
in the period 1920-1967, new equity issues for cash accounted for only 3.15
percent of the aggregate exchange trading volume in equities.15 The ratio
today would be even more heavily weighted towards trading transactions in
the secondary markets.
The Wheat Report’s reappraisal of the SEC’s administrative policies
under the 1933 act and the 1934 act signaled a concerted effort to shift the
emphasis in disclosure to building a reservoir of continuous up-to-date in
formation about companies whose securities are the subject of a public
trading market. The legislative event which made this shift in emphasis
possible occurred in 1964 when Congress extended the provisions of sections
13, 14, and 16 of the 1934 act to unlisted companies which had one million
dollars in total assets and (ultimately) 500 or more record holders of a class
of equity securities. As a consequence, companies could not escape stiffened
SEC periodic disclosure requirements merely by leaving the exchanges.
The focus on 1934 act disclosure caused SEC reexamination of the
periodic reporting forms and a host of changes were made in the annual
report on Form 10-K and the current report on Form 8-K to elicit more
detailed information. In addition, a new quarterly report, the 10-Q, was
introduced. Equally important, the SEC began to take periodic reports
seriously. It undertook a campaign to insure that such reports were timely
filed. In an amendment to Rule 12b-25 it stressed that “[o]nly the most
compelling and unexpected circumstances justify a delay” in filings.16 The
staff indicated that it would refuse to process registration statements of com
panies which were delinquent in their exchange act filings.17 Moreover, the
use of S-7 and S-16 short-form registration statements were conditioned upon
the issuers having complied in all respects, including timeliness, with the
periodic reporting requirements for three years preceding the filing. Further,
the commission instituted a vigorous injunctive program to obtain timely
compliance with 1934 act reporting requirements.
The recent SEC emphasis on 1934 act reports coupled with legal de
velopments indicating that false or incomplete 1934 act filings could lead to
14 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4968 (April 24, 1969), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
U 77,685 [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]. See also Rule 15c-2(8) under the 1934 act.
15 Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of
Federal Administrative Policies Under the ’33 and ’34 Acts, pp. 58-59 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Wheat Report].
16 The amendment was adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9048
(Jan. 4, 1971).
17 Schneider, “Developments in 1934 Act Reporting,” in Third Annual Institute on
Securities Regulation, R. Gundheim and A. Fleischer, Jr., eds. (New York:
Practising Law Institute, 1972), HP. 89, 102-103.
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substantial civil liability forced issuers and their counsel to take these filings
more seriously.18 The attempt to upgrade the quality of 1934 act filings will
continue to constitute an important regulatory effort. A substantial portion of
the recent budgetary increase for SEC activities is earmarked for more staff
review of such filings. A satisfactory level of quality in 1934 act reports is
necessary before a concomitant de-emphasis of 1933 act disclosure can take
place. At present, the SEC has been willing to modulate the 1933 act pro
spectus requirements on cash offerings and rights offerings by certain estab
lished issuers.19 In addition, the SEC permits underwritten secondary offerings
of the securities of such issuers which are listed on a stock exchange or quoted
on NASDAQ on the filing of a brief statement containing information about
the distribution; the transactions in which the securities to be sold were
acquired, incorporating by reference certain of the issuer’s filed reports and
proxy statements; and describing any material adverse changes in the issuer’s
affairs occurring after the end of the fiscal year for which certified financial
statements are included in the documents incorporated by reference.20 The
SEC has also premised the availability of the Rule 144 exemption from
registration for the public sale of securities acquired in a private placement
or the sale of securities by a controlling person of the issuer on the existence of
adequate public information about the issuer of the securities sought to be
sold.21
One of the shortcomings of a system of continuous disclosure in which
information is placed in the public file on prescribed forms is that the informa
tion filed tends to be stale.22 Consequently, an additional focus of disclosure
regulation will be to force instant public dissemination of material develop
ments about a company. The major stock exchanges have traditionally ex
pected listed companies to “release quickly to the public any news or informa
tion which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for
18 Section 18(a) of the 1934 act expressly provides for civil liability with respect to
filed documents containing materially misleading statements. Since investors in the
trading markets can reasonably be expected to rely on the accuracy of information
in filings, the filing occurs in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and
Rule 10b-5 liability may be applicable.
19 Form S-7 under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 CFR § 239.26 (1973); 2 CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. U 7190 (cash offerings);
Form S-16 under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 CFR § 239.27 (1973); 2 CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 11 7291 (rights offerings).
20 Form S-16 under the Securities Act of 1933.
21 Rule 144(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 CFR § 230.144 (1973).
22 For example, the annual report on Form 10-K under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 17 CFR §249.110 (1973), 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1J 31,102, must be filed
within ninety days after the end of the fiscal year; the quarterly report on Form 10-Q
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 CFR § 249.308a (1973), 3 CCA
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ⁋ 31,031, must be filed within forty-five days after the end of each
of the first three quarters of each fiscal year and the report on Form 8-K under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 CFR § 249.308 (1973), 3 CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. U 31,001, must be filed within ten days after the close of each month during
which any of the specified reportable events occur.
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securities.23 However, in the absence of trading by the company, it has been
thought that Rule 10b-5 does not impose a duty on the company to come
forward with nonpublic material information. There are signs that it would
be unwise to continue to rely confidently on this interpretation of Rule 10b-5.
For example, in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5092 it was stated that
“[n]otwithstanding the fact that a company complies with such reporting
requirements, it still has an obligation to make full and prompt announcements
of material facts regarding the company’s financial condition.”24 Late last
year, the SEC reminded companies possibly affected by fuel shortages arising
from the energy crisis of the importance of public companies’ making prompt
and accurate disclosure of information, both favorable and unfavorable. It
cautioned management that, even though the issuer fully complied with the
registration and reporting requirements of the securities laws, it nevertheless
had an obligation to “make full and prompt announcements of material facts
concerning the issuer’s operations.”25 The effort to read Rule 10b-5 as re
quiring companies to come forward with material information unless they
have a business reason for not doing so finds implicit support in a Tenth
Circuit Court opinion and is reflected in recent nonpublished statements of
some key SEC staff members.26
The creation of a system of company disclosure reaches mature ex
pression in the American Law Institute’s Federal Securities Code. The re
porter for the code is Professor Louis Loss, the acknowledged dean of securi
ties law academicians. His consultants and advisors include three of the
present SEC commissioners, six past commissioners and a distinguished roster
of securities law practitioners and academics, and Judges Fairchild and
Friendly. Drafts of the code have also been reviewed by the American Bar
Association’s Committee on Federal Securities Regulation.
The key to the code’s scheme for integrating the present 1933 and 1934
acts is to register a company rather than a class of securities. Thus each
company with a million dollars in total assets and 300 record holders of its
securities (other than exempted securities) will be required to register.27 All
subsequent reports and filings of the registrant will go into a file established
for collecting material on the registrant. The reasonably current reservoir
of company information produced under the code permits substantial re
trenchment on the present emphasis on the registration statement. Thus, the
23 New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, § A2, p. A-18.
24 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5092 (Oct. 15, 1970), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
⁋ 77,915, p. 80,035 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]. For a discussion of the extent
to which this release suggests that Rule 10b-5 imposes a duty on a company to dis
close nonpublic material information, see Loss, “A Rationale of Rule 10b-5,” in
Second Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, R. Mundheim and A. Fleischer,
Jr., eds. (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1971), pp. 2, 17-21.
25 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5447 (Dec. 20, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
⁋⁋ 79,607, p. 83,629 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder].
26 Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (10th Cir. 1973), CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ⁋ 93,773 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder],
27 American Law Institute Federal Securities Code § 401 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1972).
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code contemplates nothing comparable to the 1933 act registration statement
for secondary offerings, including distributions by controlling persons. The
only disclosure required for a secondary distribution is a distribution state
ment which contains information with respect to the distribution and its
terms, identifies company information on file, and certifies that the person
making the distribution is not aware of any material undisclosed information
about the company whose securities are being distributed.28 An offering
statement (the code’s equivalent of the 1933 act registration statement) must
be filed when an issuer seeks to raise money (or otherwise increase its assets)
by selling securities. The inflow of new money (or assets) typically creates
a material change in the issuer, and thus a new disclosure document describ
ing the issuer seems appropriate.

Consequences of the Shift to Company Disclosure
The shift in emphasis from disclosure in connection with distributions
to disclosure for the trading market has important consequences for the kind
of information sought in all SEC-required disclosure documents. The trading
markets traditionally elicit substantial amounts of informal information to
supplement required information. The presence of such information will
tend to soften insistence on the disclosure of only apparently objective, prov
able facts. In addition, there will probably be some decrease in the need to
emphasize the negative aspects of an enterprise. In the trading market the
public to be protected includes sellers as well as buyers. Overly conservative
disclosure would be unfair to sellers. The prospectus of a company with a
public trading market in its shares will be seen as creating an impact not
only on the buyers in the distribution, but also on the sellers and buyers in
the trading market. In addition, transactions in the trading market normally
do not require protection against the selling pressure expectable in a distribu
tion context.
The most dramatic shift in SEC attitudes on disclosure content has
occurred with the inclusion of projections in SEC filings. The Wheat Report
reconsidered the SEC’s traditional policy not to permit projections in pro
spectuses or other reports filed with the commission and determined to
recommend no change in the commission’s policy.29 However, in a release
published in February 1973, the SEC indicated an inclination to experiment
on a voluntary basis in permitting inclusion of projections in SEC filings so
that this highly relevant item of investor information could be obtained in a
formal and regulated way.30 The SEC also indicated that companies that
28 American Law Institute Federal Securities Code § 509(e). The code provision is
similar to the Form S-16 requirements discussed in the text at note 13-3.
29 Wheat Report, supra note, pp. 95-96.
30 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
79,211 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder].
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released projections to any outsider should make public disclosure of such
projections and that it was “moving to require that these projections be filed
with the commission and planfned] to develop reporting procedures and
forms for that purpose.”31 Although the SEC has not yet taken the actions
outlined in its February 1973 release, the chairman of the SEC has recently
stated that he expected the commission to move forward sometime this fall
along the lines indicated in the release.32
Although it will probably not be unusual, in the future, to find companyissued projections in SEC documents, substantial problems remain in working
out details of such disclosure. The most difficult problem will probably relate
to setting forth the assumptions underlying the projections. This issue was
raised in Beecher v. Able decided by Judge Motley in the Southern District
of New York in the spring of 1975.33 The court analyzed language in the
Douglas Aircraft convertible debenture prospectus which stated that “it is
very likely that net income, if any, for fiscal 1966 will be nominal” as con
stituting a forecast that substantial losses in 1966 were not likely. In fact,
the company lost 52 million dollars for the full year. Although no objection
was raised to the inclusion of this forecast in the prospectus, the court stated
that “an earning’s forecast must be based on facts from which a reasonably
prudent investor would conclude that it was highly probable that the forecast
would be realized.”34 In addition to imposing this high standard of care upon
the preparation of an earnings forecast, the court stressed the need, in the
circumstances of the Douglas case, to accompany the forecast with a state
ment of the underlying assumptions:
Moreover, any assumptions underlying the projections must be dis
closed if their validity is sufficiently in doubt that a reasonably prudent
investor, if he knew of the underlying assumptions, might be de
terred from crediting the forecast. Disclosure of such underlying
assumptions is “. . . necessary to make . . . [the forecast] . . .
not misleading . . . .”35

The court did not explain which assumptions should have been set forth in
the Douglas Aircraft prospectus. It did indicate that a critical assumption
with respect to the performance of the aircraft division involved improvement
in assembly performance, and that this assumption, in turn, was based on
other assumptions—e.g., the existence of a stabilized labor force, meeting new

31 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
79,211, p. 82,666 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder].
32 Address by SEC Chairman Garrett, Financial Analysts Federation, April 29, 1974,
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 79,776, p. 84,110 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder].
33 Beecher v. Able (March 22, 1974), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. <194,450 [1973-1974
Transfer Binder].
34 Idem., p. 95,562.
35 Idem.
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engine schedules by a supplier, and the success of certain corrective actions to
improve the manufacturing system. In turn these assumptions are based on
other assumptions.36

Disclosure for the Sophisticated Investor

The shift in focus to company disclosure occurred at a time of great
growth in the professional body of securities analysts and the increasing im
portance in the equity markets of institutional investors. The Wheat Report
indicated that by the end of 1950 the Financial Analysts Federation had
2,422 members and that by the close of 1967 its membership had increased
to 11,752. These professional investors could absorb detailed, sophisticated
information. Moreover, their function was to make comparative analyses of
the financial information available about numerous investment opportunities.
They could not be satisfied with bare earnings-per-share figures, but had to
judge the quality of the earnings. They could not accept at face value the
balance sheet presentation, but had to judge the quality of the liquidity por
trayed. Further, they were sufficiently experienced to give appropriate weight
to the infirmities inherent in what one writer has defined as soft information37
—forward-looking statements with respect to future events; information based
on subjective evaluations such as the competence or integrity of management;
statements of motive, purpose, or intent; and qualifying words such as “ex
cellent” or “efficient” for which no generally accepted objective standards of
measurement normally exist. Their demands on the disclosure system were,
therefore, different from those of the public investor.
One of the most significant changes in the SEC’s disclosure philosophy
is its recent explicit recognition that certain required information is
primarily designed to assist professional analysts who have the re
sponsibility of developing an understanding in depth of corporate
activity. [It is] not primarily intended to serve the direct needs of the
“average investor.” Such an investor does not usually have the time
to study or the training necessary to fully understand the data which
are called for . . . .38

36 Beecher v. Able (March 22, 1974), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1194,450, p. 95,565
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder]. For a discussion of the difficulties in drafting an ap
propriate statement of assumptions, see Schneider, “Financial Projections—Practical
Problems of Disclosure,” in Fifth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, R.
Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., and J. Schupper, eds. (New York: Practising Law
Institute, 1974), pp. 47, 59-63.
37 Schneider, “Nits, Grits and Soft Information in SEC Filings,” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 121, December 1972, p. 254.
38 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5427 (Oct. 4, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
H 79,519, p. 83,425 [1973 Transfer Binder].
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Disclosures designed primarily for the professional investor audience include
a requirement for corporations to explain in detail why their effective tax
rate differs from the statutory federal income tax rate,39 a requirement for
setting out short-term financial costs and policies, including information about
compensating balances to support short-term financing arrangements,40 and
a proposal for requiring improved disclosure of the effects of accounting
alternatives on reported results.41
SEC willingness to compel disclosure of information specifically de
signed to aid professional investors probably furthers the statutory goal of
protecting all investors. By fully informing the professional investment com
munity, company information will probably be speedily disseminated with
the result that securities prices will rapidly adjust, thus limiting the oppor
tunities of any investor to find overvalued or undervalued securities. More
over, the shift in emphasis to company information on file with the SEC
necessarily signals an increasing reliance on the responsibilities of securities
professionals as the bridge for making the benefit of disclosure available. The
nonprofessional investor will not take the initiative to acquire filed informa
tion. Companies that offered their shareholders the 10-K report in 1974
found that less than 1 percent of them requested it.42 Thus, regulatory policy
can be expected to require brokers and investment advisers to be familiar
at least with filed information and to take it into account in making recom
mendations.43

Making Disclosure More Useful for the Public Investor
The SEC effort to make required disclosures more useful to profes
sional investors has not been at the expense of a continuing effort to design
disclosures which will directly serve the public investor. Indeed, the com
mission has been very sensitive to any hint that it is fostering “undue
advantage to the professionally advised institutional investor over the ordinary
little fellow.44 It does not want to add to the forces that discourage direct
public investment in equity securities.

39 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5441 (Nov. 28, 1973), 5 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 72,171.
40 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5436 (Nov. 13, 1973), 5 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 72,170.
41 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5427 (Oct. 4, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 79,519 [1973 Transfer Binder].
42 The Wall Street Journal, 11 July 1974, p. 1, col. 5.
43 Brudney, “Origins and Limited Applicability of the ‘Reasonable Basis’ or ‘Know
Your Merchandise’ Doctrine,” in Fourth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation,
R. Mundheim and A. Fleischer, Jr., eds., (New York: Practising Law Institute,
1973), pp. 239, 258-262.
44 Address by SEC Chairman Garrett, Financial Analysts Federation, April 29, 1974,
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 79,776, p. 84,109 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder].
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SEC concern about the disparities in the availability of information to
professional and public investors is highlighted by a story in a recent issue
of Forbes magazine on the collapse of the stock of Franklin National Bank.45
Forbes described the 1973 Franklin Annual Report as showing the “sun in
all its glory against a sky of vivid red, orange and yellow. If ever there was
a report bright with hope and promise, it was Franklin’s Annual Report.”46
The letter to stockholders also reflected hope and promise. Forbes reported
the letter as stating:
Franklin is ideally suited by corporate temperament and tradition to
adapt quickly to the vast revolutionary changes anticipated in the
new local, national and world order.47

On the other hand, Forbes reported that Franklin’s Form 10-K, which
was not sent to shareholders, contained some important and disturbing finan
cial information. The 10-K showed a narrowing in the overall spread between
the cost of money borrowed by Franklin and the average return on money
it was lending. It also stated that at times during 1973 Franklin was paying
more for money than the yield earned on loans. The 10-K also flagged
Franklin’s increased purchases of highly volatile short-term money at average
interest rates of 8.8 percent and the reasons for the decline of its valuation
reserve. Forbes quoted one source as saying that with all the information
available in the 10-K, there were no sophisticated investors in Franklin
when it announced omission of dividends on its common and preferred
stock.48 The Forbes story concluded, “Any wonder the public has deserted
the stock market?”49
The annual report is the central document by which public corporations
communicate directly with their shareholders. In addition, it may also be the
document which many brokers use as the basis for making at least casual
judgments about investment situations. Thus, improvement in the content of
the annual report has been and continues to be a major concern of the SEC
and the New York Stock Exchange.50
At the present time, SEC requirements concerning the contents of the

45
46
47
48
49
50

Forbes, vol. 114, July 1, 1974, p. 74.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 77.
Ibid.
The SEC is also anxious to insure that shareholders receive the annual report. Thus,
it has proposed amendments to Rules 14a-3 and 14c-3 which require the issuer
to make efforts to find out from brokers and banks how many copies of annual
reports are needed so that distribution can be made to all beneficial owners. In
addition, the proposed rules require the issuer to pay the reasonable expenses of
sending copies of the annual report to the beneficial owners. SEC Securities Ex
change Act Release No. 10591 (Jan. 10, 1974), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 79,619,
pp. 83,659-660 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder].
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annual report are meager. The major requirement is that the annual report
contain in comparative columnar form, a balance sheet and income state
ment reflecting the company’s financial position and operating results for
each of the last two fiscal years. The statements for the most recent fiscal
years ordinarily must be certified.51 These financial statements must be
prepared on the same basis as those in the company’s Form 10-K unless
divergencies are pointed out and explained.52 In addition, the company must
briefly describe its business in the first annual report issued after the company
becomes a reporting company.53
In January 1974, the SEC proposed amendments to the proxy rules
which would expand the information required to be disclosed in annual
reports.54 Under these proposals, an annual report would have to contain
information describing the general nature and scope of the issuer’s business;
disclosing the contribution of a company’s lines of business to the company’s
sales and earnings; provide textual material indicating the nature and scope
of the liquidity and working capital requirements of the issuer; give the
name and principal occupation or employment of each director and execu
tive officer; identify the principal market in which the company’s securities
have traded and the high and low prices for each quarter over the most
recent two years, along with information about dividends paid and a state
ment of the company’s dividend policy. In addition, the annual report must
state that the company will send a copy of the Form 10-K to any security
holder who requests it. Further, the proposals remind issuers that no chart,
graph, or similar presentation of a financial nature may present information
in a light more or less favorable than the financial statements.
Although it is likely that experience will prompt the commission to
impose additional disclosure requirements in the annual report, there remains
a strong reluctance to intervene too much in this channel of direct commu
nication between management and shareholders. The tentative draft of the
Federal Securities Code adopts the device of explicitly giving the SEC power
to prescribe information which the annual report must contain but also makes
it clear that annual reports can contain material not required by the SEC.55
The code contemplates possible prefiling for the required part of the annual
report but not for the optional part. The two-part annual report permitted
by the code may reflect the direction in which that disclosure document is
developing.
In addition to formal SEC requirements, other pressures will operate to
upgrade the quality of the information in the annual report. False or mis
leading statements in an annual report may violate the antifraud provisions
17CFR § 240.14a-3(b)(3) (1973).
Idem. § 240.14a-3 (b)(2).
Idem. § 240.14a-3(b)(5).
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10591 (Jan. 10, 1974), CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ¶ 79,619 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder].
55 American Law Institute Federal Securities Code § 601 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1972).
51
52
53
54
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of Rule 10b-556 and give rise to substantial civil liabilities, even though the
annual report is not a filed document.57 Moreover, the financial community
seems to be growing less tolerant of managements that put out annual reports
sparse in detail or financial information.
The commission is also continuing its struggle to make the prospectus
a readable document. The new Guides for Preparation and Filing of Regis
tration Statements attempt to limit the information on the cover page of the
prospectus.58 In addition, new Guide 59 requires, immediately following the
cover page, a short summary of the contents of the prospectus highlighting
salient features of the offering and cross-referencing to more detailed de
scriptions elsewhere in the prospectus. The new guides also require graphic
illustration of certain information in the prospectus.59 A recent proposal for
the amendment of Guide 22 stresses the responsibility of the corporation to
present meaningful and analytical summaries of financial information in
terms that the average investor can understand.60

Restraints on Securing Nonpublished Information
From Companies

The equity considerations underlying the SEC’s continued emphasis on
getting understandable information to the public investor should not interfere
with the needs of the professional investor to get information which meets
his specialized needs from public sources. The SEC takes the position that
since every investor is entitled to receive any information available to pro
fessional investors, all investors have equal access to information. Emphasis
on the theme of equal access to information may, however, have an adverse
impact on the ability of financial analysts to dig out information from com
56 See, for example, Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 US 903 (1969); cf. Butler Aviation International Inc. v. Comprehensive De
signers, Inc., 425 F2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970) (Section 14(e)).
57 The objection to filing the annual report relates primarily to potential SEC staff
scrutiny of the contents and its “suggestions” for improvements. It is feared that
this SEC staff review will destroy the annual report’s spontaneity and turn it into a
rigid, highly stylized reporting form. Commissioner Sommer echoed this fear in a
recent speech:
I must candidly confess the commission’s staff has not historically appeared
to have much tolerance of the P.R. arts and I would fear for the annual
report’s vitality if it came under our scalpel.
Speech by SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr., American Law Institute-American
Bar Association Post-Graduate Course on Federal Securities Law, BNA Sec. Reg. L.
Rep. No. 261, July 17, 1974, pp. F-l, F-5.
58 SEC Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements No. 5, 1 CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶¶ 3765.
59 SEC Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements No. 6, 1 CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 3766.
60 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5443 (Dec. 12, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 79,615 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] and SEC Securities Act Release No. 5342
(Dec. 18, 1972), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,144 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder].
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pany management and other nonpublic sources. Although the SEC has
recognized the legitimacy of private analyst contact with corporate manage
ment, developments in the law surrounding insider trading imbue such
contacts with increasing risk.
Restrictions on insider trading developed to prevent corporate officials
from using their position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed share
holder.61 The restrictions also serve disclosure policy. If corporate manage
ment cannot take personal advantage of delays in disclosure of important
corporate news, such news will likely be made public as soon as the news
becomes ripe for publication, unless there is a good corporate business reason
for delaying publication. In addition, insiders (or their tipsters) who possess
material, nonpublic information about the company will press for disclosure
so that their trading activities do not continue to be frozen.
Although insider trading restrictions were first applied to corporate
officials, they were extended to prohibit trading whenever any person with a
special relationship to a corporation received access to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose. Thus, lawyers, accountants,
and underwriters of an issue of securities could come within the restrictions.
Moreover, the restrictions also applied to tipsters of insiders, if the tipsters
“knew or had reason to know that the information was nonpublic and had
been obtained improperly by selective revelation or otherwise.”62 Analysts
and their clients have been held to violate the insider trading prohibitions of
Rule 10b-5 under this standard.63
Financial analyst contacts with corporate managements contribute to
the information available in the market. Analysts supplement published
data by probing for greater detail. They dig out information which is not
susceptible to written disclosure. Moreover, analysts can make available
material which companies are not allowed to publish in documents filed with
the SEC and which they may be reluctant to make generally available in a
press release.
Analysts are motivated to secure these supplements to published infor
mation by their ability to capitalize on it in their trading activities or rec
ommendations. However, expansive interpretations of the insider trading
restrictions may inhibit analysts’ willingness to go beyond evaluation of
published data and managements’ willingness to meet for discussions with
individual analysts or groups of analysts.64
61 See Strong v. Repide, 213US419 (1909).
62 Investors Management Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267
(July 29, 1971), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,163, p. 80,520 [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder].
63 See, for example, Investors Management Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,163 p. 80,520 [19701971 Transfer Binder].
64 Philip Morris reportedly decided not to talk to financial analyst John Maxwell in
the period shortly before quarterly results were publicized because “[w]e find the
guy is so sharp that he’d wind up with inside information.” Dorfman, “The Rise
of the Entrepreneurial Analyst,” Institutional Investor, vol. 8, July 1974, p. 106.
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The penalties for violating the prohibition on insider trading can be
severe. For example, a violation can result in SEC suspension or revocation
of the registration of a broker or dealer who violates Rule 10b-5. In addi
tion, civil liability will, at a minimum, squeeze out any profits made by the
violator and may require him to compensate any investor who purchased at
too high a price (or sold at too low a price) during the period that the
material nonpublic information was not reflected in the market price.65
Perhaps the most difficult problem for the analyst is determining
whether or not his attempts at digging out information from management
have resulted in his receiving material information. Definitions of materiality
abound. Information has been defined as material if its dissemination “is
likely to affect the market price of any of the company’s securities or is
likely to be considered important by reasonable investors, including reason
able speculative investors in determining whether to trade in such securi
ties.”66 The Second Circuit, in the famous Texas Gulf Sulphur case, defined
as material facts which “may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or
hold.”67 In addition to these broad formulations of materiality, courts have
viewed the fact that the insider or his tipster bought or sold stock shortly
after acquiring the information as evidence of its materiality. The analyst’s
quest for information is designed to find facts which will aid in decisions to
buy or sell stock.
The broad reach of materiality can best be understood by examining a
factual situation. SEC v. Shapiro68 involved the attempted promotion of a
merger between Harvey Stores and Ridge Manor Development Corporation.
One month after a merger proposal made by the finder-defendants had been
turned down by Harvey’s board of directors, the finders arranged a luncheon
meeting with the same director of Harvey who had carried their prior pro
posal to the Harvey board. At this meeting, the finders gave the Harvey
director a pro forma consolidated financial statement projecting the expected
earnings of Harvey and Ridge Manor as a merged unit. The Harvey
director reacted favorably and agreed to discuss the proposal with the other
members of the Harvey board. After this luncheon meeting, the finders
purchased 600 shares of Harvey stock at prices between $7.00 and $7.25.
The court held that these purchases violated Rule 10b-5 because knowledge

65 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 495 F2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974);
Fridrich v. Bradford, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,723 (M.D. Tennessee June 17,
1974).
66 This definition appears in Investors Diversified Services’ Statement of Policy With
Respect to Receipt and Use of Material Inside (nonpublic) Information. That
statement was worked out in connection with the SEC’s litigation against Lum’s,
Incorporated for improperly revealing earnings projections. SEC v. Lum’s, Incorpo
rated (Nov. 9, 1972), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 93,659, p. 92,947 [1972-1973
Transfer Binder].
67 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 US 976 (1969).
68 SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
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of the Harvey director’s favorable reaction under these circumstances was
nonpublic material information.69
It is not clear that an analyst who learned these facts in an interview
with the Harvey director and subsequently recommended the purchase of
Harvey stock, would also have been held to violate Rule 10b-5. Since
analysts are motivated to fulfill the socially desirable function of digging out
information by the possibility of capitalizing on what they learn, a public
policy basis for giving materiality a narrow construction could be erected.
On the other hand, finders would expect to be compensated for their work
by the fee paid upon consummation of the merger. However, the suggestion
that the definition of materiality should vary with the type of person who
receives the information has not as yet found explicit support in any of the
cases or administrative pronouncements.
Although the SEC has promised to explore the possibility of drafting
guidelines on insider trading restrictions, it is not foreseen that there will
emerge any bright line tests which will enable an analyst to know with
reasonable certainty when he is in possession of material, nonpublic informa
tion.70 If the SEC makes good its threat to impose severe sanctions for
violations of insider trading prohibitions,71 and the materiality concept is
given a broad reading in the analyst context, lawyers will become more
insistent in urging their company clients and their analyst clients not to take
the risk of attending private meetings designed to ferret out information
which has not yet been made public.

Disclosure as a Tool for Regulating Corporate Conduct

The discussion thus far has focused exclusively on SEC disclosure
regulations which are designed to facilitate investment decision-making and
investor confidence. Disclosure regulation can also be used to influence
conduct. For example, requirements in the prospectus and proxy statements
relating to management compensation and transactions between manage
ment and the company may be of marginal value to making an investment
decision. Interestingly, investment manuals prepared by commercial services
rarely include such information. Nevertheless, compelling such disclosure
may be justified as imposing a moderating influence on corporate compen
sation and in encouraging the elimination of as many conflict of interest
69 Another recent case containing an expansive definition of materiality is Rochez
Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973), rehearing denied (Jan. 29,
1974), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 94,386 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder].
70 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10316 (Aug. 1, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ¶ 79,446 [1973 Transfer Binder].
71 See Faberge, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973),
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,378 [1973 Transfer Binder] and Reynolds & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10835 (May 31, 1974), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 79,811 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder].
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opportunities as possible. Similarly, the view recently expressed by the SEC
Division of Corporation Finance that the indictment or conviction of a
corporation or its officers for having made illegal campaign contributions
must be disclosed in the company’s proxy statement and in the Form 10-K
and 8-K reports, may be interpreted as primarily providing supplementary
policing of conduct which has received sharp public disapproval.72
The last few years have seen an intensified public interest in the social
responsibility of corporations. Disclosure has been an important tool in the
attempt to define corporate responsibility goals, in monitoring the extent to
which corporate managements meet such goals and in pressuring manage
ment to enlarge its view of appropriate corporate action to achieve such
goals. The following is an examination of certain aspects of the effort to
eliminate corporate discrimination in employment practices as a vehicle to
describe the role which disclosure plays in stimulating corporate action.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 directly prohibits employment dis
crimination.73 Disclosure of information about certain corporate employment
practices is mandated by federal regulations. For example, the Equal Em
ployment Opportunity Commission requires every corporation of 100 or
more employees to file an EEO-1 form for the corporation,74 and a separate
form for each physical location having 25 or more employees.75 The EEO-1
form is roughly a one-page document calling for a body count of employees
divided according to sex, race, and Spanish surname for nine standard job
categories. This form must be filed annually. In addition, the Labor De
partment, through its Office of Federal Compliance, requires every non
construction company which has a contract or subcontract for $50,000 or
more with the federal government and which employs 50 or more persons
to submit to an appropriate federal compliance agency for approval an
“affirmative action plan” for eliminating discrimination in its operations.76
This plan must provide a detailed analysis of the job structure of the com
pany and point out deficiencies in the utilization of women and minority
employees and propose specific solutions to remedy those deficiencies.
The information required in the EEO-1 form and the Affirmative Action
Plan is used by the EEOC to eliminate prohibited employment discrimina
tion. In addition to seeking voluntary compliance, the EEOC has estab
lished a National Programs Division which uses court action as a major
weapon.
However, some persons believe that progress on equal employment

72 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5466 (March 8, 1974), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
U 79,699 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder].
73 42 USC § 2000e (1970).
74 29 CFR § 1602.7 (1973).
75 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Employer Information Report EEO-1,
Sec. A., Item 1(4).
76 41 CFR § 60-2.1 (1973); also § 60-1.40.
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opportunity programs should not be left solely to governmental action. They
think that shareholders have an interest and responsibility to monitor cor
porate progress in this area. Since the EEOC- and Labor Department
generated information will at best only be made available to individuals
requesting it,77 some interested shareholders have sought to compel or en
courage corporations to make such information, or summaries of it, directly
available to all shareholders. In 1974 seventeen equal employment oppor
tunity information disclosure resolutions were filed by shareholders for inclu
sion in the proxy statements of sixteen corporations. Generally, these
resolutions asked that detailed information about the company’s equal
employment opportunities be included in the corporation’s annual report or
in some other document sent to all shareholders.
Rule 14a-8 of the proxy rules entitles a shareholder to submit for
inclusion in the company’s proxy statement a proposal which he intends to
present for action at the meeting. This proposal may be accompanied by a
supporting statement of not more than 200 words if management plans to
oppose the proposal. Rule 14a-8(c) gives management a number of grounds
on which to oppose inclusion of a specific shareholder proposal. A proposal
may not consist of a recommendation or request that management take
action on a matter related to the ordinary business operations of the issuer.
Although recommendations with respect to employee practices would seem
to fall within this prohibition, the SEC presently takes the position that
requests for information concerning ordinary business operations are not
within the exclusion. Since shareholders must judge the management’s
stewardship of the corporation, the SEC accepts the proposition that they
should have broad power to advise management about the kinds of infor
mation they would like available. Management can also omit a proposal
with respect to any matter not significantly related to the business of the
issuer or within its control. Since the SEC reads “significantly related” as
referring not to the subject’s financial significance, but only to its relationship
to the corporation’s business,78 a resolution seeking disclosure of equal
employment opportunity information would not be excludable on that
ground. A third ground for exclusion is that the proposal is not a proper
subject for shareholder action under applicable state law. Even if it were
determined that appropriate corporate disclosure is solely a question for
management under state law, the proposal can always be worded to request
management to consider making information available. A precatory resolu
77 Although the EEOC is specifically barred from making public the information con
tained in the EEO-1 form, 42 USC § 2000e-(8)(e) (1970), present federal regula
tions, adopted in January 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 3192 (1973), permit any other federal
agencies to make available under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC § 552
(1970), all EEO-1 forms or Affirmative Action Plans filed with them. There are a
number of suits presently pending challenging the right of the government to make
this information available to members of the public.
78 Newmount Mining Corp., letter (available March 20, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
H 79,325 [1973 Transfer Binder].
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tion would not normally be excludable as an improper subject for shareholder
action and, as indicated above, would also not be excludable if it relates to
a matter of ordinary business operations.
Proponents of shareholder resolutions tend to be satisfied with the
precatory formulation because they do not seriously expect to carry their
resolution against management opposition. Indeed, I do not know of any
shareholder resolution that has done so. The primary purpose of introduc
ing the resolution is to focus public attention on an issue. Moreover, since
the board of directors is personally responsible for the company’s proxy
statement, issues raised in it are likely to receive detailed consideration by
both the board and top management. Nine of the seventeen equal employ
ment information disclosure resolutions proposed in 1974 were withdrawn
because the corporations involved agreed to disclose information that the
sponsors considered adequate. In addition, some of the remaining companies
agreed to make information available to any shareholders specifically
requesting it.79
Since shareholder disclosure resolutions are an inexpensive and rea
sonably effective way to publicize issues of corporate responsibility, it is
likely that their use will continue. In addition, corporations seem to be
increasingly willing to make information on many issues available if they
are given some flexibility in the format and content of their disclosures.
Corporations have learned that rigid opposition to disclosure requests leads
to the unwelcome charge that the corporation is “covering up.”
There have also been attempts, albeit not in the equal employment
opportunity field, to persuade the SEC that it should require disclosure of
information that, though admittedly not material financially, may be im
portant to an investor who does not think profit maximization is the only
relevant concern in making investment decisions. For example, the SEC
adopted rules in April 1973 on disclosures concerning compliance with
environmental requirements.80 These rules were adopted against the back
ground of a provision in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
which provided that “. . . to the fullest extent possible: (1) the . . . public
laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance
with the policies set forth in this Act. . . .”81 The rules limited the disclosure
requirement to those “material effects which compliance with environmental
laws and regulations may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and
competitive position of the issuer and its subsidiaries.”82 In one respect,
however, the rule calls for disclosure of information that would not nec
essarily be material in a financial sense. The rule requires disclosure of any
79 Those companies thought it unnecessary automatically to send the information to all
shareholders.
80 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5386 (April 20, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
U 79,342 [1973 Transfer Binder].
81 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(1), 42 USC § 4332(1) (1970).
82 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5386 (April 20, 1973), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
U 79,342, p. 83,029 [1973 Transfer Binder].
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governmentally instituted administrative or judicial proceeding arising out
of violations of environmental laws whether or not the amount of any claim
for damages is material and whether or not such proceedings would normally
be considered ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business.
The SEC will probably continue to limit its disclosure requirements to
matters which have some connection with investor or shareholder decision
making or with retaining investor confidence. However, there is ample room
within those limits to call for disclosure of information that may not be
material financially. Some non-financial information may be important in
judging whether management is sufficiently in tune with changing societal
demands and can be expected to keep the corporation profitable in the long
run. Moreover, if a substantial number of shareholders evidence an interest
in judging management’s stewardship of the corporation on bases other than
the company’s financial results, the SEC can be expected to require disclosure
of information which will permit shareholders to make an informed judgment
on such issues. In addition, if social responsibility factors are given signifi
cant weight in investment decision-making, information relating to such
factors becomes material in the traditional SEC sense.83 However, the
failure of the “social responsibility” mutual funds to awaken investor enthu
siasm suggests that the problems of implementing such disclosure require
ments lies in the distant future.

83 Rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933 states:
The term “material” when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing
of information to any subject, limits the information required to those
matters as to which an investor ought reasonably to be informed before
purchasing the security registered.
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Discussion
Of the Mundheim Paper
Robert Mundheim, Discussion Chairman

Achieving Equal Access to Disclosure—
Restrictions on Insider Trading

Analyst: I wonder if you would expand upon your conclusion that
the SEC is now considering corporate approval, or checking, of analysts’
reports as inside information.
Chairman Mundheim: Let’s take a number of hypotheticals.
I suppose the clearest is one in which the market has $2.00 as a projec
tion of earnings, and the analyst learns from management that they think
$1.50 is the right figure. If everybody knew that there was a revision from
$2.00 to $1.50, that would be material. But, it’s not known to anybody but
that analyst; that’s not public; and, therefore, that’s a use of material non
public information acquired through an inside source.
Now, instead of going to management and saying, “What are your
estimates?” you could go and say, “I estimate that your earnings are going
to be $2.00. Is that right?” And he says: “No, that’s not right. You’re
high—way high.”
It’s not hard to see, analytically, that that’s not much different—
certainly not in the ultimate result—than the analyst who got the same
information from the management if he asked, “What are your earnings?
What do you project earnings to be?”
The next situation is this one: The analyst comes in with a fairly
carefully done report, in which he says various things about the company
and also projects earnings of $2.00. And on that basis management says,
“I don’t think that’s right. I think you are off.”
Now, management could say the same thing, I suppose, in a number of
ways. Management could say, “You’re high,” directly or indirectly, or it
could say, “I think you’d better go back and do some more homework.”
Then you’ve got to imagine the next scenario, when the analyst says: “What
do you mean, do more homework? In what regard? What problems do you
see?” And at that point you can begin to see that that analyst, again, is
getting information that other people don’t have, that may be considered
material in the sense that it will affect their investment decision-making.
Now, from the analytical way I put those hypotheticals, it’s not hard
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to say the same result ought to apply for all three cases. But it does seem to
me there is a difference in the case where an analyst has done his homework,
and is checking that homework, fairly carefully done, and the one where the
analyst just goes to management without having done much homework, and
searches for an answer.
Now let me give you the next hypothetical. Assume that the market
generally projects a range of $1.75 to $2.25. Now, the analyst goes to manage
ment and says, “Is that range right?” And management says, “Yes, that’s
the range we’re still predicting.” Has he received material information?
That’s a tough question. And the reason it’s tough is because he has
clearly gotten a new piece of very significant, or thought-to-be very significant
information; namely, that management agrees with the estimate that is around
in the market. And that may confirm a decision to buy or sell. I think
it’s this last case that is the hardest type of case.
Now, we’ve got representatives of the SEC here. They may have a
different view.
Regulator: I think you have explained the problem well, and, frankly,
we don’t have the answer to all the hypothetical that you posed.
At the present time the SEC staff is intending to publish some sort of a
release that would incorporate a number of hypothetical along the lines
suggested, as well as others, in an effort to provide some guidance. But it’s
going to be a very difficult process because the outlines of the law are not
completely clear. You have a very difficult problem deciding what the law is,
and what good practice is, and what the difference is.
We could put out a release very easily that would be predicated on
recommended conservative practice, but I would be hesitant to describe that
as the requirements of the law. But on the other hand, if we put out some
thing like that, it would be immediately interpreted as law. So the problem of
providing this kind of guideline, and the kind of guidance to analysts in their
relations with issuers, is a terribly complicated and thorn-studded problem.
Chairman Mundheim: I have never been terribly clear about what the
practical impact on analysts’ activities is of what I see to be the restrictions on
analysts’ behavior that the law seems to impose, and I would put that in terms
of both how the definition of materiality is developing and to what extent you
have your report checked by management. Is that useful? Desirable? Not
desirable?
Does it create some undesirable inhibitions on analysts’ conduct?
Financial Executive: I was hoping there would be one more hypo
thetical in your list, which would be that the analyst was perceptive enough to
have decided that there were factors suggesting a lower earnings estimate, and
he had worked out $1.50. At that point he has a choice of being convinced
of his rightness, acting on it, or going to management and saying, “This is
where I come out. Can you confirm it one way or another?”
Certainly if it was confirmed, and that was new information, he would
have insider information, and now he couldn’t act on it, whereas he could
have the day before.
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Chairman Mundheim: Precisely. When the analyst works it out, and
the answer is different from what the market estimates were, he goes to man
agement and he says, “Here’s my report; do you have anything to say about
it?” and the management says, “You’re right on the button,” the result is the
analyst’s stuck. He can’t use it until management makes that projection
public.
Your hypothesis nicely illustrates what I think it is that troubles me;
that is, you are saying to the analyst: Don’t go to management. Publish that
information, even though it may be way off base.
Financial Executive: The other thing that troubles me about the
point of view that if action is taken, then it follows something material must
have been developed, is the hypothetical situation that you have made up
your mind one way or another. You own it, and now you are going to sell it;
you don’t have it, and you’re about to buy it, but if you then contact manage
ment at all, not you, but the court you were quoting seems to say, “Now you
can’t take an action even if you learn absolutely nothing to change what you
had concluded before, and there was no new information. All you did was
confirm where you were, but now you can’t act on it.”
Chairman Mundheim: Well, just to try to spell out the rationale,
when you asked for that additional bit of information, you obviously felt you
needed something to strengthen your result, and you got it. And that’s why
you’re stuck.
Analyst: We have a theory among financial analysts called the mosaic
theory, which says that this perceptive analyst who finally picked out that
last series of bits of information, none of which was material, and came up
with $1.50, has the right to use it. That’s our theory, and it’s still arguable.
I’d like to switch ground and ask the financial executives if they feel
they have a responsibility, if the market’s estimates are generally $2.00, and
they know they are going to come up with $1.50, do they feel they have a
responsibility to disclose that?

The Extent of Continuous Disclosure Responsibility

Chairman Mundheim: Do the financial executives feel that if the
street is making projections about your company, that you have an obliga
tion every time there is a change in a previous projection that you have made,
or a deviation of the analysts’ judgments from the judgments that are held
internally, to come forward?
Analyst: Now, let us suppose that it is widely believed that the earn
ings will be $2.00 a share, and let us suppose that nothing at all happens,
and you come right down to the wire, and everybody in the world thinks that
they will be $2.00 a share except, perhaps, the company. And then suddenly
the $1.50 bursts on the scene, and then there’s a certain market effect, and a
great deal of unhappiness.
Financial Executive : A company that makes no projections obviously
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has some reservations about participating in an estimate anyway, and in
dicating that a projection is right or wrong gives them cold feet.
However, I think that in our own case if there was a generally accepted
estimate significantly higher than should be expected, that the company would
do something. It may not make a forecast, but I think it would disclose some
information that would indicate some economic or other problem on the
horizon that should result in some lowering of earnings from those apparently
expected.
Chairman Mundheim: Did you consciously say,
. . only if they are
higher”? For example, suppose the earnings estimates were consistently lower
than what you projected. Why do you shrink from doing the same thing under
those circumstances?
Financial Executive: Well, maybe it’s because of some bad ex
perience on our own part in making forecasts, or the fact that we aren’t,
maybe, as concerned about someone getting hurt if the results are better.
Financial Executive: I support that! In our own case, we feel that
we’re really obligated to our investors to provide this kind of leadership. It
worries us greatly, because we recognize the situation that it puts us in, and
that’s why we have gone on record that forecasting is necessary and desirable
from the standpoints of the company, management, and our investors.
I can give you an exact illustration of what we have just gone through.
As you are probably aware, the retail industry is suffering, like a number of
industries these days, and it became very apparent to us some weeks back
that the third quarter earnings that we released on Tuesday of this week
were going to be substantially below what the street was expecting.
It also happened to be that this announcement was going to be made in
an appearance before the New York Society of Security Analysts, and we
were very concerned about an unfortunate reaction to this news.
We went to work with our analysts—all of them that called—to try
to get them to understand the trends occurring in our industry that were going
to make our third quarter earnings quite different from all the projections.
We were able to get the expectations revised downward partially, about half
way to where we felt they should go, and really went into the meeting with
considerable apprehension.
We were quite pleasantly surprised to find that in the few days preceding
our appearance the key opinion makers among the retail analysts had lowered
their figures even further.
Now, to be precise about this, a year ago we made $.84. The projections
on the street six weeks ago were from flat to up, $.84 to $.89. Just before we
went into the meeting, most were talking $.75 to $.78. When we got to the
meeting they were talking $.72 to $.75. We announced $.71. And I can
report to you that on Tuesday nothing happened to the price of our stock.
It was absolutely flat. Yesterday it was off only fractionally in a down
market, and I’m completely convinced that if we hadn’t taken this responsi
bility to work those estimates down, we would have had a very serious
reaction in the market, not only to our stock, but to all other retail stocks;
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because of the importance of the retail industry generally in our economy, I
think it might have reverberated beyond that.
So for these reasons we do take that obligation in hand. We try to work
it down. It bothers us that we can’t do it within the framework of formal
revisions of projections, yet; at least, we feel we can’t because of the liability
questions involved. But in the process of doing it the way we do, we know
we’re also running serious risks.
Chairman Mundheim: May I ask whether or not, when you worked to
revise—to get people psychologically, at least, prepared for a revision in
earnings—whether you work with analysts on that, or do you work through
public statements?
Financial Executive: Well, in this case we did both. Really, our
first effort at this was in the first part of October, in an appearance before
the Chicago Society of Security Analysts. At that time we tried to set out
very clearly the factors that would adversely affect the performance. What
bothered us was that people were not reacting the way we felt they should
have to things that we thought were very, very clearly expressed. So we had to
go substantially beyond that in working with individual analysts.
Analyst: Don’t the first few analysts in the door then have an im
possible legal problem?
And, if an influential analyst changes his mind, isn’t that in itself a
problem with the SEC?
Chairman Mundheim: Well, I would have thought that—the firstfew-analysts-in-the-door kind of problem, where you work with them and
indicate to them that there is going to be a revision downward from present
estimates—they do have a problem.
Now, I’m not so sure I understand how a leading analyst’s changing his
mind creates a problem. It seems to me that it depends on why he changed
his mind, what’s the basis of the information that made that leading analyst
change his mind. That’s one aspect of it.

The Disclosure Responsibility of Investment Advisors
Regulator: There have been some questions raised about whether an
investment banker has some obligation to use information which, at least
under some of the interpretations given here today, he can’t use. I wondered
if you would give some indication of where we might be going in these
directions, since the cases seem to represent a change in what people have
perceived as being their obligation.
Chairman Mundheim: I will try to tell you what the cases are about,
and then give you the various kinds of resolutions that I see. Let me give you
the facts of the case as I understand them.
An investment banker is the underwriter for a company which, for the
purposes of this hypothesis, we will call XYZ Co. At the same time, in its
retail department the stock of XYZ Co. is being recommended by retail sales
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men. The investment banker side of the operation gets some adverse, non
public material information.
That firm takes the position that the retail operations are to be sealed
off in terms of information from the investment banking part of the operation.
So that kind of information is held in the investment banking part of the
firm, and not communicated to the retail side of the firm. Therefore, the retail
side of the firm continues to recommend the purchase of that stock, which they
clearly wouldn’t do at those prices if they had possession of the information
which the investment banking side had.
The customer buys the stock. Then the information is made public and
the stock plummets. The customer is very disappointed, and he says, “How
could you let me buy that stock? You knew (“you” being the firm) ma
terial adverse information and you have an obligation to me, your customer,
to warn me of adverse facts. If you had done that, I never would have
bought it. I want damages.”
The defense is: “If I have got separable portions of a business within a
firm, I ought to be able to wall those separate portions off and act as if each
of those entities, or portions of the business, were separate entities.
The lower court said, No, you can’t act that way. The customer has a
right of action. The lower court’s opinion in that case may have been in
fluenced by the fact that the wall in that case was porous. It wasn’t an effec
tive wall.
But the issue up before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals tries to
really deal with the problem in the hypothetical that I have put to you, the
kind of “cleaner case,” if you will.
There are two amicus briefs in that case that are of particular interest,
because they represent one kind of solution to the problem.
One position was that you ought to have a wall, as a preventative
measure, but you oughtn’t to rely on the wall totally. What you ought to do
when you get that kind of material information—as soon as you get it—is
give somebody in that firm the responsibility for putting that stock on a
restricted list, which means: “We have material information. We’re not
telling you whether it’s favorable or unfavorable, but as long as we have it,
we are not going to ‘recommend.’ ”
So what you see here is, you’ve got to use that information, but you use
it as a way of triggering the withdrawal from the market of the investment
banking firm until the information is made public.
The briefs say that those principles, for reasons that they do not explain,
are not applicable to banks, where they say that a wall may really work to
insulate the trust department from the commercial side.
I think that’s a pretty fair characterization of the positions. I must con
fess to you that I don’t understand the logic of the positions. I can under
stand the pragmatic quality of the decisions.
It would have seemed to me that, whether or not the wall works ought
to depend on at least two factors. First, you have to communicate to your
client that what he is getting when he buys your investment services—let’s take
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it to the bank situation—is just the research of the trust department, and that
he is not going to get, and is not entitled to get, any information that the
commercial department has—that that’s sealed off. Second, if you in fact
construct the wall, and you observe those procedures, and can make that case,
then you ought to be home free, and you ought to be home free in the
brokerage case also.
So it seems to me it’s a question of building a wall, implementing it
effectively, and disclosing to your customer what it is that he is buying when
he buys your recommendations or your investment management.
CPA: Just for clarification, how did the investment banker obtain that
information? And would it make any difference if they had obtained it by
reason of being a member of the board of directors?
Chairman Mundheim: They obtained the information because of
their investment banking relationship. There was a projected underwriting,
as I recall.
CPA: Did they have someone on the board?
Chairman Mundheim: I don’t remember. But the fact that you are
the underwriter, and get the information as an underwriter, makes you an
insider. It’s a position of special access.
You’re quite right in pointing out that if the possession of information is
going to be attributed to the firm, you have the same problem as if you have
an officer or director of the firm sitting as a director of the company. Lawyers
have always operated on the assumption that if you wall the director off from
any investment decision-making responsibilities with respect to the company
on whose board he sits, that technique ought to work, if you can show that,
in fact, you have had a policy of that kind of a wall, and that there is no reason
to believe you weren’t following that policy.
I think there is a serious question—if you are an investment banker,
or a banker, or an insurance company executive—as to whether or not you
aren’t taking on additional, unnecessary risks in having somebody sit on the
board.
Regulator: You mentioned, just very briefly, insurance executives. I
think that the identical problem that exists with respect to banks and
brokerage firms exists for insurance companies.
Chairman Mundheim: I think that’s absolutely right.
CPA: We have got the same problem in a different way. We frequently
have a situation where one of our partners will be auditing a client and know
that company is going down the tubes. Another client has got a receivable
from that company. What should we do?
Chairman Mundheim: It’s funny, I heard that hypothesis the other
day, and I couldn’t answer it then, and I don’t think I’m any better able to
answer it today.
Financial Executive: I think most all of us agree that there must
be full and fair disclosure of a company’s activities. We do differ on the
details of how and when.
There’s another element here, though, that seems to me to be surfacing,
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and that has to do with what appears to be the policy that the SEC is ad
vocating, and that is that you are not only obligated to make the information
available, but you have responsibility for force-feeding the understanding of
information about your company. Would you care to comment on that
aspect?
Chairman Mundheim: I don’t think that I accept the force-feeding
aspect of that statement, but I agree with your general thrust that experience,
I think, has suggested to the commission that disclosure is a useful, but not
completely effective, regulatory tool. When you try to direct disclosure to
the public investor, in a way that he can understand it, you tend to simplify
something that essentially is not simple, and, therefore, the very act of sim
plification may have misleading aspects to it.
If you try to give a picture of the world as it really is in all its com
plexity, the public investor is simply not going to have the interest, the time,
and sometimes the training to understand that information. Once you come
to that kind of a conclusion, then you look to the professionals in the business
as providing the bridge between that information that is disclosed and its use,
in the sense of buy, sell, and hold decisions by the public investor.
And you can look at doctrines, such as the suitability doctrine, the
know-your-merchandise doctrine, as examples of how the commission is
forcing the building of that bridge by the professional in the investment com
munity. And I would expect that particular trend to deepen.
Financial Executive: But is there a push to have the company do
that?
Chairman Mundheim: Well, there is, certainly. The alternative would
be to tell the company that it has to do two things: (1) disclose the raw in
formation and (2) put an editorial gloss on it, in the sense that it will com
municate and simplify all that information into a something that the public
investor can use.
There are, I think, some examples of the commission’s beginning to think
about getting companies to do that. That has certain obvious dangers. One
is, it’s got to be a generalized statement, and investment decisions are personal
investment decisions. You have got to take those facts and relate them to your
own investment needs. I just don’t see the company officials really being able
to respond to that particular problem.
The other question is whether or not the management has the kind of
objectivity to let it editorialize, or to require it to editorialize, and then hold it
responsible for failure to editorialize in an appropriate way. And I think
that kind of problem will lead one back to fastening the responsibility onto the
professionals in the investment community, the brokers, the investment ad
visors, and to accelerate that trend toward having people invest through pro
fessional intermediaries.
The commission talks a lot about—we all talk a lot about, and wring
our hands about—getting the individual back into the market; and by that we
mean direct investment. But I have some doubts about whether or not
regulatory policy can really lead us in that direction. It seems to me regulatory
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policy has to end up putting more and more emphasis on having the public
investment decisions led, to a substantial extent, by professionals. And the
easiest form of leading is going to be through some kind of commingled invest
ment of those assets.
Banker: I continue to be bothered by the distinction between the
process of who is to say that information is for the sophisticated, or for the
unsophisticated, and who is to make the determination as to who has sophis
tication and who does not have sophistication.
And if we say disclosures are only made when they are material, what
material disclosure are you not going to make to the unsophisticated? And
are you also saying, in fact, that any kind of a decision that involves an
investment or a credit decision must go through a professional, and not be
done on a free enterprise basis?
Chairman Mundheim: No, I’m not saying “must.”
The 10-K is now being looked at as, essentially, a document which is
going to be putting forth the kind of complex, detailed information that may
give one a better view of reality. It is a public document. Anybody who wants
it can have it, and, indeed, the annual report, if I recall correctly, after
December 20 will require a statement indicating its availability.
Regulator: Either the proxy statement or the annual report has to
say that.
Chairman Mundheim: Now, the question is, Who’s going to ask for
it? I think, as a practical matter, you have got to recognize that I, as an odd
lot investor, am not going to ask for that information. It’s available. I have
got equal access with the professional to that information; and I think that’s all
the commission can do. They can give me the opportunity, if I want to take
advantage of it. But the commission has also got to be realistic. They know
I’m not going to take advantage of that access; and therefore, the professional,
who will, is going to have a comparative advantage, and the best the com
mission can do for me is to say to the professional—who is advising me, whose
advice I buy—“If there’s something in that file that is material, that should
have an impact on your investment recommendation, you better know about
it, because we’re going to charge you with knowledge of the information that’s
on file.”
The law doesn’t say that yet, but it does seem to me the law will say
that.
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The Need for Additional
Disclosure

The Need for
Disclosure Criteria
By William S. Gray, III ,Senior Vice President, Harris Trust and Savings Bank

This paper begins with a rather basic premise which may be stated as
follows:
The material needs and desires of people living in the United States
can best be achieved through an efficient economic system in which
private individuals have free choice in the selection of goods and
services and in the application of any portion of their income to
savings and investment.

If one accepts this premise (or other similar versions), it seems necessary
to ponder the relationship between disclosure as it relates to our financial
markets and economic system and the specified conditions, that is an “efficient
economic system” and “free choice.”

Benefits of Disclosure—Not for the Investor

The efficiency of an economic system depends upon its productivity
(output per man-hour) and its responsiveness to consumer preferences (out
put of things most needed and wanted). Knowledge of economic conditions
is importantly involved in both aspects, indeed it is vital to the competitive
performance of producers. The efficiency of the system hinges upon the
intelligent knowledgeable use of “free choice” by private individuals. As con
sumers, individuals must be aware of the variety of goods and services avail
able, the relative quality of these items, and the prices at which they may
be purchased. As savers or investors, they must have knowledge of the
alternative media available (both direct investment forms and the instru
ments of the institutional intermediaries), the investment characteristics of
these different media, and the rate-of-return prospects.
To develop a reasonable understanding of the investment characteristics
and the rate-of-return prospects, it is essential to have information, some of
which is of a general nature having to do with broad economic, political, or
social developments. There is an abundance of material on such matters and
55

much of it is publicly available. However, some of the required information
is of a more specific nature, having to do with particular companies and
industries. This is the kind of information that forms the body of “disclosure,”
as that term is normally used in the context of the investment process.
In recent years, much attention has been directed to the theory of efficient
markets. One version of this theory (the “semi-strong” form) says that cur
rent prices of securities fully reflect public knowledge about the companies. A
close corollary is that any new information is discounted very promptly in
the prices of securities. It should be apparent that financial markets can be
efficient (in the sense used in this theory) whether corporate information dis
closure is substantial or restricted. However, if the financial markets are to be
a most effective part of an efficient economic system, it does require sub
stantial information disclosure. It seems reasonable to assume that greater
knowledge will increase the likelihood that capital will be channeled into its
most productive uses and this should be the overriding objective of public
policy.1
It is for these reasons that an economic system, “efficiency,” “free
choice,” and “disclosure” are undissolubly related. It is in the context of the
effectiveness of the entire economic system that the importance and the value
of “disclosure” must be considered.
Some academic literature has questioned the real value of information
that is required under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure
provisions or that is otherwise available. An example would be the work done
by George J. Benston,1
2 who has studied this subject over a long period of time.
It appears that some of his own earlier work, and the studies of several
others, had conditioned his thinking that changes in expectations with respect
to key financial variables have only minimal economic relationship to changes
in stock prices.
In his March 1973 article, he covered the empirical work that he had
performed on the effect of the disclosure requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The principal reporting requirement imposed by the
1934 act was the disclosure of sales. His findings indicated that the disclosure
requirements had a lesser effect on securities of companies that did not
previously disclose sales as compared with those that did.
It may be noted that the focus of attention was on the effect that in
formation had on the behavior of stock prices. Benston concluded with the
statement that “the disclosure provisions of the ’34 Act were of no apparent
value to investors.” As suggested earlier, the assessment of value should go
well beyond the interests of the investor and whether incremental information
enhances the value of investments (independent of other variables) or enables
an established investor to have some advantage over a new investor.
1
2
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Even if “disclosure” were to be judged on the basis of the narrower
interests of the investor, it should extend beyond the effect that additional
information might have on market value. For example, with the development
of case law on insider information, investors find themselves in a very difficult
position. The problem centers on the uncertainty of whether they are in
possession of nonpublic material information and, if so, what they can or
should do about it. If companies did a better job of promptly disclosing ma
terial information, it would reduce the incidence of this problem, providing
considerable relief for investors. Indeed, it might have a material benefit
through a reduction in legal counsel fees that may be incurred under the
present circumstances.

Benefits Versus Costs

Thus far an attempt has been made to establish that information dis
closure is an essential element for an efficient economic system within the
context of a “free” society. Clearly, there are significant benefits resulting
from disclosure; however, there are costs as well, sometimes very significant
ones!
On June 4, 1974, the Wall Street Journal reported that companies were
complaining about the new federal reporting rules because a boost in costs is
involved. The new rules provide that the top 500 companies must report
sales and profit on each line of business. The Journal reported that Fruehauf
would have to add 150 persons to its 300-member accounting staff; Dow
Chemical estimated its payroll costs would swell $300,000 just to gear up for
compliance; and Procter and Gamble feared diverting costly computer experts
from other tasks.
These were reputed to be the costs associated with one new kind of
information disclosure. Of course, this particular increment of disclosure may
be somewhat unusual in terms of the scope and the complexity of the task.
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that there are already very substantial
costs associated with the corporate information that is already provided,
whether it is required or voluntary. There is probably no way to determine
the aggregate of these costs or, if it is possible, to compare them against the
value of the benefits to our economic system. However, because the costs of
disclosure are very significant, it is very important that discriminating judg
ments be made about the kinds of information that are likely to be most useful.

Judging the Usefulness of Information

To consider the usefulness of information within the context of the eco
nomic system, it would seem reasonable to note that the sectors of the economy
which are least able to serve the current and prospective level of demand tend
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to be the sectors most in need of additional capital resources. Furthermore,
the need for additional capital resources can be most readily fulfilled through
a combination of increased profitability (with new investment application of
retained earnings) and access to relatively less expensive capital in the market
place. Of course, the cost of capital is primarily determined by the price at
which new securities can be sold. To a large extent, the price of new securities
is closely related to the prices of securities trading in the secondary market.
Therefore, the information that is likely to be most useful is that which could
be expected to have more than an insignificant and/or temporary effect on the
price of a security.
Securities are among those kinds of assets all (or most) of the conse
quences of ownership of which are financial. It is presumed that the prices of
securities are largely determined by what investors expect the financial conse
quences to be, including an implicit choice between the expected rewards of
investing and the gratifications of consumption. The financial consequences
of the ownership of stocks and bonds are represented in the cash flows, which
have two main components: (1) periodic payments of dividends or interest
and (2) the price of the asset when it is sold or its proceeds at maturity.
There is an additional factor that has a direct bearing on the prices of
securities, that is the degree of uncertainty (or risk) associated with the
financial consequences. The degree of uncertainty is reflected in a discount
rate that provides the direct linkage between the future cash flows and the
current price. In the case of fixed income securities, the discount rate is
expressed as the yield to maturity, and, therefore, is dealt with in an explicit
manner. However, with common stocks, the discount rate is implicit in the
relationship between the future flows and the current price. In either case,
the discount rate includes the rate of interest on risk-free assets and an addi
tional rate which is the risk premium on the particular asset.3
Any knowledge or information that is likely to alter expectations about
the stream of future payments (either the magnitude or the likelihood of such
payments) is likely to have an effect on the current price. With respect to the
magnitude of future payments on a common stock, it is usually dealt with in
terms of the expected growth rate and the volatility of the dividend and (or)
the earnings stream. The distinction between dividends and earnings is of no
particular consequence because it has been demonstrated that the present
value of the two streams is quite similar.4
To deal with the characteristics of future payments that are expressed
in terms of the volatility and the growth rate, it is necessary to have a point
of reference in determining price, and that point is usually current earnings or
dividends. If the current earnings or dividends are abnormal, a sense of
normal current earnings or dividends may be used.
In summary, the information or knowledge that is likely to alter expec
3
4
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tations about the earnings growth rate, the relative certainty of the growth
rate, the volatility of the earnings stream, the sense of current normal earnings
or dividends, the discount rate (for reasons other than factors just listed,
that is, the risk-free interest rate), or some combination of the foregoing would
seem most likely to have more than a temporary effect on price. It is sug
gested, therefore, that the relative usefulness of different kinds of information
disclosure should be viewed accordingly.

Corporate Earnings Forecasts
One type of information that receives a great deal of attention within
the financial community and among investors is the prospect for earnings
during the coming year. Of course, some argue that such information receives
more attention than it should, perhaps implying that our financial markets
would be better off if they did not pay so much attention to such matters.
However, whether it is desirable or not, earnings forecasts are considered
to be very significant by professional investment people. In a survey con
ducted by the Financial Analysts Federation, 99 percent of the respondents
indicated that they felt it to be a key factor in making investment decisions.5
Although it seems reasonable to assume that professional investors are
becoming more influential as participants in our financial markets, it is
possible that they may be deceived about the importance of forecasts. Cer
tainly, at this time it is quite well established that many earnings forecasts are
quite inaccurate—more than slightly different than the actual results that
are later published. Furthermore, there have been a number of studies in
dicating that naive forecasting techniques produce projections that are just as
good (on average) as those that have been carefully prepared. For example,
one of these focused on the use of first-quarter earnings as a naive predictive
device.6 Findings of this sort have lead some to the conclusion that earnings
forecast information is useless.
To provide what may be a more meaningful perspective, this writer has
studied the earnings forecasts prepared by securities analysts at the Harris
Bank and compared them with the actual results later published and the
relative behavior of stock prices during the interim. Earnings forecasts are
initially developed in the fall of a year and are continuously updated (as
necessary) until the actual results are reported. The forecasts that have been
subjected to careful study are those that were prepared in the fall rather
than the updated forecasts.
Although these particular forecasts are prepared on an independent basis,
with the benefit of considerable knowledge of the company characteristics, the
5
6
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industry fundamentals, and macro-economic prospects, they are rather close
to the “street consensus” forecasts in a large majority of cases. Therefore, they
can be taken as a proxy for the “street consensus.”
For each given year, the January 1 forecasts were compared with the
actual results and the percentage differences were arrayed, starting with those
cases in which the estimated earnings were furthest above the actual results
and running down through the cases in which the estimated earnings were
furthest below the actual results. With the individual cases arrayed in this
manner, the population was divided into quintile groupings. The average
price change between January 1 and December 31 was computed for the
stocks in each of these quintile groups. The results for 1973 are summarized
below.
EXHIBIT I

Changes in Earnings Expectations and
Relative Market Performance
1973

Group

No. of
issues

1
2
3
4
5

33
32
32
32
33

All (or
average)

162

Percent difference between
estimated earnings and
actual earnings
(61.4)%
(4.3)
0.4
6.7
15.7

Average percent
price change
(Jan. 1 to Dec. 31)

to (4.3)%
to
0
to 6.1
to 15.1
to 98.6

-37.6%
-23.4
-20.3
-17.2
+ 0.2

6.3%

-19.7%

Of the 162 diversified companies covered in the 1973 sample, the
quintile (1) that experienced the greatest erosion in earnings expectations
experienced an average price decline of 37.6 percent while the quintile (5)
that experienced the largest improvement in earnings expectations had an
average price increase of 0.2 percent. Within the context of the small differ
ences in rate of return that distinguish a well-performing portfolio and an
average portfolio, this spread in percentage points would have to be con
sidered very significant. In terms of average price experience, the other three
quintile groups were much more closely clustered, but the magnitude of
changes in earnings expectations was not all that great for the companies in
these groups.
Using the same method of dividing the cases into quintile groups, the
relative price action was computed for each group in 1971 and 1972. These
results are shown in summary form, along with the corresponding average
price changes for 1973.
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EXHIBIT II

Changes in Earnings Expectations and
Relative Market Performance

on percent error of
earnings estimates

1
2
3
4
5
No. of issues

Average percent price change
Quintile groups based
(1/1 to 12/31)
_________ ____________ _______
1973
1972
1971
-37.6%
-23.4
-20.3
-17.2
+ 0.2

- 2.5%
+ 14.3
+ 17.3
+ 26.7
+ 36.1

+ 5.9%
+ 12.0
+ 11.3
+ 23.0
+ 38.0

162

154

140

The same pattern of relative price behavior is evident in the two earlier
years. Since stock prices were generally rising during 1971 and 1972, in
contrast with the sharply declining prices in 1973, it provides a fairly good
indication of the persistency of the tendency for changes in earnings expec
tations to be reflected in the relative price behavior of securities, regardless
of the character of the general market environment.
If these kinds of changes in earnings expectations are important, then
changes in earnings forecasts are important. If changes in earnings forecasts
are important, then earnings forecasts are important. Clearly, earnings fore
casts represent material information because they have a significant impact on
the prices of securities.
Although there are many “outsiders,” that is, institutional and broker
analysts, that prepare earnings forecast information, the corporations them
selves are in a position to make a unique contribution to the forecasting effort.
While “outsiders” may have a more objective view, possibly with greater em
phasis on macro-economic factors and competitor actions, corporate manage
ment is in a much better position to know what is going on within the com
pany and what actions may be taken with regard to the use of reserves or
accounting adjustments. Thus, the corporate earnings forecast is not only
useful in a general sense but, also, in the more particular sense that was
suggested for judging the need for “disclosure.”

Corporate Growth Rate Predictions

Before moving on with the development of some thoughts with respect
to those kinds of information that are relevant to a meaningful understanding
of the earnings characteristics of a company, it would seem appropriate to
comment briefly on the subject of growth rate forecasts. Although there
have been individual instances where companies have made public an earn
ings growth rate figure, these have usually been in the nature of an objective,
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not necessarily a forecast. The fact that some of them have become “pie in
the sky” might lead some to conclude that corporate growth rate forecasts
would be useless. This is entirely possible but should not be taken for granted.
There have been some studies performed with respect to the growth
rate forecasts developed by “outsiders” and/or that are implicit to the differ
ences in price-earnings (P/E) ratios among various common stock issues.
One apparently significant study concluded that the careful estimates of the
security analysts, the bases of which are not limited to public information,
show little more about the future than past growth rates. Moreover, the
market price-earnings ratios themselves were not better than either the
analysts’ forecasts or the past growth rates in forecasting future earnings
growth.7 Perhaps it is worth emphasizing that while they found the corre
lations of predicted and realized growth rates to be low, most of them were
significantly greater than zero.
To provide another more current reading on the possible relationship be
tween price-earnings ratios and longer-term earnings growth rates, this writer
had some data prepared on the companies represented in the Standard and
Poor’s “425 Industrials” as of early 1973. Price-earnings ratios were calculated
for all of these issues as of three dates: January 1, 1959, 1962, and 1968.
Point-to-point earnings growth rates were computed for three time periods:
1959 to 1972, 1962 to 1972, and 1968 to 1972. In each of the three tests the
companies were ranked according to their price-earnings ratios and then were
split into decile groups. The average point-to-point earnings growth rate was
then computed for the companies represented in each of the decile groups.
The summary figures are shown in the table below.
EXHIBIT III

P/E Ratios and Earnings Growth Rates

Decile

A verage
P/E
1/1/68

Average
earnings
growth
rate
1968-72

A verage
P/E
1/1/62

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

65.05x
31.28
25.36
21.44
19.46
17.83
16.52
15.07
13.79
11.58

12.73%
3.76
7.63
1.48
-5.28
1.84
0.75
-2.45
-5.19
-9.68

34.72x
23.49
19.94
17.97
16.27
14.89
13.38
12.11
10.87
8.86

7
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A verage
earnings
growth
rate
1962-72

10.84%
7.07
7.23
5.42
1.34
6.96
4.88
6.14
4.52
-0.30

Average
earnings
Average growth
P/E
rate
1/1/59 1959-72

9.74%
50.45x
26.21
5.84
4.96
20.90
6.06
18.40
0.65
16.53
14.84
4.17
4.22
13.27
3.26
12.06
6.36
10.65
8.21 -0.22

Cragg and Malkiel, “The Consensus and Accuracy of Some Predictions of the
Growth of Corporate Earnings,” The Journal of Finance, March 1968.

For all three time periods, the companies in the high P/E decile had
the highest average earnings growth rates and the companies in the low P/E
decile had the lowest average earnings growth rates. In between these most
extreme differences in P/E ratios, the pattern of the results was quite varied,
although there was a fairly good correlation between the earnings multipliers
and the average earnings growth rates across the spectrum of decile groupings
in the shortest of the time periods (1968 to 1972). This would seem con
sistent with the notion that the longer-term earnings growth rate characteristics
of any given company can and do change with the passage of time.
While these kinds of somewhat limited correlation findings are not likely
to convert the most ardent skeptics, they are not such as to justify a complete
rejection of the development and use of earnings growth rate information.
It is possible that more specific inputs from corporate sources on a regular
basis would add to the quality of the effort to estimate earnings growth rates.
Such inputs might include the corporate objective, if it has one (and some of
the other kinds of information that will be listed below), and should help
“outsiders” develop better growth rate estimates. Of course, if any given cor
poration has made a careful estimate of its own longer-term earnings growth
rate, that would certainly fall in the category of useful information.

The Most Useful Information
From this writer’s point of view, there is an unfortunate irony with
respect to earnings and growth rate forecast information. On the one hand,
its impact on securities prices is subject to measurement with relative ease, and
the empirical evidence strongly suggests that it has a significant and predict
able impact, which implies that such information should be disclosed. On the
other hand, there are many other kinds of information that are more important
to a real understanding of the business and its future prospects, but much of it
is of such a nature that it is more difficult to test its significance in relation to
impact on securities prices. In other words, that which may be more important
is more difficult, if not impossible, to prove; or, to put it more bluntly, views
with respect to the importance of many other kinds of information are more
subjective and therefore, more debatable.
In turning to other kinds of information vital to a substantial under
standing of the earnings characteristics of a company, it must be recognized
that we are moving from the tip of the iceberg (earnings and growth rates) to
the much larger portion that is below the surface. Therefore, the problem is
to sort out these other kinds of information so that it is possible to deal
reasonably with the entire subject. The classification method used, is not an
exclusive one but should be helpful here in dealing with a subject in which
there are numerous different interests. The suggested information classes may
be indicated as follows:

• Information that relates to sales characteristics.
63

• Information that relates to expense characteristics.

• Information that bears upon the competitive environment.
• Information that explains accounting methods.

Sales Characteristics
The sales characteristics of a company are very significant because of
the impact that they are likely to have upon earnings characteristics. Of
course, the characteristics that we are most concerned about are growth and
volatility. The kind of information that will contribute to an. understanding
of growth prospects would include product mix, new product developments,
entry into new markets, market shares for major products, scope and dura
tion of major contracts, and order backlogs. Information relating to sales
volatility should include indications of sensitivity of demand for products or
services (relative to macro-economic developments), variability of product
prices, and vulnerability to production curtailments (due to work stoppages,
natural disasters, material or fuel shortages, and government constraints
relating to safety or environmental protection).

Expense Characteristics
To a degree, the expense characteristics of a company will be affected
by its cost of goods purchased and, therefore, will be subject to some of the
same kinds of factors that were mentioned under the category of sales char
acteristics, because the items purchased by one company are the sales of
another company or group of companies. The character of these and other
expenses may tend to counter the volatility of sales, but are more likely to
either extend or magnify the sales volatility at the net income level. Informa
tion relating to fixed and variable costs can be very significant and should be
provided where it can be done in a meaningful way. Included in the fixed
cost category would be interest costs. The future pattern of these costs will
be affected by existing rates, the maturity of issues outstanding, the need to
refund, and the possibility of additional financing. Such information should
be provided on a regular basis.

Competitive Environment
Information with respect to the competitive environment may be of a
more controversial character. If it is significant, as this writer believes, it is
because of its effect (sometimes subtle) upon the relationship between reve
nues and expenses. However, due to the many factors or circumstances that
have an effect upon the competitive environment, it is not possible to measure
the impact of changes in any one. In other words, the extent of the effect of
any change is largely a matter of personal judgment.
As an illustration of the nature of the problem, the leading companies in
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the brewing industry have been increasing their market share for a good many
years. While the many smaller brewers (in the aggregate) were losing market
share, they were not suffering a decline in absolute volume. However, within
the past couple of years, the continuation of above-average growth for the
“Big Three” could not be achieved without some encroachment upon the
absolute volume of the remainder of the industry. Any unit that suffers a
decline in its capacity utilization is forced into counter-measures, which often
take the form of more competitive pricing. It may be purely coincidental, but
the “Big Three” have had difficulty passing along cost increases and otherwise
maintaining margins during the past couple of years.
Some of the factors that appear to have a significant effect on the com
petitive environment are the capital requirements for entry, the degree of
concentration of the productive units within an industry, the relative eco
nomic strength of a company in relation to its suppliers and its customers, the
degree of utilization of industry capacity, the cost position (vis-a-vis labor,
capital, and materials) relative to competitors, the extent of insulation
(through technical know-how, patents, marketing clout, and so forth) from
competitive challenge and vulnerability to antitrust actions (either by the
government or competitors).
Some further comment would seem appropriate with respect to the
utilization of industry capacity. Information about the expansion of facilities,
the building of new plants and the retirement of old facilities is vital to an
understanding of how the utilization of capacity may be changing. While
attention is normally focused upon the actions and plans of existing producers,
the view must be somewhat broader. Perhaps a good example would be the
development of petro-chemical facilities within the oil industry back in the
1950s and early 1960s. This was bound to have some effect upon the com
petitive environment of the chemical industry, as long as the chemical com
panies continued to reinvest a sizable portion of their earnings in additional
chemical and plastics facilities.
It should be apparent that the most significant aspect of the competitive
environment is the manner in which it is changing, that is, improving or
deteriorating. To develop a reading on the manner and extent of change, it is
necessary to have information about circumstances or prospects over a period
of time. Some of these changes will have a common effect upon all par
ticipants in the industry, while some of the changes can be unique to a
particular company. Although it is not reasonable to expect that any given
company will provide comprehensive information covering all units in the
industry, it can make an important contribution through disclosure of this
type of information with respect to itself.
Since changes in the competitive environment take place over a period
of time and may be very difficult to discern in the earlier stages, they will not
necessarily affect the prices of securities in the short run. On the other hand,
they may have a very profound impact on securities prices on a longer-term
basis. These kinds of changes may not be of great interest to the short-term
trader or even the average small investor; however, a basic standard for
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determining what should be disclosed should be based on the needs of the
serious investors. Whitman and Shubik state their own conviction that secu
rities markets have an economic function in channeling the nation’s resources.8
If the disclosure is not based in great part on corporate reality, these resources
are going to be misallocated. In treating the limitations of accounting as it is
presently used, they state that the objective should be to supply enough infor
mation, wherever possible, so that an intelligent, diligent investor who is willing
to apply himself can get a good idea of how a business operates and can
appraise it based on this view.

Accounting Methods
Information that explains accounting methods is essential to an under
standing of reported financial data because there are a variety of “generally
accepted” ways of treating the events that occur. Some of these methods can
be used to “smooth” the reported earnings of a company on a routine basis.
LIFO inventory accounting will have that effect in those cases where there
is a fairly close correspondence between raw material and finished product
prices. Depreciation that is related to the percentage of capacity usage has a
similar tendency. It can be argued that such methods really provide the most
realistic portrayal of what is happening. However, there are other methods,
such as the arbitrary creation of or drawing upon reserves, that shield
from the “public view” the real character of the company’s earnings.
Oftentimes a company will change the method of accounting treatment
that is applied. It may just be the suspicious character of the writer, but it
seems that most of the changes in accounting methods have a “smoothing”
effect, that is, they are implemented at a time when there are otherwise
adverse events that have taken place. While such use of accounting may be
beneficial from the point of view of the company and its stockholders (on the
premise that more stable earnings command a somewhat higher P/E ratio),
it would seem difficult to justify it in terms of the most effective functioning of
the entire economic system. To the extent that accounting is used to distort
reality and make it appear more ideal, it must interfere with the most desirable
allocation of resources.
Since there is usually some room for difference of opinion regarding what
is most realistic, there will continue to be a somewhat flexible use of account
ing, with some incidence of abuse to be expected—a dilemma from which
there is no apparent escape. Therefore, to enable the serious investor to make
his decisions most effectively and, thereby, contribute to the effective working
of the entire economic system, it is vital that complete information on account
ing methods (and changes therein) be provided in reasonably convenient
form. Included under this general heading would be appropriate explanations
8
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Whitman and Shubik, “Corporate Reality and Accounting for Investors,” Financial
Executive, May 1971.

of differences between earnings that are reported to stockholders and those
that are subject to federal income tax.

Emphasize Disclosure Criteria
The specific kinds of information that have been mentioned in relation
to sales and expense characteristics, competitive environment, and account
ing methods are not intended to be exhaustive, merely illustrative. In some
cases this type of information is already required or normally provided in the
annual report to stockholders. If it were not for the somewhat unique method
of classification, this particular list would seem quite similar to others that
have been prepared.
The Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) sponsored a project and
publication in 1962 that attempted to define the information needs of the
professional investor.9 It stated that shareholders and their representatives are
entitled to the kind of financial and other information that is material and
important in judging the operations of a business, the financial implications
of what is being done for the future of the company, and the abilities of the
corporation’s management. In the body of this publication, there was a very
extensive listing of information types, classified under a number of headings
including “General Economic Factors,” “Operating and Financial Matters,”
“Balance Sheet Items,” and “Income Statement.” Excellent examples of some
effective ways to present various kinds of information were included.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) completed a study and pub
lication on financial reporting to shareholders in 1967.10 It was divided be
tween some policy statements and opinions on various kinds of information
disclosure. The policy statements covered such things as the Financial Ac
counting Standards Board (FASB), the number of outside directors, the cor
porate audit committee and the mailing of quarterly reports to shareholders.
The opinions on corporate disclosure were classified as Securities and Ex
change Commission-related matters, NYSE topics, or experimental sugges
tions. Some of the particulars, such as line-of-business reporting, differences
between book and taxable income, and liquidity information having to do
specifically with debt maturities, were virtually identical with some of the
types listed in this paper as being most useful.
Early in 1974 the SEC issued some proposed amendments to improve
disclosure in annual reports to shareholders. The amendments were related to
Rules 14a-3 and 14c-3 under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The com
mission stated that these proposed amendments were based on past recom
Corliss D. Anderson, Corporate Reporting for the Professional Investor, sponsored
by FAF Corporate Information Committee (New York: Financial Analysts Federa
tion, 1963).
10 “Recommendations and Comments on Financial Reporting to Shareholders and Re
lated Matters,” White Paper, New York Stock Exchange, July 20, 1967.
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mendations of the Industrial Issuers Advisory Committee, an NYSE white
paper, and the SEC’s own experience. Much of what was being proposed
for inclusion in the annual report to shareholders was similar to information
that is already being provided in proxy solicitation material or the 10-K
report. Again, some of the particulars, such as line-of-business reporting,
explanation of changes in revenues and expenses, and financing plans, were
quite similar.
Based upon the way such ideas have developed in the past (as illustrated
by the previous references), it seems likely that there will be a continuation
of such efforts, perhaps to the point where the quantity of information is
completely overwhelming, even for professional investors. There will always
be the dramatic cases in which the omission of particular information proves
to be most unfortunate; at which point the “need” for such additional in
formation is “recognized,” and the information becomes a requirement for
all on a continuing basis. Unfortunately, there is an inherent dilemma in that
it is impossible to come up with a complete list of information requirements
sufficient for all cases without parts of it (quite possibly significant parts)
being of very marginal value (or no value) in some individual cases, perhaps
a majority of cases.
In suggesting the types of information that would be most useful, the
method of classification used in this paper was based on what might be
described as the criteria for determining the importance of information. The
criteria tend to emphasize those kinds of information that have to do with an
understanding of the real earnings characteristics of a company and how
they may be changing with the passage of time. Undoubtedly these particular
criteria can be improved upon and, perhaps, should be broadened; but, it
would seem that those groups that are most interested in the functioning of
our financial markets should be asked to contribute their own ideas with
respect to such criteria. By shifting the focus away from particular kinds of
information to the criteria by which the importance of that information can
be judged, it may be possible to escape an endless increase of information
requirements.
By specifying and emphasizing appropriate criteria, each company, to
some extent, may provide somewhat different kinds of information but, in each
case, the total of what is provided should more nearly approximate that which
it is most important to know. The responsibility of corporations to make
full and prompt disclosure of material facts is based upon a similar objective
and points out the diversity of what is material to various companies. Un
fortunately, there are at least two problems with it. First, it is not clear that
the SEC and the two major stock exchanges (the New York and American),
each of which has published much material on this subject, are totally serious
about the enforcement of this responsibility. Second, the standards that have
evolved for determining materiality are too narrow. There are various kinds
of useful and important information that may not have a significant effect upon
the price of a stock in a short period of time or that cause investors to make
immediate changes in their decisions to buy, hold, or sell a stock.
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As developed earlier in this paper, some of the most significant in
formation is related to the changing characteristics of a company and its
competitive environment. Oftentimes these kinds of changes occur over a
rather extended period of time and, therefore, don’t necessarily have a short
term impact on the price of a company’s common stock. As a matter of fact,
the price impact of such changes may be spread over several years. His
torically, the market’s response to such changes may have been largely related
to the effect that such changes ultimately had on reported earnings (lower
earnings, greater earnings volatility, or a slower earnings growth rate);
however, it probably would be somewhat sooner if there were more infor
mation of this type available and its impounding effect were more clearly
understood. Certainly, the efficient allocation of resources within our eco
nomic system would benefit from a more prompt market response to changing
business characteristics and competitive environment factors.
The proposal to shift emphasis to disclosure criteria does not mean there
would be no basic information requirements. There is probably a basic core
of information (perhaps yet to be clearly defined) that would be useful and
essential in a vast majority of individual cases, and such information should
be reported by all companies. However, beyond this common core, there is
need to provide for a variety of information, the particular make-up of which
would vary from one case to another. It is within this category of additional
information that carefully developed criteria could be most helpful, indeed
essential. A serious commitment by corporations to a disclosure policy in
keeping with the spirit of such criteria (perhaps to be more fully assured by a
greater enforcement effort on the part of the regulatory agencies) would not
only boost the efficiency of our economic system, but help keep the costs
of disclosure and the use of financial information from becoming unduly
burdensome.
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Disclosure and the Banker
How Much Is Enough?
By Edwin A. Schoenborn, Executive Vice President and Chairman of the
Policy Committee, Irving Trust Corporation

Today the commercial bank lending officer has available to him a greater
variety of financial statements, schedules, and required reporting by public
corporations than at any time in history. Whether in the form of annual
reports, information contained in Securities and Exchange Commission
reports, standard financial statements, or corporate management disclosure,
it would appear to many that the banker has all of the ingredients needed
in order to make the loan decision. In reality, however, is that the case; or,
is his persistent plea for more information merely a chronic complaint arising
from vague anxieties he may have about loan decisions, or is the plea symp
tomatic of a need for specific improvements in both the quality and the
quantity of disclosure? On balance, the latter contention appears to have
substantial merit.

The Role of the Banker

The efficient allocation of resources is the goal of an organized economy.
The commercial banker plays an important role in helping to attain this goal
by loaning funds to borrowers engaged in local, regional, national, or inter
national markets. In fulfilling this function, the commercial banker is keenly
aware of his responsibilities to the interests of two important groups, namely,
his depositors and his stockholders. Implicit in the taking of deposits from
customers is the desire to protect the integrity of these funds. At the same
time the banker seeks to protect the integrity of the shareholders’ investment,
supplemented by a satisfactory profit which is so necessary to the continuation
and growth of the bank. Within the range of acceptable borrowers, the com
mercial banker therefore seeks to equate risk and return, bearing in mind that
the nature of commercial bank lending is such that the amount of money at
risk is great in relation to the return, which is limited. As a result, a large
degree of prudence in lending is required with scant room for error. In
addition to being a lender, the banker acts in many cases, whether through
fault or design, as a financial advisor. In view of the above, full disclosure in
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whatever form has always been expected by the banker as his due in the
ordinary course of events.

Disclosure as Viewed by a Banker
When the banker speaks of full disclosure, he means nothing less than
the timely and periodic publication of that information necessary to and
sufficient for an understanding of the financial condition and prospects of the
firm. Such disclosure can be broadly separated into two areas: financial state
ment and non-financial statement disclosure. This disclosure should be a
standard requirement rather than one selectively practiced and should be made
in such detail as to satisfy the needs of the most sophisticated user. By the
term sophisticated user, the banker means that regular user of financial state
ments with the greatest need for detail, as opposed to users who may only
infrequently require information not normally divulged or needed.
Beyond certain items of disclosure that are unequivocally acknowledged
to be necessary, the guidelines of materiality and relevance must be employed
in deciding what should be disclosed. Non-financial statement information
deemed material and relevant should be disclosed in such a manner that the
implications of the content, as understood by management, are communicated
to the public. This area of disclosure can be quite difficult, and every effort
should be made to ensure that the information is made available in such
detail as to be understood by the broadest possible segment of the financial
community—analysts, bankers, investors, and others. In making these state
ments, the banker is aware that there are potential limitations from the stand
point of cost and the desire not to disclose information that competition may
use to advantage. Yet, judging by today’s standards of disclosure, few firms
could seriously say that they had encountered either of these problems.
The banker also looks forward to an additional benefit to be gained from
required general disclosure: an end to the practice of playing off one bank
against another with the objective of limiting the amount of disclosure. Cer
tainly in recent years, increasing competition among the banks has at times
permitted borrowers to do business with that lender who requires the least
information to make the loan decision, who feels that the annual report suffices
in the way of information. While the reason for greater disclosure is not to
protect banks from themselves, the general availability of this information
should result in better loan decisions and thus long-run benefit to the
borrower and the lender.

Exceptional Needs of the Banker
In his capacity as lender, the banker is, for all intents and purposes,
in partnership with the investor in a firm. In fact, the investor in a public
corporation often has less of a commitment than the banker since the investor’s
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shares of ownership are usually readily marketable. Should the firm prosper,
the investor is in a position to reap large rewards; if the firm encounters
difficulties, the investor may be in a position to simply sell out and walk away.
Thus, the investor is able to divest himself of the firm, albeit at a price.
The banker, however, finds it considerably more difficult to extricate
himself from a firm experiencing problems; more often than not he is forced
to ride out the difficulties. At the same time, his return is quite limited when
it is compared to the potential return to the shareholder; thus, the risk in
commercial bank lending is large in relation to the reward. To illustrate,
consider the banker’s return on a one-year loan of $1 million. The spread
between the prime lending rate and the marginal cost of money may, under
favorable circumstances, approximate one percent or an annual return of
$10,000 on the $1 million loan. Thus, the banker’s return is hardly imposing
to begin with, and frightfully small in relation to the risk if the company is
experiencing problems. For these reasons, the banker’s need for information
often goes beyond requirements for general disclosure.
Having such an interest and need to monitor the firm’s progress, the
banker may require interim disclosure in the form of a full or partial balance
sheet and income statement data. The banker’s need for this information
above and beyond the levels of general disclosure is most immediate in the
case of financially troubled borrowers. The need may also arise, however,
during the banker’s analysis of a new credit proposal, and the same avenues of
specific disclosure should be available to support the borrower’s request. In
addition, the monitoring of a loan may require special reporting, as in the
case of highly seasonal industries.
Meetings between the banker, corporate management, and the CPA
represent another means for obtaining such detailed information as is needed
by the banker. The banker, like the CPA, is an advisor to the firm, and these
meetings are seen as a means for communicating in detail the financial position
and results of the firm, so that the banker is able to offer advice and monitor
his loan based on informed judgment.
It should be recognized that the special needs of the banker, as described
herein, are not inconsistent with his support of required general disclosure.
Rather, they represent needs that arise of necessity, based on an individual
assessment of the degree of risk involved, and encompass information that is
more detailed or needed on a more frequent basis than that normally con
sidered to constitute general disclosure. At the same time, it is acknowledged
that the banker assumes specific responsibilities pertaining to the ethical use
of such information.

Quantitative Considerations in Disclosure
The recent improvements in product-line reporting as required by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are welcomed, but, at the same
time, it is well worth remembering that even with divisional reporting a
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multitude of sins may be glossed over. The following case will serve to
illustrate the problems that may occur. A conglomerate having three divisions,
each composed of seven subsidiaries, issues its annual report with consolidated
financial statements and meets the divisional reporting requirements of the
SEC. The manufacturing division accounts for 60 percent of the company
sales, and divisional assets are 65 percent of the company total. This manu
facturing division reports profits of $8 million as compared with $7 million
for the previous year. Six of the subsidiaries in this division with total earnings
of $4 million last year have profits of $7 million this year, the increase being
due to a chance position in an item that became a national fad—strictly a
one-shot situation. The seventh member of the division, with 60 percent of the
divisional assets as well as heavy lease commitments, has experienced a rela
tively poor year, with profits falling from $3 million to $1 million and future
prospects dimming because the firm has lost a competitive edge formerly held
as the result of cheap labor. The firm, which is unable to pass along cost
increases, has now unionized and signed an escalating labor contract.
This example, although perhaps somewhat exaggerated, does point out
that, with reporting on a consolidated basis or even with divisional or product
line reporting as required by the SEC, significant negative information may be
concealed. The banker must have consolidating balance sheets and income
statements, preferably for all subsidiaries but, in any case, for all significant
subsidiaries. A suggested definition of significance would be that if an
individual subsidiary accounted for 10 percent of the company’s total assets,
sales, or operating income, then consolidating balance sheets and income state
ments should be disclosed. It is acknowledged that this guideline would not
cover all cases, and therefore this rule would not be meant to alter the
banker’s preference for consolidating balance sheets and income statements on
all subsidiaries. Rather, it is a recognition that in a relatively small number
of cases, the number of subsidiaries may be so large as to render impractical
individual disclosure by each.
Many other examples could be cited to illustrate the point that group or
consolidated reporting can lead to erroneous impressions or conclusions,
because it may conceal the deterioration of important individual members
within the group. This criticism is also valid for practically every balance
sheet and income statement account. Inventory buildups and slow receivables
on the balance sheet, for example, and lessened or no profits or both, as
expressed in deteriorating gross or net margins on the income statement, can
be concealed or hidden in consolidated numbers. The banker does not even
have to venture outside his own industry to confront this need for consolidating
financial statements. With the growth in bank holding companies in recent
years, particularly in nonbanking areas, and with the trend toward financing
subsidiaries with borrowings by the parent, the gentleman’s approach to lend
ing on the name of the lead bank of a holding company is no longer practical
or prudent. In requesting full disclosure across the board on a consolidating
basis, the banker does not seek to except the banking industry.
Recent trends in retailing, particularly in the discount field, have also
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served to reinforce the banker’s desire for reporting on a consolidating basis.
Discount store chains flourished in the 1960s, and in the race to dominate the
field the chains expanded at a startling pace. Due to competitive factors and
control problems as well as extraneous influences, already thin profit margins
had begun to shrink by the 1970s, so that marginally profitable stores became
unprofitable, while stores that had been unprofitable since their inception
became glaring testimonials to excess. The vehicle for this rapid expansion
was the long-term lease, whether in the form of a straight lease or on a sale
lease-back basis. These same lease obligations, which facilitated the growth
of the industry, came back to haunt the chains with a vengeance. In order
to assess potential borrowers in the retail field today, the banker must know
the profitability mix of the locations. He must know the number of stores
that are marginally profitable or are unprofitable, the extent to which they are
unprofitable, and the extent to which lease obligations accrue to such locations.
Using the retail store industry as an example, it can be seen that the
extent of information needed to constitute adequate disclosure can vary with
the particular industry, and in certain cases disclosure may involve schedules
that go well beyond even consolidating statements. It is recognized that there
will be anguished cries that profitable and unprofitable locations are com
petitive secrets; yet, without this information needed to assess the firm, the
investor is unwise to invest and the creditor is unwise to extend credit.
Nowhere is this contention borne out better than in “Commercial Loan
Charge-Offs ... a report for the year ending December 31, 1973.” This
compilation by the Robert Morris Associates of member bank charge-offs
accords department stores a lofty position in the ranking of charge-offs by
industry. A supplement to consolidating statements, then, would be corporate
management’s and the accountant’s heightened perceptions of what is ma
terial and relevant in their reporting of negative information. It is a matter of
sad irony that disclosure problems for the banker usually disappear when an
industry becomes troubled. The firm which offered the least information
yesterday, in seeking to regain the confidence of creditors and investors, is
suddenly the paragon of disclosure.
With the upheaval in the world economy during the past year, the need
for expanded reporting by true multinationals and domestic companies that
lend, sell, or borrow in foreign markets has become more apparent. While
detailed information could have been considered a luxury yesterday, it may
well be a necessity tomorrow, and the need for this type of reporting has
barely been acknowledged. Considerations of importance include total claims
and exposure in foreign currencies, percentages of sales and profits accruing
from each foreign country, intercompany payables and receivables, debt
obligations in foreign currencies, and effects of foreign tax credits on domestic
earnings. A prerequisite for an analysis of the type indicated is that financial
statements of the foreign subsidiaries be available to the banker.
New kinds of financial statements are also on the horizon. The Study
Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements, sponsored by the AICPA
and more familiarly referred to as the Trueblood Committee in recognition
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of the late Robert M. Trueblood, who chaired the group, proposed a state
ment of financial activities. This would be in addition to the more familiar
financial statements and would disclose only those activities presumed to
have significant cash consequences, stressing such functional activities as
purchasing, manufacturing, selling, leasing, and financing. The statement
would include purchase commitments, lines of credit, sales backlogs, leases,
acquisitions of long-term assets, incurrence of long-term debt, and capital
contributions and distributions. The difference between this statement and a
statement of earnings would be that no attempt would be made to relate these
sacrifices and benefits to the earnings process—no allocation is involved. The
significance of this financial statement is that it would report data requiring
minimal judgment and interpretation by the preparer; it would offer hard data
to be interpreted by the user. The banker strongly endorses this new financial
statement, consistent with his plea for greater disclosure of raw data.
To summarize, it is recommended that general disclosure in the area of
financial statement reporting, in order to be considered adequate, be on a
consolidating basis both for the balance sheet and the income statement. Addi
tionally, adequate financial statement disclosure in certain industries is
dependent upon the publication of supporting schedules and data that com
plement consolidating financial statements.

Qualitative Considerations in Disclosure
Adequate disclosure also embraces qualitative considerations. The
banker, because of his emphasis on cash flows, is necessarily concerned with
the quality of earnings as disclosed by the firm. To the extent that such earn
ings are questionable, the basis for a loan decision may be invalid, the banker’s
monitoring of a loan may be hampered, and the timely repayment of the loan
may be endangered. An excellent illustration of this problem can be drawn
from the reporting by real estate investment trusts (REITs) during 1974. In
a year when both the rate of inflation and interest rates reached unprecedented
levels, causing substantial problems for developers (contractors and hence the
REITs), a number of REITs experienced difficulties in determining whether
loans had reached that stage of deterioration at which the accrual of interest
should be ceased. This being largely a judgmental matter, in many cases
REITs continued accruing interest up to the point at which foreclosure pro
ceedings commenced. The results of these policies were staggering. One
REIT, after reporting earnings of $8 million for nine months, reviewed its
portfolio and sharply increased its provision for possible losses, thereby
reducing net income for the year to approximately $3 million. At the same
time it was announced that the amount of loans on a nonaccrual basis was
being increased to approximately one-fourth of the loan portfolio. The result
was that the trust had distributed $4.7 million in excess of earnings, which
required treating the dividends paid as a return of capital!
This example raises important questions about the quality of earnings
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reported at interim dates. Would greater disclosure at interim reporting dates
have made management more cautious in reporting profits; that is, if manage
ment were forced to defend profit figures with detailed supporting data, would
results be reported differently? If not—if management insists on unembellished
interim figures—should the accountant have a more influential role in their
preparation and disclosure? The intent in having the accountant review
interim financial statements would be simply to prevent the issuance of that
which is misleading. In the example of the REIT, the problem was not
recognized until the accountant came in at year end, a fact that is unacceptable
to investor and creditor alike. The banker is not seeking an unqualified
opinion and full audit at quarterly interim dates. Instead he is looking for the
benefits that accrue from having the accountant, who is familiar not only with
the firm but also with industry practices, review that which is to be disclosed.
This review would assure a greater continuity in adherence to policy between
fiscal reporting dates as well as allow for the timely review of changes in
policy. The review in fact would be only one step removed from the con
tinuous audit that is becoming more common today.
With regard to the quality of earnings, certain assumptions have to be
made by the banker. Granted that as the amount of disclosure of raw data
increases, the banker is better able to evaluate the quality of earnings; how
ever, the accountant is the one best able to pass judgment in this area. This
is particularly true with inflation considerations, as will be discussed later, but
it is also true in another area: the banker would like to see greater emphasis
by the accountant on revenue recognition policies, particularly with respect
to new industries, firms that emphasize financing, and firms that engage in
project work. Recognition of income can be a highly judgmental matter, and
judgment can be good or bad. A detailed statement by the accountant of the
firm’s revenue recognition policies, together with comments on their adequacy
and the underlying factors that may bear significantly on them, should be a
standard requirement. As an example one might note that REITs commonly
include interest costs in budgeting the cost of a project and thus in the loan
to fund it. To be unaware of this in evaluating revenue recognition policies
is to court faulty analysis and bad judgment.
It is recommended, then, that quarterly interim financial statements,
which are an essential aspect of general disclosure, be reviewed by the accoun
tant responsible for the fiscal audit. In addition, greater emphasis should be
placed on disclosure of revenue recognition policies, for they bear mightily
upon the quality of earnings.
Goals and Objectives

Another aspect of general disclosure involves the communication of cor
porate goals and objectives and management progress in achieving them. The
banker must look beyond the numbers to assess the underlying company and
its management. He cannot rely solely on past results and optimistic forecasts.
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Rather, the banker must have confidence in the borrower, being satisfied that
past financial results are meaningful in the sense that they can be shown to be
part of an overall scheme of progress, not strictly the result of chance or oneshot situations. From this base, the banker establishes the credibility of the
firm and its projections.
The obvious medium for much of this type of disclosure is a meaningful
message in the annual report. This message should be a factual commentary
on how operating results, acquisitions and dispositions, extraordinary events,
and such other events as are deemed material and relevant, relate to the goals
and objectives of the firm. The chairman’s and president’s messages could
be in the form of a running commentary, intermixed with the pertinent
financial statements, schedules, and other supporting data. Inventory levels,
accounts receivable, and fixed assets show significant changes during the year.
Why? Are these changes of an active or passive nature—that is, do they
represent progress or problems? Have problems disclosed by the accountant
been discussed? What is the significance of acquisitions and/or dispositions
and mergers? Have the results been in accordance with objectives? This is
certainly pertinent in view of the painful experiences of many firms that were
active in making acquisitions in the 1960s. Again, the guidelines for what
would be commented upon are materiality and relevance, both judgmental
concerns requiring responsible management.
In addition to the need for explanation of events that have taken place
(with accompanying details about how they aid in meeting goals and objec
tives), more effort should also be made to detail the goals and objectives them
selves. Perhaps a five-year horizon would be in order, with management
stating the general directions in which the firm will move, together with
growth ranges sought and capital expenditures required. This information
would be broadly stated and would be complemented by proposed one-year
forecasts.
In summary, it is recommended that general disclosure should be con
strued to include management communication of goals and objectives and the
firm’s progress in achieving them. As a suggestion, a five-year horizon might
prove a suitable backdrop for discussion of these goals and objectives.

Forecasts and Projections
On February 2, 1973, the Securities and Exchange Commission
announced that it planned to allow publication of financial forecasts within the
scope of guidelines to be developed at a later date. The effect of this action
was to rekindle the long-running debate over the pros and cons of forecasting.
At the heart of the SEC action was a desire to eliminate selective dissemination
of earnings data and other earnings related information—in other words,
another disclosure problem. Preliminary SEC guidelines limit the forecasting
period to one year, require that underlying assumptions be reported, require
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sales and earnings projections at a minimum, require updating by disclosure as
needed, and state that only companies with an earnings history and budgeting
experience should issue forecasts.
While the difficulties that can be encountered in forecasting are numerous,
and policing of the SEC guidelines (which appear reasonable on a preliminary
basis) will be a formidable task, the banking community and the financial
community as a whole should benefit from this exercise. These benefits will
accrue as companies move to strengthen their internal budgeting so as to
enable them to make accurate forecasts in response to investor demands. In
part, a banker’s loan decision is based on management capability, which should
be enhanced by greater knowledge and control in budgeting. Additionally, the
firm’s ability to prepare accurate forecasts aids the banker in assessing cash
flows. In recent years, owing to various reasons, including the inability of
firms to go to the equity markets and the strained bond markets, there has
been a trend in banking toward increased intermediate-term lending, with
maturities in the five- to ten-year range becoming common. Lending in this
manner requires projections of exceptional depth, that is, information one
would not expect to be included in general disclosure. To the extent that a
firm is better able to forecast one-year results, there should be some carry
over into projections going out further, although a great many other con
siderations are included in term projections. Inasmuch as this type of
forecasting is clearly beyond the scope of general disclosure as we envision it
today, let us return to the one-year forecast. The practice of obtaining pro
jections, as has been pointed out, is a well-established procedure in banking.
The prudent banker, however, accepts these figures in the knowledge that they
are only as good as the underlying management. Clearly, then, the banker
uses these forecasts in combination with other information to make his
decision. Thus, the banker supports the SEC proposal but strictly within the
aforementioned guidelines, in particular that the publication of these forecasts
be on a voluntary basis and that only those firms with experience in internal
budgeting and an earnings history should participate. The prudent banker
will proceed cautiously in the use of the forecasts, expecting detailed explana
tion of underlying assumptions and recognizing the need to use them in
combination with other financial statements and information, thus not attach
ing undue significance to them.

Inflation Accounting
If the decade of the 1960s witnessed creeping inflation, experience in
the 1970s to date would suggest that the creep has quickened to a gallop.
Inflation rates for the 1970s on the average have been approximately double
the average rates for the decade of the 1960s. Not only that, but inflation
rates in 1973 and 1974 have escalated sharply. While the future course of
inflation is uncertain, contrary to the abundance of dire predictions, the
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problems of accounting for this inflation are very real and are rightfully
approached for review at this time. The SEC has requested publicly held
companies to disclose the impact of inventory profits on earnings. Addition
ally, the FASB has embraced the problems of inflation accounting, with pro
nouncements yet to be made at the date of this writing.
The banker is also concerned about the ability of generally accepted
accounting principles to effectively communicate the financial condition and
performance of the firm in an inflationary environment. The reasons for this
concern are rooted in the quality of earnings and include not only debt repay
ment but also the general health of the financial community.
The most obvious area of concern is in inventory accounting. During a
period of rapidly increasing prices, firms that use the FIFO basis of inventory
accounting are apt to show sharp increases in profits. Price increases
that take place after the purchase of inventory and prior to the sale will
inflate profits by a like amount. Profits are disclosed, indicating that the
firm has performed well during the period. But has it? The firm must now
replace the inventory used and sold, not at the price it carried the old inventory
but at today’s inflated prices. To the extent that reported earnings include
inventory profits, they distort the impression given of the firm’s ability to repay
debt.
A second area of concern is the extent to which reported earnings are a
result of the underdepreciation of capital assets. As in the case of inventories,
the basis for depreciation is found in original cost. However, in a period of
rapid inflation, the failure to adjust depreciation to reflect replacement cost
is also a failure to match current revenues with current expenses. Thus, the
quality of earnings is again suspect. The overstatement of earnings as a result
of inventory profits and underdepreciation can have debilitating aspects.
Taxes may be paid on the questionable earnings, and with increased earnings
there may be pressure for greater dividend payout, resulting in an erosion
of capital. At a time when working capital is being depleted by the cash pay
ment of taxes and dividends, “profits” are not realizable by a going concern. In
addition to these problems, even in cases where earnings are not suspect, there
remains the problem of measuring the progress of the firm via earnings in
constant dollars.
The quick answers to these three problems have been LIFO inventory
accounting, accelerated depreciation, and the use of a universal deflator.
These quick answers, however, overlook difficulties and ineffectiveness in their
application, not to mention the problem of arriving at a deflator with universal
applicability. As a short- and intermediate-term lender, the banker, even
without inflation accounting, might be able to achieve timely loan repayment
by selective lending. However, the banker is interested in continuing relation
ships with firms and, thus, the health of industry. For this reason, he would
like to see an end to the reporting of unrealized profits that have the effect
of leading to an erosion of capital via increased tax and dividend payouts.
Yet, as a user of financial statements, credibility is of the utmost importance
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to him. The combination of needed credibility and the comparatively short
period of what to Americans is a high inflation rate suggests to the banker that
the answer is, in part, more detailed disclosure. In the case of inventory valu
ation, a supplemental restatement of cost of goods sold and operating income
giving effect to replacement cost should be included in the notes to the financial
statements. With respect to adequacy of depreciation, the banker seeks a more
detailed disclosure of capital expenditure plans which he will use in his
analysis along with methods of depreciation and figures for the same as re
vealed by the accountant. Some would argue that, from the standpoint of loan
repayment, the banker is on relatively safe ground because he is a short- and
intermediate-term lender, and the effects of underdepreciation, while accruing
yearly, are evidenced in the longer run. This argument is shortsighted, yield
ing false comfort. The inflation atmosphere has given rise to considerations
long discussed and little implemented: price-level-adjusted figures and
current-value accounting. These considerations transcend the current inflation
spurt, pointing instead to a limitation existent since the inception of financial
accounting—the sacred aspect of historical cost and its inflexible application.
As a financial statement user, the banker hopes that the FASB will move
cautiously and thoughtfully, but purposefully, toward a more responsive set
of generally accepted accounting principles.

Conclusion

The substantial increase in the growth of business enterprises, the trend
toward involvement in multipurpose companies and the changes in the inter
national economy that have resulted in rising inflationary trends, sharpen the
need for greater financial disclosure. As bankers, we have become important
term lenders, as well as seasonal lenders, requiring not only the “nuts and
bolts” of financial data, which can be gleaned from detailed consolidating
financial statements, but also an insight into the longer-range qualitative
aspects of financial reporting as encompassed in descriptive statements of
income recognition, effects of inflation upon earnings and assets, statements of
goals and objectives of corporate managements, and reports on their degree of
adherence to them. In addition to these information needs, which are viewed
as being essential components of general disclosure, the banker occasionally
requires information above and beyond that offered in general disclosure.
Recognizing the nature and extent of the banker’s commitment and the
limited return in relation to the risk involved, the banker may require addi
tional reporting in order to assess and monitor a credit risk and thus protect
the interests of his depositors. The need for disclosure is no longer question
able—its form and content are what is at issue today.
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Critique
Of the Gray and Schoenborn papers
By John Boyce-Smith, Vice President and Treasurer, Foremost-McKesson,
Inc.
The two papers on which I was asked to comment were both written
by bankers. Mr. Schoenborn’s paper reviewed what he felt were shortcom
ings in present reporting which prevent the credit analyst from doing his
job adequately and which would be overcome by fuller disclosure. Mr. Gray’s
paper viewed the problem from the standpoint of the security analyst. Accord
ingly, each brought a different set of concerns. As a corporate financial officer,
I can agree with some of the suggestions made, but not with others. As a
former banker and security analyst, I can see reasons why some of the in
formation suggested might be required as part of normal reporting, but not
all of it. I will comment on individual items but, first, I feel impelled to
express this observation.

Disclosure of Significant Items

Most of the discussion I have seen to date relating to disclosure doesn’t
deal with what I believe is the real problem. The real problem is not dis
closure but integrity. What seems the attempt to steadily expand the types
and amounts of information which must be published forces management to
divulge so much detail about everything in all situations that those few bits of
information which might be relevant in a particular situation will be made
public and any interested party can sift through the chaff and find them.
What I think we should ask for, instead, is a standard of honesty and openness
on the part of management which results in disclosure of the significant items.
If this standard were adhered to, I venture to speculate that the present
demand for more detail would disappear.
Integrity is essential on the other side, too. If management had no need
to be concerned whether information disclosure would be used irresponsibly,
its resistance to disclosure might be less. Well, why don’t we take this
approach? I think there are at least these reasons:

1. Corporate management is not convinced that many of those asking for
information have a right to it and can see no way to limit access to
information to those they feel are entitled to it.
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2. Even if it is conceded that certain people have rights to information, it
is human nature that it is difficult for management to be enthusiastic
about volunteering information which is not what management wanted
it to be, or what it was expected to be. So we get into a dialogue some
thing like this: The analyst says, “We won’t let you decide what to tell
us. You might withhold just what we want to know.”
“Well, what do you want to know?”
“We don’t know what we want to know, so tell us everything.” And
round and round we go. Are we discussing disclosure? No, we are
discussing integrity. What the analyst is really saying is, “We don’t trust
you. It’s your integrity we are really questioning—not your financial
statements. We hope that, by setting disclosure rules, enough information
will come out so that we can comb through it and find out what we want to
know.”

Disclosure and the "Need to Know"

And who is this analyst? Is he friend or foe? Is he a major stockholder
who put up part of the original capital for the enterprise, or is he a competitor
with designs to take you over? Is he thinking of buying your stock to hold,
or planning to sell short? Is he interested in the growth and development of
the country or dedicated to destroying it? The answers to these questions
make a difference in what it is appropriate for the inquirer to expect to be
told, but I haven’t seen recognition of this in disclosure discussions. Instead,
there is demand for more disclosure with an implication that more is better.
More is not necessarily better for the company, whether publicly held or
privately owned and whether reviewed from the narrow point of view of
stockholders, employees, the public as consumers, the government as a
steward of the country’s economic health, or from the standpoint of corporate
management. I put management last, not because it is the last group to be
involved, but to make the point that it should arrive at decisions in light of the
needs of all other interests.
I shall comment first on Mr. Gray’s paper. He wants us to accept a basic
premise that disclosure provides the information which allows “free choice”
(of product selection as consumers and investment opportunity as investors)
which leads to an “efficient economic system” which, in turn, provides the
best way to fulfill the material needs of the U.S. population. I thought a
long while about whether to discuss that, decided it would take a book to
do it and, therefore, decided not to attempt it at this time. I think every par
ticipant in the symposium has his opinion on this premise and, therefore, will
view Mr. Gray’s suggestions and mine from his own view of it.
I don’t see how disclosure of financial information has much to do with
free choice in selecting goods and services. I don’t believe the material well82

being of the population is necessarily helped. Does anyone seriously argue
that our well-being is helped by our choosing to consume the billions of
cigarettes and millions of barrels of liquor we choose to buy?
What I believe is the right approach to disclosure is one which answers
these questions:
1. What are the groups which are entitled to information about publicly
owned companies?
2. Who is entitled to be considered a member of each group?
3. What information does each group need?
4. From what source should the information come?
During wartime when military secrets needed to be kept, there were
procedures to try to protect information. Individuals were investigated and,
if approved, given levels of security clearance. If properly cleared, an in
dividual could be given “secret” information. But, even if he had a security
clearance, an individual was not to be given secret information unless his
duties created a “need to know” that particular information. You didn’t
give secret information to everyone who had a secret clearance. You gave
it to those who had a clearance and who had to have that particular information
to carry out their particular mission.
Going back to the questions I raised above, some of the groups outside
company management whose information needs are different are—

1. Auditors.
2. Equity Investors—existing or potential; large or small; real or ostensible;
professional or amateur.
3. Creditors—Banks, long-term lenders, trade, and other current creditors.
4. Governments—taxing authorities, regulatory agencies, economic planners,
miscellaneous.

Each of these groups has a different “need to know”—different in the
kind of information and the quality of information, the level of detail, time
liness, and maybe still other criteria. Instead of recognizing this, disclosure
pressure seems to be in the direction of forcing a rigid uniformity. Not only
must more and more be published, but only what is given to everyone can be
given to anyone.
With these thoughts in mind let me look at other points raised by Mr.
Gray.
He is satisfied with existing sources of broad economic, political, and
social developments but wants more and better information on certain in
dustries and particular companies because, as he states, “It seems reasonable
to assume that greater knowledge will increase the likelihood that capital
will be channeled into its most productive uses.” This, I believe, has to remain
an assumption. It’s such a neat-sounding statement that it has appeal. I
doubt, however, that the real world works this way.
After several more pages of discussion, to which I take no exception,
Mr. Gray deals with expectations about the stream of future payments. I
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agree that if we could know what will happen to factors which will alter
future earnings, the ranges within which these factors might operate and
the probability of any combination of movements, it would be superb. But
attempts to do this are futile. If he had been given every piece of data he
could have dreamed of about every oil company in the world in 1972, his
conclusions would have been knocked into a cocked hat if he had not been
told that in 1973 Egypt would attack Israel and the OPEC nations would
triple the price of the greatest part of the world’s oil supply. And who knew
that? Noone.
Mr. Gray makes a plea for corporate-prepared earnings forecasts after
starting with an understanding that earnings forecasts are inaccurate. Cor
porations should not release earnings forecasts. There is no way I can
conceive, now, that they could be surrounded with the explanation and
qualification needed to avoid misunderstanding on the part of 99 out of 100
who would read the forecasts, or at least one figure in it—EPS.
A security analyst who had first done his homework would come away
with more insight than any forecast could give him if he could visit with the
corporate financial officer for an hour or so about the developments, visible
or suspected, which might modify the experience of the past. But this is
just the kind of information we can’t give him without wondering whether
it would be “inside” information. Don’t tell me to give it to everyone at the
same time. There is no way.

Use of Disclosure and Forecasts

Ira G. Corn, Chief Executive Officer of Michigan General Corporation,
makes the point forcefully in the summer 1974 issue of MSU Business Topics.
He says, “I am suggesting that forecasts prepared internally by publicly held
American companies are without merit for public use as a guide to invest
ment.” He points out that they are used in an attempt to set goals and objec
tives for divisions, regions, and branches, and to lay production and expense
plans. We know they won’t be achieved. We don’t apologize. It’s not that
we don’t know our business. The fact is, so many things we can’t control will
change so much, so fast, before the year is out that our original assumptions
won’t hold. Part of the test of our skills will be how we respond to these
changes, but whether we hit the earnings projection is not necessarily the test
of management ability. If we hit it, it will be because the disappointments and
mistakes were exactly offset by pleasant surprises and luck—or some other
company’s goofs.
I remember the point being made in a discussion last year that whether
or not the outcome of a decision proves to be successful is not the way
to judge whether the decision was sound at the time it was made. Before
the decision is made, all the facts which could have a bearing on the out
come should be assembled. All the assumptions which have to be made
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should be set down. The relationships which govern the situation are thought
through. The ranges of possible future events and their probabilities are
estimated. The consequences of possible outcomes are examined—loss, if
unsuccessful, versus gain, if successful, for example. All this is done before
deciding to proceed. If all that could be done is done, and if the logic of the
decision is sound, and leads to the decision taken, then it was a good decision
whether or not the outcome is later “successful”—that is, what we desired it
to be. And we recognize that, despite our care, the outcome may not be
what we desired it to be.
In 1973 our controller asked me to forecast what the corporate interest
expense would be for 1974. All the best thinking of economists and moneymarket students that I could find said at that time that short-term bank rates
would be down, probably in the range of 7 percent, and we estimated interest
cost on that basis. Did we achieve the projection? You know we didn’t.
Should management have had knowledge superior to others of the rates we
were facing which determine what our bank borrowing cost would be? I
don’t see how. Certainly there are some plans that management is in better
position to know—is the only one in position to know—but to say that,
because of this, our earnings forecast must be superior and we must somehow
be hung with it is not proper. The point is that those things we cannot con
trol, including what our competitors do, have much more influence on varia
tions in result than do those things about which we have the superior advance
knowledge.
If management is going to be forced by the SEC, or any other way,
into the business of publishing forecasts, then my solution is this: require
us to give you a forecast “kit,” and you make your own forecast. Our kit
would be a statement of the major economic predictions we have selected
as most likely. We also can give an outline of certain plans that have reached
a point where disclosure won’t help the competition much. But there are
many things we should not be expected to disclose if you still believe in a
competitive business system. As the saying goes—“Does Macy’s tell
Gimbel’s?” And if the competition isn’t entitled to it, no one is because
there is no way to disclose information selectively. The truth of that seems
to be well recognized and lies at the heart of the disclosure controversy.
I am aware of the argument that the competition already knows all our
secrets so that disclosure wouldn’t actually hurt us. I am aware of the argu
ment, but feel it is just an argument. It is not true. If it were true, we might
establish a disclosure rule that Gimbel’s is required to tell the world everything
it knows about Macy’s, and vice versa.
When Mr. Gray moves on from suggesting publication of earnings fore
casts to requesting long-term growth rate forecasts, he speculates that more
specific inputs from corporate sources would add to the quality of effort (by
the analyst) to estimate earnings growth rates. This information, he feels,
would be the most useful he could have and he concludes, therefore, that it
should be disclosed. I don’t conclude that at all. I conclude that it has been
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demonstrated that analysts cannot reliably predict long-term growth rates
and want to pass the buck to corporate management on the argument, again,
that our knowledge is superior and we shouldn’t be allowed to monopolize it.
Our knowledge of what our long-term growth rate will be is not necessarily
superior and we shouldn’t be forced into a guessing game about it.
I can agree when he says there are many kinds of information that are
more important to a real understanding of the business and its future prospects
and we should be considering what they are and how the information should
be transmitted. But analysts will differ in their views of what is important,
and what is important will differ from industry to industry and company to
company within an industry, and from one point in time to another for a
given company.
I can see a value to the analyst of the kinds of information he discusses
under the heading, “The Most Useful Information,” but must ask the ques
tion, “Who gave the analyst the authority to make the capital allocation
decisions for the good of the world?” With all the information in the world
at everyone’s disposal and every corporation’s books and records constantly
on display on the broad tape, there will still be massive misallocations. Says
who? Says everyone. I would disagree with some allocations. You would
disagree with some. He would disagree with others—all looking at the same
information. So the allocation of resources for the good of humanity argu
ment seems to me to be not real.
Finally, Mr. Gray states a dilemma which I also see. It is impossible
to compile a list of information requirements that is sufficient for all cases
without significant parts being of very marginal value, or no value in a
majority of cases. I would like to offer a suggestion about this dilemma,
after drawing some points from Mr. Schoenborn’s paper.
In discussing the problem as he sees it, we leave the world of owner
investor, potential or actual, real or ostensible, short-term speculator, or just
enemy of private enterprise, and enter a different relationship of lender/
borrower. Going back to what I said about “need to know” there is very little
that the banker needs to know to make a sound credit decision that the inves
tor doesn’t need to know, also. If the near-term financial health of the enter
prise is not sound, which is the banker’s concern, then the investor likewise
should be concerned. Conversely, if the investor’s position is a sound one
for the long pull, the banker should be satisfied that the borrower will work
his way out of a short-term problem.
Mr. Schoenborn also sees a responsibility for allocation of resources
as a primary justification for the banker’s being furnished with information.
I can support his request for information, but delegating the resource alloca
tion responsibility to the banker is not the reason.
Conceding that the banker needs to know certain things, I cannot agree
that the information need is the same in each case. It isn’t. Therefore, I
disagree with Mr. Schoenborn’s view that standard information should be
furnished for all cases. What the bank credit analyst needs to know to make
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a sound judgment depends on the size of the loan, its duration, the nature
of the borrower’s balance sheet, his profit record and various intangible
factors—management strength and experience, market position, sources of
reserve support, etc.—all in a context of general and industry economic trends
and outlook.
So, we as borrowers furnish what information we feel should be sufficient
and we stand prepared to supplement it, to explain it, and to answer truthfully
questions about it. We expect the banker to be a professional, to know his
trade, to be able to decide in each case when he has sufficient information, and
not to take refuge behind a list of standard information that someone has told
him is what he needs to know. So long as we can find professional bankers
with whom to deal, we will by-pass the one who falls back on the shotgun or
cover-everything-with-a-net approach because that one won’t know what to
do with all the information if you do give it to him.
I can’t believe that banks suffer by being played off against each other
on matters of adequate credit information. I never suffered from it as a
banker and I never heard other bankers complain about it in our Robert
Morris meetings. I can believe, however, that one banker concludes he needs
more information to reach his decision than another one does to reach his
decision on the same company. Maybe the second one knows the industry
better, has dealt with the customer longer, or is just a better credit man. But
the first one has no right to feel he is being played off against the second.
The discussion of consolidating statements and quality of earnings
suggests one comment: “the test of whether an analyst knows his business,
whether in fact he really is an analyst or is just going through some statistical
‘busywork’ is whether he knows how to ask the right questions.” If he does,
he will zero in on the supplementary balance sheet and profit and loss informa
tion that will really tell him what he needs to know. In some cases, consoli
dating balance sheets are important. In the case of our company, they
wouldn’t be, because all but one of our major divisions operate within a single
corporation—the parent company. All the types of information mentioned in
Mr. Schoenborn’s paper, which he was not able to glean from the furnished
financial reports, I would expect him to develop out of the dialogue which
his banking officers are having day-in and day-out with the customers’ manage
ment. Just train them to discuss what you feel needs to be discussed on a
case-by-case basis. There is no need for separate standards of disclosure
for information to be furnished banks. There is just a need within the
banking industry to work everlastingly at training enough bankers.
How Should Disclosure Be Handled

Where do we come out then, overall, on how disclosure should be
handled? I think it should be handled along these lines:

1. There is basic financial information which is the foundation for under
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2.

3.

4.

5.

standing and further analysis. This should be disclosed universally and
continuously.
Significant developments affecting, or which might affect, the company’s
value or results, whether favorable or unfavorable, should be disclosed
promptly.
Corporate management needs to be scrupulously honest and objective in
asking itself what is significant and, therefore, what should be disclosed.
There may be some additions to the present standard information which
will be proven to be advisable, but there should be a limit to the amount
of additional detail to be required as standard because, in fact, it is not
broadly needed.
There should be recognition that some people in exercising legitimate
functions need additional information which it is not appropriate to
broadcast generally. Emphasis should be put on preventing misuse of
this information by those who receive it, but corporate management
should not be prohibited from supplying it. CPAs regularly receive such
information but seem not to have had problems handling it; bankers,
also. But investment bankers get into lots of trouble and as long as they
also deal with the stock-buying public, I suppose they will continue to
have such problems.
It needs to be recognized that conscientious and skillful analysts and
real investors are entitled to more time and attention from corporate
management than some who may express an interest out of curiosity
or malice but represent no, or only minor, financial commitment to the
corporation. I know full well that some will cry “discrimination” and
others will say there is no way to define who is entitled to how much
management attention. Well, the process of learning is the process of
achieving an ability to discriminate in the healthy sense.

Now, back to the dilemma Mr. Gray posed: Why shouldn’t there be
recognition of the “need to know” doctrine? Why shouldn’t corporate manage
ment be free, after publishing the agreed-upon basic information, to make
judgments on who really needs what information and to discriminate, if you
will, in releasing it?
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Critique
Of the Gray and Schoenborn papers
By Oscar S. Gellein, Member, Financial Accounting Standards Board

Both Gray and Schoenborn start from the premise that disclosure, in a
broad sense, should be designed so as to contribute to the efficiency of the
economic system and, more specifically, to the efficient allocation of resources
within the system. Gray recognizes that some of the information necessary to
further this end concerns general economic, political, and social develop
ments. He chooses, however, to confine his comments to aspects of disclosure
concerned with particular companies and industries, limited further to that
information which is relevant to the investment process. Schoenborn seems
implicitly to be concerned with the same dimension of disclosure, but gener
ally confines his attention to the bank-lending aspect of the investment process.
Gray observes, by way of emphasis, concerning the “efficient market
theory,” that efficiency under this theory is attained without regard to whether
the information which is a part of the public knowledge is complete or
substantive.

Usefulness of Information

Gray suggests as a test for usefulness of information the expected effect
on the price of a security in terms of magnitude and persistence. It could be
argued that this is not a test at all, but rather a manifestation of the result
of disclosure. On the other hand, to the extent that the proposed test places
an emphasis on the expectation of a result on a security price, it may be
another way of saying that usefulness of information should be tested in terms
of how it might be expected to influence investor decisions. Gray seems to be
applying this latter test when he refers to the likely effect of “knowledge or
information” on expectations concerning future cash flows.

Earnings Forecasts
Both Gray and Schoenborn find earnings forecasts useful. Schoenborn,
however, would make public distribution voluntary, and would limit their
distribution to those companies with an earnings history and demonstrated
experience with internal budgeting. Gray seems not to favor such limitations.
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Gray presents some interesting figures and comments about the relation
ships between (a) earnings forecasts (presumably for selected companies)
prepared by securities analysts at the Harris Trust and Savings Bank, (b) ac
tual published results for those companies, and (c) the behavior of the prices
of the companies’ securities. One observation by Gray is that those com
panies experiencing the largest negative difference, in 1973, between actual
results and analyst expectations showed, on the average, the largest stock
price decline. Another observation is that those with the largest positive
difference showed, on the average, the smallest price change. After present
ing information for two additional years, 1971 and 1972, Gray concludes
that there is a good indication that changes in earnings expectations (again
presumably those of analysts) reflect on the prices of securities, irrespective
of the nature of general market conditions.
The results of these studies and observations then become the basis for
Gray’s conclusions that changes in earnings forecasts are important, and
accordingly that earnings forecasts are important, because they provide in
formation that has a “significant impact on the prices of securities.”
Several questions come to mind in weighing these studies and the obser
vations made about their results. The first is whether the nature of the com
panies, their operations, and the external factors bearing on their results
did not have a greater effect on stock prices than the forecasts themselves.
Correlation measures may or may not relate to cause and effect. It would be
interesting, for example, to see whether historical earnings for selected periods
would correlate with the same average security price changes. Of course,
even if the correlation were significant, it would not demonstrate that his
torical earnings figures provide sufficient information for those making deci
sions about investments in a company. By the same token, caution should be
used in inferring too much about the usefulness of forecasts from correlation
studies.
Mr. Gray does not comment on the relationship between forecasts
and the orderliness of the capital market, and the possible consequent effect
on the relative positions of the short-term speculative investor on one hand,
and the long-term investor on the other.

Company Growth Rates
Forecasts of company growth rates are dealt with at some length by both
Gray and Schoenborn. Gray confines his discussions largely to earnings
growth rates while Schoenborn deals with the subject more broadly in terms
of commentary on results and events in relation to company goals and objec
tives, capital expenditures, and to growth ranges sought. Both seem to be
thinking in terms of disclosure of enough company information to permit
outsiders to make their own estimates of growth ranges, but they both in
dicated that company-prepared estimates would be useful.
A fundamental question suggested here is whether greater efficiency in
the capital market is attained by (1) general distribution of company pre90

pared forecasts of earnings (presumably for one year) and earnings growth
ranges (presumably for, say, three to five years), or (2) disclosure by the
company of sufficient internal information to enable outsiders to make their
own forecasts of earnings and growth rates. The degree of capital market
upset occasioned by significant differences between actual results and fore
casts needs exploration.

Line-of-Business Information and
Consolidating Statements
Disaggregation of information along division and subsidiary lines gets a
good deal of Schoenborn’s attention. He favors, generally, the use of con
solidating financial statements, presumably in addition to consolidated state
ments. Presentation of consolidating statements would in many cases go
significantly beyond line-of-business reporting, even if the latter were broken
down considerably finer than now practiced or proposed. A question that
needs resolution here is whether consolidating statements provide useful
information different from line-of-business reporting.
Information that would be shown in consolidating statements and not
necessarily in line-of-business financial statements comprises, among other
things, liquidity, debt, retained earnings, and other similar positions, cor
poration by corporation. There are situations, undoubtedly, where this in
formation would be useful and perhaps many others where it would not.
The cost/benefit ratio for consolidating statements might be unreasonable if
they were required across the board. It would have been especially helpful
if Schoenborn had suggested some criteria for identifying, in some detail,
the type of information sought in consolidating statements, and how it is
useful.

Economic Reality and Quality of Earnings
Economic reality is given some attention by Gray; quality of earnings is
referred to by Schoenborn. These terms have some similar connotations.
They need definition and elaboration. Economic reality has the ring of the
finite, the unalterable truth. It is affected, however, by subjective consider
ations. Even the economists’ notions of value and income comprehend sub
jective factors of utility and human preferences. So, economic reality is not
a single measurable quality, but rather one that shifts within a range of
intended use and human preference.
Quality of earnings, as a term, also has several connotations. Some say
that it refers to the degree of softness (or hardness) of earnings. Others use
the term to describe the relationship between an accounting method followed
and so-called economic reality. It would be desirable to define the term more
precisely.
One suggestion is to confine the term to situations where two factors
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come into consideration: persistence of earnings and likelihood of cash
realization. In terms of persistence of earnings, the quality would be high if
the probability of continuance is high. One-shot earnings would have the
lowest quality. Concerning the likelihood of cash realization, earnings would
have high quality if cash realization of the related revenue were highly
probable and if there were a high probability that the measures of reported
expenses were not exceeded by the related cash outflows that had occurred
or would occur. It can only be muddling to use the term “quality of earnings”
to characterize a relationship between accounting methods and so-called
“economic reality.”
These factors of persistence of earnings and likely cash consequence
provide powerful guides to the development of disclosure standards. Varia
tions in the nature of company operations and the environments in which they
operate lead to varying degrees of persistence of earnings, as well as different
degrees of probable cash consequences. These variations often are inherent
in company operations. Earnings as a single measure, therefore, will have
varying degrees of quality, as that term is defined here. Those using measures
of earnings in making investment decisions concerning a company have, in
turn, varying degrees of risk preferences. Disclosures that would enable
readers of financial statements to sort out the variations in earnings persistence
and likely cash consequences should, therefore, be useful. Much can be
done along these fines.

Disclosure—Financial Statements and Elsewhere

Disclosure in the broadest sense comprehends the communicating of
all the information necessary for an intelligent economic or financial decision
concerning a company. In this sense, the financial statements themselves are
part of the disclosure. The narrower use of the term would consider three
types of information to be communicated as a part of the disclosure: (1) in
formation that is an integral part of the financial statements, (2) information
supplemental to the financial statements, and (3) information contained else
where in a company’s report.
Recently, several issues have arisen which bear on this type of separation.
One concerns the guidelines for distinguishing between information that
properly belongs in the financial statements and that which belongs else
where in the overall financial report of a company. (Note that the commen
tary contained here is intended solely to bring the issues forth for further
discussion, rather than to offer ways of resolving them.) It has been sug
gested, for example, that any line-of-business information presented in the
report should be outside the financial statements. It has been suggested, too,
that information such as price and volume variance data should be outside
the financial statements. One of the reasons offered for this type of separation
concerns the legal liability implications to the company. It is pointed out
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that case law has tended to focus on a different standard of certainty in
financial statements than in other sections of the report, and that this dis
tinction is so firmly imbedded in the law that any move to modify it should
proceed slowly.
Another reason offered is that anything that is unauditable should be
outside the financial statements. This argument would seem to relate mainly
to the type of report that an auditor would be required to give with respect
to such information and, presumably, to the significance in the capital market
of any qualifications in the report.
Another issue concerns the question of whether disclosures in financial
statements or in connection with them can be separated into those minimally
necessary for the so-called average investor and those additionally helpful to
the so-called sophisticated user. Any move in the direction of differential
disclosure along these lines would require identification of an average investor
and perhaps some caveat on the financial statements that additional informa
tion deemed necessary in making investment decisions about a company is
available, or has been made available to others.
Standards of disclosure will need to be based on recognition of the im
portance of fairness to all those who are making investment decisions con
cerning the company—fairness to those who stand ready to hold or sell, those
who are prepared to buy or not buy, or lend or not lend. The standard
of the right to know has become pervasive.
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Discussion
Of the Gray and Schoenborn papers
William Chatlos, Georgeson & Company, Discussion Chairman

Chairman Chatlos: To follow up on some of the points made by
Professor Mundheim, I think we are in an area that I feel very optimistic about
for the long-term, and very pessimistic about for the short-term. I think the
things we are doing are going to lead to the structuring of an entirely new
market the parameters of which none of us really knows how to assess.
Up to now the analysts have functioned in a sort of adversary relation
ship. The assumption has been that if you can go in and weasel something
out of management, totally against management’s best intents and even best
interests, that’s the way the game is played.
But the legal requirements for all of us do lead to increased responsibili
ties. In one particular analysts’ meeting I attended, an analyst was probing at
the chairman of the board very intently, obviously looking for a point that was
material. The chairman evaded the issue successfully, and on the way out I
caught the analyst at the door and said, “Jim, you really had him going there
for a while. Let me ask you a question. If he had answered what you asked
him, what would you have done with that information?” The analyst reflected
a little, and said, “Well, you know I never thought of that. That’s very
interesting.”
We are in an area where we must keep perspective, and I think this is a
good time for this kind of meeting. There isn’t anybody in this room repre
sented, including me, that the public thinks very much of. Who cares what
we do? The analysts have no constituency other than the people we have no
sympathy with, the institutional investors. The corporations have stockhold
ers all of whom are involved in losses. The institutions need no sympathy
from any of us. The assumption is that they are getting preferential treat
ment anyway, and the SEC acts on that premise.

Increasing Available Information

Who is using the information that is available right now? To date
nobody asks for 10-Ks. And now corporations will increasingly talk about
what their role should be; and corporations, by nature, are objective oriented.
When we talk to analysts, we sell at three and four times earnings; when we
don’t talk to analysts, we still sell at three and four times earnings. Why talk?
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The analysts in New York, to a large degree, have lost their constituency.
Very few people are listening at this point, particularly to those analysts who
deal with the retail trade. On the other hand, we are finding more and more
activity going on in the regional areas. And with rare exceptions, the regions
around the country are different from Wall Street.
We may be on the sophisticated cutting edge in New York but it is a
little different when you go out to Des Moines or Kansas City, St. Louis, or
Atlanta. You find yourself, by and large, not being worried about disclosure,
but being worried about educating the analysts who in the past were really
customers’ men, and saying, “Now, here’s a company, here is what this com
pany does, here are the products this company makes, here is what you ought
to know, and here are the questions you ought to ask.”
It’s a very grim process for a management that has been geared up to the
sophistication of Wall Street to go out into other areas of the country and
suddenly reduce the level of information to square 1, in effect, starting the
educational process all over again.
I am very interested in what some call “the smell test,” maybe we could
cut through a great deal of legalese if we applied the smell test and forgot the
courts. Is there anybody here who would disagree that an underwriter, being
on the board of a corporation or even acting in an underwriting capacity,
has some idea that maybe there is a conflict of interest inherent in what he is
doing? Do you need a law to tell you that?
Suppose somebody comes in to us and asks our help in making a tender
offer attack on a company at 50% above the market price. Well, I don’t
have inside information. Do I need a law to tell me that it is really not the
right thing to do to go into the market and exploit that information for my
own self-interest? The smell test covers that quite adequately.
And I think this holds true of brokers who want to be on boards of
directors, and of underwriters who have inside information and know it.
Let’s talk a little bit about some of the problems that can come out of
this and, maybe, what we can do about it. I have some questions based on
the papers we are going to discuss. The first was “Disclosure Criteria,” by
Bill Gray, followed by “Disclosure and the Banker,” by Ed Schoenborn, with
critiques of both by John Boyce-Smith and Oscar Gellein.

Current Market Prices as a Reflection of Disclosure Polices
If there is an efficient market, what implications does that have for the
types of information that should be disclosed?
Analyst: The problem today is not so much that we need more bits
and pieces of information, but that the SEC is not seeing that their rules are
being followed by corporations. It has seemed to me over the past four years
that the number of requests for information and lines in the 10-K are expand
ing. But what is lacking is compliance, because I have looked for pieces of
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information that I thought were called for by the SEC regulations, by the
APB opinions, and have not found them. And that’s what bothers me, more
than asking the SEC to give us another line of information. Let’s fill out
some of the lines that are already being requested. That is the biggest
difficulty here.
Chairman Chatlos: Might I ask, have you pursued any of this with
the SEC?
Analyst: Yes, I have, The chief accountant says that compliance is
going to get much better.
Analyst: But even beyond that, new ideas come along. Mr. Schoen
born presents the idea of consolidating a set of statements, and you cer
tainly can’t work on a multinational company, say, in the oil industry, without
knowing something about what’s happening in tankers, or what is made by
Aramco, and how much is downstream.
Monsanto, for example, presents a terrific variance analysis quarter-by
quarter, and our needs keep changing as times change.
Analyst: I am not sure that what we need is more information. I
rather subscribe to John Boyce-Smith’s theory that what we need is information
that is necessary. Going about the accumulation of statistics for the mere
purpose of collecting is pretty idle, and part of the 10-K is victimized in this
area. Our need, very definitely, is specific. It is definable, and it can be
complied with.
Financial Executive: Could I ask for a little discussion on this matter
of consolidating statements? If you look at it in the technical sense, I am not
sure that consolidating statements are going to give the kind of information
that Mr. Schoenborn was asking for.
It seems, people must have in mind a set of consolidating statements in
which the consolidation is on divisions, or profit centers, or something other
than technically separate corporate statements. There is no such thing as a
consolidating statement in our particular case, although we have five different
businesses, because we are a single corporation.
I would like to ask what is wanted? Should we, on an administrative
basis, set up our operations as if they were separate corporations, and con
solidate them? That is really something quite different.
Banker: I agree that each company is different. If you don’t have
specific corporations, you don’t have the specific problem of consolidating
corporate balance sheets to show what each company is doing.
But notwithstanding that, there are certain cases where there must be
a homogeneous mix by which variables within the company, which might be
operating at different levels and different profit levels, are important to be
seen.
This is particularly true in the case of retail establishments. There have
been very serious problems in the discount stores during 1974, and many
of them could be discerned by having that type of information in advance on a
consolidating basis. This would be one instance of the consolidating picture
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of a company which is not a conglomerate, where you have separate cor
porations making up the total.
Today there are many companies in the conglomerate posture, where
you have holding companies that are borrowing companies, with the divi
sions all beneath, where there is no access to the assets of those companies.
Particularly in the financial area, there are companies that have insurance
companies or banks as subsidiaries, which are untouchable as far as any
assets are concerned. This is vitally important, in our opinion.
Financial Executive: Then, your concern is where there is a cor
porate structure which, in effect, compartmentalizes parts of the resources?
Banker: Right.
Financial Executive: But I thought that the analyst was saying
something a little different. He would like to see balance sheets, or the cor
porate balance sheet, broken down to line up with the sales and contribution
to earnings breakdown by line of business, which already has been pulled out.
Analyst: The line-of-business breakouts, I think, have been disappoint
ing in all too many cases. They are just too broad, or they are done pre-tax
when there are major differences in tax rates.
Recently Exxon issued a prospectus saying they historically made around
35¢
a barrel out of Saudi Arabia for a total of $260-odd million. This year
it’s zero. This is unbelievable.
The difference, compared to Texaco, is Texaco’s nailing down 65¢ a
barrel out of Saudi Arabia, and making nothing in Europe. So you just can’t
understand the different trends unless you know the different prices. If you
see tanker rates plummet, and this is sheltered because they are located in
Panama or some place, it is important to know the impact. On the outside
you just will not be aware of these things without the consolidating.
Financial Executive: But your emphasis is on earnings, and his
[banker’s] is on the balance sheet?
Banker: I think it is important here to realize the difference in view
point. A banker, generally, is interested in the consolidating statement from
the technical standpoint, because then he knows what assets he can get at,
and whether he is going to ask for an upstream-downstream guarantee.
This has nothing, really, to do with the standpoint of an investor, who is
evaluating the investment quality of the overall corporation or the holding
company, except in the special case where minority stock is outstanding in a
subsidiary.
So from the banker’s standpoint, we need the technical consolidating
statement, because what is liable on our obligation is a corporation, which
may or may not include the things that we can use to pay off our debt, and
we are not going to learn that from a consolidating statement which includes
other things than those which are liable on the debt.
From the investor’s standpoint the technical consolidating statement is
not important, but it is important to break down by lines of business. Of
course, it has to be a matter of judgment as to where you are going to make
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your breakdowns. And the statement cannot be prepared technically, because
there is no such thing as a consolidating statement where it is all in one
corporation.
If a firm has everything under one corporate hat, the banker is not
concerned with the consolidating statement. This has not, however, always
been true, and a couple of years ago we were asking that firm for a con
solidating statement.

The Variety of Information Requirements
Chairman Chatlos: We should keep in mind that, in talking about
information abuse to what I consider an insider (a creditor or an investment
banker), there can and should be acknowledged the differential between his
category and the category of the outside investor.
Analyst: One of the difficulties in answering the question about the
need for additional disclosure is that the analyst is always working with a need
for a different kind of information; it has only been in the last two years, for
example, that inventory profits have become particularly important, or that
commodity exposure has become important. This is part of the continuing
flow of information that Mr. Murray was talking about.
The problem of trying to institutionalize that in terms of SEC require
ments is that they always deal with the past need to know, not the future
need to know. What analysts both need and hope for is a kind of openness
on the part of corporations, and a kind of understanding that the investors,
their shareholders, have a right and a need for continuing information that
may change from day to day, in terms of its nature.
Banker: As a bank creditor, I don’t really look to the SEC as my
protector. The fact that the SEC may require X, Y, and Z, which may be
incidentally helpful to me, is great. But I feel that I should have the ability
to ask a borrower for X, Y, and Z, whether or not it is required by the SEC.
The impression I got from Mr. Boyce-Smith’s comments in the paper
was that he feels that some bankers are asking for information, and more and
more information, which really is an endeavor to hide our incompetence to
judge the information that he gives us anyway. And that may be true.
But I didn’t say that I needed more information from the SEC, because
I don’t think their role is to protect me.
Chairman Chatlos: An interesting question comes out. What is the
corporate obligation? Is the corporation a body that you personally own and
sit on in sole judgment, outside of SEC regulations or stock exchange regu
lations, as to what is really good for the rest of mankind? Do you feel an
obligation not only to your stockholders, but to potential stockholders?
Financial Executive: The corporation, as such, has to be interested
in a fair set of standards for disclosure. The average corporate executive
has two apprehensions on making disclosure, beyond some reasonable limit.
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One is from the business strategy point of view. If he overdiscloses, he
impinges on his ability to compete in a free enterprise, and he has a problem
of how much to tell—to the extent that it doesn’t affect his ability to protect
his shareholders and achieve his business goals.
The example of Exxon and Texaco, in terms of what is going on, in
dicates that there is a business strategy behind what we are seeing. And
if we give up all our strategies, we are going to lose our position in the
marketplace.
The second apprehension is that if we had total disclosure, to the extent
that everybody knew what everybody else was doing, we might have the
Justice Department, perhaps, on our backs, because there would be the im
plication that we are dealing in units, and are eliminating all competition.
The corporate man would like to see something that would, perhaps,
provide for a reasonable need, so that we exclude the excesses or the abuses
that can crop up, but yet not prohibit or inhibit our ability to conduct our
business.
Banker: I think the analysts have been pretty much aware of those
restrictions, and I would like to go to the so-called mosaic theory.
The mosaic theory says that what you are doing as an analyst is putting
together information not only from one company, but from many companies.
Now, it is not necessary that each company disclose precisely the same kind
of information. It is necessary that the information be pertinent, and that
the analyst can accumulate this material, and put the mosaic together, which
gives him an industry picture, and the relative position of each of the
companies.
So maybe the concern about the Justice Department can be avoided, in
the sense that you don’t have to be precisely the same. In other words, the
standard would be made to take the test of applicability, rather than
similarity.
Banker: With the advent of floating exchange rates, the banks became
very active in foreign exchange, and this became a large part of our business.
I think it is commendable for our industry that we began to announce our
foreign exchange results separately, when it became apparent that this was
part of our business.
If we create the right atmosphere for disclosure, these things will happen.
This was a big decision for bankers, because there was a lot of worry about
speculation claims. But with the right atmosphere, I think these things will
happen.
Analyst: One problem we seem to have is that the SEC and the
FASB are charged with making rules that apply to all corporations and,
unfortunately, it is almost impossible to do that. What is material for one
company and one industry is not necessarily material for another company in
the same industry, or any other industry.
Perhaps what analysts are looking for is the 10-K to act as an encyclo
pedia, a reference document, where potentially material information is fed
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out to the analyst who can find the material he needs to know. For example,
capitalized lease obligations for most companies simply are not material. For
some companies they are. And the fact that they are in the 10-K means that
I can look at Company X and see. If it is material, I worry about it, if it
isn’t, I don’t.
The same is true for pension fund liabilities and everything in the
footnotes.
I realize that the FASB is in the midst of trying to define materiality
and is trying to find a definition that would permit reporting on a segmented
basis that is meaningful. And I certainly agree that what is reported in the
10-K on line-of-business information is inadequate in a lot of cases.
I don’t know how you write precise definitions, but, perhaps, it is one of
the most serious problems we have.
Regulator: I think that this is a very good point because it is one we
run into all the time.
What is important is to write a rule that says, “Disclose what is
important.”
The trouble is that as you start looking, you see a situation without
rules. You see a very substantial least-common-denominator effect come into
play. We have it in the line-of-business area where companies have said, “Yes,
it might well be useful. Of course, we all aren’t sure of what is useful and what
isn’t. It might be useful, but if our competitors don’t have to do it, why should
we do it?”
We also have in the accounting area a least-common-denominator
approach where investment bankers and others will push their clients to go to
their auditors and say that other auditors are insisting on this. So, in the
absence of rules, a number of factors come in to play that tend to move away
from disclosure.
On the one hand, there is a strong desire to say, “Disclose what is
relevant to your company.” And on the other hand, there are very real
pressures in the other direction. I am not sure that I know how we can make
disclosure criteria operational. Once you get past saying, “Disclose what
is important,” you start getting into the process of rules. And, of course, the
legal profession has been pressing very hard: “Tell us what you mean. Write
the rules!”
It’s the old story, “Write the rules, so we can abide by them,” when
really what they mean is, “Write the rules, so we can avoid them—legally.”
A case in point is the inventory profit disclosure, where we have adopted
an exhortatory rather than rule-making approach. I guess we feel that the
response to those has not yet been very encouraging.
Chairman Chatlos: What is the problem? With the exception of a
few scandals, and with the exception of a few gross abuses that we probably
would have eventually found out about if there were no disclosure require
ments, I find corporations breaking their backs to try to live up to, not only
the letter, but the spirit of the law and finding it very difficult to do so. The last
thing in the world they want to do is do something stupid or dumb.
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And I wonder who has been hurt by the lack of increased information?
I am not saying that if you come up with something really pertinent, you
shouldn’t proceed with it. But are we making jobs for attorneys, or are we
really pursuing something meaningful in the informational stream?
Banker: You have touched on something here that is the basic assump
tion on which all of this and the whole consumerism interest rests: namely,
that corporate management is out to rook the public, and, therefore, we have
to take all kinds of measures to protect the public.
That is valid only if the assumption is valid; namely, that corporate
management is out to rook the public. It is beyond my comprehension, for
instance, that General Motors tries to put out shoddy cars so that they are
going to break down after 10,000 miles or something. And yet that is what the
consumer advocates imply in their criticism.
I think the same thing can be brought to bear on the whole disclosure
problem. I have yet to find any corporate management that doesn’t want to do
right in this area, and the more rules and regulations that are imposed upon
them, the more difficult they find it to do right.
Analyst: I feel that those who said that there really is no need for
information, and that corporations really want to give you all there is to give,
are people who have access to inside information.
The bankers who lend money have a great deal of clout, and they get
information that I, as an analyst, do not get.
A banker told me that the analysts meet with the finance people and
that he meets with the president. There are obviously two different levels,
and the ability to command information is quite different.
So, in effect, we who are outsiders really must depend on rules and
regulations for getting our information, and I realize that writing them is an
extremely difficult task. I have been involved with the business segment
aspect for about seven years now, and I am no closer to helping anybody
formulate a definition than I was when I first started.
There is no question in my mind that, when you sit down with corporate
management, your only problem is to ask the right questions. It is not in get
ting the answer. It is in asking the proper question.
Chairman Chatlos: Do you see this as a conflict? If a bank, through
a necessity, or the insider capability of being a creditor, commands the in
formation that you don’t have, does this pose a problem to the potential in
vestor? Is anybody hurt by it, or is it simply approved business practice being
followed?
Analyst : I incline to the prudent business practice.
Chairman Chatlos: So you are not saying that you should have every
thing, necessarily, that is going to be given to a banker?
Analyst: I don’t need everything as an analyst but I think that your
statement is really true. Anyway, I think our positions are somewhat different.
I can lose money as a buyer of stocks, obviously, but the lender really has a
different kind of a relationship, and I am willing to recognize that there is some
difference here.
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Banker: In terms of the commercial banker, as opposed to the invest
ment analyst, the problem is different. It is very important for the com
mercial banker to have information on the type of lending that he is doing
on a short-term basis, which is very intimate as far as the company is con
cerned. This material may or may not be relevant to the analyst, who is
looking at it, presumably, from the institutional point of view over a longer
time period.
I think it is very important that the analyst understand the short-term
function, because that is important to the success of the company which is,
in turn, a long-term determinant. So there is a very clear distinction.
Banker: About 70 percent of our loans are in the long-term category,
and a good many of our borrowers are large, publicly owned companies who
would like us to use the publicly available information, the stockholder
reports, and the 10-Ks. So it is certainly true that we have all kinds of
problems in our own portfolio. We have many short-term loans and we have
many special-purpose loans for which we need cash flow forecasts. But we
also have a large group of borrowers where we deal exclusively with publicly
available information, and the progress that has been made over the years
in upgrading the quality and quantity of information is critical to us.
Banker: A thing that bothers me is, “What information should a cor
poration be expected to disclose?” A corporation could be developing a
revolutionary new product that could be tremendously important to its future,
and its competitors would love to know about it long enough in advance to
prepare some sort of defense.
There are types of information that are not necessarily something that
the whole world is entitled to, and there are many classes of information users.
Some need more or less than others. I don’t know how you regulate who gets
what, or whether there is any information, however important, that the cor
poration is entitled to keep to itself.

The Obligation to Disclose
Banker: What do you do with the sophisticated analyst who has done
enough homework to really do an in-depth probe into a stock? I think that
most corporations start with the premise that there is a long stream of in
formation, and the first 5 percent of which, for reasons that they may or may
not be right about, is simply not available to everybody. Information such
as a new product that is going to be a breakthrough, or whatever.
At the other end of the spectrum there is a whole body of information
available to anybody. The question then is how much do you force on any
body? We don’t think any of it, standing by itself, is material, but what do
we give?
If you come in and ask the right questions, we’ll give you the right
answers. If you don’t ask the right questions, we are not going to force it on
you. There is an obligation on your part to do some homework.
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Now, can the corporation be criticized because an analyst didn’t do his
homework, and doesn’t come in and ask the right questions? This is perfectly
public, available information to anybody who asks. But if you don’t ask, is
there an obligation on management’s part to spoon-feed it?
Analyst: The corporate people put a lot of weight on the business of
their competitive position, and a competitive right, and on the need to know;
we have recent court decisions dealing with that very point—the disclosure of
developments in technology.
We have the recent case of Xerox, and also that of IBM, where the
courts have already determined that competitors don’t have a need to know.
Chairman Chatlos: There might be a difference there because the
cases you cite concern corporations who dominate industries, as opposed to
the normal corporation, which is really in a competitive position.
I think for IBM to make the stand is not quite the same as a Wheeling
Steel in the steel industry, for example.
Financial Executive: The lawyers have this concept of privileged
information, which means that when they put a little mark on the piece of
paper, the matter is not required to be exposed further.
Is there some way in those special situations where banks and invest
ment bankers have a need to know that would relieve corporate management
of the responsibility that they take on when they disclose their forecasts, or
other kinds of information, and at the same time would protect the recipient
of that from the need to extend the disclosure elsewhere under certain
circumstances?
Chairman Chatlos: If I have some need to know as a creditor, it’s
assumed that, as an insider, that information is for that specific purpose only.
If someone with that information either abuses it, or lets the information out
generally, then, obviously, the burden comes back to the corporation.
Mr. Mundheim: I think it is perfectly plain that a company is not
under an obligation to make disclosure with respect to everything important
that it knows. In the McDonnell Douglas case, management thought at the
time it didn’t have enough information at hand, and in a sense it thought the
important information it had couldn’t be adequately explained in a public
statement. The court indicated that to be a perfectly good reason not to come
forward under those circumstances; and I would think that is perfectly good
law.
As to the question on information to investment bankers, it is perfectly
clear that you can, under those circumstances, give your private placee
information that is not publicly available, because he needs it to make up his
mind whether or not he wanted to buy that package of equities. The Investors
Management case, which is the landmark commission opinion in the area,
makes it perfectly plain that this is proper.
What is improper would be for the person who receives that information
for the purpose of deciding whether or not to take down the private placement
to then use the information in connection with some other activity such as
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buying the securities in the market. I shouldn’t think the company would be
subjected to any liability because of having made that information available to
that potential private placee for the private placement purpose.
Banker: I sense, then, from the comments that have been made, that
the banker is entitled to certain information which the general public is not
entitled to, bearing in mind, of course, that we in each case become an insider.
More and more, bankers today are becoming insiders of more companies, as
we get to know more about the things we should have known a few years ago.
I would like to ask whether the banker shouldn’t have access to the
accountant’s work papers when he gets into difficulties in examining the
wherewithal of what a company is doing. This, of course, requires the agree
ment of both the CPA and the corporation.
CPA: The question of access to the working papers presumes that the
working papers have a full analysis of the account; and, of course, they don’t.
The working papers are test samples and so forth for the purpose of getting
some idea regarding the reliability of the records, not an analysis of all the
transactions.
I submit that if access is given, you are not going to find what you are
looking for; an analysis of what’s in the accounts of the company is not in the
working papers.
The common denominator running through the discussions in the last
half-hour is that we don’t really know what it is we want, and the rules don’t
give us the right answer. The accountants have been very quiet this morning;
and yet, the accountants are involved every working hour in what is material
and what should be disclosed. We have the same problems that the corporate
executives do, because when we are producing something for consumers, we
are not sure what it is the consumer wants. The rules of the SEC say that
what is material is what a prudent investor ought to know; and yet, neither the
legal fraternity nor the SEC has seen fit to decree that, when a suit is brought
against an accountant for some failure to disclose, that prudent investor should
have read that information.
We have to observe the old Chinese maxim, “Your action speaks so loud,
I cannot hear what you say.” And we try to determine what it is our con
sumers really want. Take the case of loan agreements, where there are clauses
that lead to difficulty. They are full of financial information. You look at
these clauses in different loan agreements and find they are completely differ
ent; in one case there has been a particular debt-asset ratio, or debt-capital
ratio, and in another one there is a completely different debt-capital ratio.
The common denominator is quite simple. What the lenders have done
is taken a situation and said, “Well, when this company came to us, they
were in pretty good shape, and what we want to know about is change; we
have worked into the loan agreement these ratios based upon what they are
at the time the loan is made, and what the banks are looking for is the
deterioration.”
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Remarks were made earlier about the difference between the information
in a registration statement and the information in a 10-K, and it was said
that a registration statement has far more information than does a 10-K.
The comment was made about the Texas Oil Company and Exxon giving
different information with respect to Aramco. What runs through all these
things is that the absolute information is a lot less important than the change,
and the recitation in five or a thousand words of the detail of a pension plan
is a lot less important than a one-sentence comment that says, “We changed
from an average compensation base to a terminal compensation base, and
that has increased our unfunded benefits by $100 million.”
It is the change that is important, and I suggest that this year maybe we
should be thinking about rules that determine materiality in terms of the
changes, rather than the absolute.

The Value of Registration Statements
Chairman Chatlos: There seems to be a generally recognized trend
that we are going toward perpetual registration. If there is consensus that
the registration provides better consistent answers throughout, perhaps with
out the need for further concern about disclosure, would we solve the prob
lem you see by simply arriving three years earlier, rather than three years
later, at what we are apparently going towards anyway—continuous registra
tion?
CPA: I think that would be an excellent way to go.
Regulator: In our NYSE white paper, published in December of 1973,
we recommended on an experimental basis, under the heading “Comparison
of Operations of Current and Prior Year—Variance Analysis,” that
The text of the annual report should disclose the reasons for
material changes in the factors affecting the results of operations of
the current year, as compared with the immediately preceding year.
It is important to describe the effects of changes in product or cus
tomer mix, changes in volume statistics, new contracts, new products,
et cetera, even if over-all consolidated results of operations are rela
tively unchanged.

In the questionnaire, we recommended that this be done in a tabular
form, following the kind of pattern that Monsanto uses.
In the replies to that question, we had one hundred fourteen companies,
which was about 10 percent of those that responded, who said that they did
that sort of thing prior to 1973, when we recommended it. There were
twenty-five companies that adopted it in 1973, and one hundred sixty-seven
that planned to implement it in the future. Because this was quite a radical
recommendation, and companies really didn’t have time to consider this for
their annual reports in 1973, it is encouraging to see that several hundred
companies were going to follow this recommendation.
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But six hundred forty-nine of the companies disagreed with it, and I think
that is very significant.
Some of them may have disagreed because we were recommending it in
tabular form, but it is clear from what I can read out of this reply that there
were a substantial number of companies that objected to making a realistic
analysis of the variances in the profit results from year to year.
This is going to become a moot question now, in the light of the new
requirement the SEC has adopted under the proxy rule that is going to require
something along these lines in the 1974 annual reports.
Chairman Chatlos: Of the 10 percent that responded who said they
were already doing it, did your staff do any checking, simply to ascertain what
the 10 percent thought they were complying with?
Regulator: We haven’t been able to do very much. We have been
busy just trying to get these tabulated and the responses cleaned up.
Chairman Chatlos: The concern I have is that they may have written
back and said, “We’ve all been doing that,” and when you looked at it, you
said, “You missed the boat completely. You’re not anywhere near doing it.”
Regulator: I don’t know. The companies usually are pretty respon
sible when they answer these things.
As a consequence of the Wheat Study, a considerable effort has been
made to provide a continuous reporting system, so that the 10-K is now
really much closer than it was before to a simple updating of a registration
statement that the company may have filed. That process is being further
refined in the proposed Federal Securities Code that the American Law
Institute is working on, which would register companies.
I think, in a large measure, that we are pretty close to it now, even
before the code is adopted. If you take the S-l and list its requirements, and
then take the 10-K and list its requirements, and the proxy statement, I think
you will find that the net effect is pretty close to a complete update year
by year.
Obviously, the information in the 10-K is not as universally available
as the annual report or the proxy material, but we have placed a fair amount
of the 10-K material into the annual report and the proxy statement. An
example is to highlight changes which were first mandated in the 10-K. It
has now been mandated in essentially the same form for the annual report.
Banker: Mr. Mundheim’s paper says that there will probably be some
decrease in the need to emphasize the negative aspects of the material con
tained in the prospectus, and he reminds us that when you are talking about
investors, it includes sellers as well as buyers.
As a banker, I am averse to surprise, and the reduction of negative
aspects doesn’t strike me as a forward step.
Mr. Mundheim: I sense that people are always more interested in bad
things that will happen, so that they don’t get caught, than the fact that they
will miss out on the good things which will happen.
Let me give you an example where I think one should emphasize the
positive, rather than the negative.
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A proxy statement relating to a merger is an area in which you wouldn’t
want the negative to be emphasized, because the flow of the transaction
vis-a-vis the public investor runs the other way. You have to be somewhat
more evenhanded when you are looking toward disclosure for the market
place, because there are buyers and sellers, and to be very pessimistic simply
gives an advantage to the potential buyer and disadvantages the seller.
But I must confess that maybe that is an academic judgment, and that
people will continue to stress the negative, because somehow you are more
comfortable feeling that at least you have told people the bad news, and
that may prevent them from suffering a worse loss than they otherwise might
have. But if you fail to give them the good news, and therefore have them
sell at a lower price than, perhaps, they were entitled to—you place them at a
disadvantage.
Analyst: I think there has been a change in that regard. In recent
tender offers, and also when a company repurchases its own stock, there have
been positive statements.
In one recent prospectus, there is a rather specific earnings statement
for 1974, with a discussion of the earnings prospects for 1975 including com
ment to the effect that it is very possible that the buyer would raise the
dividend once it had control. I think in that situation the concern for the
seller is much more important than concern for the buyers.

New Demand for Information

Chairman Chatlos: Those of us who have been in the business of
information for some time can remember the hallowed days of 1964. I don’t
think there is any doubt in anybody’s mind that there was significantly less
information available in 1964 than in 1974.
If that is the case, why are we concerned about information at this
point? Is the subject at hand “information,” or is the subject at hand the
economic climate in which we temporarily find ourselves?
Nobody complained about lack of information in 1964 because we
were all making money faster than we could count it, and there was plenty
of information to serve our purposes. Aren’t we really talking about the lack
of an appropriate structure in today’s marketplace to truly reflect corporate
performance? And, instead of addressing that issue, we are either not
recognizing it, or wondering whether it isn’t the difference in disclosure that
is the meaningful circumstance.
I wonder if the reasonably responsive market in 1964 didn’t make the
whole issue of the fine points of disclosure—short of total fraud or total
abuse—rather academic. It is odd that now, when it’s hard to make a buck
and when the market shows signs of being in a total flop, maybe the change
that we are seeing is not so much the change in information, but the change
in the market structure that no longer provides a reasonable reflection of
corporate performance.
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Analyst: I would dispute your implied assumption that things were
fine on disclosure ten years ago. The effort to get more disclosure for investors
has been a continuous process ever since I have been in the business, which
goes back to 1936. And continuous progress is being made, and today is
better than ten years ago.
But at the same time, the world is more complex, corporations are much
more diversified, geographically and by type of business; so you get a host of
new considerations coming along all the time that create new demands for
information, and it seems to me that there isn’t any way to define, from a
regulatory standpoint, what is good information. You simply must have an
all-encompassing system that requires the disclosure of a substantial amount
of basic information; at any particular time some of it may be of relatively
little use, but who can predict when it will be very useful again?
I recall that in the 10-K the SEC is still requiring information on main
tenance and repairs. That information was in the first prospectus back in the
1930s and was very important at that time because a lot of industries were
economizing on maintenance and repairs in order to show some kind of profit,
and the fear was that they were mining the property, so to speak. It was
particularly true in railroads.
I don’t know that this information is particularly important today. Not
many analysts use that particular data for analysis purposes. Maybe that
particular item can be cut out, but who knows when it again will be important?
So it seems it is a dynamic situation that is growing and expanding all
the time, and I don’t really see that you can define any absolute limit.
Chairman Chatlos: Would you say that our current market is apply
ing “fair” (whatever that means) prices to corporate performance?
Analyst: I don’t know. Why don’t you apply the same analysis to
bonds? The company that got 5 percent money a few years ago now pays
10 percent. Is that fair? I don’t know.
It seems to me the equity market reflects the same set of circumstances to
a considerable degree. So I don’t think, as far as disclosure issues are con
cerned, we can derive any particular guidance from the present state of the
market.
Chairman Chatlos: The reason I mention this is that I noticed
through all the papers prepared for this session that there was an inherent
assumption that information is important, in the first place, because this in
formational stream into the marketplace gets converted into “fair” market
prices. And as Graham and Dodd said, the individual stockholder only gets
two things if he gets an unfair market price, all the disclosure in the world
doesn’t compensate; and he is entitled to only two things: market price and
dividends.
The reason I ask this question is that information is only important in so
far as it leads to one or both of those two items of benefit to the stockholder at
the end of the line. I really don’t see what this does for a stockholder, unless
it leads to a fair market price.
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Analyst: It seems that one could argue that the upsurge in demand
for disclosure and information, if, indeed, there has been one since the 1964
through the 1974 period, as a “for instance,” might be a very direct reaction
to the experience of that period, during which it is clear that investors evalu
ated the future stream of payments that they expected to obtain from a
great many companies in a fashion quite different from the way they evaluate
it today.
So, one might well look back at what we thought of as growth com
panies which turned out not to be. We looked upon that as, perhaps, a
source of the kind of discontent that has manifested itself since that time, with
a feeling that greater disclosure might have prevented those over-revaluations.
Chairman Chatlos: I find that enormously interesting. I was particu
larly interested in your comment that the investors put a price on this. I don’t
see that we can blame the investors for the price they put on something, when
we gave it to them. If you didn’t have sufficient disclosure, why didn’t you
say, “I don’t have sufficient disclosure. I will not recommend”?
I think that’s our problem. I find it very difficult to blame the investor
for falling into a trap on which we spring the trigger.
Banker: The changes in the marketplace, particularly as they relate to
banks and the extension of credit, have had a very real impact in pushing
out a request for additional disclosure, because we are being asked to make
different loans than we were making in 1964.
The tenor of the portfolio has changed, and perhaps one of the problems
is that the requests for information tend to become cumulative. We don’t give
up what we had before. We continue to build on that. And I am not sure
whether some of the older questions we have still remain valid; but, never
theless, they are still there, so you get this building effect.
Banker: I want to quarrel with one of the premises that the two papers
submitted for discussion talked of—the purpose being allocation of resources.
If one is allocation, I would say that the fact that I had two decisions to make
last week—one, to sell a stock at three times earnings and the other one at
twenty-five times earnings—and in both instances the multiple came down
massively, it was relatively unimportant.
If I am going to reinvest the money, I have choices of 8 percent bills, or
whatever, and the allocation process is what we are really about, not the
level. So I don’t believe, as much as all of us have heard about the prices at
which our assets are being appraised, that that is the issue.
Chairman Chatlos: A corporation planning for growth, needing new
capital, and looking at three times earnings might have a different opinion.
Banker: I can’t fight with the market either. I don’t have enough
money to do it, and I don’t think that the corporations can.
Analyst: I think there is some confusion here. The comment about
the three times earnings is really a factor of the total financial market, and that
is not necessarily connected with the disclosure by individual corporations.
What you are looking at is really all of the economic factors that impinge on
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financial markets in total, and of which the stock market is really only one
part. Those of us who work for brokers regard it as very important, but it is
only one part. Thus, what you have is a competition for money, and it comes
from all the way down the line. Essentially, common stocks, which are in com
petition with the total financial market, are being evaluated at a considerably
lower discount rate.
Now, that has very little to do with disclosure by corporations, as such.
If we are talking about why we ask for disclosure now when we did not ask
for it before, a previous comment was really to the point in that corporations
have become much more complex, and so, in order to understand what is
going on within them, we have to have more information.
In the case of pension funds, ten years ago it was a small charge for
most corporations, and many of them were on a pay-as-you-go basis, and little
attention was paid because the costs were such a small charge against income.
But if you sit here today, and if you think about the cost of pensions, it gets
to be crucial. I think that this is going to add a leverage factor to many
corporate income statements today, and we have to know. Otherwise, we are
not going to be able to discount properly some of those corporate stocks.
I think that we are in position where the total picture of the corporate
side is different, and I would say that the whole structure of the market has
changed in that the individual stock buyer has gone from being 60 to 70
percent of the total trading in the market to representing 30 to 35 percent;
thus, the institutional buyer should be a much more professional and under
standing kind of analyst of securities. And so his ability to digest the in
formation and his awareness that he needs the information is much greater
than that of the individual stock buyer who was, just a few years ago, prac
tically throwing darts at the American Stock Exchange page. So, I think we
have a total picture which is entirely different.

Complexity of Corporate Disclosures

Chairman Chatlos: I am tempted to quarrel with what you said.
Simply looking from the corporate side that we see so often, I can’t imagine
anything more complex than USI putting together one hundred twenty-four
separate companies. That seems to me fairly complex, even in light of your
pension fund commentary.
Financial Executive: I don’t think any of us from industry would
deny the need for information. We are all interested in making sure not only
that our current investors are well informed, but also that the investors who
we hope will keep the marketplace going up or who will buy our new issues
are also well informed.
Additionally, we want our bankers to be informed, because they lend us
money. We want the financial analysts to be informed, because, if you will
excuse the expression, they help to tout our stock.
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The only question that faces us is the specifics of disclosure. What is it
that we ought to be disclosing? We have serious divergences among the orga
nizations represented here as to such things as seem to be lying already in the
well-decided realm of things, such as flow-through versus normalization tax
differentiation.
Normalization tax differentiation is a current issue facing the FASB
today, having to do with lease disclosure as a specific, and we have arguments
among ourselves.
We have a new issue on the horizon with the FASB, concerning price
level adjusted statements, and we disagree among ourselves as to whether
that information should be made available to the general public. Primarily,
it isn’t that we think that the information would not be useful as much as it
is that we don’t know how it can be used by those who would get it.
More specifically, I think we are concerned with where people would
misunderstand information. We have been talking about the need for in
formation, but I’m not sure anybody has as yet addressed specifically what
information.
CPA: Is there anyone who can help me to zero in on why the public is
discounting currently reported earnings? I think one of the reasons is that I
don’t think they believe profits are being generated. When you subtract 1960
dollars from 1974 dollars, it is very much like subtracting one yard from three
feet and getting a profit of two.
The price-level statements will not only be understood, but they will
straighten out at least the difference between translating a dollar and two
French francs, or adding them together without translation which is the kind
of thing we are doing when we are not price-leveling old dollars.
That is one reason why I think profits are being very severely discounted
in the marketplace, and until we straighten out that basic accounting—it is
the fault of our profession because we have to take the lead in these things—
nobody is going to volunteer to depress earnings. Everybody who lends money
is going to find to his dismay that he is going to be paid back in twenty-fivecent dollars; and when there is 8 percent interest and 8 percent inflation, the
person who takes a bond gets nothing and is taxed on that nothing.
CPA: I was rather deeply involved, back in the mid-1960s, in the
APB’s considerations and deliberations on price-level accounting.
The two principal groups who showed little interest, and had the principal
impact on reducing that problem to the level of an APB statement rather
than an opinion, were the analysts and the bankers, who were in the fore
front of those who were asking for more information.
I don’t know what the responses to the current FASB considerations on
price-level accounting have shown, but it has been my general impression that
those two groups were still among the less enthusiastic.
Analyst: I am completely puzzled and baffled by how price-level
adjusted statements can be of any use whatsoever in analyzing securities. I do
draw a distinction between price-level adjusted statements and current value
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as against historical cost, but I haven’t run into any other analysts who think
this information is any good. We are dealing in relative values, and it is just
as easy to deal in nominal terms as real terms. In fact, I think one can
understand the process of inflation better in dealing almost in nominal terms
than in real terms.
If one wants to see whether the stream of corporate earnings and
dividends has been fruitful for them in economic history, it is perfectly easy to
adjust earnings and dividends downward by the GNP deflator, or something
of that sort.
Financial Executive: Some of what has been said here supports a
feeling I have that many analysts, and even institutional investors, focus on
that information which may have short-term market application, rather than
a judgment of the real worth of a firm, from the point of view of the trader
whose real interest and objective is short-term trading profit and is not a
provider of capital, rather than from the point of view of a shareholder who is
a long-term investor.
Banker: When we make loans, we make them in the hope that they will
be repaid, and price-level adjusted statements don’t really show me how I am
going to get repaid.
In 1964 the banks in general were not too concerned about the capital
loan ratios. In 1974 the companies are looking to us for long-term and
medium-term financing. They are really looking to us for equity, to a very
great degree, so I have to look at the quality of the management. And how
do I judge the quality of the management but in terms of real performance?
I judge the quality of the management by looking at the various operations of
the company, not the overall company, and seeing what steps management
has taken to curtail uneconomic aspects of its operations. Price-level adjusted
accounting, unless you simultaneously change depreciation laws and tax laws,
doesn’t have applicability to me.
CPA: I don’t think accountants are trying to indicate that price-level
adjusted statements are a panacea for anything. We are certainly not ad
vocating that they replace historical cost statements—they should not and will
not. They are only designed to provide some perspective for the historical
cost statements.
If we were ever to experience the inflation that has taken place in South
America we would soon see that there is a need to put those historical state
ments into perspective, otherwise, they soon become meaningless.
Bankers are going to be paid only out of earnings, as they all know. The
question is, “What are the earnings?” We don’t know, and we are trying to
find out. But whatever we are doing here is attempting to refine the process,
and we just have to keep working at it. The price level statement is at least
one step toward putting something into perspective, and that’s all.
Cash flow is important from that standpoint, certainly. Whether or not
there is a real gain through a depreciation of the dollar by a company that is
highly leveraged, which may go bankrupt the next day, is a matter of how
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you put that price level statement into perspective. We have to recognize that
the monetary gains that come through in price level are far different from the
operating gains, and we have to draw that distinction. This is a matter of how
well people will understand price level statements when we get around to them.

Making Disclosure Meaningful
Chairman Chatlos: The answers we come up with are based largely
on the assumption we make, and for a long period of time everybody in this
room, including myself, has come to the conclusion that the “market” is always
right. And I wonder. For a hundred years, maybe, there were very adequate
reasons to believe and to support the fact that the market was always right.
But between the 1960s and the 1970s we found something totally unknown
in the previous history of the market.
For reasons we all know about, and there’s no use to assess the blame, the
public left the market. It is pretty hard, by semantic definition to have an
auction market without the public. An institutionalization of the market took
place and, totally contravening what the SEC led us to believe in their study of
the institutions, exactly the opposite happened in the marketplace. The in
stitutions did not provide breadth in the marketplace. They did not provide
liquidity.
This may change in the future but, as of right now, I suggest to you that
the problem is vastly different, and that we cannot afford to go on the assump
tion that the market is right, and therefore whatever you are, you deserve,
as we were wont to assume in the 1950s and the 1960s.
The stock exchange has problems. Wall Street has problems. All of this
cannot be lost on the impact of the marketplace.
The Wheat Report contained a fascinating comment in one area, and
I’m going to paraphrase it. “It isn’t enough that you tell the truth. It is not
even enough that you give appropriate prominence to that truth. It is not
enough that you distinguish between type faces in giving that truth, the facts.”
The Wheat Report goes on to say that information must be understood
by the readers. What good is information, if the people to whom we direct it
don’t understand it?
CPA: There is consideration being given to showing in financial state
ments the effects of inflation on companies.
There are a lot of ways in which that can be done, and the FASB has
proposed that one way is to include financial statements adjusted to the
general price. That is the ostensible purpose. There would be other ways.
The analysts have said, “Well, we really don’t see much usefulness in
that information.”
Now, my question is, “Assuming that the analysts do believe that there
should be disclosure of the effects of inflation on companies—would they find
it useful to have supplemental information that would, in effect, show fairly
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complete financial statements on a reproduction cost basis, that would include
inventory replacement costs, and maybe depreciation based on a reproduction
cost number?”
Analyst: This is all a very complex subject, and I certainly think
that every analyst does consider in some way or another the effects of inflation
on particular companies. But it seems to me that this subject, as far as the
general interest is concerned, has more of a political orientation. In other
words, in a period of years when corporate profits are very high and rising
still higher, it is appropriate for corporate management to emphasize that a
lot of these profit gains are due to inflation, directly or indirectly, and if the
inflation factor was taken out, profits would be much less.
All of us take inflation into account when we are looking for higher
salary compensation. So, I think that corporations have a legitimate reason
for indicating in some way that their profits are, when adjusted for the
changes in inflation, somewhat less.
It would be much simpler all the way around to do that by simply
deflating the earnings and dividend stream by the general price level and show
ing this in the annual report. I think that when the general price level is
applied to the peculiarities of each company, you get a lot of erroneous
information.
For example, let’s say the general price level accounting is applied to
American Sugar Refining and, let’s say, one of the copper companies. In the
last year the spot price of copper has declined 50 percent, and the price of
sugar has gone up by some triple-digit numbers. So it really isn’t represen
tative of the particular situation.
I think that an adjustment of the dividends to the price level indicates
the general buying power of the dividends that are paid out of that company;
and that might be of some use.
Since we don’t have price level accounting, I guess we are getting at the
issue in some other way. For example, the SEC asks for inventory profits. I
think that the analysts have begun to ask this question of managements, and I
guess that a year ago they weren’t quite sure what they were asking about.
There wasn’t much response to the SEC’s request; but now, all of a sudden
companies are converting to LIFO, and we are finding out in some way what
the extent of those inventory profits was.
I don’t think an inventory profit is necessarily not a profit, and there are
a host of different situations; but the key thing from an analytical standpoint
is that it probably is nonrecurring, in large measure. So I think that the LIFO
accounting is giving us that information a little better.
Current value accounting might be helpful to us in the long run, but
I appreciate the very great difficulties of getting to that point. However, I am
inclined to think that any compromise is probably not going to be very useful.
Analyst: I have no interest in replacement values of assets, or appraisal
values, in an ongoing operating entity like Procter & Gamble. On the other
hand, there are many investors who are Graham and Dodd asset value players;
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and these people search lists of stocks at book value or less. And, just to take
a simple benchmark, when stocks get to book value or lower, then I am
interested in seeing third-party appraisal values.
Chairman Chatlos: I might point out that a company has come in to
see us with the idea that they want to make a grand effort in the annual report
to explain the ravages of inflation to their stockholders.
The net result of this, at least in one instance, is that this company, on an
academic basis, is currently planning to devote a great deal of time to inflation,
which could have some very interesting educational and informational oppor
tunities. I don’t quite know how it will work out, because we have just
started to work on it, but it does strike me that that is an interesting activity
to be pursued.
There is some interest about whether what is currently called the mosaic
theory is, really, simply a clever ploy to hide what really is information. Do
we really assume that the mosaic means exactly that—nonmaterial informa
tion, innocent bits and pieces put together?
Banker: Basically, what you are saying is possible. There will be
analysts and others who will attempt to build a picture from information other
than what is generally held. However, the mosaic theory is something that
should be understood a little bit better.
It is an outgrowth, really, of the complexity of today’s corporations.
They are in many businesses. They are in many aspects of the same business.
Sometimes I find them ranging, in an oil company, from the ownership to the
drilling, exploring, tankers, and so forth.
If an analyst is to do his job properly on a comparative basis, making
relative comparisons, he has to have a base. The base is the mosaic. The
mosaic is made up of not only what he has gleaned from his own research but
from his interviews with management, not just of oil companies, but perhaps
of tanker operations or perhaps exploring operations; and, out of this mosaic,
he can generate a universe within which he can make his comparisons of
companies, even though they may be complex.
Chairman Chatlos: Are you completely assured in your mind that that
mosaic standing by itself is sufficient for you, or for hypothetical analysts, to
make a good, sound, in-depth judgment?
Banker: No. To rely on it alone would be foolish. If you are analyz
ing a security, it isn’t just its position in the industry, it is the current senti
ment, perhaps, among the investing public covering that industry, or a portion
of that industry.
We cannot disassociate ourselves from political aspects, and other items
that also must be included. But for investigating the company and its position
within a given industry, sticking strictly to the physical aspects of that industry,
the mosaic theory will work.
Analyst: As we have worked with the mosaic idea, it seems to me
that it is necessary to make a distinction as to how and over what time period
the mosaic is put together. And perhaps I can illustrate that by saying, “If you
115

go in, and obtain an individual piece of information that is by itself ma
terial, obviously you have inside information. If you go in and ask six ques
tions within a five-minute period, and a determination of the answers to those
six questions leads you to a piece of material information, while it is a mosaic
on the one hand, it seems to me it probably should fall in the same category of
inside information.”
Another illustration would be where, over a period of time, because of
various studies that you have made and because of contacts from time to time
with the management, you have gradually developed a mosaic that is missing
a piece of information, or two or three. But on a particular call you get an
answer and fit it into that pattern, and then you have something that you
believe to be significant.
If you rule that out in terms of what analysts can legally use, then you
rule out the whole analytical function.
Chairman Chatlos: If the answer to six inquiries in a row leads you to
a decision that would, in your mind, be a material decision, then management
may be totally and completely unaware that it has given you anything material
and you, then, are putting yourself in the spot of doing nothing whatever, or
making your own public announcement to protect yourself.
I would think that was completely within the mosaic theory. Would
anyone like to comment on that?
Analyst: I think it depends on what those half-dozen questions are.
If they are high-spot and unrelated, I would think that might not be inside
information. On the other hand, if it is a chain of things that may have been
led, possibly, by management to try to get around the rule, there might be a
distinction.
Chairman Chatlos: If your ladder is accurate, management would also
realize that there was a materiality problem.
Is there a nonanalyst who believes that the mosaic theory is just a cute
device to afford protection for what, basically, is the abuse of material
information?
Actually, I have not found anyone who disapproves the mosaic theory,
the assumption being that these are bits and pieces of information; the alter
native is rather drastic, because if you don’t buy that, you penalize people for
being experts, or you just shut down the informational flow.
Financial Executive: Where there is integrity on the part of the
corporate management, the mosaic theory probably doesn’t hold true, because
chances are, if there is an ability to link a number of either isolated or cumu
lative incidents together, to the end that management can perceive a problem
coming, I think they would be open about it, particularly if it is going to
become a material situation.
In most instances, if there is a situation that could be perceived through
a mosaic pattern, the chances are that management can perceive it, unless
there is a lack of integrity. In that situation, I think we have a different story.
But if you have such a thing as that, then management is in a minority. I
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don’t think it could be depicted as being a general outlook or feeling on the
part of corporate management.
I would like to respond to something raised in the form of a question
as to how you would implement a system in which criteria were used, rather
than simply having a specific set of requirements that everybody had to
follow.
I want to say, first of all, that I wasn’t advocating a system that relies
entirely on criteria. I am suggesting that perhaps there is some common core
of information that is needed in all situations, perhaps yet to be clearly
defined. But beyond that, the criteria should be keyed to determinations of
useful information relevant to the particular company. How would this be
come effective? Somehow we have to get closer to the point where corporate
management really feels a responsibility to disclose material information.
I would relate this to both the Shearson-Hammill—Slade situation and
the McDonnell Douglas—Merrill Lynch cases. In both, I have to ask myself,
“Would there really have been the necessity of a lawsuit if those companies
had rather promptly disclosed information with respect to the deteriorating
earnings situation that they had, and was there, really, a legitimate business
purpose for not disclosing that information before the problem arose?”
Perhaps through case development, we need to get to a point where
somehow there is a greater feeling of desire or compulsion, on the part of
corporations to provide material information promptly.
If you get to that point, then it seems to me that the responsiveness to a
criteria approach will take care of itself, and then the only remaining problem
is to determine what those criteria are, which is where the users come into
play. Maybe we have to do some more work in trying to define, in terms of
criteria, what really is useful and then, with the corporation’s own ideas as to
what’s useful, put it together and see if it can work.
The alternative is intolerable, as I see it—an endless proliferation of
more and more information requirements that apply across the board and
create an impossible situation. There’s too much material, and a lot of it is
irrelevant to the particular case.
Regulator: When you say “a criterion,” what are you contemplating?
Just to cite one particular type of problem that we are having, people always
come to us and say that there are certain requirements the SEC should be
doing away with. One that initially is mentioned almost invariably as being
unnecessary is our parent company reporting requirement in terms of what
people’s needs are.
We talk to some analysts, who say that there are certain circumstances
where a particular kind of information is very valuable and they will cite
one or two circumstances, but it is hard to see how they develop criteria. I
guess the question is, “How do you contemplate that criteria can be articu
lated?”
Analyst: I think it has to relate very specifically to the notions that we
have about what affects the price of securities. In the development of my
paper I [William S. Gray] suggested what I think most directly affects the
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price of securities, that is future streams of payments, and discounting those
streams, and the various factors that will influence either the magnitude or
the slope of the stream, the variability of the stream, and factors that will
affect the rate at which streams are discounted.
Then I went further to develop—in terms of sales characteristics, expense
characteristics, competitive environment developments, and so forth—things
that I think are the next step removed from understanding and interpretation
of what is happening to the earnings stream. I indicated that I didn’t feel it
was an exhaustive list. I was merely suggesting a direction in which, perhaps,
it would be useful to go to avoid the intolerable result of just more and more
information broadly required of everybody who is involved in the disclosure
process.
Chairman Chatlos: I guess what you have just said is that, drawn to its
logical conclusion, we can always get in trouble almost no matter what the
premise is.
Suppose you go one step further, and go to market information, as
opposed to corporate information, which obviously, has the fulfillment of
your premise: an impact on market price. Suppose that you find out that an
institution is buying a stock, and the institution may even be your customer.
Suppose the corporation finds out that the institution is buying its stock.
Should this be a matter of public announcement? It certainly could be ma
terial, in terms of the market price. Would this be an extreme, or would you
think this would be a logical extension of your theory?
Analyst: I am not prepared at this point to say that that should be
included as required information. And the reason I feel that way is that
when an institution takes that kind of an action, there may be some in
dividual instances where it is simply something that has to be done for some
purposes that are peculiar to the particular account that it is working on;
something unrelated to what is going on in the real world, other than that
liquidity needed for that particular situation.
But in the vast majority of cases it will reflect, in some respect, things
that are going on in the real world with respect to that company, or that
industry; maybe it now reflects the fact that that particular institution has
some insight about a development that others generally do not have.
But to enable the market to function as efficiently as possible, it seems to
me that people who are interested in digesting large volumes of information
should be able to get as much relevant information as they can. To avoid
the problem of overkill, and quantities of marginal information, you need
to have something in the way of a different approach that enters into the
picture.
Financial Executive: We talk about need to know, and I agree with
that. We need to know. But I think we need one more word: need to know
what?
Then I would like to ask, “Why?” And then, “What is the cost-benefit
analysis of this information?”
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Material Market Information vs. Public Disclosure
Chairman Chatlos: What do we need to know? One of the comments
was, “Does it have an impact on market price?” That is an easy one. If it
does have an impact on market price, if it is material in the sense of material
ity as we know it, at least it ought to be a subject for discussion. It may be
that there are a lot of reasons why something should not be made known. Why
do we limit ourselves to corporate information only? It is almost as though
we decided that the corporation is the victim, and the rest of us run scot free;
unless it can conclude in sending the corporation to jail, we don’t want to
“talk it.”
But it seems to me there is a further issue than that. If an institution
is going to enter into the marketplace in a large way, and the net result is
going to be a 10 percent increase in the price of the stock as a result of that
institutional buying, is that material? It’s material market information, I think
we would all agree. Should it be a matter of public disclosure?
Banker: One other criterion that you might add to the list is whether
the event will affect the ability to repay a loan. And my question to the FEI is,
If an event that will affect the ability to repay a loan is put in the context of
its original, agreed-upon terms, how are you going to handle that?
Chairman Chatlos: Aren’t you able to do that on a confidential inside
basis?
Banker: Yes. I think there is an overdeveloped belief that banks can,
upon whim, demand and receive any bit of information from a corporation
that it comes into our heads to ask for. I think other banks here would say
that isn’t the case; our ability to generate information from a corporation
under the circumstances may appear to be great, but in practice I don’t think
that is the case.
Banker: I would like to extend that problem a little bit more with
something that we have run up against just within the past year. We now
find ourselves in some loan agreements with as many as 200 banks, some
of which are quite small, and in some of which the borrower wondered
whether or not those banks have the ability to keep the information they
receive confidential. There is the problem of whether or not they should
give that information to just a few of the large banks, or whether they have
to give it to everybody. It is a very serious matter.
Analyst: I didn’t want to leave the possibility of being misunderstood
about the possible circumstances in which a corporation might legitimately
withhold some material information because there was a legitimate business
purpose. I think there are cases of that kind, but with reference to McDonnell
Douglas it is hard for me to visualize how information can be in sufficiently
concrete form so it is communicated to the underwriter if it isn’t in good
enough shape to communicate to the public.
Chairman Chatlos: I suppose the corporate purpose there would
depend on the facts. If I am planning an underwriting, and I know what my
activities are, and I am working on whether an underwriting is feasible—what
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the market price would be, what the relative degree of success might be—I
think we would say, “Yes, you can keep this confidential while you are pur
suing a proper business purpose.”
Absent that underwriting, or perhaps absent any other major con
sideration, maybe the prime topic of conversation should be, “We have a
deteriorating earnings problem. Maybe we ought to disclose it.”
Financial Executive: As a representative of industry, I have the
feeling that I am sitting here as the accused, waiting to hear the bill of par
ticulars, the full allegations, against industry. I will have to say at this point
that they are a little confusing.
I think this matter of information needs to be circumscribed much
better than it is at this moment in time. A number of analysts have said
that they aren’t giving their proxy to the SEC. They look at the information
that the commission has as being a library where they can go and dig out
some useful, consistent data.
Our own experience is that in our investor relations department we will
have this year somewhere between 2,500 and 3,000 individual inquiries and
associations with analysts. Stop to think for a minute about the extent of the
communication that takes place in these rather extended conversations.
These involve members of our board of directors, our corporate officers,
as well as those in the operating end of our business. And we talk about
everything. They want to know about markets and our share of those markets.
They want to know about financing and how much money we are inventory
ing. They want to know about plant expansion plans and in what fields we
are expanding. They want to know about the technical aspects of the chemical
business, about research and development, raw material availability, and
energy and hydrocarbons in our particular phase of the chemical business.
Finally, they want to know about this, “What is your position, what are you
doing, how are you insuring yourselves against disaster?”
All of these things are important and essential, and we concede that.
But we don’t believe that the financial statements that we customarily think
about are really the right place to convey all of that to our readership.
On a different topic, our company practices forecasts. We start out at
the beginning of the year, and we forecast, and we announce it publicly. We
studiously and religiously send a copy of that forecast to the SEC, and when
it looks like business developments are such as to require a change, we do
that.
This creates a problem in that it exposes our company to liability—a
big problem for the lawyers and management to worry about. But it has
some benefits: one is that, with our estimates made public, we don’t have the
same degree of concern about insider information that is showing up in these
conversations, because when an analyst comes in and asks questions we feel
that that is an amplification of the conditions that we foresaw when we issued
our public forecast of what our earnings would be. So, we can be relatively
candid, and feel that we don’t have an undue amount of exposure.
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Now, I will concede that an analyst may interpret differently the answers
that he gets from us. He may quantify them in a different fashion, but we
don’t worry about that, because we say what we think it’s apt to be.
Chairman Chatlos: Do you adjust those forecasts?
Financial Executive : Yes, we do.
Chairman Chatlos: How many times a year would that occur?
Financial Executive: Just about every quarter this year, because
it’s been an extremely unusual year.
Chairman Chatlos: Do you find yourself observing, or being encour
aged to observe, a blackout period with analysts just prior to the end of every
quarter? That is, you don’t want to talk to an analyst one day and give him
the old line, and the next day come out with a brand new forecast.
Financial Executive: We don’t have any great reluctance in this
particular area.
Chairman Chatlos: Would you then tell the analyst you are planning
on adjusting the forecast the next week?
Financial Executive: We say that there are favorable signs in the
economy and, if they continue to develop, we will look forward to a better
result for the year.

Institutional vs. Individual Investors
Banker: I would like to hear some comments about the problem that
we face of finding companies in midstream, after having published very fine
earnings for the first six months, suddenly taking a tailspin and losing all that
they made in the first six months.
I touched on this and used as my illustration the situation with real
estate investment trusts that have an accruing income for the first half of a
year, much of which isn’t really income. It is nothing more than funding
commitments that they have to finish jobs for the various real estate projects
they are involved in, the interest coming from their own pockets by virtue of
the funds advanced for the construction project.
It would seem that if an accountant is viewing the completion of projects
as they are pursued, the income would have stopped a long time ago, and
would not be shown as earnings in the first six months. We would not see the
problem of paying out dividends on profits that don’t exist.
This might be a peculiarity for that industry, but the important thing is
that should there be a change, say, in the accounting techniques being used
by a company, at least the accountants can test the continuity of how these
earnings are being compared.
Chairman Chatlos: We have had a slight resurgence of the individual
buying in the market, but if we look back over three or four years, there has
been a definite exit of the individual from the market. Most of the activity,
measured by any standard, has been in the institutional area, and we have
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seen a system of institutionalized information that is basically directed to the
benefit of the professional investor.
Some years ago, we never put out a quarterly report unless we got the
envelopes for the stockholders ahead of time and put the quarterly report in
the mail before we issued a press release covering it, so the stockholders
would have in front of them at breakfast the entire story as we saw it, rather
than the summary that the press saw fit to print. At least we were treating
our stockholders as the owners.
Now, thanks to what is regarded as full disclosure, our stockholders are
absolutely the last ones to know. We have a system totally designed to feed
the tape watcher, the pro, who is going to make a fast buck. And by the
time our poor little owner finds out about it, whatever the impact, it has
already occurred.
I don’t know whether that is really our intent, but it does bother me,
and I wonder whether the impact of effective information isn’t something
we ought to consider.
It seems to me that a great deal of the information we have—the mosaic
theory and all these highly sophisticated things we are talking about—is
basically geared for those who have the capacity to use it and have an inside
track on getting the information at least simultaneously with those who get it
first. Those people have an unbelievable advantage in simply being able to
assimilate and use that information ahead of others.
Are we all a big patsy group to serve the needs and interests of the
institutions? Because if we are, maybe it’s another area of discussion that’s
worth pursuing.
Analyst: Our firm made a study of our own analysts’ visits to com
panies and the investment decisions reached immediately after those visits;
the conclusion of that study was that if we had done the precise reverse of
what was recommended by those analysts enjoying the inside information,
we would have made a lot more money.
Regulator: I don’t want to comment on that, as much as I want to put
an element of precision into it.
I get very disturbed at the dichotomy, or the distinction, that is made
between individual investors and institutional investors because the money
that a lot of these managers handle is individual money, of which the bene
ficial owners are a lot of individuals.
Another point is that a lot of the money that appears to be in the market
because of individuals is really the result of institutionally or professionally
made decisions. So, it blurs thinking when you divide up individuals here
and institutions there because, when you come down to it, the overwhelming
bulk of the money that is in the marketplace is benefiting individuals—
usually people of limited means—who one way or another have their savings
channeled through institutional means rather than individual investments.
CPA: I want to raise a question on the way that information is used,
primarily financial information, but not necessarily only that.
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We might postulate that there are two ways to use information about
a company: one is to make forward-looking estimates of what the effect is
going to be on cash flow or earnings flow, and the other way is to try to
figure out what other people in the market are going to do about the in
formation, and then presumably do the reverse?
CPA: We have talked about the individual investor leaving the market.
I don’t have a very good knowledge of the statistics of the market, but I
would suppose that as long as there is a flow of money into the pension
funds that is bound to take place, and unless those funds increase the
amount of debt in their portfolio, they are bound to buy some stock. And
if they don’t buy it from other institutions, they have to buy it from investors.
So when you talk about the individuals being out of the market, do
you mean the brokerage houses are no longer able to churn the accounts of
the small investors?
I happen to know not mini-investors, but micro-investors, and those
investors have exactly the same portfolio in terms of number of shares. They
are not out of equities, but they are not being churned.
Chairman Chatlos: The number of stockholders has not changed that
much, but the activity of the existing stockholders in the market has just about
totally collapsed. The last count I saw was that there were something like
30 million individual investors.
They haven’t left the market in the sense that their portfolios are gone.
They simply are not as active in trading as they were in the prior time.
Regulator: It is true that the individual is not in the market to the
extent that he once was, but to say that the individual is not in the market
contradicts the statistics. I have seen an analysis of what happened last week
in terms of the number of trades and the number of those that were in 100share and 200-share units. On Monday, for example, there were 31,000
trades, of which 20,000 were trades of 100 and 200 shares. The individual
is still relatively active in the market in terms of individual trades, but nowhere
nearly as active as he once was.
Chairman Chatlos: Is the figure still roughly 70/30, or 80/20, as to
institutional versus individual?
Regulator: In terms of the dollar value of the volume, the institutional
participation is still up in the 70 percent to 80 percent range.
Chairman Chatlos: The comment on the pension funds reminds me
that just this past summer I heard the president of a major pension fund
advisor speak to a public group, and he said, “When you are thinking about
the pension fund, and particularly the money advisors in Wall Street, re
member four things. In 1950 the public was involved, and the institutions
were investing. In the 1960s the public was involved, and the institutions were
speculating. In 1970 the public was pretty much out of it, and the institutions
were speculating. And keep in mind one other thing: fund managers are
human too, and they don’t want to lose their jobs any more than you want to
lose yours. The one thing that a money manager is certain of is that if his
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track record is no different than anybody else’s track record, he is secure. But,
if he tries to play games, and ends up with an 8 percent loss when some
body else has a 13 percent gain, he’s fired.”
That is an interesting commentary on the nature of fiduciary respon
sibility on Wall Street and I find it absolutely incredible.
Analyst: We talk about the exodus of the individual investor from
the market, and I would applaud his wisdom, because, since the individual
investor left in 1970-71, it has been downhill all the way. I would think he
has taken a most appropriate investment attitude.
In terms of making information available to the professional or to the
individual, you should bear in mind that the brokerage firm securities analyst
directly represents the individual and the institutional investor. My own
firm does about half its business with institutions and half with individuals,
and the individuals get the same information that the institutions do.
So, I would hope the corporations would keep in mind that when they
are dealing with analysts they are also dealing with the representatives of
the individual stockholder as well as the institutional.
Financial Executive: When one says that the institutional investor,
of his own volition, if he was investing in pension funds, withdrew from the
market earlier than someone else, I don’t think that is quite how it happened.
In large pension funds, whether they are administered by banks or by insur
ance companies, it may be that the choice among particular stocks is pretty
much in his domain, but the decisions on how much of the pension funds is
going to go into equities as opposed to bonds, or some other investment
medium, is still largely controlled by the companies themselves, or the trustees
of the pension fund.
And, while it is probably true that money managers reach similar con
clusions a good deal of the time, I would suggest that there still is consider
able competition among them, and many companies learned a long time ago
that the fastest way to get performance out of a money manager is through
the mechanism of his job, and that is to try and spread the money around
among several money managers and let them compete in the same fund.
Analyst: You raised a very important question when you talked about
the release of the information which hits the Dow Jones. If that information
now hits the Dow Jones tape before the close of the market, and there is some
reason to take a market action, then the institution obviously has an ad
vantage. There is no question about it.
It sits there and can buy or sell before the market has closed. However,
the individual who owns the hundred shares does not get that information
until he goes home and buys the evening newspaper, or perhaps not even until
the next morning. So, he is really in a disadvantaged position as far as that
piece of information is concerned.
The question is how, in effect, we can serve the individual with timely
information. Obviously, in many ways he can’t read the annual report and
couldn’t even begin to cope with the 10-K. Thus, the analyst probably is in
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the best position to serve the individual. But, nevertheless, I think there is
still a question of how we get the information to the individual at the same
time as we do to the institutions?
I think this is a very crucial question, and it’s not that I want less in
formation for the analyst, or that I want the analyst to be out of a job in
interpreting the information, but I think that we must, in a sense, keep the
individual in. The record of the last year has indicated that performance of
institutions has been worse than the market overall. I would love to see some
body do a study on how the individual performed. Maybe he did well by
getting out of the market, and putting all his money in Treasury bills, savings
banks, or some form like that. But I am not so sure that the individual has
been all that well served by the institutions.
Regulator: If you accept the proposition that more information, which
is analyzed by skillful people who have had professional training, gives an
advantage to them, then the individual investor ought to go home, because
he doesn’t have as much information, he never will have, he doesn’t have the
time to analyze it, and he doesn’t have the skills.
There is a disparity here that goes right to the heart of this problem, and
I don’t know how you get over it. You could give the average small investor
all the 10-Ks in the world, but he is not going to get time to look at them,
and he doesn’t have the professional training to truly interpret them.
This is, really, the core of the problem. Either all this information and
the skills to analyze it means something, or else, if it doesn’t mean anything,
the individual is in better shape, or in equal shape; and in that case, it is use
less to go through this process. Let’s just send out a very simplified disclosure
document and be done with it.
Chairman Chatlos: We have just come to the conclusion that the
average investor doesn’t stand a chance. We have suddenly taken the whole
subject of information and turned it right upside down and said, “Let’s forget
the entire audience we thought we were talking to.” If that is the decision and
the conclusion, I think it leads to some very interesting further discussion.
Analyst: Much of this discussion is focused too much on short-term
impacts of surprises. A great deal of the information that analysts seek is
directed toward the long-term analytical process that I would describe as the
decision that an analyst makes about securities of a company: Are they worth
100 percent of the Standard & Poor’s multiple at which they may be at the
time? Are they worth 80 percent? Are they worth 200 percent? An exact
decision over a period of years is fundamental in the allocation of capital; and,
that is what we are really after. The things that make headlines are the
short-term problems.
So, to take that a step further, someone asked what we would like to
know. I’ll tell you what I would like to know about General Motors. I
would like to see the schedules that the directors and the management get
about the profitability of the Electromotive Division, the Chevrolet Division,
and so on. I would like to compare those with similar statements for Ford and
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for Mercedes-Benz, and Fiat, perhaps. Then, I would be able to make some
judgments about the long-term value of the company. I think there are
probably no important reasons why that can’t be disclosed, as a corporate
matter, and I would like to see corporations tell us what they tell their
directors about profit centers, so we could make intelligent long-term evalu
ations, and do our job of allocating capital effectively.
Chairman Chatlos: On a long-term basis, how good is that track
record? Have you fairly reasonably served your clients? Have you done a
reasonably good job? I’m not saying you couldn’t improve it in that last half
of 1 percent, which is always the hardest to achieve. But on a scale of one to
ten, how well have you done your job with the information you now have?
Analyst: Well, personally, I’m very happy: I would rate myself eight
or nine.
Chairman Chatlos: We hold more analysts’ meetings than anybody
in the country, including the New York Society. We hold an average of over
two analysts’ meetings every working day of the year. And throughout all of
this activity that we go through, and all of the feedback that comes back to
us, I don’t find the analysts that handicapped. I find that the analysts, given
integrity, given responsible management, given a rational approach, have been
able to do a really good job.
By and large, I’m pretty proud of what the analysts have done on behalf
of our clients. Over a period of time they have been right a good deal more
than they have been wrong. They have been highly responsive and they have
been highly accurate. As far as this impacts on information, I have to say I
think this cannot be construed as an indictment of the informational process.
The fact of the matter is that it has worked reasonably well, and it is only
when you get into the rarefied atmosphere of some real hair-splitting that we
can get excited about the dumb things that have gone on, or might go on.
By and large, I don’t think that too many stockholders have been really
disenfranchised by an informational lack.
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The Role of the Auditor
in Disclosure

Should the Attest Function
Be Expanded?
By Ernest L. Hicks, Partner, Arthur Young & Company
Certified public accountants are known by various interchangeable
names reflecting, in part, the variety of their roles in the business world. They
answer, of course, to the initials “CPA” and to the designation “auditor”; the
adjective “independent” often precedes whichever form of reference is used.
As to roles, they are first of all auditors, and in that capacity they weigh
financial statements against established standards on the form and content of
the statements and the notes that are part of them. They are, to be sure,
accountants, and in that capacity they advise clients concerning the principles
to be followed in preparing financial statements. They are counselors to clients
on a variety of subjects, and in that capacity they bring to bear insights from
their experience and, simultaneously, develop new insights. They have a part,
along with clients, attorneys, and underwriters, in the process of assembling
the information that is presented when securities are offered to the public or
when corporations report to stockholders, and in that capacity they both bring
to bear and obtain insights into the types of information required and made
available in connection with the investment process.
Notably, I have not asserted that CPAs are securities analysts or that
they have an analyst’s appreciation of the ways in which various types of
information influence various types of investors. On the other hand, CPAs
have the advantage of being intimately familiar with the practical consider
ations in producing and expressing the information. A CPA’s skills and those
of an analyst are not mutually exclusive: as an auditor or accountant, a CPA
should not be oblivious of the end-use of his work product; an analyst should
know something of how information is produced.

The Attest Role

With the foregoing enumeration of roles as background, let us turn our
attention to the function of a CPA as auditor. In that function, he is in the
attest role—the role wherein he associates his name with the financial represen
tations of others who ordinarily are his clients. By associating his name with
the representations, a CPA lends credibility to them.
Traditionally, the representations with which a CPA concerns himself
are in the form of a set of financial statements, ordinarily those for the client’s
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fiscal year. The CPA’s assertion on the financial statements is in the form of
an opinion of whether they conform with a standard, imprecise but identifiable,
known as “generally accepted accounting principles.” The opinion is based
on an audit, identified more fully as “an examination in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards.” The report is addressed to the com
pany whose financial statements the CPA has examined, or to its board of
directors or stockholders. Whoever the addressee, the CPA recognizes that
the report will be used by the management, directors, stockholders, and
creditors of the company, by prospective investors and creditors, and by others,
including regulatory agencies.

Expanding the Attest Role

CPAs are now weighing suggestions that they expand the attest func
tion in a number of respects. In part, the expansion would apply to the
manner of reporting on audited financial statements. One suggestion in this
category has to do with the meaning of the expression “present fairly,” as
used in an auditor’s standard opinion. Other suggestions would have auditors
express opinions on additional aspects of the financial statements or include
analytical information in their reports. Suggestions in another category have
to do with the subject matter with which the attest function is concerned and
with the nature of the process underlying the attestation. Suggestions in still
another category relate to the times when, and the channels through which,
information an auditor may have is communicated to persons who may have
an interest in the information.
These far-reaching proposals are voiced in the name of the “public in
terest.” If adopting the proposals would, in fact, serve the public interest, they
should be adopted. The questions that should be asked and answered include
the following: Why have the proposals been made? Are the proposals reason
able and practicable? Would investors indeed be better informed if the pro
posals were adopted? Might investors be misled? Would the benefits to in
vestors justify the costs to the reporting companies? What changes in the
business environment would have to take place if the proposals were adopted?

Audited Financial Statements

Let us examine, first, some proposals that have to do with auditors’ re
ports on financial statements which they have examined.

Present Fairly
The expression “present fairly” (or “fairly present”) has been part of
an auditor’s standard opinion since the early 1930s, always accompanied by
a statement of the basis of presentation: in conformity with generally ac130

cepted accounting principles (or an equivalent expression). One would be
hard put now to state precisely why the word “fairly” was introduced. A
reasonable interpretation is that it was intended to convey a meaning related
to the concept of materiality and to convey the notion that despite adherence
to accepted auditing standards, an auditor is not able to express an assurance
of precise conformity with accepted accounting standards because of the un
avoidable infirmities to which financial statement presentations are subject.
Of late, the view has repeatedly been expressed that the expression
“present fairly” should be interpreted as implying a different kind of judg
ment, having to do with some abstract notion of “fairness.” For most audi
tors, the expression “present fairly in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles” connotes conformity with generally accepted account
ing principles and nothing more.
Auditors’ distaste for an interpretation that would separate “present
fairly” from generally accepted accounting principles is not simply resistance
to change. The calls for a separate opinion (explicit or implied) as to fair
presentation, in some abstract sense, pose a peril for investors that may not be
apparent. If auditors were called upon to express an opinion on the fairness of
financial statements without specifying a standard of measurement, each
individual auditor, or each auditing firm, would have to formulate its own
view of what is “fair.” Chaos would result, and no group would be well
served.
Those whose trumpets repeatedly sound the “present-fairly-in-theabstract” note may be overlooking some fundamental considerations that, for
independent public accountants, are matters of course: that generally ac
cepted accounting principles are derived not only from pronouncements of
official bodies designated to prescribe them but also from custom and usage;
that generally accepted accounting principles, from whatever source derived,
encompass a requirement for adequate disclosure; that it is itself a matter of
accounting principle, perhaps not adequately enunciated but nevertheless
widely recognized: that the accounting principles a company uses must be
appropriate for the circumstances to which they are applied. If these matters
were better understood, the calls to give “present fairly” a meaning unrelated
to conformity with generally accepted accounting principles might not be so
insistent.
It is possible that the calls for an opinion as to fair presentation in the
abstract arise from a desire to overcome the recognized deficiencies of gen
erally accepted accounting principles — in particular, the existence of al
ternative accounting principles. Improving accounting principles is the
business of the FASB. If the further development of accounting principles
leads to better identification of the circumstances in which a specific principle
is to be used, adherence to established accounting principles may produce
more satisfactory results. Meanwhile, the individual auditor or auditing firm
lacks both the authority and the omniscience to make an independent de
termination of whether controversial generally accepted accounting principles
are fair. The public would not be well served by creating a condition wherein,
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for example, the auditing firm of Alpha and Alpha says in its reports that the
LIFO inventory method is unfair while the firm of Omega and Omega says
in its reports that the FIFO method is unfair.

Quality of Disclosure
A suggestion allied to the notion that auditors should express a separate
opinion on fair presentation in the abstract is that they should express a
separate opinion as to the “quality of the disclosures” in financial statements.
This notion ignores the fact, widely recognized by accountants, that adequacy
of disclosure is itself a matter of generally accepted accounting principle. An
auditor’s opinion of whether financial information has been presented fairly
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles runs both to the
propriety of the measurements expressed in the financial statements and to
the adequacy of disclosure, whether in the notes or in the body of the financial
statements. A separate opinion concerning disclosure would not serve a use
ful purpose.

Best GAAP
From time to time, the suggestion has been heard that an auditor should
report on whether the accounting principles (and practices and methods)
selected by his client are the ones the auditor would have selected, had the
choice been his, in other words, to report whether he believes the principles
used are the “best GAAP.” This proposal apparently is intended to be taken
seriously, but it is badly flawed. In some circumstances it might, in effect, put
the auditor in the position of selecting the accounting principles a corporation
would follow. In others, it might lead to confusion in the minds of investors
as they sought to understand an auditor’s report. As with “present-fairly-inthe-abstract,” this suggestion may be intended to overcome deficiencies in
generally accepted accounting principles. If that standard of measurement
is inadequate, for example, because it gives financial executives undue latitude
in choosing among alternative accounting principles, the cure is to improve
the principles. The FASB has that assignment. If, in addition to expressing
an opinion on a client’s financial statements, auditors were required to ex
press their personal judgments on the management’s choice of individual ac
counting principles, the harvest for investors would be confusion and be
wilderment.

Information Content
Should a CPA, in reporting on financial statements he has audited, do
more than express his opinion (or opinions, if proposals discussed earlier in
this paper were adopted)? It has been suggested that auditors’ reports should
be more informative than those now issued. The notion has not been ex
pressed precisely; the general idea might be for the auditor to provide an
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analysis calling the readers’ attention to aspects of the financial statements the
auditor considers important. If that kind of reporting would be useful, the
benefits are not apparent. Most auditors do not pretend to be securities
analysts. What an auditor would see as important might not be important to
an investor; what would be important to an investor might not seem important
to an auditor. If the proposal contemplates that the auditor would include in
his report information that a reader would not be able to derive from the
financial statements, there is a serious implication that disclosure in the state
ments would be inadequate. In that event, if the auditor found it necessary to
supply additional information in his report, he would presumably not be able
to express an unqualified opinion that the financial statements are presented
fairly in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. If the
comments proposed for the auditor’s report would in fact be analytical, this
kind of reporting can better be left to the research departments of brokerage
firms.

Some General Observations
Digressing a little bit, I would like to make some general observations on
audited financial statements, and hence on auditors’ reports. The observa
tions also have a bearing on proposals to expand the attest function to apply
to information not presently audited.
Let us consider the level of attention accorded to the financial informa
tion a company publishes about itself—in particular, its annual financial state
ments and its interim earnings reports. It is more than possible that investors
rely unduly on such information, failing to take adequately into account in
formation about the non-financial realities that ultimately determine a com
pany’s success or failure. Financial statements are not reality, but only a
representation of it.
Even those who recognize that the representation is not the reality may
fail to understand the extent to which judgments must be made in quantifying
financial statement items. Users may fail to appreciate the adverse effect this
has on the level of precision that can reasonably be expected of financial
information. Out of necessity, numbers are used in presenting financial state
ments. The use of these symbols of certitude implies a degree of precision
that simply is not attainable.
Notes, which are integral parts of financial statements, figure prominently
in discussions of financial disclosures. Much of the information in notes is at
least as imprecise as information in the basic statements. Notes, after all,
are merely elaborations on, or explanations of, information that is in the
first place merely an imprecise representation of reality.
At some point in every learned discussion of financial disclosures, the
participants should ask themselves, “Do we pay an irrational reverence to
financial statements in general and to notes to financial statements in par
ticular?” Discussions of financial reporting are sometimes impaired because
there is not a common understanding of the relationship of financial informa133

tion to investors’ decision-making processes. There is not a conclusive, ex
plicit, cause-and-effect description of how investors use financial information,
or of how they are presumed to use it, or even of how they are entitled to
use it.
The absence of a common understanding on this subject constrains every
discussion about financial reporting. Whether the discussion has to do with
the merits of one accounting principle over another, such as the merits of
“purchase” accounting over “pooling-of-interests” accounting for a particular
type of business combination or the merits of the LIFO method over the
FIFO method for inventory in a particular industry, or whether it has to
do with the usefulness of a particular type of information, such as the dis
counted amount of a company’s lease obligations or a segmentation of the
overall results of a company’s operations, absent adequate information about
the decision-making processes of investors, conjecture and personal predilec
tion may take the place of logic as sources of arguments intended to demon
strate the validity of a particular accounting principle or the justification for
requiring a particular type of disclosure. Consequently, anyone proposing
that additional information be disclosed (or that specific information now
disclosed continue to be disclosed) should be obligated to state in reasonable
detail how he believes investors will make use of the information.

Other Subject Matter, Other Processes
Some of the proposals for expanding the attest function would have
auditors reporting on, or tacitly taking responsibility for, information other
than that in audited financial statements.

Quarterly Reports
CPAs are being asked to take a role, as yet unspecified, in the quarterly
financial reporting of their publicly held clients. This suggestion raises some
questions for which answers are elusive: Do investors need assurances from
CPAs with respect to quarterly earnings reports? Will the benefits to inves
tors justify the cost to the reporting companies? If CPAs are to provide such
assurances, should the basis be an audit or should it be some new, less ex
pensive process? If the latter, how should the assurances be expressed so as not
to mislead investors? Can a reporting format be developed that will adequately
express the limitations on the scope of the new process and the corresponding
limitations on the level of assurance that a CPA can give?
CPAs could become involved in interim reporting in any of a wide
range of ways. At one end of the range is an audit, with which investors are
assumed to be reasonably familiar. For convenience, but with a welcoming
nod to the truth-and-justice implication, we may designate this end of the
range as the right end. I believe the role for auditors in the interim financial
reporting of their audit clients, if there is to be a role, is to be auditors. To
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say it another way, if investors need assurances as to the reliability of interim
earnings reports, CPAs should be willing to audit the reports. If CPAs do
less, the risk for investors that they will be misled is, in my view, unaccept
ably great; investors have amply evidenced an inability to understand the
practical limitations on the assurances an auditor is able to convey even
when he has done an audit. An approach I favor, as both practicable and
useful, is to audit the six-month reports of companies selected by the Securi
ties and Exchange Commission pursuant to selection criteria the SEC would
develop. The Commission has shown that it can develop such criteria; witness
the criteria for using the short-form registration statements instead of the
long-form ones.
At the left end of the range is a “consultation.” An example of a consulta
tion, in simplest form, is an instance wherein a client telephones a CPA in
midquarter to discuss whether profit should be recognized in recording a
specific transaction. This conversation is not directly concerned with the
preparation of interim financial statements. A very little distance to the right
is a meeting arranged to discuss the preparation of a quarterly report. Here,
the client would select the matters to be discussed. Further to the right, but
far short of an audit, is a limited review process consisting of inquiries and
other types of procedure selected by the CPA.
Investors, and perhaps regulators, might be attracted to an arrangement
for a process less extensive than an audit because it might appear to provide
investor protection at nominal cost. The attraction evidences a misunderstand
ing of the underlying facts. At the heart of the misunderstanding is the notion
that discussions “about the accounting principles used” in quarterly reports
would in themselves be efficacious. To be sure, accounting principles and
their misapplication must, of necessity, be elements of whatever problems
have led to the present discussions about interim reports, and the type of
question discussed earlier—the one about recognizing profit on a particular
transaction—would have to be considered. But the core of the matter is not
in the principles. The core is in the numerous crucial decisions that rest on
appraisals of the consequences of uncertainties as to which available informa
tion is inconclusive. Is the reserve for doubtful accounts adequate? Is a
further allowance required to reduce inventory to the realizable amount?
Should provision be made in the accounts for liability arising out of a law
suit that has been filed or decided? Have events occurred that make it neces
sary to write off assets or to provide additional amortization? In view of the
importance of these crucial evaluation decisions, a process that rests on a
discussion of “the accounting principles used” would be a misleading exercise.
What, then, of a consultation process expanded to include any and all
topics selected by the client? If such an arrangement would be useful in
solving whatever problem it is that has to be solved, there is no problem to
solve. Managements that are conscientious in preparing quarterly reports, as
I believe most are, know that help is readily available from their CPAs; no
campaign such as has been mounted to involve auditors was needed to let
managements know about that.
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These considerations bring me to the conclusion that, if CPAs are to
become involved with interim earnings reports on the basis of a process less
extensive than an audit, the process must consist of inquiries or other pro
cedures of the CPAs’ choosing, and the CPAs must issue a report appro
priately describing the process and expressing an appropriate level of as
surance. The report must state clearly the severe limitations applicable to
both process and assurance. In order to see that stating such a conclusion
does not provide a solution, consider the nature of the process as it might
apply to an interim earnings report of a large multinational company!
Somewhere in the course of our discussion about the mechanics of at
testation for interim earnings reports, we ought to pause long enough to ask
whether the game is worth the candle. More specifically, we ought to ask
whether it is sensible to encourage investors to give more weight to interim
results, as appending an attestation of some kind will surely do. The limita
tions that circumstances impose on the level of precision attainable in assign
ing the results of a corporation’s operations to annual periods are severe. The
limitations are even more severe when we undertake to assign results to
shorter accounting periods. Perhaps the responsible course to pursue, in the
interest of protecting investors, is to inform them concerning the infirmities
of reports for short periods, rather than to make short-period reports seem, by
virtue of a CPA’s attestation, to be something they are not.

Auditor of Record
An extreme manifestation of the notion whereunder auditors would
have a responsibility with respect to quarterly earnings reports is the “auditorof-record” concept. Under that concept, a firm engaged to audit a company’s
annual financial statements would be responsible for the propriety of the
company’s every utterance having a financial aspect. Independent auditors
would embrace an implicit responsibility for interim earnings information
and for other types of financial information released by publicly traded
companies. Most CPAs do not want to have any such continuous responsi
bility. Our reluctance is rooted in a concern that investors will misunder
stand the nature of our involvement and so will be led to place unwarranted
reliance on the information released. And, perhaps understandably, we do not
wish to have a responsibility that might extend to communications made with
out our knowledge.
Auditors are concerned about the absence, in the “auditor-of-record”
concept, of defined standards for presentation of financial information or for
the scope of a review and about the omission of a reporting requirement.
Traditionally, CPAs have used a written report to explain the nature of their
examination and to indicate the nature and extent of the responsibility they
assume. CPAs believe they are on sound ground in rejecting an unspecified
responsibility to the public, based on an unstated scope of work, for the
conformity of financial information with some undefined standard of re
liability.
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There appears to be extensive confusion as to the scope of work that
would be necessary to support an assumption of continuous responsibility by
CPAs. There is not much to indicate that those who support the “auditor-ofrecord” concept believe that CPAs would do much work beyond that now
performed in connection with the annual audit. Some observers may believe
it relevant that a good deal of the work in an annual examination is performed
at various times during the year. Some may believe that the audit work already
is performed continuously and that in order to assume a continuous respon
sibility the auditor would need only to read the quarterly reports or other
information intended for release. Those beliefs, if held, would evidence a
serious misconception. The scope of interim work in connection with an
annual audit is simply not sufficient to justify permitting investors to rely
on it in the way contemplated in the “auditor-of-record” concept.
The scope of interim work, for the most part, relates to the effectiveness
of the client’s accounting system in capturing, processing, and summarizing
the details of transactions. Neither that work nor a consultation on the
application of accounting principles would focus on the estimates and evalua
tions that are the most likely sources of large error in interim earnings reports,
or other releases of financial information.

Cost
Expanded involvement of auditors with their clients’ reporting will be
costly, whether the subject matter be quarterly earnings reports or the
broader range of information contemplated by the “auditor-of-record” con
cept; whether the process be an audit, perhaps for only a few companies, or
a less extensive review process, perhaps for all publicly held companies.
Especially as to the review process, observers may tend to underestimate the
cost. To a significant extent, the necessary work will be in addition to that
now required for an annual audit. Further, because of its nature, the work
will be performed by the more experienced people and will be correspond
ingly more costly.

Communicating Directly

Still another force that could change the shape of the attest function is
a suggestion that in some circumstances auditors ought to communicate di
rectly with investors or other members of the public, perhaps through a
regulatory agency. Heretofore, CPAs have addressed their reports to their
clients, and the clients have delivered the reports, with the financial state
ments to which the reports relate, to persons and organizations having an
interest in them.
In the specific instances to which the suggestion has been applied,
audited financial statements were not the subject of the reporting in question.
Rather, the subject was adverse information concerning the CPAs’ clients, of
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which the CPAs were aware, otherwise than in connection with audited state
ments, and which the clients elected not to disclose.
The notion underlying this particular suggestion underlies in some
measure most of the proposals for expanding the attest functions that are
being discussed. The notion is that when a CPA is appointed auditor of a
publicly owned company he becomes an agent of the public. Not so. The
CPA should not be anyone’s agent. The CPA is, and should remain, an
independent public accountant. That requires independence not only of the
client but also of regulatory agencies and investors. The argument that in
order to be independent of his client a CPA must be something of an enforce
ment agent is unsupported in law, in his professional ethics, and in logic.
One of a CPA’s professional rules imposes an obligation to treat infor
mation obtained from clients in confidence. Some of the views expressed on
the role of the auditor, either what it is or what it should be, carry the im
plication that the confidentiality rule is contrary to the public interest. This,
in turn, suggests either that the rule is unenforceable or that it should be
changed. Identifying the public interest in such a question is not simple.
Undoubtedly there are occasions when it would be to the public interest for
a CPA to disclose information a client does not wish to disclose. Ordinarily,
when a hard question of disclosure arises, the CPA is able, and usually is
required, to put the client in a position where the client himself discloses the
information.
If, occasionally, there would be public benefit in a rule requiring CPAs
to function as enforcement agents, the adverse consequences of lifting the
confidentiality rule would be felt in every audit. Abandoning confidentiality
would severely inhibit the efficacy of the audit process.
I conceive that an auditor has a duty to do a proper audit and to issue
a report to his client that will serve equally the interests of every user to whom
the client delivers the report. I do not conceive that the auditor has any duty
to render a report to anyone other than the client who engaged him. A client’s
legal or contractual duty to disseminate the auditor’s report should not be
misconstrued as a duty of the auditor to report to third parties.

Some Caveats About Attest Role Expansion
Proposals to expand the attest function, some of which have been dis
cussed in this paper, ought to be examined with considerable care.
On the surface, obtaining additional assurances from auditors, and on
additional subjects, just has to be a good thing. For the proposers there is
the benefit of engaging in an activity intended to protect investors. For in
vestors, there is the warm feeling that they can buy with confidence because
the auditors have blessed the numbers. Even for the auditors, there is an
apparent benefit—the fees for doing the work necessary to provide a basis
for giving the additional assurances will be substantial.
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Under the surface, the benefits are less obvious. Various segments of the
public, and some regulators, may harbor unrealistic expectations as to what a
process that is less extensive than an audit can reasonably be expected to
accomplish. Investors may simply be unable to comprehend the severe limita
tions that constrain an assurance based on such a process.
More extensive assurances from CPAs can lead investors further down
a perilous path on which they have already entered. A path marked by sign
posts seems to promise that enhancing the extent or quality of financial in
formation will remove the risk from investing; that obtaining attestation of
financial information will eliminate the limitations that circumstances place
on the very usefulness of the information as a basis for making investment
decisions.
The cost, in terms of accounting fees, of obtaining the additional as
surances would be substantial. Even so, that element of cost might be in
significant in comparison with the losses occasioned if the assurances induced
investors to place undue reliance on the information to which the assurances
relate.
It has been alleged that the reluctance of CPAs to reach for oppor
tunities to expand the attest role springs from exaggerated fears of incurring
liability. CPAs are entitled to be concerned about the possibilty of incurring
liability and about the possibility of incurring other forms of penalty. Too
often, those who espouse the proposals in question brush away these legitimate
concerns with an offhand prediction that the matter will resolve itself in
time. In fact, fundamental changes in the business environment would be re
quired in order to make feasible a significant expansion of the attest function.
It is notable that those who decry as self-serving the failure of CPAs to
assume expanded responsibilities seem confident that once the expanded re
sponsibilities are assumed, the CPAs will have the requisite skills, insights,
and judgments—or divine inspiration. The confidence may be ill founded.
No one should be surprised to learn that CPAs are mortal, that many of us
believe our present responsibilities strain our capacities, and that the number
of practicing CPAs exceeds by a substantial margin the number of geniuses
engaged in the practice of public accounting.
The views I have expressed are not necessarily those of my firm, al
though many of my partners share them, or of any other organization,
although many practicing CPAs will, I believe, concur. But I can say for my
firm, and I believe for CPAs in general, that we recognize the “public inter
est” as a compelling consideration in any decision taken with regard to the
professional practice of CPAs or to the content of financial statements. It is
my own belief that CPAs ought to support proposals to expand the attest
function by including assurances concerning types of information not now
covered or by including new types of assurance based on new types of process
less extensive than an audit if they become convinced that investors will in
fact be helped and not misled. But I want to be sure, and I believe CPAs in
general want to be sure, that these matters are adequately considered before
far-reaching decisions are taken. That, too, is in the public interest.
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Of the Hicks paper

By Kenneth S. Axelson, Senior Vice President—Finance and Administra
tion, J. C. Penney Company, Inc.
Mr. Hicks’ paper probably reflects the views of a large number of prac
ticing CPAs. But his conclusion is wrong, and, therefore, his whole rationale
fails. CPAs must conclude that their role in financial reporting needs expan
sion because the financial community needs more and more reliable financial
information. With this conclusion in mind, CPAs can then proceed to de
termine how to carry it out. Should CPAs not accomplish this task, others who
are far less able to make realistic and workable suggestions will propose
further steps that are impractical and offensive to auditors.

Serving the Public Interest

The same day that I read Mr. Hicks’ draft, I also read the newspaper
account of the decision by Coopers & Lybrand to assume a limited public
responsibility for clients’ quarterly financial statements. Mr. Hicks had three
pages of well-reasoned explanations of why CPAs cannot attest to quarterly
earnings statements, but his conclusion is wrong because it does not best serve
the public interest. The Lybrand proposal is right because they have found
a workable solution to meeting the needs of investors and, at the same time,
coping with the problems of the auditor.
In the same article, Lybrand also proposed to extend its annual audit
to historical or past financial data included in unaudited portions of annual
reports. This plan was particularly interesting because we adopted this practice
in the Penney Company several years ago and found it to be very constructive.
When we made this change, we were seeking to take steps to maximize the
usefulness and credibility of our annual report to investors. To accomplish
this, we found it useful to separate information dealing with historical data
from discussions involving plans and expectations for the future. This led us
to group together the financial statements and other statistical and discussion
material into a financial review that would make an orderly and meaningful
presentation. We put all matters dealing with the future into the chairman’s
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letter. This division was helpful to our own thinking in separating fact from
plan or wish and logically led to the expansion of the auditor’s certificate to
embrace the entire financial section of the annual report. From our own
experience, I would conclude that Lybrand is very much on the right track in
adopting, as a matter of firm policy, a similar proposal on the auditor’s report.

Usefulness of Disclosure
Now, my purpose in reciting this evolution in our annual report is to
underscore my belief that the burden falls on both corporate management and
its auditors mutually to evolve the disclosures and presentations that are most
useful to investors. I would agree with Mr. Hicks when he says that CPAs
are not security analysts. But management knows very well what information
analysts want and need. For example, in my company we keep a written record
of all interviews with analysts. We make a point of noting the information
which each analyst was interested in discussing. We then review these notes
when preparing the annual report, earnings releases, and speeches before
analysts in order to be responsive to their requests. Last year we conducted
over 700 such interviews. So, while the CPA may not be in a position to
determine the disclosures needed by investors, management most certainly
is or should be. And management should make those judgments concerning
what is too little and what is too much information. The CPA, then, can
determine whether the figures used in the presentation are accurate and the
method of expression appropriate. And the CPA can make a value judgment
whether the information conveyed is realistic and not misleading.

Auditor/Management Cooperation
We have several additional examples in my company of how this partner
ship in disclosure has worked for the benefit of the company and our investors.
Up until a few years ago, retailers made no disclosures concerning the profit
ability of their customer credit operations. It was the common wisdom that
credit was enormously profitable and that there were many retailers who broke
even on the sale of merchandise and made all their money in credit. In view
of this, it really wasn’t surprising to find that a number of states initiated
legislation to reduce the rate of maximum service charge on credit accounts.
In the Penney Company we had been losing money on credit ever since we
started the activity in 1958, and these reductions in rates were unbearable.
We concluded that a major part of the problem was with ourselves, the re
tailers, who for years had been secretive about the results of credit operations.
We therefore decided to present this information in our annual report and
asked our auditors to embrace these data within their certificate. The first
reaction of this disclosure was that we were not telling the truth because
“everyone knows how much money retailers make on credit.” But when ad
ditional retailers and other credit grantors adopted a similar disclosure prac
tice and had their CPAs attest to their operating results, the public began to
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recognize that the profitability of credit was, in fact, a myth. Credit is an
important part of the operations of most retailers, and it plays a critical role
in the profitability of operations. This disclosure was long overdue and bene
ficial to the companies concerned, as well as to investors and the public, and
the attestations by CPAs played an important role in building credibility in
this matter.
A second example of how this partnership in disclosure has worked is in
the area of lease obligations. Retailers typically have large lease commitments.
Here, the common wisdom has always been that these leases represented offthe-balance-sheet financing which enabled retailers to hide the commitments
and thus achieve far greater debt capacity and better credit ratings than would
be available if these commitments were disclosed. We made an extensive
study of how credit worthiness was determined by investors in bonds and other
debt instruments and how the rating agencies assigned credit ratings. This
study made it very clear that retailers were not getting away with anything.
To the contrary, they were being penalized in the credit markets because the
value of their lease commitments was not adequately disclosed.
Because the value of lease commitments was not known, analysts de
veloped an estimated figure based upon one of several techniques. We
found these estimates had considerable allowance for error. This allowance
tended to limit the retailers’ credit rating and credit capacity and it became
evident that it was in our own best interests to disclose the value of these lease
commitments. We worked with our CPAs to develop a method for computing
the value of these lease commitments and have now published this figure in
our annual report for a number of years—and the auditors’ attestation has
added importantly to the credibility and acceptance of this number. Here,
again, is an example of a company defining, in its own self-interest, desirable
disclosure and then seeking the assurances of the auditors to gain acceptance
and credibility by investors.

Determining Meaningful Disclosure
It will be noted that these two examples deal with matters of particular
importance to retailers. I would have to assume that most industries have
specialized disclosure needs that are particularly important to investors, and
CPAs should be working with their clients to identify these investor needs
and achieve meaningful new disclosures. There is an old adage that Wall
Street can’t stand a surprise. I believe that it is managements’ responsibility
to see that surprises are avoided and to work with their CPAs to achieve this
result. In turn, CPAs should insist that their clients constantly seek to im
prove the form and quality of disclosure and should have the courage to
resign an account when management doesn’t conscientiously pursue that
objective.
I do not believe that investors expect CPAs to remove the risk of in
vesting or expect them to be geniuses. Suggestions concerning “best GAAP,”
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“auditor of record,” “communicating directly,” and similar proposals, are
aimed at achieving a quality of disclosure that may be very difficult or un
reasonable to attain. But management knows, or should know, that the only
sound long-term objective in financial communication is a fair evaluation by
investors of the prospects of a company and the relative value of a given
company’s stock. CPAs should urge management to recognize this objective.
Experience shows that investment decisions are most soundly made when the
prospects of the company are most thoroughly understood.
We are all aware of the great expansion in disclosure requirements in
recent years and the growing result that so much information is presented
that it is difficult for an investor to sort out the important from the unim
portant. This trend is bound to continue, with the resulting proliferation of
data that will further confound investors. CPAs can provide an enormously
useful service by insisting that management identify the disclosures required
for intelligent investor decisions and by attesting to the reasonableness of the
resulting presentations. This would draw upon the specialized accounting
and auditing skills of the CPA in making historical information more mean
ingful for investment decision-making purposes and would avoid the dangers
inherent in forecasting the future. After rereading Mr. Hicks’s objections, I
am even inclined to believe that he might endorse this type of program.
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Of the Hicks paper

By T. Lincoln Morison, Jr., Vice President, First National Bank of Boston

One does not have to read many financial publications to realize that
criticism of financial reporting practices and the accounting profession abound.
Some of this is directed at problems involving the measurement of economic
events; more is aimed at the adequacy, or rather the inadequacy, of disclosure
and the failure of the profession to live up to its perceived role. Other articles
treat the issues as irrevocably intertwined and conclude that the present level
of financial reporting is seriously deficient in meeting the needs of the users
of such reports.
If nothing else, this wealth of comment suggests that financial reporting
standards and the role of the auditor continue to require intensive examination
and revision. It also suggests that considerable confusion exists concerning
generally accepted accounting principles and the audit function. At the
same time, this debate has precipitated the formation of special interest boards
and has caused governmental agencies to increase their activities in account
ing related matters to compensate for, what appears to be, a lack of timely
response by the accounting profession in dealing with these complaints and the
underlying causes.

The Current Environment

The financial reporting arena is crowded with participants, both public
and private, interested in resolving the many controversies which have
arisen or at least in protecting and developing their own special interests.
Certainly the most visible of these parties is the SEC whose efforts in account
ing are led by John C. Burton, chief accountant, who was appointed in 1971
and is an activist. It is an often cited fact that prior to 1973, the Securities and
Exchange Commission issued, on the average, three-and-a-half Accounting
Series Releases (ASRs) a year. In 1973, the number jumped to seventeen; so
far in 1974, another eleven have appeared. Of significantly greater im
portance than Mr. Burton’s activism and the number of ASRs recently
released is the policy which is driving the SEC in this regard. In a recent
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issue, the Journal of Accountancy published the following quote from a
speech by Mr. Burton before an American Bar Association group on October
3,1973:
The SEC has authority and responsibility for setting accounting
measurement and disclosure requirements. Historically, the commis
sion has felt that this responsibility can be most effectively met by
allowing the private sector to lead the way in setting principles of
financial measurement.

These remarks clearly established a sharp delineation between the
measurement function and disclosure and carved out for the SEC a dominion
over disclosure requirements. This philosophy is obviously contrary to that
espoused by Mr. Hicks and the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) whose position is made apparent in an article by Marshall Armstrong,
chairman of the FASB, published in the March 1974 Financial Executive.
Mr. Armstrong states:
Members of the Standards Board are unanimous in believing that
the distinction created by the SEC between disclosure and measure
ment is an artificial one and such a dichotomy, if imposed, could gen
erate continuing problems. We believe that disclosure of financial
information is an inextricable part of establishing accounting stand
ards. Realistically, one cannot be separated from the other.

The release of ASR 147, among others, confirms that this dichotomy has
been imposed and forces observers to wonder whether a reconciliation of these
viewpoints can reasonably be achieved. It is also important to be aware that
the SEC has also promulgated two levels of disclosure by acknowledging the
needs of sophisticated users vis-a-vis the man on the street.
Another of the parties involved in the determination of financial account
ing standards is the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) which func
tions as an arm of Congress. It’s mandate under PL 91-379 is to “promulgate
cost-accounting standards designed to achieve uniformity and consistency in
the cost-accounting principles followed by defense contractors and sub
contractors under federal contracts.” The CASB has issued at least seven
standards to date, has several more in the exposure draft stage and its agenda
is quite lengthy. Due to its special interest, it is difficult to envision a lessening
in the activity of this board in the future and, more importantly, that its
pronouncements will not have a significant impact on the financial reporting
environment.
This scenario is joined also by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and
American Stock Exchange (ASE), all of whom have special reporting needs
which necessarily spill over into the reporting environment if for no other
reason than the economic necessity of companies trying to kill as many birds
as possible with one stone. Unfortunately, these agencies or boards are not
particularly well coordinated with each other to the point where the same
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information is often required to be submitted in different forms with a
commensurate waste of corporate time and expense.
In the middle of this arena is the FASB which represents the private
sector’s last-ditch effort to retain control over the setting of accounting
standards. As was expected, it took the FASB some time to get organized,
properly staffed, and an initial agenda prepared. However, the Board has
been very active since the first of the year and one financial accounting
standard has been released, a number of exposure drafts are in circulation
and several more are in the discussion memorandum stage. The FASB must
now demonstrate that it can solve current and fundamental issues in a timely
fashion. Even if it can, is it reasonable to expect that the SEC, CASB, and
others, given their philosophies and mandates, will be willing to reduce their
activities? In the absence of this or greater coordination among the various
boards, preparers and users will continually be faced with multiple reports,
several levels of disclosure, and the attendant confusion.

Users and Financial Reports
Mr. Hicks asks in his paper whether “we pay an irrational reverence to
financial statements in general and to notes to financial statements in par
ticular?”
As a banker who has been involved in making commercial loans and is
now involved in loan review and the training of future loan officers, I find it
difficult to foresee a time when we will use financial reports any less. In
fact, as our knowledge of accounting and the audit function expands, it is
quite likely that our review of such documents will intensify. This, in turn,
will trigger requests for even more information as we attempt to establish the
quality of the numbers. Much of this additional data will be too specific in
nature to include in published reports; on the other hand, some items such as
a cash flow statement, might properly find its way into the annual report.
Bankers are also likely to be more aggressive in requesting copies of, or
at least reviewing, all communications between the auditor and the client.
We knew from hindsight that the management letter and audit workpapers
contain significant disclosures which are of considerable value in improving
our knowledge of a borrower’s needs and problems. This line of inquiry will
undoubtedly result in more frequent direct communication with the auditor
to the mutual benefit of all.

Fair Presentation and the Attest Function
Mr. Hicks’ discussion of these two related and pervasive issues reflects
users’ confusion about the role of the CPA as auditor and their frustration in
not being able to compare effectively the performance of companies within the
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same industry due to the existence of alternative generally accepted account
ing principles. Depending upon the sophistication of the reader, the phrase
“present fairly” may be interpreted with the knowledge that substantial judg
ments are involved, or it may be viewed as a statement insuring the quality
of the numbers and the company. Only lately has the profession been active
in talking about and attempting to deal with materiality and the range of
judgments involved in an audit. Axiomatically, the more users become aware
of these, the less inclined they will be toward treating the auditors’ certificate
as an insurance policy.
The pressure will not be removed from the accounting profession, how
ever, until it deals conclusively with leases, materiality, broad qualitative
standards, inflation accounting and the host of other specific problems which
are embraced by the captioned topics. As mentioned previously, Mr. Hicks
regards measurement and disclosure as inseparable components of generally
accepted accounting standards. He also states that the improvement of
accounting principles “is the business of the FASB.” This is true. Never
theless, if standard setting is to remain in the private sector, the Board must
be given maximum opportunity to reach peak effectiveness. Unfortunately,
during the time it has taken the FASB to become operational, many account
ing and reporting problems have reached critical proportions. Thus, it seems
that the AICPA or individual firms within the profession must take the lead
in resolving certain of these issues, particularly those relating to the attest
function, if the FASB is going to have the chance to succeed. Two such issues
which come immediately to mind are multilevel reporting and interim financial
statements.
In the case of banks, the problem of multilevel reporting results from
involvement with publicly held entities, large privately owned concerns, as
well as small- and medium-sized companies whose reports are often quali
fied because of scope limitations or are unaudited. Large privately owned
concerns are not required to provide the type of disclosure requested of
publicly held companies. Thus, footnotes and other data contained in annual
reports may not be as complete as those found in a 10-K or other SEC
filings. Fortunately, many of these companies have sophisticated data re
trieval systems which can and may already be producing this type of informa
tion for use by management. Nonetheless, lenders must contend with this
difference in reporting practice and strive to ensure that complete disclosure
is available when making decisions on the allocation of scarce loan dollars.
The adequacy of disclosure is even more difficult to deal with when scope
limitations preclude full certification of a company’s figures. In this situation,
a banker must not only be familiar with the differences in reporting for public
and private companies, but also with the disclosure obligations of auditors
involved in an unaudited engagement. In fact, we are asked to be familiar
with three levels of financial statement disclosure at a time when it would
be difficult to deal with one.
Interim financial reporting presents a whole range of different disclosure
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problems which require immediate solution because of the almost instanta
neous reactions of the equity markets to their release as well as the inability
of creditors to postpone economic decisions until such time as audited figures
are available. We recognize that certification of interim results would be
prohibitively costly both in terms of dollars and time. Yet some compromise
must be reached. As a result, the kind of action taken by Coopers & Lybrand,
even though it runs parallel to a course that Mr. Hicks finds unpalatable, has
to be welcomed by users as an important step forward.

Accounting Profession Responsiveness Required

The controversy surrounding financial reporting and the audit function
results from problems which have gone unresolved for too many years. The
lack of timely response to these problems coupled with confusion regarding
the role of the auditor has resulted not only in litigation, but also the steady
erosion of the private sector’s control of the standard-setting process. If
recovery of control by the private sector is desirable, and in my opinion it is,
the FASB cannot be left to stand alone in this effort. The accounting pro
fession must support the Board by acting quickly, aggressively, and innova
tively to resolve problems relating to the attest function and to intercede with
its members and clients to ensure that the highest standards of disclosure called
for under current and future generally accepted accounting principles are
observed. Pursuit of this latter course will no doubt precipitate enforcement
problems and, since there is no public agency which has uniform jurisdiction
throughout the spectrum, the profession will have to deal with them. Cer
tainly, the auditor’s report remains the most effective tool vis-a-vis a client, but
some direct communication with interested third parties may be necessary. In
terms of the profession, the AICPA and the state societies must be more
aggressive in reviewing the work of their membership to ensure that the
highest quality auditing techniques and reporting standards are followed.
Continuing education requirements are a step in the right direction. Periodic
reexamination of CPAs should be considered as the next logical step. If the
profession demonstrates a willingness to develop such an enforcement
mechanism, bankers will simultaneously be faced with the task of upgrading
their standards regarding the quality of financial reports they will accept in
conjunction with a loan request.
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Critique
Of the Hicks paper

By Frances stone, Vice President, Merrill Lynch Co., Inc.

My sympathies lie with auditors who are feeling buffeted by criticisms
from analysts, investors, the SEC and, most important, the courts. The
role of the auditor in our current economic and political scene has changed
substantially from the role of the expert in a private contractual client
auditor arrangement to public involvement and responsibility.
In Mr. Hicks’ paper, there is a short paragraph that I quote as follows:
I conceive that an auditor has a duty to do a proper audit and to
issue a report to his client that will serve equally the interests of every
user to whom the client delivers the report. I do not conceive that the
auditor has any duty to render a report to anyone other than the
client who engaged him. A client’s legal or contractual duty to
disseminate the auditor’s report should not be misconstrued as a duty
of the auditor to report to third parties.

Analysis of User Needs
The important phrase in the foregoing short paragraph is “user to whom
the client delivers the report.” It is this aspect of the auditor report that has
come under severe attack. As the user of this report, do I clearly understand
its import? Can I use the data to provide money to the corporation on a
debt instrument? Do I recommend the purchase of the stock or outstanding
bonds based upon an analysis of the numbers?
Speaking directly toward the use of the data by the security analyst, a
number of questions are raised by the paper. Does the analyst really under
stand the audit function? The probability may be high that we have been
according too much faith in the accountant. We have been assuming that
“present fairly” might mean something about accuracy. This is, of course,
erroneous! However, until recently, accountants appeared to be acting as if
this was a proper interpretation. We all know better now. We know the
accountant is only assuring us that, under the accounting principles available,
the choice has been made to present the data in the most favorable fashion.
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Until this year’s change to LIFO from FIFO by a wide variety of companies,
the usual choice has been to select a principle that raised rather than decreased
earnings.

Standards Setting vs. Disclosure Requirements

The paper sets the responsibility for setting standards on the FASB.
This is not a point of controversy, but the responsibility still lies with the
profession. The Board needs guidance, suggestions, and interpretation of the
accounting methods. The accountants must supply the empirical evidence of
the use of accounting principles and the actual effect of such standards on
business practice as well as reporting standards.
One of the issues specifically touched in the paper is the understanding
by the analyst of the auditing and accounting principles. Most security analysts
with finance degrees of any level have studied some accounting. In addition,
the CFA program has accounting as one of its seven topics. Further, in
meetings held for analysts in New York and other cities, accounting is a
continuous topic of discussion and learning. Among analysts, this is one of the
most important areas.
The use of accounting information in the valuation process is a disputable
issue. In my opinion, it is a basic ingredient for judging the level of future
earning power. In this fashion, accounting numbers are a very significant
part of this process. As the report on the objectives of financial statements
indicated, the user needs a basis for estimating and forecasting future income.
Accounting is central in this process.

Auditor's Responsibility in Financial Disclosure
In the matter of Touche Ross & Co. and the SEC on the investigation
of the financial reporting of U.S. Financial, the commission, aside from rein
forcing the need for adherence to high auditing standards, extended the
responsibility of the auditor.
In reviewing significant transactions, it is not enough for auditors
to accumulate documents relating to the transactions. It is critical that
an analysis be made of transactions and all of their ramifications, in
cluding any involvement management or persons acting for manage
ment may have in such transactions. It is equally insufficient to
obtain negative assurances that no such involvement is present if at
the same time all of the details are not known as to the various trans
actions in question. Thus, for example, when an accountant becomes
aware that a party to a transaction has received a guarantee or some
other form of assurance which may relieve him of some risk of loss,
it is critical that the accountant not only receive assurances that such
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guarantee does not involve members of management, but also that
he obtain information concerning the nature and extent of the
guarantee, as well as the identity of the guarantor. It is only when
armed with that information that the accountant may properly evalu
ate whether or not the transaction, including the guarantee, will be
properly reported.

In the recent ASR No. 159, the SEC has requested a series of explana
tions on material changes in income, charges, deferred costs, assumption for
pension funds, and other items.
The auditor must widen his horizon. The first duty may be to report to his
client, but along with this is the larger responsibility to the user. Whether
acquiescing gracefully or dragged along by the institutional demands, the ac
countant will find that the use of the figures in annual reports and for the SEC
will place the onus on decisions abetted by his knowledge of the accounting
rules.
In the future, these rules will call for additional disclosure of information
with attention to the cost and the use of the data. However, involvement with
the statement will place the accountant beside management. Consequently,
the profession, in its own interest, should help set standards that have informa
tion and validity.
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Discussion
Of the Hicks paper

R. K. Mautz, Discussion Chairman
Chairman Mautz: The subject, “the role of the auditor in disclosure”
has a different emphasis than the others considered thus far. The question
isn’t so much more disclosure, or the extent of disclosure; it has to do, really,
with the credibility of what is disclosed.
Mr. Hicks has given us a very useful paper and I’d like to follow it as an
outline. He has cataloged and commented on a number of proposals for
adding credibility to certain items.
Mr. Hicks presents a carefully reasoned case against expanding the
CPA’s attest function. He follows a straightforward and familiar method. He
tries to ask the kinds of questions—penetrating questions—that he thinks are
highly relevant to the issue, and then he answers those questions, reasoning
his way to what he thinks is a satisfactory conclusion.
Now, the reader’s evaluation of a paper of that kind is of two kinds.
First, what do you think of the questions? Has he asked the right questions?
And, secondly, has he reasoned to answers that are satisfactory in view of the
questions?
His paper puts a heavy emphasis, in discussing the attest function, on the
need for established standards. He doesn’t think the auditor can serve effec
tively without a set of standards against which to measure whatever it is that’s
being disclosed. He doesn’t think the auditor can be very effective in the
abstract—just say: “In my opinion these statements are fair.” He leans very
heavily toward saying: “In my opinion these statements are fair in accordance
with a specific set of standards.”
He argues that chaos would result if we shifted away from “in accord
ance with generally accepted accounting standards” to just “the statements are
fair.” So he opposes this notion of fairness in the abstract. He wants some
standards.
He opposes also the notion of giving two opinions, one on the measure
ments—that is, the application of accounting principles—and the other, on
the extent of disclosure. He feels that extent of disclosure is one of the
accounting principles, and there should be one opinion.
Someone has suggested, he adds, that the auditor might well offer an
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opinion on whether the principles followed are the best accounting principles,
rather than just generally accepted principles, and he argues against that,
proposing as an idea that, within the concept of generally accepted accounting
principles is the notion that the principles are appropriate in the specific
circumstances. So he sees no need for saying anything about the relative merit
of the principles used.
And, finally, he responds to another notion that someone has suggested,
and that is the notion that the auditor should do more than just offer an
opinion; that the auditor should add some degree of analytical comment about
the information in the financial statements. Mr. Hicks argues against this on
the basis that the auditor is not an analyst, doesn’t know what the analysts
need, and should not be put in the position of taking that kind of a position.
As an aside, he notes that we don’t really know how, or how much,
investors rely on financial statements and on the notes to statements; but he
hazards the guess that they may rely too much, that perhaps financial state
ments get more attention than they really deserve, and people expect more of
them than can be included in financial statements.
Most readers, he says, do not understand accounting and its limitations.
They do not understand auditing and its limitations; nor are they really aware
of the impact that non-financial statement events have on the success of a
company.
In talking about quarterly, or interim, statements, he questions whether
anything useful can be done by the auditor short of a full audit of interim
statements. And he goes into some detail to point out the kinds of questions
that might be raised about the validity of interim statements and concludes
that something far more than a review is necessary to add any worthwhile
degree of credibility.
And then he goes on to ask another very intriguing question, and that is
whether the effort is worth the candle. In other words, interim statements
cover such a short period of time that there’s a very real question in his
mind whether they can be described as fairly reflecting anything. We have
enough trouble, he says, in annual statements to give an idea of how the
company is doing. We’re taking an arbitrary period out of a continuing
process.
Now, if we cut that down to three months, he wonders if that’s useful.
And he suggests, rather than tell the investor that the interim financial state
ments are fair, we might do far better to warn them, and point out their
limitations—something like the health warning in cigarette commercials. We
might add a statement: “Reliance on these for investment decisions may be
detrimental to your financial health.” In his view there is too great a tendency
to rely on information that by its very nature cannot be sufficiently accurate
for the purpose.
The idea of direct communication between the auditor and some users of
financial statements, short-circuiting the company, in effect, has been raised;
and Mr. Hicks takes a position against that, arguing that if we get to the
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position where the auditor’s confidentiality rule is breached, we will really do
violence to the idea of an audit, and make it very difficult to have a useful
audit. And so he rejects the notion that direct exchange of communication
between the auditor and those interested in the financial statements is a good
thing.
He also examines the concept of “auditor of record” and finds it not a
very good idea. He speaks here, he says, for what he thinks is the majority
of independent auditors, and he says they cannot be blamed for rejecting what
he calls an unspecified responsibility for an unstated scope of work with
undefined standards of reliability.
He adds that the auditor, rather than being an agent of the public in
some way, ought to be truly independent of everyone, and approach the audit
on that basis.
And finally, he closes with what I think, at least, is a very desirable note
of humility, pointing out that auditors are human, there’s a limit to what they
can do, and the expectations some people have of their work might well be ill
founded.
So, in summary, then, Mr. Hicks takes a strong position against any
extensive change in the extent of our expectations of what an independent
auditor ought to do.
Now, there are three critics of his paper, and the differences between
Mr. Hicks’s views and the critics’ views come through clearly. Ken Axelson
doesn’t bother to disagree with Mr. Hicks’s questions at all, nor, really, with
his reasoning. He goes straight to the conclusion. And he tries to blast it out
of the water, really, with just one statement, “But his conclusion is wrong,
and therefore his whole rationale fails.”
Now, how does Mr. Axelson reach that conclusion? He doesn’t follow
any laborious reasoning, a carefully constructed, logical scheme, as Mr. Hicks
did. He just knows in his heart, and he doesn’t need to meet the logic on a
point-by-point basis. He just knows that Mr. Hicks has arrived at the wrong
conclusion, because it—and I quote now—“It does not best serve the public
interest.”
Mr. Axelson’s approach is to get the conclusion, and worry about reason
ing later.
Now, of course, that’s not quite fair, because he does offer some evidence
in support of his position. One is his own company’s experience; and he gives
a number of cases with which he is intimately familiar where he or members
of his company’s executive staff have worked with their independent auditors
to improve their annual report. And he offers that as a solution.
He also points out the willingness of another public accounting firm to
extend a modification of the attest function to interim statements and to his
torical, or past, financial data included in unaudited portions of the annual
report as evidence of the fact that it can be done, and ought to be done.
He’s not content merely to disagree with Mr. Hicks. He wants to make a
constructive suggestion. He places the burden for adequate disclosure on a
combination of management and the independent auditor.
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And then he goes a step farther, and shifts the burden a bit, because he
calls on the independent auditor to be management’s conscience; and when
the independent auditor can’t bring management along with the auditor’s
ideas of what ought to be disclosed, he says they ought to have the courage
to resign.
Lincoln Morison, writing as a banker, notes the confusion and com
petition in the standard setting arena, and finds that unfortunate. He finds
himself in substantial disagreement with Mr. Hicks. While Mr. Hicks ques
tions whether we ought to rely on financial statements as much as we do,
Mr. Morison points out that he can see no lessening in the necessity of relying
on and using financial statements.
He also disagrees on the matter of direct communication, and points out
that in the future he thinks bankers are going to become much more aggressive
in demanding more frequent and direct communication with auditors. And
he goes so far as to suggest that the auditor’s letter to management, and any
other communications of this kind, ought to be available to the banker.
He reminds independent auditors of something we really don’t need to be
reminded of, I think, and that is that the pressure is on auditors for solutions to
many of the problems that have been bothering analysts and credit grantors
and others for a long time, such as, accounting for leases and objectives of
financial statements, and that it is going to stay on until the problems are
solved.
He goes from there to the point that the FASB is overloaded, has more
than it can do, will take some time to cover its present agenda, and that what
we need is work from within the profession to meet and solve some of those
problems. And he calls upon the major firms and others to help in the solution
of problems.
Mr. Morison also raises some interesting possibilities that might not have
occurred to me had I not read his paper. One is the disclosure obligations of
CPAs in engagements to prepare unaudited statements.
And also, he makes the point that if CPAs are successful in raising
reporting standards, then as a result bankers can upgrade their standards
regarding the quality of financial reports they will accept in conjunction with
a loan request. As I interpret that, he’s really saying that CPAs are in a better
position than bankers to exert leverage on a company to improve its dis
closure and its reporting. And if that’s so, that’s going to destroy the beliefs of
a good many CPAs.
And, finally, we come to Frances Stone’s paper. She, in her kindly way,
has sympathy for the poor CPA, who is being criticized in so many ways. But
she really has only the kind of sympathy you have for someone who is suffer
ing for his own sins, and deserves it anyway.
Because she says that if many users of financial statements expect too
much of them, that’s at least partly because CPAs have, if not encouraged—
at least not discouraged—people from expecting more than financial state
ments can provide.
She has a definition of “fair presentation” that I find memorable, to say
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the least. In talking about what “presents fairly” means, she says, “At one
time we thought it might mean something about accuracy, but now we all
know better. We know the accountant is only assuring us that under the
accounting principles available the choice has been made to present the data
in the most favorable fashion.”
That definition raises some interesting questions. Is it really true, or
is it not something of an overstatement?
Should management be expected to put something other than its best
foot forward? And if so, what would that be? How would we define that?
The worst possible position? A moderate position? Where does this leave us?
And I find it a very stimulating question.
Now, what I would like to do is propose a list of topics that we ought
to discuss, in some kind of order, so that we do justice to the effort Mr. Hicks
has put into his paper and the effort the others have put into criticism. And
I think we might well accept Ken Axelson’s criterion: Would society be better
served? Would society be better served if CPAs reported just generally on the
fairness of the financial statements, rather than their fairness in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles?
Would society be better served if CPAs tried to report on disclosure
separately?
If CPAs were to comment or report on the relative desirability of the
accounting principles that were applied, as against any other principles that
might have been considered acceptable, or preferable, in the circumstances?
Would society be better served if CPAs included some analysis of the
financial statements, as well as just adding his opinion?
Should CPAs attempt to add credibility to interim financial statements
by any means at all, in view of the limitations of such statements on a time
basis, and so on?
Would society be better served if CPAs were accorded and accepted the
role implied in the term “auditor of record?”
Would society be better served if CPAs modified their confidentiality
rule to provide for direct communication with those who read and are in
terested in the financial statements?
Now, I think, in facing those questions, we have a couple of choices.
One is just to express our emotional feelings about them—which may give
vent to a lot of animosity, but won’t lead us very far toward a conclusion—
the other is to keep in mind that there ought to be some guides to the solution
of such problems.
One guide is: Can any proposal, for or against, survive the cost
benefit analysis? When we are talking about society being better off, what do
we mean? There are costs in doing these things, and there are benefits; and it
seems to me the net benefit of whichever position you advocate ought to be
demonstrable.
And also, the proposals ought to be implementable in our economic
environment, in the kind of world in which we live and perform our duties.
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Now, while you think about these—and we’ll go through them in just a
minute—I think it’s only fair to give those who wrote the papers an oppor
tunity to reject any of my interpretations which are in error.
CPA: Well, on my part, having heard your summary of my paper, I
kind of wish I’d said it that way. That’s my reaction.
Chairman Mautz: I thought you had, much better.
Banker: Yes. A couple of points. I think one of the concerns that
I have is to get us away from dealing solely with publicly held companies,
and the disclosure problem as it relates to a publicly held company, as
opposed to a privately held company, particularly a smaller business.
The way our bank is organized, a loan officer is assigned geographically,
and as a result goes into a broad spectrum of businesses, both in terms of in
dustry and size; and one of the problems that we have been running into with
nonpublicly held companies, particularly the smaller ones, is a great difference
in the quality of the audit reports, as we perceive them, that we receive, both
as to the inclusion of footnotes and the absence of an auditor’s opinion and
other things that, in our minds, clearly create a substandard reporting
environment.
The point of all this is to question how CPAs might assist us through
establishing, perhaps, a policing mechanism within the profession for going
further than voluntary continuing education—or compulsory, depending on
the various states—perhaps into the concept of periodic reexamination, to
ensure that there is an attempt to make the profession more uniform in its
ability throughout the spectrum from the individual practitioner up to the
very large firm.
If we can get some help on that side, it puts the banks in a better
position to demand simultaneously better reporting from our nonpublic
customers.
As to the reporting environment and my comments about the pro
fession lending a hand, if you will, to the FASB, I think that the competing
pressures for information from a variety of special interests are such that I see
a real risk that the standard setting function might be extracted from the
private sector. There is a possibility of a federal law resulting from the
application of Rule 10b-5 that might establish what is fair, to the point where
I think that the FASB needs as much help as possible to preserve the standard
setting process in the private sector, where I think it belongs. I hope that
that process can continue to be insulated as much as possible from having
financial reporting affected by political and other considerations that aren’t in
the best interests of good financial reporting.
Analyst: I guess I should say something, after the way you quoted
from my paper. And I must admit, that sentence was written very deliberately.
It didn’t come by chance, and it makes a point that I have felt very deeply
myself, that in effect the auditor’s report conveys an authority that these are
the correct numbers for the corporation. And I think that there have been
times when the reader of a report has been led astray.
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Obviously, what I’m looking for is for the auditor to take responsibility,
which is not merely to report to management, but, equally as much, to
consider the reader—the third reader of that report—the investor, the analyst,
or whoever it may be.
In effect, this is an outsider reading the report, who does not have inside
information; and when the auditor’s opinion says “presents fairly,” the reader
should be informed that this does not convey the concept of accuracy.
Perhaps CPAs should be a little more vocal on saying that the numbers
are based on judgment and decisions.
Chairman Mautz: Maybe we can add, then, your questions about the
auditor’s opinion to our list.

The Meaning of "Present Fairly in
Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles"
Now then, let’s start down the list of problems which Mr. Hicks has
presented to us, and discover, if we can, what your views are on the question of
how the CPA should report. Is it desirable that he report on financial state
ments that they do or do not present fairly in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles? Or should he just say, “In my opinion, they’re
fair”?
Would this be more useful? Would this be less useful? Would society be
better served?
Banker: I agreed very much with Mr. Hicks’s presentation and his
reference to standards as a means of determining whether or not a CPA is
doing the job he is supposed to do; and I think the degree to which he adheres
to those standards is, of course, highly important. Without the standards,
you get a mishmash of various kinds of approaches that would be hard to
reconcile from any user’s point of view.
The CPA, however, has an obligation to be competent, to be independent,
to report his work with integrity—and I mean intellectual integrity, moral
integrity—not to use accounting principles in such a way as to result in a
misleading point of view about the statements.
But, having done that, I think the standards are highly important, and
that’s what the Financial Accounting Standards Board is all about, to try to
establish those standards so that we can get reporting in which all of us can
have confidence.
CPA: I’d just like to point out that you dealt with it in terms of two
alternatives. There really is a third, the combination of the two. You said
we can report in the abstract, or report in conformity. The third alternative
would be to report on both of those things, with a sentence in the report that
says they are fair, if we think they are fair, in the abstract, and a second
sentence which would say that they are in conformity, if we think they are.
Chairman Mautz: Is it inconceivable, then, that in any case at all the
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application of generally accepted accounting principles could result in an
unfair presentation?
CPA: Yes, sir!
Chairman Mautz: Then how do we report on both? Or would you
report on them individually?
CPA: Yes, individually they are unfair, but are in conformity.
Banker: I think I understand—at least, I hope I understand—what is
involved in having fair presentation in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. I’m interested in having a CPA explain a little further
the kinds of judgments and decisions he might make if a dual opinion were
required.
CPA: In other words, you want to define fairness. You are right back
to setting standards.
Aren’t honesty and decency as clear to CPAs as they are to the layman?
I think they are.
Chairman Mautz: This is a little bit like the “smell test” that was
referred to earlier.
Banker: Is that what you are talking about?
CPA: Yes.
CPA: I wonder if there is anybody in the room who thinks that some
thing that is either dishonest or indecent could be that and also in con
formity with generally accepted accounting principles. I don’t.
Analyst : If I recall the last Seaview Symposium it was acknowledged
by one of our CPA participants that financial statements could be simul
taneously in conformity with GAAP and fraudulent.
Chairman Mautz: I guess what CPAs have asked for is specifics.
CPA: I think I was here. I don’t recall that statement, but I believe I
did make the statement that I could take a position that it was unfair, but still
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, and I could cite
the oil industry as one where I have, maybe, a choice of a number of methods,
many of which I might think are unfair, but, nevertheless, they are in con
formity with generally accepted accounting principles.
As of the moment, I personally would say that applying the new FASB
statement of writing off all research and development, that the statements
would be unfair, but in conformity with generally accepted accounting prin
ciples, because in many situations I can see justification for deferral of
research and development. But, nevertheless, we do conform with generally
accepted accounting principles, and what we are attempting to say is that
it presents fairly in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles,
and if we separate the two, we create all kinds of problems, and I don’t know
how CPAs could possibly cope with them.
Financial Executive: I think we have got to recognize that we do
live in a real world, and even with the most fantastic computers, there’s no
possible way that you could present all the alternatives that you can have in
this kind of a situation. I think this brings us to the question of whether or
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not there should be alternative generally accepted accounting principles. I
don’t think we have enough time to debate that; but I don’t see how there can
really be any serious question of the present way that CPAs report on finan
cial statements.
LIFO is a big item. The inventory method chosen certainly has an
important effect on the financial statements of most companies, but I don’t
see how anyone who reads a company’s financial statements—when the policy
is set out that they are either on LIFO or some other inventory method—
could be misled to think that the statements do not fairly present the financial
position of the company in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles.
Now, if the question really is, “Don’t CPAs have any alternative account
ing principles,” that’s a different question. It’s just inconceivable to me, though,
that you can have every possible alternative set forth, or that you could ask
the CPA to pass judgment on whether the statement fairly presented the
position of the company under all alternatives. I just don’t think it’s possible.
So I would say, the present situation should be satisfactory to, at least, all
sophisticated users of financial statements; and I think we have said that they
are the ones that are most concerned with this problem.
CPA: Consider what would happen if CPAs only reported that financial
statements present fairly. Actually, if you think there are a lot of alternatives
in accounting, you should see how many alternatives are available if you took
all the partners of all the accounting firms. So what one CPA would consider
fair, would be different from what another CPA would feel. So I don’t think
greater comparability would be achieved.
And too, the definition of the standards that we have should encompass
the idea of fairness, and that the standard should be changed if its results are
unfair. That’s what we should strive for: standards that build in fairness.

Reporting Separately on the
Adequacy of Disclosure
Chairman Mautz: I think, with that, we ought to move on to the ques
tion of whether we ought to take this proposed dichotomy between disclosure
and measurement—and measurement really means the application of all ac
counting principles other than those concerned with disclosure—and report on
these separately.
Standards, however set, call for certain things to be disclosed. In giving
his opinion the auditor adds to the credibility of what is disclosed.
Most of the subjects, I think, which Mr. Hicks has mentioned in his
paper, and which are the basis for our discussion, are items that are already
required as information. In only a few cases is he proposing that additional
information should be added. When he talks about the possibility of an
analysis of the data in the financial statements, he’s at least considering the
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possibility of adding to present disclosure; and he rejects that.
So my feeling is that, in general, we are considering the credibility of
what is now required to be disclosed, rather than considering, as we were
earlier, the desirability of disclosing some additional kinds of information.
CPA: It seems to me that the issue in speaking separately to disclosure—
if CPAs were to do that—would be to speak to whether the disclosures that
are presented are (a) those which are required under generally accepted
accounting principles and (b) whether the subject matters that are treated in
accordance with GAAP are treated properly. So that we would be talking
about the extent, the coverage, the subject matters, and also the propriety of the
comments that are made on those subjects.
Now, I don’t know if that helps any, but that’s, in my mind, why the
question comes up, and that’s how I understand the question that has been
raised, and my conclusion is that we already do that when we say “fairly
presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles,” which,
of course, means the principles applicable at the time we sign the report,
so that it’s all covered by the report.
And I see some advantages in keeping that unitary whole as the subject
of the opinion and some disadvantages in breaking it apart.
Chairman Mautz: The question, then, is whether the auditor should
offer two opinions at the same time, one opinion covering the adequacy of dis
closure, the other opinion covering whether or not the things disclosed are
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or
whether one opinion really covers both of these, and we don’t need two
separate opinions.
Analyst: I’m bothered by the statement of accounting policy, because
I feel that it only give us a whiff of what we need. Merely to tell me that a
company uses four-years’ digits, or so-many years’ digits, and somebody else
ten-years’ straight line, and someone else is a full-coster, and another a
successful effort, doesn’t give me the dollar impact. In many cases, I just have
to derive it on my own.
So, I think, while these may be disclosures, they are not really meaning
ful disclosures from the investor’s viewpoint.
Chairman Mautz: In effect, then, you are asking for additional in
formation not presently required to be disclosed, aren’t you?
Analyst: Yes. I’m asking for dollar impact, or what some have called
“as if” accounting.
CPA: In order to disclose the difference between a principle adopted
and one which may have been adopted under some other condition, you have
got to decide which one is the right one.
Now, for a full-coster to tell you what his income would be on a
successful-effort basis is impossible. He wouldn’t have made the same oper
ating decisions; and besides, he doesn’t think successful-effort accounting is
meaningful accounting, any more than someone else thinks that writing off
research and development, when it generates phenomenal income over the
next five years, is proper.
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So for a successful-effort man to tell you what his income would have
been under full-cost accounting would be speculation. Would you like that?
Analyst : Yes. I’d like them reconciled one to the other.
CPA: And he says, “I would never tell anyone what my income would
be under a method of accounting I don’t believe in.” So if they are both
generally accepted, the guy who adopts one believes that’s the right one, and
there’s no point in reconciling it with something he doesn’t believe in.
Analyst: I think the trade associations in particular are probably best
organized to do it, and industry by industry we ought to inventory our prin
ciples. It well may be that trade associations can’t get together and agree as to
what should be the standard. Someone, then, must come along, the FASB
or the SEC, and determine a set of principles, because if you look back at the
computer-leasing boom, by simply assuming different circumstances, such as,
keeping the level of air conditioners at one level in one place, and a higher level
at an IBM facility, it made 40 percent the first year at IBM and 9 percent
depreciation at a computer-leasing company.
Chairman Mautz: Mr. Hicks actually had something to say about this.
In his paper he mentioned something that a quick reading would miss; and he
says that there is an accounting principle already that says: “The accounting
principles that a company uses must be appropriate for the circumstances to
which they are applied.”
I think that’s the point that some of the CPAs were speaking to. You
select only the principle that is fair in the circumstances in which it is applied;
and if you select something else, then you have really departed from generally
accepted accounting principles. It’s a high standard, but it’s one which Mr.
Hicks feels now is effective, and should continue to be.
Banker: Are you saying that within one industry there is a certain
set of principles which are uniform and fair for that industry and are adopted
by all CPAs in that industry?
Chairman Mautz: I’m not going to make any such statement, no.
But, implicit in your statement is the notion that circumstances change only
from industry to industry, rather than circumstances changing from company
to company within the industry.
Banker: I think it is much more meaningful for anyone to analyze a
company by contrasting it, or comparing it, with other companies within that
same industry on the same basis, using the same standards.
Analyst: Financial statements should be fair to users, and less fair to
the particular objectives of a company. If a company is smaller and doesn’t
have the net income to carry on a big research and development or a big
exploratory program, it shouldn’t be able to use a method that glosses over
this and puts it in a different position. It should be the nature of the trans
action that determines the accounting principle.
Banker: On this particular issue, I want to make something clear
first. I in no way want to suggest that the concerns and the questions that are
raised put me, or anybody that I would presume to speak for, in the position
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of an adversary of the accounting profession, because I certainly don’t feel
that way at all, especially on something that the banks really, I don’t think,
could get along without.
In a bank, we use financial data to make decisions as to whom we are
going to lend money, as an initial step; and then, we use it to look forward,
after the loan is on the books, to determine whether we’re going to get that
money back. And when you get into the problem of alternative accounting
principles, it confuses our analysis. It makes it difficult for us to get at, if we
have to pick a single figure, the amount of cash being generated which is
available to service the debt. Some alternatives tend to obscure our efforts
to get at that number. Others don’t.
In the case of research and development, I recognize the potential unfair
ness of that in terms of what the future impact of that research and develop
ment will be for the firm’s well being. On the other hand, in looking at the
current year’s financial information, if it’s being charged off, then I know that
the income figure I’m looking at, in at least that respect, is perhaps closer to
the amount of cash being generated.
As long as there are some facilitators to us in our analysis to get at the
amount of cash being generated, then a lot of this heated discussion may just
disappear.
CPA: It seems to me that we’re having, simultaneously, an interesting
discussion of three very separate questions. One has already been identified:
Should there be alternative accounting principles? And that could be a subject
in itself.
The second question is: If there are alternative principles, who should
make the choice, management or the auditors? That question is implicit in
much of the discussion that’s going on.
And the third is: After somebody, whoever it is, makes the choice, is it
useful and meaningful to present a matrix of alternatives of what it might
have been under the multiple combinations and permutations of these choices?
For example, consider full costing versus successful efforts. Combine
that with LIFO versus FIFO. Combine that with the various alternative
choices of actuarial methods under pension plans, and then combine that with
all of the various alternatives. The ultimate combination would be a matrix
of permutations that would even challenge our modern-day computers, and I
think you would really face the question of the usefulness of the information.
All of this, I think is an important and interesting discussion, but Mr. Hicks’s
question, as I understand it, really was: Granted that at the present time—
whether we’re doing it right or wrong, or doing a poor job or a good one—
the auditor’s opinion purports to cover both conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles and the adequacy of disclosure, all in the one
expression, would it be better to fragment that, and express it in two different
parts?
Chairman Mautz: That’s exactly the question, and it has led us into
these other avenues.
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The Best Versus Acceptable
Accounting Principles

Chairman Mautz: The next question is really very closely related, and
that is whether CPAs should, in expressing an opinion, specifically comment
on whether the best generally accepted accounting principles have been used,
or whether just something other than the best, but still acceptable, accounting
principles have been used.
And again, it has been suggested that only the one appropriate to the
circumstances should have been used, and, therefore, it should be unnecessary
to say that the best has been used.
CPA: Well, that’s not quite what was meant. Rather, the principles
used should not be inappropriate. That is not to say that the judgment, the
expression of the judgment, is unnecessary because it’s implicit in the opinion
that is expressed. The opinion that is expressed—that is, as to conformity
with GAAP—is the opinion that’s appropriate, and that another opinion, or a
separate opinion that would say, in effect, “These statements are in con
formity with GAAP, and not only that, but these are the principles I would
have chosen”—that’s really the choice that’s before us.
Chairman Mautz: Does anyone wish to comment on this thought?
Banker: Your reference to “best,” it seems, raises a question of best
for whom, under what conditions, for which user? Is the statement being
prepared for a bank, who would take it from a longer-term point of view,
perhaps, or a cash point of view, or is it being prepared for a speculator who
wants to see the company report the highest possible earnings for this
quarter, regardless of the impact on taxes, or cash, next year, or if union
negotiations are coming along, is it prepared for a union leader who would
like to point to exorbitant earnings?
How can you say “best” in that context, in a context that suggests that it
means one thing to everybody?
Banker: Isn’t the implication here that the CPA, if he does his job
right, picks the most appropriate combination of principles? And I guess
we can argue about what’s appropriate. But, again, if he has done a pro
fessional job, they should be the ones that most appropriately reflect the con
dition of the company at that time, and not necessarily trying to figure out
the best for whom, but as accurately as it can be done.
CPA: I think all of us should recognize that the accounting profession
has established the goal of eliminating alternative acceptable principles. Of
course, realization of that goal is a long way oft and may never be achieved.
But we may at least reach the point where we will minimize the alterna
tives.
For the moment, however, we have not yet established guidelines for
depreciation methods, and the like, or the LIFO or FIFO. These are equally
acceptable alternatives. Consequently, we are not in a position to say what
is most appropriate.
164

But what Mr. Hicks has said is that he certainly believes that they are not
inappropriate in the circumstances, because if they are inappropriate, then
they are not in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles at
that time. And that’s as far as we can go at the moment. We can say they
are not inappropriate, but to say whether one is better, until we have guide
lines, is impossible.
But that’s a goal, and I think at some point the public is going to expect
us to opine on the application of the most appropriate principle in the
circumstances. And I expect that the profession would be only too happy to
do that, once it establishes the guidelines to determine which are most
appropriate.
Banker: Today a number of different accounting methods are appropriate and that’s entirely proper. What bothers me is that from our bank’s
point of view—and I suppose other banks share it—we would like the oppor
tunity to sit down with the auditor of a borrowing client in question and talk
directly to him and see the judgment that he brought to bear in preparing the
financial statements.
I know Mr. Hicks stressed the confidentiality of the auditor and client
relationship, but I don’t see that this necessarily disturbs it. I don’t see that
it has any additional costs involved, to any great extent, and I think it has
substantial benefits to the bank. I think any client, or any auditor, can
determine what accounting principles they want to use, as long as we under
stand what went into that determination, and talk it out.
CPA: I’d like to jump back to two earlier comments before I react to
this latest one. Someone said that if the auditor has done his job right, he will
have picked the most appropriate principle.
This flies directly in the face of a notion that we auditors cherish fondly
and that is the notion that it’s the client that selects the principles, and we
express an opinion as to whether those principles he has selected are in
conformity with the standards.
Now, I recognize that the line gets blurred sometimes, but it’s important
for all of us to understand that this really is the way the world works.
If we get to the point at which the FASB will have identified the circum
stances that make straight-line depreciation, and the circumstances that make
double-declining balance depreciation appropriate, and the circumstances that
make various other principles appropriate—those principles no longer will be
alternatives. And that’s good. That’s what we all want.
Now, on this point of discussing matters between an auditor and some
body else—what I think is inappropriate is a direct and private conversation
between auditor and somebody else except with the permission of the client,
and preferably, in the presence of the client, with the client as a participant.
So, really, there is no contradiction here. The conference among banker,
client, and CPA takes place regularly, and we foster that, and we think it’s
useful. So there’s really no contradiction here.
Financial Executive: Thank you, for saying what I was about to say.
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I somehow feel like a cadaver in the process of being dissected by the
financial analysts and the CPAs. I must emphasize that the reports are our
reports. They really are.
There’s one problem that I have with the standardization of a cut-anddried, single-only method, or even the use of alternative methods, because one
can’t fail to remember that the accounting principle that’s going to be used
has a tremendous effect on the decisions that management makes. Before
most major decisions are made in business, some kind of an answer is given
as to how that is going to affect the bottom line. And if we are forced to take
a different action by virtue of a standardized accounting principle that is
different from the one we normally would have followed otherwise, it may
make a tremendous difference in terms of the amount of research and develop
ment conducted.
I am reminded of the fact that there was an article in Barron’s this week
on the Financial Accounting Standards Board, and among the items men
tioned was research and development for airplane manufacturers. And I’m
wondering what the impact is going to be on those companies in terms of
developing new airplanes if they have to expense research and development
all in one year. My guess is that those directors and managers are going to
have second thoughts about putting that kind of money into a research and
development operation that is probably going to reduce their earnings per
share to zero for that particular year, and perhaps create a net loss.
So it’s for that reason that we think that you must pick the particular
accounting principle that is going to reflect the conditions applicable to that
particular business. We’re not talking about a hodge-podge of accounting
principles, but there are some clearcut ones that it seems to me do apply. It’s
perfectly appropriate for my business to expense research and development
in a given year, but it might not be for some other business. And I think
management has to have some freedom to choose the principle that is
applicable.
Explain it in the footnotes. Let analysts, if they want to, redo that
financial statement by giving them the information in the footnote. But let us
report the operating results of our business in accordance with those account
ing principles that are applicable to our business. They are still our reports.
We are the management. Don’t forget that they are our reports.
Financial Executive: I disagree. I’m not sure whether I’m taking
basic exception to what he said or just on a point of emphasis, but I don’t
think we business managers make our decisions on the basis of what effect
it’s going to have on the bottom line. I think we make our decisions on the
basis of what we think is economically right for our companies. And if the
accounting conventions present that in a way that we do not believe reflects
the economic realities in our business, then through our footnotes or other
means we seek to convey that information, so that it will not be misunder
stood and misinterpreted.
Financial Executive: If you had been in our board room, your
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explanation of what you thought was right in the way decisions are made
would have fit exactly what I’m sure our chairman would have said. But,
being in the lending business, I submit that, right or wrong, decisions for
companies that are more capital hungry than yours and ours are much
affected by the effect on the bottom line.
CPA: You can say that the management of a company makes its deci
sions in terms of what’s economically right for the company, but what’s
economically right for the company may be to keep the financing off the
balance sheet, to get a lower borrowing rate or a higher credit rating, and,
therefore, management selects a lease instead of a purchase.
In other words, it’s accounting that allows you to keep the lease off the
balance sheet that produces the result that’s an economic result for the
company. And you cannot say for a moment that accounting judgments
don’t enter into management’s judgments every day.
CPA: I agree with that and not only in the leasing area. There are
dozens of business combinations that are either go or no-go on the same basis.
It’s accounting that governs.

Interpretive Reporting by the Auditor
Chairman Mautz: Can we move along to the next one? I have a feel
ing that a number of the speeches that have just been made could have been
made on almost any topic we were discussing.
Now, the next question is one that struck me as very interesting, that is,
whether the CPA should do more than just offer an opinion; whether he ought
to make some kind of interpretive comments about the data in the financial
statements.
Now, is this something that would be useful to financial analysts and
credit grantors, or would it be undesirable?
Analyst: If the proposal is that, as part of the attest function, the
CPA says that the financial condition of the company is such-and-such,
their earnings were up or down for such-and-such a reason, I think that’s
beyond the scope of an audit. If you have the management do it, I think it
would be useful. I’d be happy if the CPA said the disclosure was adequate
and the numbers were correct—or reasonable.
Banker: Would the CPA’s interpretive comments include offering an
opinion whether it’s a generous or conservative or very liberal interpretation?
Is this the kind of thing that would go into this part of the opinion?
CPA: That could be one of the kinds of things. You might also con
sider it to be the very kind of thing that’s required by the recently revised
Guide 22 of the SEC, the analysis of operations, the things that somebody
ought to know in order to understand the import of a financial statement,
the changes in operations, the whys, the wherefores—that kind of thing.
What you mentioned could be one of the things, but it’s not the only thing.
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Adding Credibility to Interim Financial Information

Chairman Mautz: If we move to the next one, we get to this interesting
matter of interim statements, and what the auditor’s relationship to interim
financial statements ought to be.
Analyst: I’d like to ask CPAs what they are going to do? In other
words, are we seeing some motion toward some surveillance of the quarterlies?
CPA: First of all, the accountant did not invent quarterly reports, and I
have to agree that the three months’ results of operations is a very difficult
thing to determine. We have reason to believe that even a one year’s result in
the history of a company is difficult. But there is a requirement that quarterly
reports be published. And I think, that being the case, the user of those
reports needs to have some assurance of their reliability.
We also know that it’s certainly uneconomic to audit quarterly reports, at
least with the present approach to an audit. Perhaps some day we’ll move
towards something like a continuous audit, which would make it possible for
us to give an opinion at any given moment as to what the results may be; but
that’s a long way off.
And so the only question is: what can CPAs do in the meantime to
provide credibility for quarterly reports? And we have certainly seen many
instances of unreliable quarterly reports in the past.
Obviously, the auditor of record, if I may borrow a phrase, is one who is
usually well equipped to understand the background of the company, how it
operates, its systems, its procedures, and so forth. And, consequently, it
doesn’t take too much to review whether or not those procedures and systems
are operative.
Consequently, the CPA can make that kind of a review, and state that, on
the basis of a review of the application of the principles and the operation of
the system—particularly as it relates to quarterly figures—he has no reason
to offer any adjustments.
Now, this is not identical with what might be considered the comfort
letter to underwriters, which all accounting firms are issuing today. It is
somewhat more in line with what many firms are giving the audit committees
of their clients—oral assurance of having made this kind of review. All
I’m suggesting is that, since the profession has already been doing this sort
of thing, that the shareholders ought to have the benefit of that knowledge
and, certainly, have some indication of reliability.
Obviously, it’s not an audit, and there has to be a complete disclaimer in
that respect; but at least I think it will add some credibility.
Financial Executive: I’d like to speak on behalf of industry again,
if I may. I once again feel like I’m being judged guilty without a fair trial.
There is a certain inference from the conversations that are going on here
that statements of industrial companies, issued on a quarterly basis, are in
accurate, unreliable, and undependable; and I think that is a misstatement of
the first order. I get particularly incensed when I am included in that group,
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because that’s my responsibility in my company, to see that they are accurately
stated.
And so it’s my position that if a company needs the attention and the
advice that comes from consulting with their auditors, then they should have
that. And the auditors, if they so desire, and if the client so desires, may attach
their name to the company’s quarterly reports. But, I think, to mandate this
for all companies is the wrong way to go, and I think that, by and large,
American industry is reporting reliable figures.
I would point out, and I don’t want to point a wicked finger in this
regard, but many of our most notorious defalcations and frauds have been
perpetrated on the public under the banner of an audit opinion which said
that the statements were okay. Now, if the auditor performs casual inquiries
in a review of a quarterly report, I don’t see how the public has any right
to expect any greater benefits, or near as much benefit, out of that as they
would get in a full audit.
So I think, personally, that we are going in the wrong direction here,
and that this is really not necessary. There may be some cases where the
integrity of companies can’t be depended on, but I suggest that those cases
are rare, and that the intervention of the auditor in the affairs of those com
panies isn’t going to change that.
Banker: I really have, I guess, three hats, in the sense that we are
audited, we rely on the audits of others, and we lend to auditors. And to the
degree we are audited, I certainly share your opinion. I think we conduct
our own affairs honorably, and using the highest standards, and I resent the
fact that we need someone else’s name added to ours on a quarterly basis.
To the extent that I use audit reports, I would love to have them. But
to the degree I lend to auditing companies as a banker, I should caution
against the possible liability and misinterpretation that might result.
CPA: There’s no doubt that we live in a dangerous world, and that we
have to deal with that as we see it.
I would like to respond to the point of making CPAs’ reviews of quar
terly reports mandatory. Certainly, a review should be voluntary, at least
as of the moment. It may become required. But I do believe that many
companies are certainly well equipped to deal with their reports, not only on a
quarterly basis, but on an annual basis; and on that basis I would say most of
them don’t need annual audits either, because there are many companies that
don’t need to make any adjustments at all as a result of an audit. And I
think this would be great, if we had all our companies in that spot; but they
are not, and we require annual audits principally because it’s felt that every
body ought to be dealt with the same way.
I think it’s the rare occasion that creates the problem. And as you
mentioned, audits are not infallible, and we don’t ever expect that audits will
be infallible. But all we can do is hope that we can keep working at it, and
minimize the travail that we see.
Financial Executive: I think that there is a difference here that we
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are not recognizing. First of all, on an annual basis, we conduct ourselves
differently than we do on an interim basis. We bring to a close many
decisions. For example, the standards governing interim reporting for those
who are on a LIFO basis require a good deal of judgment and interpretation
and estimation about where you are going to be in terms of inventory levels
at the end of the year, as compared to your beginning base, as opposed to
March or June or September, if you are on a calendar year basis. But at
the end of the year there is a certain finality that comes out of this that we
don’t have to struggle over any more.
Industry does not document and formalize all of these things on an
interim basis; yet, if CPAs review interim reports, we’re going to have to
formalize, and give some real, solid support for the kinds of things that
management is doing. So I think there is a conflict brought about by the
special conditions that prevail in an interim period that are not present at the
end of the year.
CPA: But what I was saying is that you don’t really need an auditor
at the end of the year to do your job for you, because you are capable of
doing it yourself. You reach your own conclusions. So the impact of an
audit is not really for that purpose.
CPA: I think the key issue for CPAs is whether the credibility that
presumably would attach to the interim statements based upon a limited
review would be warranted.
Presumably, the credibility that attaches when the auditor expresses an
opinion on the annual financial statements is something more than the signing
of the auditor’s name. There is the audit. A substantial amount of work is
done that has been planned in advance. It covers a good portion of the year
in a good many cases, and the adding of the auditor’s name on a quarterly
basis on a limited review is likely to convey a measure of credibility that is
simply not warranted.
Analogies aren’t good, very often, and maybe mine won’t be very good
either, but if you have an annual physical examination, and you’d like to be
assured every quarter that you are in good shape, so you would call your
doctor, or sit down with him, and he asked you a few questions and you
gave him a few answers, and he said, “I think everything is all right,” and you
might think you were in good shape. But it’s not the same kind of feeling
that would be warranted at the end of the year, when you have had a
three-day examination, with all the lab tests.
CPA: I think that perhaps the right answer for the time being in this
area is that the auditor should provide limited reviews for the periods that are
unaudited, but the line should be drawn on letting reports on the review go to
the public. Negative assurance, which is really what comes out of this, should
be directed solely to sophisticated readers. In the investment banking field we
give negative assurance on the basis of inquiry and review, and our own
knowledge and experience with the company, and the application of its
principles, and the results that are being demonstrated in the unaudited
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periods. But we give it in a very limited fashion to sophisticated people with
a warning that it should not be used in conveying messages to the public,
because the public can’t understand it, and will misconstrue it. They would
misconstrue it as more holy water than is warranted under the circumstances.
We can’t convey what we’re doing annually to the public. They don’t
understand “presents fairly in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles,” no matter how many times we say it. We need a new auditor’s
report. We need a new method of communication.
I saw one draft the other day that was a three-tiered report. It started
with a representation from management. The middle paragraph by the
attorneys, who are lending all kinds of opinions with respect to the validity of
these statements; and then, the final paragraph by the auditors, relying on the
opinions above, saying that it did conform with generally accepted account
ing principles.
But we need a new kind of communication, and I hesitate in this climate
to communicate on unaudited figures, when I’m not very successful in com
municating on audited figures. But I do think the service is vital, and it’s a
good service to the audit committees and to the boards of directors and others
inside, who need to be assured that they are going to be on track at year end
with the decisions that are being made month to month.
CPA: We have had some discussion of the costs involved and some
discussion of the benefits.
For those companies that you are not now providing that service for the
audit committee, how much would it add to the audit fee? So what would
be the cost to society in that sense?
CPA: Well we estimate that it might add 10 percent to 15 percent to
the audit fee, because we recognize that whatever we do is beneficial in terms
of the year-end audit; so there is an interrelationship that has to be recognized.
I think those of us that are doing this already have found that, in fact,
it adds probably less than 10 percent.
Again, I have to point out that we discussed earlier the difference be
tween the sophisticated investor and the unsophisticated investor. I think we
reached the conclusion that, basically, what we were doing was communicating
with a sophisticated group. I don’t believe that group could misinterpret the
significance of a limited review.
And going back to the doctor analogy, I don’t expect that a person who
calls the doctor on the phone is going to feel that he can walk away with the
same assurance that he would if he had a complete physical. So the same
analogy can support an opposite conclusion.
CPA: I wasn’t going to say anything until you got down to less than
10 percent. If I can use 9 percent, that’s 3 percent a quarter.
Now, you add 3 percent a quarter to the annual audit bill, and I submit
that’s less than a phone call to the doctor, in terms of what the public is
going to receive. If they can’t understand some of these other disclosures—
some of which are very helpful if you know how to use them—to say that
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putting out the same-looking, fancy certificate, or whatever your logo or letter
head is, and say that the public isn’t going to take an unwarranted sense of
satisfaction from it—I just can’t come to that conclusion.
CPA: I don’t know why you would struggle over the footnotes, if you
assume they can’t read.
CPA: I do because it’s GAAP. Or it’s required by an SEC release. It’s
conformity that someone else has decided on. I did not decide it.
Analyst: I’m absolutely sure of one thing, that the statement of the
CPA on the quarterly report, as such, is not really going to add that much to
the credibility of the quarterly statements. For example, some companies
change their method of reporting right in the middle of the year.
The first two quarters come out one way, and then in the third quarter
they wipe out all the earnings, because they have changed the method of
reporting.
As I understand the CPA’s function—and I see it at my company—the
accountants are around all year. They are there in one way or another, and
they confer with management, and they are part of a whole process. And
so our auditors are available for discussion; and I’m sure that there are other
companies that are in the same position.
And so we know they are part of the process. They don’t audit the
statements, but they are part of a process.
I think what might be useful here is that there might be some com
munication in the quarterly statements which says that we have been con
ferring with our auditors on our methods of reporting, rather than a formal
report by the CPA, as such.
CPA: That’s exactly what we propose to say.
Financial Executive: You don’t address yourself to the point, how
ever, that changes were made. You’re not going to prevent the company
from making changes in the second quarter or the third quarter, and that is
the point.
Analyst : Let me clarify that.
It would seem to me that if a CPA is giving a sort of informal report
on quarterly statements, and there has been some discussion that there
may be a change, I think that perhaps it would be his responsibility to say:
“We have been discussing this. That’s what, really, I’m looking for; that in
the process of discussing how you will report, that if the question were to come
up that perhaps we should change to LIFO from FIFO—that that be part of
your report.”
CPA: It seems we have swung around full circle, to credibility of the
amount disclosed. CPAs really don’t have much more credibility than manage
ment in this disclosure area. And on interim reporting it seems to me that
something is better than nothing, and no matter how we address this assur
ance, whether it’s a negative assurance to an audit committee, or whether we
go all the way and say something to the entire public—to the user—that it has
to be a step in the right direction.
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And since this group is concerned very much with disclosure, I get a
good feeling that we’re moving in that direction, and I’d hate to think that we
were looking for reasons to avoid a step in that direction.
Regulator: The New York Stock Exchange White Paper made a
recommendation that companies consult with their auditors during the year,
and particularly in connection with their quarterly reports. The objective of
such consultation would obviously be to deal with any particular reporting
problems on a current basis, so as to avoid, wherever possible, year-end adjust
ments or delays in the prompt issuance of the annual report.
Nine hundred seventy-four—pretty close to 90 percent of the companies
that replied, indicate that they did, on one or more occasions during the
year, consult with their auditors.
Also, on quarterly reports, it has become almost a universal practice
with listed companies to mail quarterly reports to their shareholders. I
would have guessed, if somebody had asked me, that it was about 70 percent
or 80 percent; but, at least among the group that responded, it was almost 100
percent.
CPA: Just dealing with the question of involvement in quarterly state
ments, it may be helpful to you to have some background about the sorts of
things that the auditor could do.
We have to get back to the main question of whether the public good
would be served. It’s interesting to reflect why the auditor should be involved.
There was an earlier question about a banker who wanted to consult with the
CPA. I’m not sure exactly why that consultation is desirable. Certainly in
most cases the same information could be obtained from the people that are
responsible for the records, and probably more complete information could
be obtained from company personnel.
I think what the banker was looking for, and in a sense what the public
is looking for, are two things. First is the fact that the auditor has a knowl
edge of the business, which I would call the audit base, so that he has some
familiarity with the problems that run back over a period of time.
Second, and probably the most important, is that the public wants a sense
of objectivity. I’m not in any way impugning management’s integrity; I’m just
trying to point out that in the area of management decisions it’s very helpful
for the auditor to discuss with management a change of accounting principle,
because the auditor brings a different point of view.
That doesn’t mean that the auditor is always persuasive, but it does
mean that the auditor acts as a sounding board. And in that area the auditor’s
involvement with quarterly statements is most valuable.
When we get to new transactions, the auditor may bring a different point
of view. Again, he may not be persuasive. He may be convinced that the
management view is correct. But he can question it, and that’s a good
process; and there, too, I think the auditor brings something valuable to
quarterly unaudited statements.
In other areas I admit that the auditor’s ability falls off rapidly. The
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error that’s unintentional in the data might sometimes be detected simply
through the process of review. The auditor goes around and asks the question:
did you check this or that? And the man would say: Of course we did, but
now that I think about it, I better make sure. Sometimes that reveals an
unintentional error.
Sometimes the errors are discovered by review of the system; but even
though our effectiveness is limited, because our procedures are limited, at least
it’s helpful.
And, of course, when errors are deliberate, I don’t think we can do very
much at all.
The point that I’m getting at is that we do bring what was called “some
thing better than nothing.” I happen to think it’s pretty good.
On the question of public reporting on the CPA’s review, I think one
CPA said he would prefer not to have it put out to, let’s call it, the third-party
users.
I’d have to ask you: if we had something bad to say, would it be helpful
for that to get out?
Financial Executive: As a company controller, if one took a
narrow point of view, excluding the deliberate errors, one could say that for
three quarters out of a year a company controller has less than honest
intentions in terms of putting out a report, and only in the fourth quarter, at
year end, he’s honest, but only because he is audited.
Well, I submit that the company controller knows that at each year
he’s going to have to put out a set of financial statements, and they are going
to have to be consistent with GAAP, and he’s going to have an audit. As he
goes through that year, he’s going to remain as consistent with GAAP as he
would at the year end.
I agree with your other three points. There are conditions that can
arise during the period of a year when that company controller will have
opinions as to what might be at the end of the year. He isn’t always going to
be right, because in many cases he’s going on the basis of judgment.
In the case of a new situation, I think you will find that the average
company controller will call on the public accountants in order to get some
help, to get some insight into what is the proper way to do a thing.
The point I’m making is that when you say something is better than
nothing—I think we have got something already. I think it’s the integrity
that the company controller brings to it.
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The Problems of Disclosure

Disclosure: The Corporate View
By Maurice H. Mayo, Vice President and Comptroller, General Electric
Company

Other subjects being discussed here include the history and extent of
present disclosure requirements, the potential benefits that might be attributed
by users to additional disclosure, and the difficult, even perilous, role of the
independent auditor. This paper is intended to convey some sense of the
views of one of the intimate and necessary participants in the disclosure
process—that of a financial manager with some experience in a publicly owned
corporation. The subject of disclosure could be divided into two categories,
one being the disclosure of newsworthy events having a material bearing on a
company’s future results, and the other being the regular or periodic reporting
of financial information about a company’s past and projected results. While
the first category is currently of great interest and sensitivity, comments in this
paper will be limited to the second category—past and projected results.

The Need for Information for Decision-Making

To begin, it seems necessary to consider a basic question—Why is in
formation about a company needed? Parenthetically, one might even wonder
if “needing” information is the same as “wanting” it. However, a reasonable
answer to the question is that information is needed in order to make informed,
intelligent decisions regarding whatever is deemed important at the moment
with respect to a potential business transaction involving the company.
When faced with a decision it would be ideal to have enough information
to make the decision a certainty. However desirable are certainty and the
urge to achieve it, it is obvious that we live in an uncertain world. Recognition
that the only certainty about business decisions is that they will be made under
conditions of uncertainty leads to the need for moderation on the part of
seekers of information regarding the kind and amount of information they
need in order to arrive at decisions with a reasonable degree of confidence in
the result.
Within this same thought framework is another question: If both parties to
a decision are equally informed, is there any need for further information? The
obvious negative answer presents difficulties because it is virtually impossible
to enable parties to a decision to be equally well informed. This is because of
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inherent differences among individuals’ ability to understand financial data,
for instance, and the physical impossibility of providing all one party’s in
formation to another. These obvious impracticalities and impossibilities have
long been recognized in many forms and are embodied in our securities laws
under the “reasonable and prudent person” doctrine. In short, we realistically
have to settle for trying to make the parties in the decision-making process
equally well informed with respect to material facts pertinent to a particular
transaction.
In attempting to make available information that will enable reasonably
informed decisions, the apparent lack of interest on the part of many par
ticipants thereto presents a real challenge. There are a number of indications
that there is more information disclosed now than most share owners want to
know. Witness the surveys showing that hardly any requests for 10-K reports
are received in response to offers to make them available. One could take
advantage of this apparent apathy to lighten the job of disclosure by publish
ing only that which is now required. However, this would be shortsighted
and would overlook the contribution that the cumbersomeness of the 10-K
makes to this apathy. A much more realistic approach, I believe, is to
attempt to make the regular releases such as annual and interim reports
comprehensive enough so that the 10-K is unnecessary, and understandable
enough to be useful even to the least sophisticated users.
Having considered the “why” question, there is another dimension to be
addressed. To whom is information necessary? The list today seems almost
limitless. Claimants to corporate information include customers, competitors,
suppliers, Congress, governmental agencies, stock agencies, stock exchanges,
trade associations, labor unions, economists, consumer groups, news media,
creditors, and share owners of two categories—present and potential. And
where does the securities analyst fit? Is he really trying to perform the role
of enabling investors to be equally will informed? As in any other profession,
the ability of analysts to use information disclosed by a company to develop
quality advice in a field so characterized by uncertainty varies greatly from
one to another. One of the insights that comes from preparing financial in
formation for busy executives is the value of brevity and clarity. This points
up an obligation that I believe goes along with disclosure, and that is to assist
share owners, analysts, and others to understand the necessary intricacies of
accounting needed for a complex economic world.

Extending Disclosure Practices

To discuss the pertinent aspects concerning all of the users or asserted
users of information disclosed by corporations is beyond the scope of this
paper. But, one thing does seem to stand out—management is in the middle
when it comes to satisfying any or all of them. Having expressed these general
thoughts, we turn to three specific items currently being considered that would
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result in a considerable extension of present disclosure practice. These are
the subjects of public forecasting, price-level accounting, and segmented
reporting.

Public Forecasting
With respect to public disclosure of corporate forecasts—either permissively or mandatorily—this is a step that would appear to be both unworkable
for preparers and contrary to the best interests of investors.
Although it is true that most companies have internal budgeting and fore
casting procedures to assist management in its conduct of business, there is
substantial doubt that the inherent difficulties of working with such forecasts
could ever be communicated in a meaningful way to even the sophisticated
investor. Two comments can be made with assurance about almost any fore
cast of corporate results: It will not be accurate, and it will change. Pro
ponents of disclosing the results of internal forecasts apparently misunder
stand the purpose of forecasts as management tools and underestimate the
real, practical complexities of their preparation. In this I believe they would
do well to heed words of advice attributed to Will Rogers—“It ain’t what you
don’t know that hurts you most—it’s what you know that ain’t so.”
The corporate forecast is an aid to management. It is an expression in
financial terms of all the assumptions, conditions, and alternatives foreseeable
at every level of the organization. Assembly, review, documentation, and con
stant honing of forecasts is an essential and time-consuming job. The process
can involve hundreds of persons on literally a daily basis, and the results at
many levels are constantly affected by individual judgments. Principal bene
fits of this process are a probing of business plans and objectives and the
discipline imposed on the organization, irrespective of the accuracy of the
final result achieved. In addition, the system of forecasting is an inherent part
of management’s control, especially in the sense of setting out targets or goals
to be achieved. Inherent in this internal forecasting process is a continuing
necessity for change. In a large company, changes in assumptions, tactics, or
expected results may realistically be daily occurrences. To communicate to the
investor, clearly and without possibility of misunderstanding, the nuances,
shadings, judgments, and changes involved is simply not possible.
It should be clear that inaccuracy in terms of specific results is a prom
inent feature of forecasting. But for forecast data to be of use to the investor,
“there must be convincing evidence that a reasonable level of accuracy in
forecasting is being regularly achieved.”1 In an article for The Accounting
Review, R. Austin Dailey examined the forecasting record of a number of1

1

R. Austin Dailey, “The Feasibility of Reporting Forecasted Information, The Account
ing Review, October 1971.
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firms and, among his conclusions, was “reasonable doubt should exist regard
ing the ability of firms to forecast operating results with the degree of accuracy
and precision necessary to satisfy the requirements of investors.”
There is a very real possibility, even probability, that permission to
publish forecasts would be taken advantage of by the relatively few who may
not be inclined to exercise sufficient care to avoid being misleading. Those
who have manipulated historical data for unscrupulous ends will likely be
aided considerably by the ability to use the inherent flexibility involved in
forecasting future results to further their purposes.
Responsible businessmen really do feel strongly that disclosure of fore
cast information may put them at a competitive or tactical disadvantage.
Some proponents of disclosure tend to dismiss this objection rather lightly.
However, there are very real questions of this nature which can best be stated
as a concern that the dissemination of forecast assumptions in some instances
can result in premature disclosure of a significant corporate plan. Three
examples that come to mind involve assumptions as to (1) the outcome of
pending labor negotiations, (2) planned introduction of a significant new
product, and (3) a planned, major change in research or advertising plans.
Depending on the circumstances, we can easily see that these kinds of assump
tions could be material to a forecast and that premature disclosure would be
to the disadvantage of the company’s share owners.
If forecast data is disclosed, prudent management probably will tend to
forecast safely or, perhaps worse, may feel it desirable to take unwise short
term actions to realize a forecast, even in a way detrimental to the long-term
best interests of share owners. I believe this to be a realistic assessment based
on available surveys of potential reactions by various representatives of
management. In addition, it is our experience that there is a constant effort
by lower levels of management to have “safe forecasts” accepted, as contrasted
with the more ambitious goals desired by higher management. This tendency
might well develop in forecasts to be made public.
Proponents of forecast disclosure assert that in various forms forecasts
are already circulating and that uniform disclosure rules would make them
available to all. It seems important that this condition be recognized as
generally harmful to investors before any changes in present practices are
made. If the argument is concerned only with the normal work done by
investment analysts in studying and evaluating individual businesses or in
dustries, then adoption of formal requirements for issuers would not seem
appropriate because issuers are not the ones at the root of the problem. If
the argument is that analysts are perhaps in some way misleading investors, it
would seem more logical to consider some form of rules applicable to infor
mation gathered and disseminated by analysts. Last, if the argument is that
some firms—with or without assistance from analysts—are making public
forecasts so as to mislead investors, then it would seem that there already
are sufficient punitive powers available, just as the investor who believes him
self to be harmed already has legal recourse at his command.
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Proponents also argue that investors in private placements often receive
forecasts as part of their decision-making process, and that similar information
should be available to the public. Although the assertion may be correct in
some instances, the private placement investor’s general, subjective evaluation
of management and the intangibles of business prospects is probably of more
significance to him than projections of results. Information for these intangible
judgments is all but impossible to duplicate exactly in a public forum. The
public investor makes the same sort of judgments based on his overall im
pression of the ability and integrity of the management of the firm that is
the object of a particular investment decision.
It is also sometimes stated that the British system of public forecasting
has proven workable, thus providing a practical experience in forecast dis
closure. My understanding of the British system is not exhaustive; however,
the system appears to be quite limited. More importantly, it operates in an
economic, legal, and social climate considerably different from this country,
and the applicability to American corporations is doubtful.
To summarize my view of public disclosure of forecasts from within a
corporation, it appears to be unworkable and contrary to the best interests
of investors, and fraught with dangers for all.

Price-Level Accounting
The situation with respect to price-level accounting is somewhat different.
It will be recalled that the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Discussion
Memorandum on this topic addressed itself to two major issues:
• Is financial information that has been restated for changes in the general
price level useful?
• Do the benefits of making price-level-adjusted accounting information
available outweigh the costs involved?

Given the recent state of the economy, the usefulness of including infor
mation with respect to the effects of inflation in financial reports seems to be
virtually self-evident. The approach to price-level accounting published in
Accounting Principles Board (APB) Statement No. 3 was based on extensive
research conducted over a long period of time. That research effort adequately
demonstrated the soundness of the theory on which the approach was based.
However, the resulting restatements of financial position and earnings are
complex and exceedingly difficult to interpret meaningfully. This leads one to
question whether the research conducted to date has produced a result that
yields information sufficiently understandable to the users of financial state
ments to meet the test of being materially useful.
Having reservations regarding the understandability of the results of the
presently available approach to restatement, one wonders if the benefits of
making the additional information available outweigh the costs involved.
Only a high degree of assurance that the potential benefits of restatement will
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actually be realized would warrant incurring the very substantial cost asso
ciated with establishing and maintaining the detailed records required for
accurate restatement. Application of the APB Statement No. 3 method to a
set of actual accounting records of even average complexity will entail a
wholesale revision of procedures in order to establish mechanisms to ascertain
and maintain information regarding both the period of origination and the
period of reversal of all significant amounts carried forward in the balance
sheet. That this is theoretically possible, for most accounts, has been
demonstrated in the APB Statement No. 3 illustrations (“most accounts”
rather than “all accounts” because, for example, it is not clear how the
proposed method would be applied to deferred income tax accounts main
tained under the “net change” method). However, practical application of
the proposed method would be a very costly procedure, requiring an expen
diture of effort that would be economically warranted only by assurance of a
high degree of benefit to report users.
In short, some form of inflation accounting may be useful, but the
specific form has not yet been found. Resolution of the practical aspects of
the problem requires a considerable on-going effort by business because the
theoretical work has about reached its end—and that is not quite far enough.

Segmented Reporting
The final specific disclosure problem for discussion is segmented report
ing. In the broad sense, a qualified assent must be given to the thesis that
some form of segmented reporting is useful. The qualification is that such
reporting may be useful, depending on the particular company involved, its
own operating philosophy, organization, and style, its products, its markets,
the extent of its vertical integration, and the circumstances extant at any
particular time.
If segmental information has any use, it can only be for enterprise
analysis, especially over time, with perhaps limited use for comparisons with
aggregate economic data. Interenterprise comparisons on a disaggregated
basis are likely to be meaningless and misleading because of the tremendous
differences between companies, even those operating within the same industry,
if “industry” can successfully be defined.
With respect to comparisons with macro-economic data, it appears that
only rather broad comparisons, such as units of automobiles shipped or
megawatts of turbine generators on order, may be useful. The more detailed
attempts at comparisons become, the less likely it will be that understandable
and not misleading information will result. This is again because of the
multiplicity of differences between companies that may be carried forward
in the aggregation process.
There are two aspects to the segmented reporting question. What seg
ments should be reported, that is, who would define them and how, and what
amount of detail should be reported for the defined segments?
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On the subject of definition, anyone who has seriously studied even two
companies in any detail will recognize that the SEC’s approach was a realistic
one. Their recognition of the need for management judgment, using general
guidelines with respect to contribution to revenues and before-tax income,
with a practical limit to the maximum number of segments required, is realistic.
To do otherwise means that a standard and arbitrary set of definitions must be
devised by some authority, but no such set of definitions will match the eco
nomic facts of life in any company. The results produced for either a single
company or an aggregation of companies can only be chaotic, a situation which
can hardly be described as “useful” to anyone.
Some proponents of regimented segmentation sometimes assert that a
system using or patterned after the standard industrial codes is adequate to the
task. In making this assertion, it is frequently cited that companies already
supply SIC data to various government agencies and trade associations. This
is an oversimplification. To the extent that data is prepared, for example, for
the Bureau of the Census survey of manufactures, it is very limited, is often
performed by analysis, and is useful only for the purpose intended. A basic
element of the census reports, such as value of shipments, is useful in develop
ing aggregate data on the value of shipments in the economy for, say, appliance
motors. However, some of those motors may have been shipped, that is, sold
to other manufacturers for incorporation in appliances of their manufacture,
and others may have been shipped but incorporated in appliances manu
factured by the motor manufacturer. In the latter case, there are no “sales”
of motors, only sales of end-product appliances. Examples of this type are
legion. To attempt to develop external financial reports including sales, in
come, investment, and so forth from an SIC-type code basis is completely
impractical because such data simply does not exist. Any such system, being
arbitrary, cannot result in meaningful data about an enterprise.
Recognition of the impossibility of establishing across-the-board defini
tions is the key to understanding the segmented reporting question. However,
there has also been considerable attention devoted in the literature to the
amount and type of detail to be reported. There is no shortage of discussion,
analyses, surveys, and ingenious ideas with respect to transfer pricing, cost
allocations, and asset allocations. The only conclusion that can realistically
be reached is that the diversity of approach to these problems is also the one
prevailing characteristic. Such diversity is justified and necessary because each
individual firm’s procedures reflect appropriate management methods, varying
degrees of sophistication and availability of expertise, and dynamic circum
stances. Transfer pricing practices of a company in the iron and steel busi
ness are not necessarily appropriate for an automotive firm; the needs and
capabilities of a relatively small but diversified firm are not necessarily the
same as those of a larger firm; and routines that were adequate last year may
be obsolete or unnecessary in this year’s competitive environment.
The proper balance must be reached between segmented data that may
truly be useful to the investor and an achievable obligation that exists for the
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preparer. No static, artificial prescribed system will strike that balance. Using
an SEC-type guideline approach with reasonable disclosure, individual com
panies are in the best position to work out with the primary users of their
statements the appropriate segmentation.

Disclosure of Meaningful Information

In summary, reflection about why information is needed, and the rami
fications of the answers, leads one to the inevitable conclusion that com
munication of all available information between two parties is not possible.
Therefore, the realistic answer to equalizing information between parties is to
strive to communicate meaningful, significant data. In addition, the list of
potential users of financial information is lengthy, but general financial state
ments cannot be the universal answer to all questions. Management must
continually work from the abstract ideal to the practical real in so far as
providing financial information is concerned. The thoughts concerning pub
lishing forecasts, presenting general price-level information, and segmenting
financial statements are intended to illustrate the corporate view of specific
disclosure problems.
In a discussion of regular financial reporting requirements from the view
point of the corporation, the principal boundaries are (1) the ability of the
corporation to meet its obligation without incurring inordinate costs and
without otherwise damaging its present share owners and (2) the ability of
the recipients of such disclosure to utilize the information to their benefit. In
order for the costs and benefits of disclosure to be commensurate, require
ments imposed on a company should not result in accounting and reporting
systems alien to its internal structure and management philosophy. In order
for the recipients of information to benefit by it, they must be able to grasp
its significance and, above all, understand its limitations. Even management,
which deals with economic and business information daily, is sometimes
wont to accept a conclusion expressed in numbers as being solid fact without
inquiring about the validity of the underlying assumptions.
Within the boundaries of acceptable cost and understandability, manage
ment has the responsibility to provide the information needed so that parties
to business transactions can be reasonably informed. I believe most manage
ments are fulfilling that responsibility in a creditable manner. We must hope
that the users of information will accept their responsibility to understand
that significant information, not just information, is their right, that some
uncertainty is a fact of life, and that there are practical limits on the ability to
produce information at a reasonable cost.
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Disclosure: The Auditor's View
By Charles A. Werner, Partner, Alexander Grant & Company

Although views may vary on the need for additional disclosure and the
form that additional disclosure might take, it is abundantly clear that such
requirements will entail costs, and that such additional costs may or may not
be commensurate with the benefits that the public and the financial com
munity may realize as a result. The costs of disclosure include, but obviously
are not limited to, out-of-pocket expenses. These would include such items as
the increased staff time necessary to assemble, interpret, and disseminate the
facts and statistics upon which disclosure is based and the additional audit
fees that will be incurred where the disclosures are subject to the attestation
process.
Possibly of greater concern are certain intangible “costs” that could
result. For example, some expanded disclosure requirements that are presently
being debated can be expected to result in a greater exposure of companies
and their auditors to lawsuits by shareholders and the general public. Two
instances that immediately come to mind in this respect are the proposals
to require increased disclosure of related-party transactions and the inclusion
of earnings forecasts in annual reports. Of equal concern to management is
the possible damage to competitive position if disclosure requirements are
expanded to embrace operational data that heretofore has been considered
as internal in nature. Recent proposals for expanded line-of-business or
segmental financial reporting have elicited opposition premised, in part, on this
concern.
Whatever costs may be associated with disclosure, it can be argued that
these should be accepted if a clear and convincing case can be demonstrated
that the benefits to the American economic system and to all of those directly
or indirectly involved in it are of equal or greater magnitude. Obviously, a
cost/benefit analysis of this type is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve with an acceptable degree of accuracy, given the measurement prob
lems and the number of intangible factors to be considered. The task would
be somewhat lightened if the cost/benefit analysis is limited to the impact of the
disclosures upon a definite user group such as financial analysts or share
holders with financial or accounting backgrounds.
Finally, by way of introduction, it should be noted that the matters
touched upon in the foregoing paragraphs are relevant not only to proposals
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for new and expanded levels of disclosure, but also to a critical re-evaluation
of existing disclosure requirements. For example, a debate is just now be
ginning in the accounting profession on the necessity and desirability of
requiring closely held corporations to meet disclosure standards that perhaps
should apply only to public companies or companies that are subject to SEC
filing requirements. This paper will examine these and related considerations,
both in their general impact upon financial reporting trends and as they bear
upon several issues of great interest in the financial and accounting com
munities at this time.

Complexity and User Comprehension

The modern business and financial world is complex and increases in
complexity each year. The difficulty of summarizing the activities of a large
business entity as a set of numbers and disclosures and thereby clearly com
municating the financial position and the performance of the entity in such
a way so as to reasonably satisfy the needs of one or more classes of users of
such information has long been recognized. If this problem was a matter of
concern thirty to forty years ago, it is obviously much more acute now that
the multinational corporation has assumed an increasingly dominant role in
modern business.
In a continuing effort to cope with increasing complexity and to provide
the investor and creditor (and, one might add, the non-financial users of
business reports, such as governmental agencies) with the information they
need to make reasoned decisions affecting their interests, the accounting pro
fession and the SEC have promulgated at an accelerating rate in recent years
a roster of technical and sophisticated disclosure requirements. To illustrate
just one of many, consider the information that lessees must disclose to meet
the requirements of Accounting Principles Board Opinion (APB) No. 31
and Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 147. Furthermore, despite the
existence of four APB Opinions dealing with lessors and lessees (Nos. 5, 7,
27, and 31) and ASRs Nos. 132 and 147, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) has considered it necessary to reexamine the area and has
issued a 180-page discussion memorandum which poses twenty basic issues
and twenty-three implemental issues for consideration—of which seven can
be roughly characterized as involving disclosure as opposed to accounting
issues.1
Given these complexities, how do the accountant and the auditor decide
what information is relevant and necessary to make the financial statements
sufficiently informative and not misleading? Further, what criteria dis
tinguish disclosures that must be included in the financial statements them
1

Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Discussion Memorandum, “Account
ing for Leases” (Stamford, Conn.: FASB, July 2, 1974).
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selves as against those disclosures that are appropriate and useful but that
should be made outside the framework of the financial statements?
At some point, moreover, it can justifiably be maintained that the
proliferation of disclosures and their technical sophistication can result in
confusion on the part of any but the most skillful and competent user backed
up by both the organization and the powerful analytical tools available to a
large institutional investor. This latter consideration is more appropriately
discussed in the context of the desirability of differentiating between classes of
users at a later point in this paper.
Although there does not appear to be any easy answer to the problem of
complexity in financial statements and related disclosures, certain steps can
be taken to mitigate the problem. To the extent possible, footnotes can be
written in clearer and more understandable language than has, perhaps, been
the case to date. Abstruse financial and technical jargon can, in many in
stances, be eliminated and replaced by explanations that are readily under
standable by a reasonably educated and sophisticated layman. Measures such
as these may result in somewhat longer footnotes, but the quantum jump
in user understanding would be well worth that relatively minor price. How
ever, there is a limit to the extent to which this type of increase in user com
prehension can be achieved through the improvement of financial com
munication techniques. Although understanding may be enhanced, there is
no touchstone by which an inherently complicated transaction can be made
uncomplicated.
In short, it does not seem possible that general purpose financial state
ments can and should be designed to serve as an adequate means of com
munication with the untrained user. In its testimony before the AICPA
Study Group on the Objective of Financial Statements (the “Trueblood
Committee”), Alexander Grant & Company made the following observation:
A recent study by Georgeson & Co. reveals some interesting facts
about untrained users’ attitudes toward annual reports. Fifty-three
per cent of individual stockholders do not believe that annual reports
can be written so as to be understandable to the average stockholder.
Fifty-eight per cent of the shareholders surveyed did not consider the
annual report important when they make a decision to buy or sell a
stock. Finally, the average shareholder spends approximately 15
minutes reading an annual report. Can a financial report be made
understandable to anyone who will spend only 15 minutes reading it?
We think not.2

Professor Marc J. Epstein of California State College at Los Angeles,
in a recently concluded study of the usefulness of financial statements (pub
lished late in 1974), found that 42 percent of the shareholders responding

2

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Accounting Objectives Study
Group, Objectives of Financial Statements, vol. 3 (New York: AICPA, 1974).
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to his questionnaire stated that they often have difficulty understanding foot
notes to the financial statements. Further, the respondents stated that the
reason that they did not read some items in the annual report very carefully
was mainly due to a lack of time (43.5 percent) and a lack of understanding
(29.6 percent).
Admittedly, the accounting profession’s third standard of reporting is of
small assistance in this aspect of disclosure. It reads: “Informative disclosures
in the financial statements are to be regarded as reasonably adequate unless
otherwise stated in the report.”3 However, in expanding upon the third
standard, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1 contains a state
ment that is certainly pertinent to the present discussion: “Verbosity should
not be mistaken for adequate disclosure.”4
A discussion of “understandability” that appears in the Trueblood Report
is perhaps as good a summary and as elegant a presentation of the principles
which should be adhered to as can be found. The study group concluded:
Accounting information should be presented so that it can be under
stood by reasonably well-informed, as well as by sophisticated, users.
In effect, presenting information understandable only to sophisticated
users establishes a bias. Investors with means to do their own re
search already have an advantage over others. The form and content
of financial statements should not add to this advantage.

Increasing understandability of financial information is not a matter
of mere simplifying. Not all complexities can be made simple by
describing them simply. Understandability requires that information
be expressed as simply as permitted by the nature and circumstances
of which is being communicated.5

It is obvious that one major pathway to improved disclosure, par
ticularly as it pertains to most individual investors, is to increase the level of
comprehension of financial statements and related annual report materials
with particular emphasis on financial statement footnotes. Perhaps manage
ment and the accounting profession have been derelict, to a degree, in failing
to adequately explain in the plainest possible English what their views of a
particular transaction are and in effectively describing the accounting prin
ciples employed. Although improved and more specific standards of dis
closure will undoubtedly assist in achieving this objective, improvement must,
in the last analysis, depend upon the exercise of professional judgment and the
desire and ability of the practitioner to more effectively communicate the
substance of financial transactions and their accounting treatment.

3
4
5

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 1 (New York: AICPA, 1973), Sec. 430.01.
Ibid., Sec. 430.03.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Report of the Study Group on
the Objectives of Financial Statements, Objectives of Financial Statements, vol. 1
(New York: AICPA, 1974), p. 60.
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Levels of Disclosure

Much has been written in recent years about identifying the users of
financial statements and determining how best to meet the needs of such
users. Paragraph 43 of Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4 pro
vides, in part, that “financial accounting information is used by a variety of
groups and for diverse purposes. The needs and expectations of users deter
mine the type of information required.” The principal purpose of the True
blood Committee was to define the objectives of financial statements, taking
into consideration the needs of diverse classes of users. All of these studies
have concluded that identifiable groups of users do exist and that their in
formational needs differ although, as might be expected, there are sub
stantial areas of overlap. The differences among the various groups arise not
only from the end purposes to which the information will be put (invest
ment, lending, regulation) but, perhaps more importantly, from the existence
of vastly differing capacities to understand and analyze the information that
is available. Without belaboring the point, it is clear that the need for and the
ability to use complex financial information will vary greatly between an
untrained, small investor and a member of the Financial Analysts Federation.

Identifying User Purposes
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss at length the problems
involved in the identification of user groups and, having made such identifi
cation, to determine in what way financial statement format and content
should be structured so as to best meet their needs. It is, rather, to identify
and propose some tentative solutions to a related problem—the rapidly
growing burden upon both the accounting profession and their nonpublic
clients created by the expansion of disclosure requirements.
Professor Stephen Buzby, in a recent definitive article entitled “The
Nature of Adequate Disclosure,” has made the following observation:
There are many potential user classes with a direct or indirect interest
in financial accounting information. For example, a partial list of in
terested parties could include present and potential owners, creditors,
employees, financial analysts, government, labor unions, and socially
oriented action groups. Moonitz, in his discussion of disclosure,
recognized that the adequacy of a given disclosure can only be
determined within the context of a specific identification of the users
of the information. As Devine has pointed out, the need to identify
the group(s) for whom the information is being disclosed derives
from the fact that different users have different purposes. By identify
ing user classes, we are led to the identification of the purposes in
using financial information.
*

Thus, the purpose for which the information will be used must first
be determined before the relevance of specific types of information
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can be determined. Information which is relevant for one purpose
is not necessarily relevant for an alternative purpose. Empirical sup
port for the proposition that relevance depends upon purpose is pro
vided by Backer’s study of security and credit analysts. He found that
the two groups placed different importance on certain selected items
of information.6

If recognition is not given to these principles, the accounting profession
will be imposing burdensome and costly disclosure requirements on many
companies without conferring any real benefit on their investors and creditors.
Speaking before the June 1973 meeting of the New York State Society of
CPAs, John C. Burton, chief accountant of the SEC, stated unofficially that
consideration should be given to a differentiation in accounting standards
applicable to public as opposed to private companies. The AICPA has
recently appointed a task force to determine whether privately held com
panies must heel to the same standards of disclosure as are applicable to
public companies. However, merely stating the desirability of such a course
(assuming that it is, in fact, desirable) is not sufficient; a host of problems will
thereby be created which must be identified and solved. This will be a major
task facing the accounting profession.
Differentiation in applicable standards already exists to some degree.
In promulgating Opinion No. 19, the Accounting Principles Board recognized
that the statement of changes in financial position would be omitted in some
circumstances; specifically, from financial statements restricted for internal
use only. This exception has been codified in Section 516.08. Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 1, Section 516, also permits the omission from
unaudited, internal-use-only statements of footnote or other disclosures that
might otherwise be required, provided that the auditor’s disclaimer of opinion
notes the omission. Similarly, Part II of APB Opinion No. 28 is specifically
made applicable only to interim financial reports of publicly traded com
panies.
The SEC in recent accounting series releases (ASRs) has attempted to
distinguish between disclosure requirements that are generally necessary to a
fair presentation and those that can be considered as a compliance require
ment applicable only to registrants. For example, Accounting Series Release
No. 147, requiring improved disclosure of leases, specifically states that dis
closure of the “present value of financing leases and of the impact on net
income of capitalization of such leases, neither of which is required by (APB)
Opinion No. 31, are essential to investors.” On the other hand, ASR No.
148, requiring disclosure of certain compensating balances and short-term
borrowing arrangements, states that the mandated disclosure “may not be
required in financial disclosures oriented solely to the needs of the average
investor.” Nevertheless, the SEC tendency to include in the introductory sec
tions of ASRs language that links, perhaps loosely, the subject of the ASR to
6

Journal of Accountancy, April 1974, pp. 40, 41.
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a requirement for fair presentation is disturbing. It clouds the issue of
whether the subject matter of such releases must be construed as generally
accepted accounting principles with application to all financial statements.

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and Disclosure Levels
It is obviously desirable that restrictions on the applicability of new
SEC disclosure requirements should be made clear at the time of issuance.
However, the issue presently being addressed is broader than this special case.
What is proposed is that levels of disclosure be defined and that all generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), including disclosure requirements,
be identified as having either universal applicability or limited applicability to
one or more levels. To illustrate, a three-level approach might be established
that would provide the following classifications:
1. Main body of GAAP. Universally applicable GAAP that would apply
to all financial statements of both public and private companies.

2. Supplemental GAAP. Additional disclosures that would be required of
public companies, either in the financial statements proper or in some
other part of the annual report.
3. Specialized compliance requirements. SEC requirements applicable only
to public companies with filing status, and similar specialized requirements
of other governmental authority or a private authority (such as a stock
exchange).

No great degree of imagination is required to appreciate the substantial
difficulties that would attend this proposal. The principal problems would
appear to be definitional and legal. It is in connection with the definitional
problem, that is determining the criteria for differentiating between GAAP
that are generally applicable or applicable only to publicly held companies,
that continuing intensive analysis of the needs of various user groups would
be necessary. Nevertheless, a significant start on such differentiations should
be possible, premised only upon the professional experience and judgment
of the accounting profession.
A further departure from present practice would also be required.
Auditors’ reports could not confine themselves to a simple reference to con
formity with GAAP. The opinion paragraph of the auditor’s report might be
modified to read:
In our opinion, the aforementioned financial statements present fairly
the financial position of X Company at December 31, 19xx, and the
results of its operations and the changes in its financial position for
the year then ended, in conformity with generally accepted account
ing principles applicable to public companies (or, “applicable to
nonpublic companies” or “applicable to public companies including
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requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission”) applied
on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.

An obvious question inherent in the above proposal is: “How is a non
public company to be identified?” This should not prove to be an insurmount
able hurdle; although, as similar definitional attempts in the Internal Revenue
Code illustrate, careful draftsmanship is essential.7 In rough outline, however,
a nonpublic company might be defined as one with less than twenty-five
shareholders, a “shareholder” being a family or affiliated company group. An
exception might have to be made for a company that meets the definition but
has outstanding debt obligations in the hands of the public. Similarly, reduced
disclosure levels might also be defined for any company that issues only
unaudited financial statements, although the disclosure criteria that would
apply in this case might require a somewhat different approach.
To digress briefly, the accounting profession should have the right to
omit disclosures that are required by GAAP, even those considered to be a
part of universally applicable GAAP, in the case of unaudited financial state
ments. This might, of course, be taken up as a special case of the more general
issue of redefining the role of the independent auditor with respect to un
audited financial statements. Nevertheless, a strong argument can be made
for the proposition that disclosures that would otherwise be required can be
omitted from unaudited statements provided that the fact of such omission is
clearly stated. Accountants should not have to hide behind the “internal use
only” disclaimer when, in fact, it can be anticipated that many such state
ments are used more extensively. Such an approach would put the user of
the statements, whether manager or outsider, on notice concerning what is
and is not included as part of these statements. This approach would not
operate to excuse any party associated with such statements from disclosing
material information of which they have knowledge, which, if omitted, would
result in the statements being misleading. Again, the professional judgment
of the accountant would play an important part in such an approach.

Impact of Level-of-Disclosure Reporting
How would the “levels of disclosure” proposal impact in a specific situ
ation—for example, in the case of a creditor such as a commercial bank or a
comparable institutional lender? Provided that disclosures that are necessary
to avoid a misleading statement are made, this type of lender should have
little difficulty accepting audited statements of a nonpublic company which
include only those disclosures required by universally applicable GAAP.
This type of lender not only has a long-term and continuing relationship
with the borrower in most cases, but also has a degree of influence over the
borrower that does not exist in the case of a shareholder of a large public
7

Internal Revenue Code, Sections 318 and 544.
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corporation. At one time, the AICPA rules of professional conduct dis
tinguished between the status of a public and private company in terms of
the independence rule. The rationale for this distinction was described by
John L. Carey in the following manner:
The second part of Rule 13 makes a distinction between publicly
financed companies and other enterprises not publicly financed which
are used as a basis of credit and those which are not. ... In effect
this part of the rule implies that the relationship between an enterprise
not financed by public distribution of securities and those who may
grant credit to the enterprise (usually banks) is not as impersonal or
as diffuse as the relationship between the management of a publicly
financed corporation and its stockholders or prospective investors.8

Although the particular circumstance that gave rise to this comment no
longer exists, the reasoning would still appear valid within the present context.
Assuming that, among others, the requirements for computation and disclosure
of earnings per share and for provision of information about compensating
balances were relegated to the GAAP classification applicable only to public
companies, would there be an adverse effect upon a bank’s ability to appraise
the credit worthiness of the borrower? It would seem not. Or, to take a more
extreme case, can it be argued that the omission of general price-level state
ments (if these were mandated for public companies) would affect the
relationship? It would seem, rather, that by requiring such specialized or
sophisticated disclosures to be made, the accounting profession would be
doing a disservice to nonpublic companies by unnecessarily increasing their
accounting and auditing costs without any concomitant, readily discernible
benefit.
It is not possible in this paper to discuss, other than in the most per
functory manner, the criteria that would have to be formulated to make the
proposal viable. Some insight into the nature of items that would be assigned
to the different levels of disclosure can be offered, however. Probably most
accounting principles that deal directly with measurement, as opposed to
supplementary disclosures, would be assigned to the first level—that is, to
universally applicable GAAP. Similarly, certain disclosure requirements, such
as APB Opinion No. 22 (Disclosure of Accounting Policies) would prob
ably be deemed to be of universal application.
On the other hand, since earnings per share might be judged as having
little relevance to the needs of shareholders or creditors of private cor
porations, this disclosure would probably be relegated to the second level,
that applicable to public companies. Such present proposals as general price
level statements, earnings forecasts, product-line information, and disclosure
of the effect of alternative accounting principles could be considered as
8

John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Certified Public Accountants (New York:
AICPA, 1965), p. 35.
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applicable only to public companies. Admittedly, once beyond principles that
are classifiable with relative ease, some hard decisions would have to be made
about other “gray-area” items. With respect to these, both presently avail
able and additional investigations of the need for, and the usefulness of, certain
types of disclosures to various users could be expected to prove valuable.
Perhaps the biggest stumbling block in implementing a levels-of-disclosure proposal is the justifiable fear of its consequences in terms of an
increased exposure to legal liability. It is by now apparent that the courts are
not inclined to unquestioningly accept the pronouncements of the accounting
profession as defining the extent of its liability for adequate disclosure and
fair presentation. This is certainly the crux of the court’s holding in the
Continental Vending decision. In a more recent decision, Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath9 the court stated:
The policy underlying the securities laws of providing investors with
all the facts needed to make intelligent investment decisions can only
be accomplished if financial statements fully and fairly portray the
actual financial condition of the company. In those cases where ap
plication of generally accepted accounting principles fulfills the duty
of full and fair disclosure, the accountant need go no further. But
if application of accounting principles alone will not adequately
inform investors, accountants, as well as insiders, must take pains to
lay bare all the facts needed by investors to interpret the financial
statements accurately.

It is hoped that the present uncertainties with regard to many disclosure
requirements, particularly those promulgated by the SEC, would be alleviated
by the new arrangement. In any event, the existence of a formalized set of
criteria for disclosure based upon a levels concept would not appear to place
the accounting profession in a worse posture and, indeed, might represent an
improvement over that which presently exists. Although the courts have
refused to accept reliance upon generally accepted accounting principles as a
complete defense, it has been held that proof of compliance with generally
accepted standards is evidence that may be very persuasive. Again, there
seems to be no way for the profession to avoid, even if it wished to do so,
reliance upon professional judgment exercised in good faith. In the last
analysis, professional judgment must be exercised to assure that financial
statements are not misleading. “Judgment is the foundation of accounting.
Criteria established, therefore, should encourage the use of effective judgment,
not decrease it.”10

U.S. District Court, SDNY, No. 71 Civ. 2209 (LFM), May 29, 1974; CCH Fed.
Sec. Law Rpts., Par. 94, 574.
10 American Accounting Association, “Report of the 1973-74 Committee on Concepts
and Standards—External Reporting,” The Accounting Review, Supplement to
Vol. 49, 1974, p. 215.

9
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Cost as a Disclosure Criteria
One price of improved and expanded disclosure is increased cost. The
anticipated benefits of improved disclosure must be weighed against the costs
of achieving it. No one would want to argue against these facts. As previously
noted, however, their application in quantitative terms to any given situation is
difficult and perhaps inconclusive.
Expanding the range of required disclosures will, in the aggregate, in
crease the costs of disclosure. Included are not only such direct costs as
increased accounting expense and audit fees, but also certain related indirect
costs such as those for educational programs to keep staff personnel informed
of current developments. These are costs that must be cheerfully borne by the
practitioners of a dynamic and developing discipline.
Nevertheless, there are obvious differences in the costs associated with
specific disclosure proposals. These differences, when weighed against the
anticipated benefits and the needs of different users for given categories of
information, have been discussed in relation to the proposal for establishing
criteria for a levels-of-disclosure approach to the dissemination of financial
data. In addition to these considerations, however, another aspect of the
cost-benefit test is worth a few minutes of consideration. A significant number
of the present disclosure requirements and many others that can be proposed
carry such a relatively modest cost burden that this factor can almost be
ignored in weighing their desirability as part of GAAP at any level.
A number of these come to mind immediately. One, for example, would
be the income tax expense disclosures required by APB Opinion No. 11 and
ASR No. 149. For any given company, the types of permanent and timing
differences that must be taken into account in developing the information
necessary for these disclosures will remain relatively constant from year to
year. Once these computations have been made and a footnote drafted and
included in the financial statements for a given year, it is a relatively minor
matter to update the disclosure in subsequent years. Thus, cost is an incon
sequential factor in weighing the pros and cons of this particular disclosure,
although the needs of any given set of users would still be considered.
In its testimony before the Trueblood committee, Alexander Grant &
Company suggested a number of additional disclosures that it felt would im
prove the usefulness of general purpose financial statements, of which many
could be developed from readily available information. Among them were
these:

1. More detailed information about inventories, either in a separate state
ment or as a part of footnotes to the basic financial statements. Such
information might include separate data on obsolete goods and related
valuation methods, a breakdown of raw material, work in process, and
finished goods, and a breakdown of inventories according to the way in
which they are expected to be sold. In this connection, the SEC in
Release 33-5492 has recently proposed expanded disclosure requirements
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relating to receivables, inventories, and accounting policies and assump
tions related to defense and other long-term contract activities.
2. Detailed information on depreciation (closer to the present SEC require
ments).
3. More detailed information about intangible assets, including manage
ment’s justification for capitalization. Since the testimony was submitted,
the FASB has issued an exposure draft on accounting for research and
development costs and has decided to reconsider the entire subject of busi
ness combinations including the treatment of intangibles that may result.
4. Certain nonfinancial information such as the expiration date of union
contracts and the dates on which such contracts can be reopened, market
ing expectations, and related marketing budgets for the next fiscal year
and information about new products.

Perhaps certain of the above disclosures, as well as others that could be
proposed, cannot or should not be covered by the auditor’s attestation. How
ever, neither the costs associated with such proposals nor lack of auditability
should be a factor in discouraging their adoption.
Other suggestions for improved and expanded disclosures would carry
substantial costs and would require a careful weighing of the value of the
benefits to be derived in relation to such costs. Obvious examples are proposals
to require some form of participation by independent auditors in the issuance
of interim financial statements, to provide general price-level financial state
ments and, perhaps to a lesser degree, segmental or line-of-business reporting.
In connection with auditors’ attestation of interim financial statements, a
recent AICPA survey indicated that annual audit costs might increase by as
much as 65 percent if this proposal were implemented. It is interesting to
observe that the proposals that would carry the greatest additional costs, both
for the company and its independent auditors, are also those that pose the most
difficult technical hurdles.
In short, many improvements in present disclosure standards can be made
without incurring a prohibitive increase in costs, and a serious study of this
type of improvement should be undertaken without delay.

Contingent Liabilities

The auditor’s responsibility in connection with the disclosure of con
tingent liabilities continues to present troublesome questions and has received
increased attention recently as a result of the American Bar Association’s
efforts to adopt a statement of policy for the guidance of lawyers in responding
to auditors’ requests for information. The focus of this discussion will be
centered upon the auditors’ dilemma in dealing with certain contingent lia
bilities and not upon the lawyer’s justifiable concern in reaching a suitable
accommodation with the auditor.
SAS No. 1 interprets the third standard of reporting to mean, in
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general, that “The fairness of presentation of financial statements in con
formity with the generally accepted accounting principles comprehends the
adequacy of disclosures involving material matters.”11 It goes on to state:
“Disclosures should not be considered to require publicizing certain kinds of
information that would be detrimental to the company or its stockholders.”11
12
An example is given of a threat of a patent infringement suit that might cause
management to set up a reserve for possible loss. Apparently, however,
“publicity” would not have to be given to such a loss provision since that
might inure to the harm of the company because of court decisions holding
that the reserve can be considered an allocation of infringement profits.
Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 50, which dates from October
1958, discusses the problem of contingencies in greater detail. The bulletin
describes three broad categories of contingencies, of which two are not of
immediate concern. These are contingencies “where the outcome is reason
ably foreseeable,” that should be reflected in the accounts if they will result
in losses, and general risk contingencies “that are inherent in business oper
ations and which affect many if not all companies,” that need not be disclosed.
The troublesome category is those contingencies where “the outcome is not
sufficiently predictable to permit recording in the accounts, but in which there
is a reasonable possibility of an outcome which might materially affect finan
cial position or results of operations.”
Examples of contingencies that could result in liabilities or losses are
given, and include “pending or threatened litigation, assessments or possible
assessments of additional taxes, or other claims such as renegotiation refunds
that are being or would be contested, guarantees of indebtedness of others,
and agreements to repurchase receivables which have been sold.” However,
the limited scope of these definitional examples, which ordinarily would
present little difficulty to the auditor in meeting the requisite standard of
disclosure, is not that reassuring when measured against the general definition
of “contingency” provided by ARB No. 50:
In accounting a contingency is an existing condition, situation, or
set of circumstances, involving a considerable degree of uncertainty,
which may, through a related future event, result in the acquisition
or loss of an asset, or the incurrence or avoidance of a liability,
usually with the concurrence of a gain or loss. A commitment which
is not dependent upon some significant intervening factor or decision
should not be described as a contingency.

The simplest way to focus on the problem thus presented is to examine
the type of contingency that the American Bar Association (ABA) is, at this
writing, leaning towards classifying as a general risk contingency, which a
lawyer need not disclose in his response to the auditor’s request for informa
11 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Auditing Stand
ards No. 1 (New York: AICPA, 1973), Section 430.02.
12 Ibid., Section 430.05.
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tion. In addition to those risks so characterized by ARB No. 50 (losses from
wars, strikes, catastrophies, and the like), these include “the possibility of
challenge in the future of items and tax returns for open years resulting in as
sessment of taxes in excess of amounts considered to be reasonably likely, and
the possibility of assertion in the future of claims by governmental agencies
or private parties which, by reason of their dormant status, are not considered
reasonably likely to be asserted.”13 It should be noted that the ABA excepts
from this latter category contingencies that are required under obligations
imposed by law, government regulations, or contractual obligations established
by security exchanges to be the subject of timely public disclosure.
Should the ABA adopt this proposed standard of disclosure, the account
ing profession would be faced with the basic question of whether a lawyer’s
response, so circumscribed, would constitute an unacceptable scope limitation
that might require a qualified opinion. Apart from this basic question, how
ever, the profession would still be faced with a hard decision about what its
disclosure responsibilities are in certain situations where it has knowledge of a
contingent liability of the type that the ABA statement considers a general
risk contingency but that would appear to fall within the definition of a
contingency as set out by ARB No. 50. In resolving this question, the
auditor must also bear in mind that Rule 3-16(i)(2) of Regulation S-X
requires that a “brief statement as to contingent liabilities not reflected in the
balance sheet shall be made.”
The particular type of contingent liability at the heart of this problem is
that which the auditor might be considered to have knowledge of as a result
of the audit procedures he is required to undertake in order to meet his
obligation to comply with generally accepted auditing standards. These would
probably not include contingencies arising from a violation of legal require
ments that presuppose a specialized knowledge that the auditor could not be
expected to possess, unless they come to his attention in some other manner.
Neither should the auditor be expected to formulate and perform audit proce
dures to uncover every possible violation of all of the myriad legal responsi
bilities with which the client must comply—for example, violations of anti
trust laws, environmental protection laws, or the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970. At the same time, certain contingent liabilities can be
expected to come to the auditor’s attention as a result of his normal audit
procedures or his familiarity with the client’s affairs. These might include,
for example, borderline exposure to tax liability, significant profits on govern
ment contracts that could be the subject of a renegotiation dispute, and vio
lations of price control regulations by a client who was not required to file
periodic reports.
If the possibility of the assertion of a material claim based upon such a
13 American Bar Association, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
Draft Resolution and Report, “Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’ Responses
to Auditors’ Requests for Information,” July 22, 1974.
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contingent liability exists, and if the auditor can be presumed to have knowl
edge of this possibility based upon information either contained in his work
papers or of which he became aware during the course of his audit, a sub
stantial risk of liability would be created should a claim be successfully
asserted at a later date. If the auditor recognizes this possibility and leans
toward disclosure, he is then troubled by the certainty that his disclosure will
significantly enhance the possibility that an otherwise dormant claim may be
asserted as a result of his disclosure. He must also reconcile his defensive
disclosure posture with the SAS No. 1 pronouncement that adequate disclosure
should not require publicizing certain kinds of information that would be
detrimental to his client. Recent court decisions compound the problem by
prohibiting the profession from falling back upon its promulgated standards
as a defense against allegations that disclosures were not made that should
have been made to prevent financial statements from being misleading.
Adopting a cutoff point similar to that proposed by the ABA may be
troubling to the profession from a social responsibility standpoint and may
have limited effectiveness in reducing exposure to legal liability. Nevertheless,
ARB No. 50 should be modified to provide for such a cutoff, recognizing that
professional judgment would still play a part in those situations where the
contingent liability would be of such magnitude that the fairness of the finan
cial statements, taken as a whole, would be called into question unless the
disclosure was made. An inescapable gray area would still be present, but
the proposed distinction would substantially narrow the scope of the con
fusion now existing. The alternative of expanding the profession’s disclosure
responsibilities with respect to this type of contingent liability puts it in the
untenable position of serving as an unofficial law enforcement agency or as a
quasi consumer protection body, a status which should not be imposed upon
the profession as it is presently constituted.
This does not mean that the profession should not, if it concludes that
such a course of action is feasible and desirable, undertake reporting upon
social and economic consequences of its clients’ activities or the independent
attestation of management performance for the benefit of shareholders and
other interested parties. This type of responsibility is properly distinguishable
from a responsibility to assist in the enforcement of laws and of claims inuring
to the benefit of private economic interests.

Disclosure of Measurement Principles
The SEC has recently moved to require increased disclosure of both
accounting policies and the impact of these policies on financial statements.
The broad objective of the SEC proposal, which was not generally called into
question by those who commented on it, is to assist investors by requiring
under certain circumstances an estimate of the dollar impact on net income of
the use by the reporting entity of an accounting principle as compared to
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alternative acceptable accounting principles. This requirement would apply in
situations “where alternative accounting principles are available to describe
the same economic phenomenon and where it appears that differences in
reported results between companies using alternative principles are more
related to the accounting methods selected than the business realities involved,
such as accounting for inventories and research and development costs.”14
Because of the open-ended nature of the proposed rule, the AICPA
accounting standards division agreed to prepare a defined list of disclosures
that could be incorporated in Regulation S-X. As a result of this effort, the
division concluded that meaningful disclosures could not be accomplished by
the approach suggested by the SEC, stating,
Our view is based primarily on the belief that the effect of circum
stances on the selection of accounting principles applied in prepara
tion of financial statements is so pervasive that meaningful com
parisons among companies cannot be made simply by disclosing
alternative income measures on the assumption that different account
ing principles might have been applied. Moreover, the Division feels
that the number of areas where alternatives may exist and comparison
disclosure might be accomplished is so limited that comparison
disclosures in these areas would be of little value to users of financial
statements.15

Should the SEC adopt the proposed requirement, the division found that
only five situations warranted a disclosure of the impact of alternative
methods. These were (1) the investment credit; (2) deferred research and
development costs, preoperating costs, start-up costs, and similar deferrals;
(3) inventories; (4) depreciation; and (5) goodwill and other purchased or
acquired intangibles. Even this modest list will suffer attrition when the FASB
concludes its deliberations on items (2) and (5). It was recognized that the
list might have to be expanded to cover new business developments for which
accounting principles are not readily determinable, a probability which the
SEC also noted.
The division rejected a number of other items, principally because it
believed that these were not true alternatives under the existing authorities and
that the choice between the available alternatives was circumscribed by the
facts and circumstances involved in any given situation. Among the items so
rejected were installment sales, lease transactions by manufacturer or dealer
lessors, and the provision of income taxes on undistributed earnings of sub
sidiaries and joint ventures. Although comparing alternatives available
within specialized industries might be necessary, the division concluded that
further study was needed to develop applications to individual industries.
14 Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 33-5427, October 4, 1973.
15 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Accounting Standards Division,
Letter to John C. Burton, SEC, Re: Securities Act Release No. 33-5427, Febru
ary 20, 1974.
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The results of this study are indicative of the progress that the account
ing profession has made in recent years in narrowing those situations where
alternative principles can be used in measuring and recording essentially
similar economic transactions. In most instances, the choice among alternative
principles is no longer discretionary but must be premised upon a thorough
analysis of the business realities involved. Apart from specialized industry
situations, the work of the FASB in the immediate future will probably
eliminate most if not all of the remaining discretionary alternatives without
imposing an undesirable degree of rigidity, given different economic circum
stances. Although commenting upon a different but related problem—the
need for the exercise of individual judgment—the committee on external
measurement and reporting of the American Accounting Association made
some observations that are appropriate to the present discussion:
As an example, regarding franchise accounting, the Committee feels
that adequate criteria were made available for practicing accountants
to make good judgments regarding the handling of franchise fees.
However, it seems they followed a “sales point” rule regardless of the
circumstances, and even though this might have been satisfactory
under certain circumstances, franchise agreements vary so much on
a case by case basis that much over-all bad accounting resulted. In a
word, one realization rule of accounting for franchise fees cannot be
supported, because all franchise agreements and all participants in
franchise agreements are not the same, legally, financially, nor eco
nomically. The facts of each case must be weighted to determine
whether the point on the continuum between uncertainty and certainty
had been reached where reliable measurement was possible and
income (loss) recognition thereby required.16

Robert K. Mautz, in a research study for the Financial Executives
Research Foundation entitled “The Effect of Circumstances on the Appli
cation of Accounting Principles,” remarks,
A strong conclusion emerges . . . that there is no inherent right
ness in any given accounting method apart from the circumstances
in which it is to be applied.

Accounting principles are only as “right” as the way they are applied
and insofar as the results they produce in each specific situation.
This is not to suggest that there should be no rules and that transactions
that are substantially the same should not be treated in substantially the same
manner. As previously noted, these rules should provide the flexibility to
treat like transactions and events in a consistent manner and, at the same
16 American Accounting Association, “Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’ Re
sponses to Auditors.”
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time, to report different transactions and events differently. Things should
look different in the financial statements if they are different. Of course,
disclosure must be made of the accounting principle applied so that users of
the financial statements can make an intelligent comparison of the results of
similarly situated companies employing different principles because of different
circumstances.

Conclusion
In summary, there can be little argument with the proposition that
amplified disclosure is desirable if, as a result, financial information will better
serve its intended function. One problem that must be recognized is the
difficulty of communicating by means of general purpose financial statements
that attempt to satisfy the needs of all users, whether an untrained, small
investor or a financial analyst, or a creditor, investor, or government regulator.
Although financial statements can, perhaps, be made more understandable
through clearer and more detailed disclosure, there does not seem to be any
easy solution to this problem given the complexity of modern business and the
varying needs of different users.
As the number and sophistication of disclosure requirements increase, so
also do the related costs. These costs are both monetary and intangible and
include increased exposure to legal liability as the nature of proposed dis
closures moves away from historical summaries to such nebulous areas as
earnings forecasts and management effectiveness. In many situations, these
costs are justified by the benefits that inure to at least some user groups. It
is time for the accounting profession to give serious consideration to limiting
the application of some disclosure requirements in situations where they pro
vide little or no benefit and involve substantial costs. A levels-of-disclosure
approach that recognizes the inherent differences between public and private
companies could serve as a starting point and provide a frame of reference
for the discussion of the many problems that attend the proposal.
Expanding the scope of required disclosure can be expected to more
often place the auditor in the position of causing potential detriment to his
client. There is a need for better and more precise guidelines on disclosure
cutoff as, for example, in the case of contingent liabilities. But here, as in
every aspect of disclosure, the ultimate criteria is fairness of presentation, a
concept that cannot be divorced from the exercise of professional judgment.
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Of the Mayo and Werner papers

By Theodore R. Lilley, President, Financial Analysts Federation

The Mayo and Werner papers on corporate disclosure of financial in
formation are here examined from the viewpoint of the financial analyst who
is serving either individual or institutional investors.

Financial Executive Viewpoint

Initially Mr. Mayo questions whether it is useful for companies to
supply ever greater amounts of information to investors. He then goes on to
consider the wisdom of publication of corporate earnings forecasts, price-level
accounting, and reporting for business segments.
My own general thoughts on disclosure by issuers to the investing public
are these:
1. The primary purpose of disclosure is to aid in thoughtful consideration
of prospective or existing investments.
2. Disclosure should be effected in such a way as to avoid favoring one
investor or type of investor over another.
3. To serve its primary purpose, disclosure needs to be timely and
relevant to investors’ needs.
4. As a corollary to item 3, issuers, investors, and investors’ representa
tives (for example, analysts) need periodically to reassess what is relevant in
the light of changing conditions and to add and subtract from disclosure
requirements.
5. Even-handed disclosure implies that the same information is made
available to all interested parties. I cannot entirely agree with Mr. Mayo when
he indicates that we should try to make the parties to the investment decision
making process equally well informed with respect to material facts pertinent
to a particular transaction. In actuality, each claimant to information about
an issuer will (a) decide whether to seek information directly or through an
intermediary, (b) pick and choose from among available information, (c) be
guided by an individual purpose, and (d) apply to the facts his own analysis,
shaped by his individual training and experience.
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Recognizing these wide differences in the use of information, the issuer
need not go beyond providing equal access to information.

Issuers' Published Reports
As a practical matter, the issuing company’s published annual and
quarterly reports must carry the heaviest part of the burden of disclosure.
These reports are the most economical media for making information avail
able widely and fairly.
One needs to recognize, however, that there are finite limits to the con
tents of reports sent out in volume. Since periodic reports to shareholders
are the practical vehicles for communication, they need to include as much
pertinent data as possible. Important data (such as detail on income taxes)
that is customarily covered in the 10-K report and is key to an understanding
of the issuer’s condition and prospects should, as Mr. Mayo suggests, be
included in the quarterly and annual reports. I question, however, whether
this means, as Mr. Mayo further suggests, that 10-Ks have become unneces
sary. Granted, 10-Ks are cumbersome and not welcome to all investors;
nevertheless, for investors or their advisors with the energy and inclination to
study, these reports are valuable and should be made available.
Mr. Mayo notes that few investors ask for 10-Ks when they are offered
and implies that this indicates the 10-Ks are of only marginal value. Two
points might be cited in challenge to this implication: First, the number of
requests for a 10-K report can be misleading—a single analyst using one
copy may serve as the eyes and ears of thousands of investors; second, an
accurate census of 10-K users is difficult since many use microfiche or other
reproduction services.

Extension of Disclosure
Mr. Mayo turns to specifics by considering the wisdom of (a) publica
tion of management’s earnings forecasts, (b) price-level accounting, and
(c) reporting by business segments. Let me offer a word on each.

Corporate Earnings Forecasts. Mr. Mayo objects to publication of cor
porate earnings forecasts on either a voluntary or mandatory basis. His objec
tions might be summarized as follows: Investors may not recognize inherent
inaccuracies in forecasts or the tenuous nature of underlying assumptions;
issuers can be harmed competitively or technically if forecast information is
disclosed; and managements will tend to warp their accounting processes or
their business practices to insure fulfillment of forecasts.
I wonder whether these objections do not skirt the legitimate needs of
investors. We know that issuers do make internal forecasts and that these
form an important tool in management’s planning. We also know that the
internal forecast is, in many cases, the culmination of an elaborate process,
constantly honed, involving assessment of the economic outlook, analysis of
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market and demand, weighing of cost factors, and financial planning. Is not
this forward-looking process for focusing on the “bottom line” the essence
of investment? Should not the investor, who furnishes the issuer’s capital, be
privy to his management’s thinking?
The Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) has expressed the view that
management should be permitted, at its option, to publish forecasts in quar
terly and annual reports, on condition that assumptions are stated, that a
logical process is used in projections, that forecasts are updated regularly, and
that some measure of their tentative character is stated.1
The federation’s view obviously is that the game is worth the candle. It
feels that investors are able to recognize the inaccuracies inherent in fore
casts, that the possibility of competitive harm may be exaggerated, and that
the necessity for updating and continuing the forecasts will act to deter
management from manipulating the books of account to fulfill predictions.
The federation also believes that publication of forecasts will promote
investor satisfaction and a more orderly market. Managements commonly
prepare forecasts for internal purposes, regardless of whether they are made
public, and, in some cases, these forecasts filter out, unevenly, to investors or
their representatives. Moreover, analysts make their own estimates of cor
porate results. Under these conditions, the publication of actual earnings
sharply different from those assumed by investors often causes dislocations and
loss of confidence. We suggest that an orderly program of publishing and
updating management’s earnings forecasts might minimize such dislocation
and build investor confidence.
Price-Level Accounting. Turning to the subject of price-level accounting,
Mr. Mayo suggests that research to date has not produced information
sufficiently understandable to be useful. I would agree with this position.

Reporting by Business Segments. Mr. Mayo’s final point concerns report
ing by business segments, which he favors, with the qualification that the
structure and practices of each individual firm should be the primary factor
in defining segments.
In agreeing with Mr. Mayo on the wisdom of reporting by segments, I
would only point to the doubtful performance of conglomerates in recent
years as illustration of the danger of permitting mystery in the internal oper
ations of issuers and placing blind faith in management. In the act of
segmenting its operations, management is, in a sense, assuming the prerogative
of the investor, that is, the investor’s right to choose the commitments for
his own portfolio. It seems entirely logical to provide the investor with data
on segments (his involuntary investments) to enable him to assess his total
position and gauge the probable future course of his commitments. In addi-1

1

Financial Analysts Federation, Disclosure of Corporate Forecasts to the Investor,
(New York: FAF, 1973).
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tion, data indicating performance by segment provides a useful gauge of
management’s stewardship in each area under its control.
The real issue on segments, I feel, is not whether, but how. What is the
best basis for defining a segment? The Financial Analysts Federation’s Finan
cial Accounting Policy Committee, in its memo of July 26, 1974 to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, goes perhaps a bit farther towards
rules than does Mr. Mayo. The memorandum suggests that “. . . for seg
ments to be useful for making predictions of cash flow or earning power, they
must be reasonably homogeneous in their characteristics so that they can be
studied in the context of economic aggregates.”2

Viewpoint of CPA

In his paper, Mr. Werner initially voices his concern on the cost and
complexity of corporate reports to shareholders and pleads for greater clarity.
He then suggests separate levels of disclosure appropriate to private com
panies, publicly owned companies, and publicly owned companies filing with
the SEC. He goes on to suggest specific additional disclosures by issuers and
offers accountants guidelines for deciding to disclose contingent liabilities.
Finally, he argues against disclosing the dollar impact of the use of one
accounting principle as compared with alternative acceptable principles.

Complexity and Comprehension
Early in his paper Mr. Werner discusses complexity of reports versus
user comprehension. I would certainly second his pleas for simplification and
education. It would be helpful for the Seaview group to discuss specific
measures that might be used for, say, education of corporate employees,
analysts, and individual investors. Industry and professional groups might
experiment by developing syllabuses of educational needs in accounting as it
affects each of them and stimulating established educational institutions to
provide courses of instruction.
Pressing the subject of complexity and comprehension further, Mr.
Werner maintains that proliferating and increasingly complex information
leads to confusion on the part of all users, except, perhaps, institutions that can
afford large staffs to organize it. I would suggest, however, that this situation
merely mirrors the growing technical complexity of all industry. In walks of
life other than financial, ultimate consumers seem resigned, or content, to
rely on technically competent specialists as intermediaries. Why is the finan
cial field different? While we ask issuers to make information widely avail
able, it seems realistic that the organization with a large staff can understand

2

Financial Accounting Policy Committee: Financial Analysts Federation, Memoran
dum to Financial Accounting Standards Board, “Financial Reporting for Segments of
a Business Enterprise,” July 26, 1974.
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and utilize the information more fully than can the individual layman.
Increasingly, the layman recognizes this condition and employs investment
intermediaries.
Mr. Werner also recommends efforts to identify user needs so as to keep
disclosure relevant and within reasonable volume limits. I can only add that
in these times of rapid change the identification of needs should be seen as a
permanent, perhaps institutionalized, process.

Levels of Disclosure
Mr. Werner’s discussion of understandability leads him logically into the
suggestion of levels-of-disclosure reporting. There is an intuitive appeal to the
idea that disclosure requirements should be graded upward from simple rules
for privately held companies to more extensive requirements for public firms.
I am inclined to believe, however, that corporate complexity rather than
breadth of shareholder list should be stressed in promulgating rules for dis
closure. Sheer numbers make the investors in private companies important.
Do not the financial professionals have a duty to this group? Furthermore,
privately held companies have a way of selling out to publicly held companies
whose investors, most of us agree, are entitled to the protection of full
disclosure.
Consider also the effects of differential disclosure on competition for the
dollar from the bank or other investor. Suppose, for example, that publicly
held companies disclose earnings forecasts and product-line information.
Will not investors seek this information from private firms and thus make it a
condition for investment?

Additional Disclosure
In considering the cost of broadened disclosure, Mr. Werner says that
many improvements in present disclosure standards can be made without
incurring a prohibitive increase in cost and that serious study of this type of
improvement should be undertaken without delay. Within this guideline he
suggests the usefulness of additional information on inventories, depreciation,
intangibles, and selected non-financial data, such as key contracts. I feel
investors would find this a constructive approach.
Mr. Werner also mentions the possibility of participation by auditors in
the preparation of interim statements, but he realistically points out the major
cost involved if auditors attest quarterly reports. In this connection, the New
York Stock Exchange’s recommendation is worthy of serious consideration.
The exchange suggests that listed corporations consult with their outside
auditors throughout the year and particularly before the publication of quar
terly reports.3 Such consultations would not normally involve audits.
3

New York Stock Exchange, Inc., white paper, “Recommendations and Comments
on Financial Reporting to Shareholders and Related Matters,” December 12, 1973.
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Contingent Liabilities
In his articulate discussion on disclosure of contingent liabilities, Mr.
Werner stresses the auditors’ dilemma. If the auditor does not disclose a
contingency, he runs the risk that a claim will later be asserted. If he discloses
the contingency, his client’s contingent liability may be transformed into a real
liability.
Obviously, the dilemma is real. The temptation, however, is for issuer
management to lean toward nondisclosure whenever there is any doubt. It
would be instructive to know of particular instances where disclosure in an
audited statement actually made a contingency into an actual liability. Cer
tainly, the effect of nondisclosure is devastating to investor confidence in those
cases where subsequent events bring to life corporate disasters whose ante
cedents had been known only to insiders.

Impact of Alternative Accounting Principles
A highly significant topic covered in Mr. Werner’s paper is the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s proposal that the issuer disclose the dollar income
effect of use of an accounting principle as compared with alternative acceptable
principles. Mr. Werner cites the American Institute of CPAs’ position that
the SEC’s approach is not meaningful since issuers, by their individual cir
cumstances, really have few areas where they are free to use alternative meth
ods of accounting. Nevertheless, the AICPA considers that, should the SEC
adopt its proposed requirement, five specific situations would warrant dis
closure of the impact of alternative accounting methods: (1) the investment
credit, (2) deferred research and development costs, pre-operating costs,
start-up costs, and similar deferrals, (3) inventories, (4) depreciation, and
(5) goodwill and other purchased or acquired intangibles.
It is hard to accept the AICPA’s position against disclosing the dollar
impact of alternatives. The investor finds it difficult to believe that, for
example, management’s choice of a method for inventory accounting is
dictated by the peculiarities of the firm’s structure. On the contrary, I would
submit that if issuers give dollar-impact figures, say in the five areas noted by
the AICPA, it would help investors make more realistic evaluations and
probably place pressure on the accounting profession to move speedily in
narrowing permissible alternatives for issuers.

Concluding Thoughts

In closing, several thoughts are offered. Beset by the problems each of
us faces and imprisoned by the background of our separate professions, we
may lose sight of the complete investment game plan. Disclosure is one
facet of a total economic environment in which investors’ funds are mobilized
for productive purposes. Investors need to be satisfied with the system and
with their investments, and they need to be satisfied over a long period of
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time. To achieve this long-term satisfaction, most of us believe investors need
to know what makes their corporation tick. Corporate managers may or may
not be willing to make the necessary disclosure. Often managers adopt the
philosophy, which may be short-term oriented, that they alone know how to
structure and manage the firm and that they can do this best in an atmosphere
of secrecy.
In such an environment those of us in the Seaview group might pro
ductively conclude that we are called to act as two-way ombudsmen, interpret
ing management’s action to investors and investors’ needs to management.
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Critique
Of the Mayo and Werner papers

By Glenhall E. Taylor, Jr., Senior Vice President, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Sam Ervin answered a reporter’s question at the conclusion of the Water
gate hearings with the suggestion that there were two ways to present the
disclosures made to the Senate committee. “You can draw a picture of a horse
or you can draw a picture of a horse and print underneath it, ‘This is a
picture of a horse.’ We just drew a picture of a horse!”
In the matter of financial disclosure, regulatory authorities today seem to
be asking the accountant, attorney, and corporate officer alike to draw a
picture and print its title underneath. To draw out the anecdote still further,
the sophisticated user may view financial reporting as a picture of a horse;
but, too often of late, the horse is a Trojan horse that certainly should have
been left outside the gates to the city. That is, not unlike most contentious
issues, disclosure, and the quantity and quality thereof, would not be issues
at all were it not for uncertainty about its nature. In the words of Marshall
Armstrong, writing for Financial Executive in March 1974, “Financial
accounting is the basic tool of economic decision-making. It also is the basic
platform on which an enterprise appears before a somewhat skeptical public.”
With no uncertainty, there would be no skepticism, and disclosure would
be a simple matter of “Here’s what we did; here’s what we look like now;
here’s what we’re going to do.”
Into this oversimplified proposition, it is possible to weave the thoughts
and premises of Mr. Mayo and Mr. Werner and in so doing, the most logical
place to start is with a discussion of “uncertainty.”

Expanded Disclosure
Mr. Werner sets forth the classic questions to which accounting theo
reticians have sought answers for years. “Given these complexities, how do
the accountant and the auditor decide what information is relevant and
necessary to make the financial statements sufficiently informative and not
misleading? Further, what criteria distinguish disclosures that must be
included in the financial statements proper as against those disclosures that
are appropriate and useful but that should be made outside the framework of
the financial statements proper?”
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Mr. Mayo underwrites the notion, “Recognition that the only certainty
about business decisions is that they will be made under conditions of un
certainty leads to the need for moderation on the part of seekers of information
as to the quantity they need in order to arrive at decisions with a reasonable
degree of confidence in the result.”
Based on this same premise, a diametrically opposed conclusion can
be reached. It is the very fact that the future is uncertain that leads to
demands for more accurate information on the past, the present, and what
management thinks future results will be.
Mr. Mayo then holds, “In attempting to make available information
that will enable reasonably informed decisions, the apparent lack of interest
on the part of many participants thereto presents a real challenge.” His
recommended solution is “to make the regular releases, such as annual and
interim reports, comprehensive enough so that the 10-K is unnecessary, and
understandable enough to be useful even to the least sophisticated users.”
Mr. Werner builds on this theme as part of his “critical re-evaluation
of existing disclosure requirements.” Recognizing that there are no easy
answers in financial reporting and corporate disclosure, he points out that
“one major pathway to improved disclosure, particularly as it pertains to most
individual investors, is to increase the level of comprehension of financial
statements and related annual report materials with particular emphasis on
financial statement footnotes.”
Users will applaud this area of unanimity no less than the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Fully aware of the legal tightrope it must walk
regarding issues of free speech, the SEC’s interest in the annual report has
been rekindled. In an address to the National Investors Relations Institute in
1973, Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr., said, “It seems to me that in its efforts
to provide access by investors to disclosures mandated by our federal system,
the commission has been much too diffident in approaching the annual report.”
In his view, “the prime source of information in the marketplace concerning
issuers is the annual report.”
Perhaps here, given a common purpose, there is room for compromise.
An all-inclusive annual report could well supplant the 10-K, even if the 10-K
information were required to appear as an appendix in the annual report.

Levels of Disclosure
Not content with improving the comprehensiveness and understand
ability of financial reports, Mr. Werner puts forth a brilliant proposal on levels
of disclosure that, it is hoped, will be a topic given its due regard by par
ticipants in this symposium.
He has taken a giant step in resolving the problem of users’ needs versus
issuers’ needs. The concept is sound. Should there be disagreement on the
criteria or other technicalities, these can be ironed out at the professional
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level for setting accounting principles. Obviously, all the perplexing questions
surrounding differential disclosure are not immediately answered, but his own
words provide a perfect summary:
. a significant start on such differen
tiations should be possible premised only upon the professional experience and
judgment of the accounting profession.”
His assumption concerning the banker’s willingness to settle for first-level
disclosure on nonpublic companies is probably correct as a generalization.
There will be exceptions and, even today, small as well as large businesses are
realizing profits that would be questionable if the effects of price-level account
ing were imposed.
Users of financial reports would all agree that the CPA should have some
association with interim reports. The estimated figure of a 65 percent increase
in annual audit costs, were the auditor to attest to the interim statement, is
staggering. Perhaps an unqualified opinion is going too far; it might suffice
if the auditor conducted a mandatory review with management of its quarterly
results and consulted formally in the case of unusual developments or extraor
dinary events, much as is often done now on an informal basis. Such a
process would not only benefit users but would do much to ensure timely
recognition of material and relevant information for management and dis
closure purposes.
Price-Level Accounting

Mr. Mayo’s position on price-level accounting suggests that, while the
theory is sound, the resulting restatements are difficult to interpret, leading
“one to question whether the research conducted to date has produced a
result that yields information sufficiently understandable to the users of finan
cial statements to meet the test of being materially useful.” He contends that
“the proposed method would be a very costly procedure.” Pragmatically
speaking, this latter part of his argument is undoubtedly true if judged by
traditional expense accounting criteria.
However, the unanswered question is the relative magnitude of another
kind of cost. As William Blackie, retired chairman of the board of Caterpillar
Tractor Co. pointed out in a recent article in Business Week, “The U.S. is
deluding itself about the true state of earnings and capital accumulation in
our economy.” The deleterious effects of failure to account for a double
digit inflation rate are too well known to need delineation in this paper.
The ramifications of the requirement for such accounting are endless. Visions
of changes in income tax law are probably merely visions, at least in terms of
their impact on the bottom line; the other variable, tax rate, is easily adjust
able. The important benefits of price-level accounting might accrue more to
management than to the user. While users will learn quite quickly how to
apply this new information in judging the company’s actions, management will
make better decisions if operating results and balance sheet items are reflective
of the real world, and this is the crux of the matter.
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One would be hard-pressed to quarrel with Mr. Mayo’s conclusion con
cerning price-level accounting: “Resolution of the practical aspects of the
problem requires a considerable on-going effort by business. . . .” If efforts
to control inflation are successful, the priority of the concept will inevitably
slip in ranking. Until then, without inflation accounting the public will be
misled to the same extent that the relative purchasing power of the dollar is
not shown.

Public Forecasting

A matter that is of immediate concern is public forecasting, which
would most likely be made useful by incorporation of price-level account
ing techniques. Nevertheless, with or without embellishments, Mr. Mayo
views proposals for public forecasting as less than desirable. In his words,
“With respect to public disclosure of corporate forecasts—either permissively
or mandatorily—this is a step that would appear to be both unworkable for
preparers and contrary to the best interests of investors.” He tells us that a
forecast “will not be accurate, and it will change” and that “to communicate
to the investor, clearly and without possibility of misunderstanding, the
nuances, shadings, judgments, and changes involved is simply not possible.”
“The forecast will not be accurate and it will change” should appear in
bold type at the top of its first page. It is no secret that bankers have ex
perienced some difficulty in the recent past in predicting what the prime rate
would be the next week, let alone the next year. It must be agreed that there
is no way to convert the day-to-day utility of an in-house profit plan to a
public forecast. The two are related but distinct.
For a comprehensive presentation of one laudible approach to public
forecasting, the members of the symposium should refer to a very recent
publication by Laventhol & Horwath, Publishing Financial Forecasts: Benefits,
Alternatives, Risks (1974, 83 pp.). It becomes clear that under the present
rules of the game there is latitude for measurements and a pervading attitude of
reasonableness.
Mr. Mayo quotes Will Rogers in his argument; from childhood another
Will Rogers’ quote comes to mind: “All I know is what I read in the papers.”
How far inferior for the user or investor to operate that way today than to
be pari passu with financial analysts and reporters by virtue of official,
formalized releases of forecast information! If Mr. Mayo’s attitude is truly
reflective of that of most corporate financial officers, there will be difficulties
in gaining volunteers to enter the public forecasting scene. In the long run,
however, the corporate financial officer will find it is probably not much
different than a child learning to ride a bicycle—just about impossible at first,
but routine thereafter.
There are some terribly serious unanswered legal questions posed, in
this topic, by Mr. Mayo and, in the levels-of-disclosure discussion, by Mr.
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Werner. These must be resolved before any significant progress can be
expected or demanded. As it is today, without the further complications of
forecasting, the accounting profession, not unlike other professions, can
literally be litigated out of business because of their tremendous potential
inherent liabilities. Leadership in putting these issues to rest, at least in fore
casting, must come from the SEC.
Mr. Mayo further expresses concern that the assumptions on which the
forecast is based will work to the competitive disadvantage of the issuer. He
is absolutely correct, unless a system is devised for secreting certain in
formation from disclosure. Perhaps this is a naive assumption, but the
Justice Department could well support the proposition that some information,
if disclosed, could lessen competition. Although the program as now en
visioned excludes the CPA from attesting to the reasonableness of assumptions,
his role initially might be to hold in confidence the proprietary information
used in forecasting and reveal it only should future justification prove neces
sary. In reality, most gross errors will be attributable to the vicissitudes of
global economics. Certainly, Mr. Mayo is not alone in his resistance to public
forecasting. A very recent study made by Dr. John J. Clark, professor of
finance at Drexel University, and two colleagues, Dr. Richard E. Speagle,
associate professor at Drexel and Peter Eigers, CPA, College of William and
Mary, revealed that over half of fifty-four businesses questioned would oppose
public forecasting whether voluntary or mandatory and for much the same
reasons as Mr. Mayo’s.
The two most common declarations, “Forecast variances will create
a crisis in investor confidence” and “Investors will not appreciate the un
certainties of forecasting” are probably the least defensible in light of the
selective forecasting that goes on now. Further, to quote James T. Powers,
partner in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., “Apparently, they believe the in
herent inaccuracies involved in budgeting and the fact that next year’s budget
is always somewhat different from actual spending would erode investor con
fidence in financial statements. Anyone who seriously believes this simply
does not understand the extent to which carrying value of assets on a typical
balance sheet is based on forecasts.”
There is no question that forecasting will be costly, but the benefits
to the volunteering corporation in the securities and credit markets could
well outweigh this negative. As an aside, these observations have been made
relying on the assumption that a corporation seeking credit from a bank or
other institutional lender would be free to provide, selectively and privately,
the forecasting information so necessary in the granting of term loans.
Contingent Liabilities
Since the discussion opened with the question of uncertainty, it would
seem appropriate to address Mr. Werner’s remarks about yet another kind of
uncertainty—contingent liabilities.
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Mr. Werner’s arguments and caveats are logical and straightforward.
There is support for the CPA’s role to be that of the public’s investigator
and watchdog while on the payroll of his suspect and, when all is said and
done, the 1934 Securities Exchange Act required the filing of certified finan
cial statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Because the
purpose of the act was to protect investors, it should come as no surprise that
the auditor has been exposed to indeterminate liabilities as a quasi-guardian
of the public interest. Yet, the dilemmas in the contingent liability examples
given by Mr. Werner are real.
Selfishly, a user wants to know about every contingency that might in
crease his risk and, legally, is entitled to know about a contingency which
would materially alter the company’s financial capacity. Perhaps a layman
should not presume to take a stand on professional matters, but Mr. Werner’s
contention that Accounting Research Bulletin No. 50 should be modified to
provide for a cutoff similar to the American Bar Association’s proposed
general risk contingency classification is quite logical, especially when he
hastens to add that “professional judgment would still play a part in those
situations where the contingent liability would be of such magnitude that the
fairness of the financial statements, taken as a whole, would be called into
question unless the disclosure were made.” The alternative is abhorrent and
would serve to weaken if not destroy the strength of the present interrelation
ships of client, creditor, attorney, and user.
Before leaving the subject of contingent liabilities, recognition of the
reasons why the organized bar is giving its attention to disclosure is in order.
A very comprehensive exposure draft entitled Scope of Lawyers Responses to
Auditors’ Request for Information was prepared by a committee of the Section
of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association
and published early in 1974. The duty of a lawyer to act in the event he has
received information establishing that his client has perpetrated a fraud is
clearly defined. The conflict will arise in responding to the auditor’s inquiry
in circumstances other than those “involving the commission of a crime, the
opportunity to prevent a crime or perpetration of a fraud.”
The study is extensive, but the suggested resolutions are quite narrow
and are vulnerable to attack by the SEC as being too restrictive. An article in
Business Week (August 10, 1974) states that lawyers see in the SEC’s actions
a threat to the lawyer-client relationship and that “many attorneys privately
state their belief that SEC policy, rather than leading to more disclosure, will
ultimately lead to less either because lawyers will simply withdraw from
active involvement or because corporate clients themselves will learn that it is
imprudent to reveal too much to a lawyer who may have an obligation to tell
all to the SEC.” It is indeed unfortunate that the illegal and dishonest acts of a
few people can cause such turmoil in the finest commercial structure in the
world.
Mr. Werner’s paper taken in its entirety could be characterized as
powerful, reflecting the views of a practitioner with a deep regard for his
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profession, but, more importantly, in it there clearly emerges the image of
a humanist who seeks, first and foremost, the common good.
It will, therefore, seem picayune to single out a single paragraph for
stern criticism, but if the accounting profession is seriously considering “report
ing on the social and economic consequences of its clients’ activities” and
“the independent attestation of management performance for the benefit of
shareholders and other interested parties,” humanism and professionalism
will not suffice. As for attesting to management’s performance, the market
place has done a superb job, although sometimes later than sooner. Mindful
that Mr. Werner does not per se commit his support to the concept, it is
patently cavalier to suggest that management performance can be judged
fairly, absent of any gross misconduct or negligence, in a single accounting
period.

Segmented Reporting

The issue of segmented reporting is a veritable nonissue. Mr. Mayo
is correct in stating that “a qualified assent must be given to the thesis that
some form of segmented reporting is useful” and in his position that, “if
segment information has any use, it can only be for enterprise analysis.” The
powerful Federal Trade Commission will do its utmost to mandate uniform
techniques for treating such matters as transfer costs, even though the pro
fessional will immediately subscribe to Mr. Mayo’s knowledgeable dissertation
on nebulous allocations and the justified diversity of approaches used to reflect
the truth as the issuer sees it.
In this circumstance, no matter how many edicts were issued, the fact
would remain that were uniform principles adopted, the results would still
belie true comparisons between or among discrete entities, thereby enhancing
the user’s purposes naught.
Mr. Schoenborn, in his paper for this seminar, has set forth the practical
aspects of the absolute necessity for segmented accounting (translated from
the line-of-product definition used by the FTC to the real-life internal sub
sidiary or divisional statements shown in the consolidating routine) and
thereby focused on the enterprise evaluation which can be so critical to proper
disclosure.
Segmented reporting is with us now. “The SEC requires corporations
to disclose for each of the last five years the approximate amount or percentage
of total sales and income of each of its lines of business that account for 10
percent or more of revenues and earnings,” and the New York Stock Exchange
urged listed companies to give stockholders the same line-of-business infor
mation in annual reports. “Corporations, prodded by their accountants and
the government, are disclosing more numbers about their operations than they
did a year ago.” This is quoted from an article in the N.Y. Times written by
JohnH. Allan. It is fair to conclude that segmented reporting is a. fait accompli.
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Disclosure of Measurement Principles
The usefulness of disclosure of measurement principles to one class of
users, bankers, cannot be overstated. Robert Morris Associates annually
publishes financial statement analyses that are extremely useful in comparing
the ratios of a given company to the industry as a whole. Yet every banker
knows the limitations in making absolute comparisons because of the varia
tions of individual measurement treatment. For example, two manufacturers
of fertilizer, one using the LIFO method for inventory and the other FIFO,
will show wide differences in selected ratios at year-end 1974.
As Mr. Werner points out, “Things should look different in the financial
statements if they are different.” The puzzle for the user is in determining
to his own satisfaction which alternative more closely reflects the truth. A
major manufacturer several years ago was not faring well in the stock market
because of its relatively depressed earnings compared to its competitors. To
put itself in “proper” perspective, it changed its method of treating inventory
to the method commonly used in the industry. Its return immediately met
those of its competitors and the stock price reacted positively as expected. The
only real beneficiary was the IRS, which collected income taxes in a moderate
eight-figure amount that, had the accounting change not been made, would
not have been payable. Why there was no suit by stockholders and past stock
holders who had sold at the depressed price remains a mystery.
It is hoped that Mr. Werner’s expectation that the work of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board will eliminate most of the remaining discre
tionary alternatives is correct. If the Board is slow to do so, the SEC will
hurry the process. In the last two and a half years, 20 percent of all the
accounting series releases that the agency has promulgated in its forty-year
history have been issued, even though John C. Burton states in Business Week
(August 10, 1974), “I believe the determination of proper business account
ing can best be made in the private sector.”
Mr. Werner states that disclosure of the accounting principles applied
must be made so that users can make an intelligent comparison of com
panies. The user does not have enough information from this disclosure
alone to help him. He really has no way to reconstruct the financial state
ments of one company using the differing accounting measurements of
another. This is the reason why the disclosure of results, had alternative
principles been used, is of benefit to the user. Any of the five situations listed
by the AICPA accounting standards division can have a tremendous impact
on a statement of the ostensible results of operations.

Conclusion

“There is nothing so powerful as an idea whose time has come,” and the
idea of disclosure is full upon us. A. A. Sommer, Jr., in his paper for the
1971 Seaview symposium, said, “The insistence upon disclosure—full, com
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plete, accurate, informative—since 1933, has been a coursing stream.”
Should American businessmen attempt to dam that stream with resistance to
change and cries of excessive costs, the stream will surely overflow its banks
and, in so doing, catastrophically inundate the profit system as we know it
today.
It must be pointed out that some of the loudest voices of dissent against
expanded disclosure belong to corporate managers whose ethics are beyond
question. Why do they put themselves in the position of protesting too much
when they are honorable men with the least to lose? The situation is not
unlike one of a few years ago. Bankers were by far the most vociferous group
to oppose truth-in-lending legislation when, in fact, their rate schedules gave
them a competitive advantage once the public understood the pricing structure.
Never in our history has business been so suspect and the subject of
attack as it is today. Our system exists not because it is the best system, which
most if not all businessmen are convinced it is, but because it meet the needs
of our society. If ever enough of the people become convinced there are better
ways to meet those needs, the system will cease to exist.
The eyes of the small shareholder with direct or indirect ownership
interests are on the major U.S. corporations. His vast numbers lend support
to perpetuation of private enterprise, but his attitude could change and is
perhaps changing already. Ray Garrett, Jr., chairman of the SEC was quoted
in Business Week (August 10, 1974): “I am amazed to find in the letters I
get that some people are still fighting the battle that government and not the
accounting profession should audit corporations.”
In the words of former SEC Chairman Casey, “It is a fact of life that
small investors have retreated from the stock market in droves—in part
because they have been shellshocked by surprise writeoffs.” While his in
ference here that adequate disclosure would prevent loss is certainly arguable,
it is possible to conclude logically that some prudent investors would not have
suffered losses if disclosure were perfect.
Without minimizing the significance of cost-benefit analyses, one can
put forth the proposition that the magnitude of the monetary costs of provid
ing expanded disclosure information pales when compared to the potential
costs of failing to do so. A distinct parallel can be drawn between these
costs and environmental costs; in our society an important concern for years
to come will be the quality of life. That concept includes corporate behavior
no less than the air we breathe and the goods we buy.
Today, the art of financial reporting is imperfect. The idealist demands
perfection; for, having it would eliminate uncertainty about the past and the
present. The realist will recognize that there will be compromise upon this
ideal for the foreseeable future but will not abdicate his responsibility to strive
for perfection.
There are few easy answers in our complex environment. There is no
“laundry list” giving neat “yes” and “no” answers to each situation which might
arise in corporate disclosure. It is for this very reason that today, more
than ever before, the user must have faith in the truth of Mr. Werner’s
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closing sentence:
. in every aspect of disclosure, the ultimate criteria is
fairness of presentation, a concept that cannot be divorced from the exercise
of professional judgment.” Humanism and professionalism on the part of
each of the interests represented at this symposium will hasten the resolution
of the problems of disclosure.
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Discussion
Of the Mayo and Werner papers
Thomas J. Burns,Discussion Chairman
Earnings Forecasting

Chairman Burns: On this matter of disclosure we have heard of the
benefits and the problems from the financial analysts and the bankers and
then the problems and the benefits from the auditors.
It is time to hear about the problems of the corporations.
Considering the issue of earnings forecasting, I would like to call on
the FEI representatives as to whether they agree with the analysis of this
situation as presented by Mr. Mayo.
Financial Executive: We don’t believe that we should be forecasting
because look at this last year and at the past six months. It is pretty obvious
what has been happening to our business, and any forecast we had made six
months ago certainly would have been wrong.
However, there are some things that we do believe in, as the analysts
here know. The analysts are aware that there is a form of forecasting that we
can do. For example, Henry Ford has been talking about the costs in our
industry, increasing costs, for months. So, there are ways you can make
disclosure without giving what I call a six-month forecast, or an annual fore
cast, or even a quarterly forecast. I don’t think you really have to forecast.
And there are other things available to the analyst beyond forecasting, such
as deliveries and production.
So, I don’t think you need a formal forecast.
Financial Executive: There is another point that Mr. Mayo makes,
and that is the tendency to forecast safely. I think this is important and, while
Mr. Mayo may be making somewhat of an admission about how companies
are run by saying so, I think we should recognize that there may be a
tendency to forecast safely, and, even worse, a tendency to take unwise actions
so that we will come out fairly close to where the forecast shows.
This isn’t the way business should be run, but I wonder if there might
not be a tendency in that direction, if forecasts were mandated.
Regulator: Isn’t there a tendency already, in that direction internally?
When a branch or a division is behind its forecast, isn’t there such a tendency?
Would public reporting make a big change in that?
Financial Executive: I think there is that tendency. However, when
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it is an internal matter, it can be handled on an internal management basis
much more easily than it can be when you have involved the public in the
whole matter.
Financial Executive: I don’t agree with that statement at all, be
cause I think a forecast can be a management tool. We may have a very
optimistic forecast, and we may make our managers live up to that fore
cast to the best of their ability, even though it may be very difficult to achieve.
It is almost like a budget.
So it is a different type of a tool, used internally, than it would be
as a published forecast.
Financial Executive: It is a no-win proposition, actually, because
when you publish a forecast, the chances of it being on target are very slim.
Therefore, the people who rely on it and the company who issued it—
when the actual results are either lower or higher—will feel that they were
harmed by it. As far as the internal use of forecasts is concerned, I think
it gets down to a much finer detail where you have expert staff people who
are operating at all levels of the management of the company constantly
analyzing on a monthly basis the differences and variances and, if necessary,
changing the forecast.
So I really don’t see any connection between the fact that companies
make forecasts for their own purposes and use them internally, and publish
that information. It is just too difficult to understand it, in my opinion, and
not reliable enough. If you have a full staff working for you, you have a
chance in that case to communicate with each individual manager. You have
no chance to communicate with the other people.
Financial Executive: Probably the poorest thing we do in most
major corporations is forecasting. I would like to differentiate somewhat
between targets and forecasts.
We probably use targets in terms of holding divisions to performance
levels; we tend to think of corporate forecasts in a different sense. And I
would tell you that if you want to judge the probable earnings of our com
pany, you would be better advised to take the average of the analysts who
publish forecasts on our numbers, constantly updated, because in looking
back over three years’ time, they have been consistently better than our own
internal forecasts.
Financial Executive: I recognize all of these things as problems,
and there was a mention about the range of thinking and disclosure that a
company should worry about in talking about its earnings. Are you going
to be extremely pessimistic, or extremely optimistic, or some place in between
in that range of thinking? And there is a risk that attaches to taking one of
those positions.
We approach this on the basis that it behooves us to be fairly con
servative. We don’t go out to the edge of potentials of our income because
that doesn’t seem to be a realistic attitude to assume. And so, because we
are not able to read the future any better than anyone else, we take a con
servative approach.
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As an example of some of the reasons why we feel it necessary to fore
cast, last fall, when the oil situation developed (we are very heavy on hydro
carbons) a lot of people got scared, because they didn’t know what our
position was, and it came to our attention that many stockholders, including
employees, who didn’t know the story, were selling our shares to get rid of
them before the bottom fell in. We thought that was wrong then, and we
think it’s wrong now, and we think the facts have supported our position.
So, at that time we went public with an estimate of what our earnings
expectations were going to be for 1974.
Now, those estimates proved to be radically in error, but that doesn’t
really matter. One of the things that nonforecasting companies have to face
up to is that every ninety days they have to go public with what happened
in that quarter. And people then begin to extrapolate those first quarter
earnings into a year’s earnings, and they may not be right. And it seems to us
that it is better, if you have a superior view—and you should have as manage
ment—to help your stockholder and prospective investor understand it.
CPA: If I understood the gentleman, he is telling me as an outsider
that he thinks there is a very real difference between the arguments for no
forecast about 1975 to be made in, say, 1974 or early 1975, and the arguments
of people who are saying, “After first quarter data are in for 1975, we still
refuse to say anything.”
With one, we have turned over one of the four cards, and we have some
input. We are all beginning to take the estimates, and beginning to target
them in, and it is a different kind of a ballgame. There may be two issues here
and I am looking for confirmation.
Financial Executive: At the end of the first quarter you will show
your earnings, and you have to communicate whether you think that is
indicative of the way the year will go on the basis of the best knowl
edge that you have. We all recognize that we can’t look out into the future
with any degree of certainty. So we estimate it with the best data we have
available, and if those circumstances change, and particularly if it’s radical,
we all know that is going to happen.
Now, one other point. The suggestion has been made here that in
ternally you use one basis—a target, or profit plan, or whatever—and it
is clumsy and awkward to speak to the public on some other basis. That
hasn’t proven to be a hurdle that can’t be overcome in our case, because we
do that every day. I think you have to have objectives, and aspire to things,
but you recognize that you have problems which you hope you are going to
settle, so you try to motivate your people to produce in a very effective
manner. But they may very well fail.
In our corporate management we put a factor—a failure factor if you
will—that we are not going to achieve all of those things that we have set for
ourselves internally. And our batting record is not all that bad. We know
that there are going to be certain failures, and you can’t always measure them.
Financial Executive: All companies, in the president’s letter or in
the quarterly reports, do a little bit of informal forecasting, and if there is
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something major that is going to impact upon us, we try to be sure that the
analysts are aware of what is happening.
But as far as formalizing it, and saying, “Our earnings will be . .
I don’t think we should.
Financial Executive: I am impressed by the fact that the few people
that have practiced forecasting rave about it.
At our last Seaview conference we had a similar kind of presentation
and the circumstances were similar, as I recall them, in that sometimes com
panies hit their forecasts, and sometimes they missed them a mile. If I
recall the circumstances, in one instance the miss was just enormous. And
yet the company was able to cope with it and still believed that it was
advantageous to the company and to the investors to do it.
I can’t help but wonder—inasmuch as the objections to forecasting all
seem to flow from those who haven’t done it—if we aren’t talking more
about the fear of the unknown than knowledge of the known. That is a
comment.
My question is, Do you forecast a fixed earnings-per-share number, or do
you forecast a range?
Financial Executive: We forecast a range, but that, nevertheless,
gets to be a problem. If you say we are going to earn some place between
$3.00 and $3.25, an analyst will say, “Well, what does that mean? Is that
$3.00, or is it $3.25?” And so they try to pin you down to a given figure. They
don’t like this. We, nevertheless, resist. We say, “Well, that’s the range.”
I will recite something that happened to us this year. Our earnings last
year, for 1973, were $2.94 a share, and we had made a forecast for 1974,
expecting a 10 percent improvement in earnings in 1974, which would bring
us to $3.25 a share. And we are presently on the Street at $6.00, and that
is after having made some accounting changes.
Now, that is a pretty wild difference, isn’t it? And yet I think we have,
among the analysts who follow us, some degree of respectability even though
that condition evolved simply because the economic situation turned around.
Things happened that we couldn’t see. Price controls in the U.S. were
eliminated, and other things of a significant nature happened.
But if you assess these things as you are going along, and put your
evaluation on them and convey it to the public, that is the only way that
the public can benefit from the inside knowledge you have about how your
business is progressing in the light of these ever-changing conditions.
In the situation where we forecast $3.25 and are going to make over
$6.00, is that a serious situation that we should have avoided?
Financial Executive: I personally come down more on the side of
forecasting, but when I think about your question, I seriously doubt the public
good if you are wrong anywhere near that percentage 50 percent of the time.
Or, putting it another way, I really don’t know what the answer is to the
investor, or the analyst, who placed validity on the $3.25 and made invest
ment decisions because of it. I would like to hear from the analysts as to
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what the position on forecasting would be if the error rate in either direction
were something like 30 percent to 40 percent over time.
Also, most of the forecasting that I have seen, in terms of numerical
definition, has been in the terms of one-year forecasting. And I suggest that
the kind of long-term capital structure that our economy and the country
needs is better geared toward longer looks at things than one-year forecasts.
Analyst: There was some material in my paper that bore on the ques
tion of forecasts, and certainly, indirectly, on the question of the accuracy of
forecasts.
In the basic work that the Financial Analysts Federation did on this
subject, which was published a couple of years ago, it was very clear on the
basis of empirical evidence accumulated at that point that the extent of
differences between forecast information and final results varies with the
amount of lead time; it also varies with the kind of industry, and so forth,
and that will always be the case. So, if there shouldn’t be forecasts because
forecasts are going to be inaccurate in some degree, that almost closes the
subject for discussion.
But as I indicated in my paper, regardless of the inaccuracy problem, the
relevance of forecasting is there, and it will continue to be there. And if
changes in earnings expectations are significant to the marketplace, changes in
forecasts are significant to the marketplace. And if changes in forecasts are
significant to the marketplace, forecasts are significant to the marketplace.
Now, whether the source of the forecast should be entirely external, that
is, financial analysts attempting to do it on their own, or whether it is with
some help from the corporation, can remain a reasonable item for debate.
But I would submit that each has something to contribute to the process, and
therefore it is certainly desirable for the marketplace to have each as a
participant.
Analyst: Everything we know about the future is derived from our
information about the past. This problem is in no way peculiar to management
nor is it peculiar to investors. To assume that investors are so naive that they
don’t realize that the inferences drawn from past information about the future
will inevitably be inaccurate in some measure is to assume that they are naive,
and I don’t think investors are that naive. They realize the problems involved
in forecasting just as well as management does.
Banker: This forecasting scares me. Last December we announced
to our board of directors what we would earn per share, and we are going
to come in right on target. The only problem is, we are going to be right for
all the wrong reasons.
Several hundred bankers met in New York in December 1973 and filled
out a form on projections for what interest rates would be. It is interesting
to note that not one in that group of 700 bankers predicted that interest
rates would be high, or higher than they were in December 1973, by August
1974. As a matter of fact, the general feeling was that interest rates would
be at their low point in August 1974.

224

So, instead of being at 7 1/2 percent they were at 12 percent. I think in
some industries it may be possible to forecast with some accuracy. In ours it
becomes exceedingly difficult, and I think it becomes confusing to a stock
holder to get forecasts that are constantly being revised and changed. If
they get quarterly information, I think this is sufficient.
Banker: I want to show that it is a united front by disagreeing with the
preceding banker completely.
Our bank has engaged in forecasting this year for the first time. We
wound up the forecast in November 1973, fine-tuned it in December and
January, and announced it in February 1974 at $2.65. Obviously, we didn’t
know what the rates were going to do, and I’m not inferring that everyone’s
forecast could be done this simply. Just last month, we announced that we’re
not going to make $2.65; it looks more like $2.55.
The reason we decided to do this is that our group thinks the stock
holders of the company should know what their management thinks that com
pany is going to do. And if anyone can explain to me how that is wrong, I
would like to hear it.
Financial Executive: Everyone here has clearly expressed the fact,
and some of the reasons, that forecasts can’t be accurate. That is, the bestplanned set of assumptions proves to be only that, and assumptions and actu
ality are different things. The future changes in the conditions within which
you operate have a much larger effect on the final result than those peculiar
little things that you, as insiders, knew that other people didn’t.
I agree with the remark that the significant thing is the long-term trend,
and an analyst said a minute ago that changes are significant and therefore
forecasts are necessary. I would like to ask him whether his real concern is in
just what’s going to happen this year, or whether he shouldn’t be interested
instead in what is going to change the long-term rate of return.
This is the significant thing, and I am afraid that if forecasts are required,
they just are not going to be understood, because the basic assumptions
won’t be understood, and all that will be recognized is that they are erratic.
But maybe that isn’t a bad idea. Maybe it would be educational if everybody
recognized that we live in a world that is so unpredictable that the skill of
somebody managing a business enterprise is not how well he can predict the
future, but how well he can adapt to what he is presented with unexpectedly.
I am impressed by the success that companies who forecast seem to
have had, and the fact that they say they don’t have problems. Maybe it is
significant that the fear of the unknown is what is being talked about, and
maybe the ones that are creating this atmosphere are the ones who aren’t
broadly represented here—the attorneys. They are concerned about defending
against accusations that have harmed people relying on forecasts that they had
a right to assume were more accurate than they possibly could be.
I think that, from our standpoint, I would like to have more assurance
that forecasts would not be misused in a way that would produce a liability
for the corporation.
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Analyst: I would like to make two points. First, if someone asks me
what to do, I think it would not be appropriate now to require companies to
publish forecasts. I would like to echo some of what has just been said and
say that the proper action would be an experimentation period, permitting
companies and encouraging them to do it, but not requiring it.
Second, management forecast of earnings is, I think, inside information
when it is first made up. Therefore, it seems to me that from a purely logical
viewpoint it can be dealt with in two ways, and not in any other way. Way
No. 1: Management says absolutely nothing. Management will neither fore
cast to the outside world, nor will management give any comment on a
forecast that is presented to it by an analyst. I think that is a perfectly logical
way of doing it.
The other logical way, I think, is to tell everybody by publishing the
forecast. I think that the in-between points where the managers says, “Yes,
your estimate of $2 is in the ballpark,” or “Yes, your 10 percent is too low,”
or “We never comment on forecasts, but yours is a little too high” are,
basically, misuses of inside information. I wonder if we could ask the SEC
to comment.
Regulator: I think that, obviously, the inside information question
is a real one; the question as to whether or not managers who have access to
corporate forecasts have any problem if they are trading the stock is one that
has to be the concern of attorneys rather than other people. But I am not
sure that, if you absolutely say you aren’t going to make any public dis
closure of it, you have solved the problem of what you can do in terms of
your own activities in the marketplace.
My own view about forecasts is that it is not desirable to see them man
dated at this time. I think the commission’s statement of policy clearly in
dicated that that was the commission’s view, at least a year and a half ago,
and I don’t think it has changed very much in terms of general view.
I guess our view was that we perceived a developing area of financial
reporting and we felt that we might be able to offer some protections by issuing
some releases. The current date, I understand, is some time in mid-1975.
I think that the commission’s view was that it wanted to assist in the
orderly development of forecasts but to prevent certain abuses we had
perceived and to see this area develop systematically, but not mandate it. I
think we were also sensitive to some of the criticisms we received that said we
have been prohibiting investors from getting information in prospectuses
which analysts generally are most interested in, and, obviously, we were
sensitive to that concern as well.
My own view of forecasts is that they are desirable. I think, from an
investor viewpoint, and probably also from a corporate viewpoint, that there
are three reasons for them. The first is that the publication of forecasts and
the examination of results is a useful means by which investors can get a
measure of degrees of uncertainty within a company’s operations. I think
that the process of comparing what happened with what was forecast and
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looking at the degrees of variability may be very useful information. I guess
I disagree with the financial executive who said, “If you are always 50 percent
off, you shouldn’t do it.” It seems to me, if you are always 50 percent off, that
is very significant information about the degree of uncertainty that exists within
a business. I wouldn’t necessarily just say that it is information about how
bad the management is. I think the statement goes more to the question of the
uncertainty of the business.
Second, I agree that changes in forecasts are important, and I think any
system that is developed has to have an updating mechanism. I don’t know the
facts, but I am sure that the company didn’t sit there with a $3.00 to $3.25
range right up until it was quite clear that it would be $6.00. That obviously
doesn’t make sense. You are trying to show changes, and one of the ways in
which changes can be effectively communicated is through the vehicle of a
forecast.
And third, I think that as an accountant I am acutely aware of some of
the problems with interim reports, and, having seen interim reports in more
enthusiastic market conditions projected not only to this year but for the year
after, it seems to me that a forecast helps to put interim reports in perspective.
I don’t think that in any of these cases there are no other ways of doing
it, but I believe that forecasting is a useful device. And also, as a matter
of faith, I concur in the conclusion that there seems to be no very strong
reason why shareholders shouldn’t know this, and perhaps there is some
benefit in having shareholders receive from management the same type of
explanation of variations that top managers receive from their subordinates.
So my own personal inclination is to think that, as we see this develop,
ten years from now we are going to see forecasts as a standard part of the
reporting environment. But I don’t think that there is likely to be a mandating
of forecasts in the near future.
Financial Executive: We have a very interesting experiment in fore
casting with volunteers trying the experiment and those who prefer to sit on the
sidelines watching the experiment. So far, I confess that the results indicate
absence of negative activity and that is highly persuasive to me as a reason to
do something. I would hope that active business people in this country look
for positive reasons to motivate action rather than the absence of negative
reasons.
There are those who now have issued forecasts for a number of years,
and I wonder if there is any comment as to what the market has said. It seems
to me that if this is valid and useful information, the market will in some way
indicate it, which would be a substantial incentive to those who are sitting on
the sidelines to join in the game.
If a substantial number of legal cases evolve, I think those who sit on
the sidelines might assume that it’s a sensible thing to sit a little while more.
I wonder why we don’t just wait and see what the facts show instead of trying
to decide at this time.
I have one further comment. If, indeed, a valid purpose for requiring
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forecasting is to cure the abuses of a few companies, I wonder if this isn’t akin
to killing a fly with a sledge hammer. There are possibly other ways of curing
the abuse rather than incurring a broad-scale requirement, which seems to me
a rather severe way to cure, possibly, a small abuse.
If the marketplace says: “I need this information, it’s valid, it’s im
portant to me as an investor.” Certainly the track record will so indicate, and
be an incentive to everyone else to join the game.
Chairman Burns: It occurs to me that Mr. Mayo did refer to the British
experience of public forecasting, which he wrote off as being so limited, and
not applicable to the U.S. because of the differences in the economic, legal,
and social climate. I recollect that the AICPA did a little work on British
forecasting. Would you care to comment on the value of the British fore
casting experience for the U.S.?
CPA: It is not directly parallel, but I wouldn’t discount it completely.
I think we can learn some things from it. First, the public attitude will be
influenced a lot by the forecasts that are published.
There was definitely an attitude among forecast users in the United
Kingdom that a forecast would be met or exceeded, and if it was not, that
company was in trouble. But the reason for that was the expectation that
had been built up in the public’s mind over many years. They expect com
panies to issue forecasts that are quite conservative, so that not meeting a
forecast would be drastic.
We can’t say, because in the United Kingdom people expect forecasts
to be met or exceeded, that will be the public expectation here. The public
expectation here will be shaped by what the issuers of forecasts do and the
type of forecasts they issue. And if they make their best estimate, and the
actual results reflect differences due to the risks that pertain to a particular
industry and a particular company, then I think investors may begin to under
stand the nature of forecast information and the difference between forecasts
and historical information.
So, a lot is going to depend on the type of forecasts that are issued, and
other things that are done to condition the expectations of users.
CPA: I want to make one comment on the British experience. The
British experience has been rather widely misinterpreted in some of the other
writings that have discussed the degree of accuracy that the British have been
able to achieve.
The key to that was their definition of a forecast. Their definition of a
forecast was any number that was released prior to the release of the audit
report. That would mean that, in our situation, a preliminary figure in early
January would be a forecast for that year, or a number made up in December,
or a third-quarter projection that would take third-quarter actual and add the
remainder of the year.
So by definition, the Times found that their forecast was sort of a
moving thing, and I think it was a little different than what we ordinarily
think of as a forecast. And having once recognized that, then we, in effect,
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broke their results down in different time segments to get experience on their
accuracy when they were forecasting a year ahead, or six months ahead, or one
month ahead, or sometimes a forecast issued after the year-end, since any
financial statement issued before the books are closed is called a forecast.
So, anyone who is concerned with that particular aspect of the British
track record should look at it in that light.
Now, that may not really be relevant if some of the other comments
are accurate that the investor is sophisticated enough to realize that variations
will occur and not be unduly disturbed by them. On the other hand, if we
consider the issue of accuracy or liability to be relevant, then at least in
comparing it with the British experience I would like to leave that thought.
We have a document in progress at the AICPA which discusses the
question of ranges. That document takes a little bit of a slap at the presen
tation of ranges on the theory that the investor will read that range as being
the worst possible result and the best possible result. We don’t know if that is
really true, but, obviously, that is the problem with ranges.
Secondly, what we have come now to refer to as a forecast in the
United States, with AICPA draft backing, is that it is a thing that presents
a point estimate, and we have chosen to say that that ought to be what man
agement thinks is the most probable result. Many of the accounting firms
are already asking for representation letters from management or clients in
connection with forecasts with which they are associated, which at least make
a representation that management thinks the assumptions are good assump
tions underlying the forecast.
Now the third thing that we have been working on for a long time
is the degree of our association with forecasts and what kind of a report letter
it should be, and we are having a good deal of difficulty in agreeing on this
point. The principal types of reports that are being talked about are, first, a
report that would say, “The assumptions are reasonable, but we still don’t
know if the forecast will come out.” The second type of report would be one
that says, “Nothing has come to our attention which would cause us to believe
the assumptions are unreasonable, but we still don’t know how the forecast will
come out.” The third type of report would be one which says, “We have
checked the arithmetic, but we still don’t know if it will come out.” The
fourth type of report is the report which is attached to the forecast: “We don’t
know much about it.”
So those are the things that the AICPA is talking about, but there is
great concern over legal liability.

Availability of Earnings Forecasts
Analyst: One of the concerns of the FAF in its work on this subject
is the question of an even flow of information, and it seems to me that that
is the way analysts have operated with managements, that the interviewers
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and interviewees try to massage the result so that it comes out something close
to what management expects because management knows that surprises can
have adverse effects.
What we feel we are dealing with as analysts is the selective, discrim
inatory disclosure of bits of inside information over time, so that the manage
ment forecast becomes the Street forecast, and everybody can rest comfortably.
It seems to us that this uneven distribution of inside information is unfair
to the public and we are deeply concerned about it, although we participate
willingly and continually in the process.
I would like to hear somebody from the FEI comment on that. Are
they comfortable with the process?
Financial Executive : I am comfortable with it. We don’t in any way
validate or invalidate the analyst’s forecast. From the time of the initial SEC
release we put a big blackout on any forecast, or any comment on any
forecast.
Analyst: I would like to supplement a comment here, because the
study that we made of this in the FAF a couple of years ago indicated that,
while very few companies claim they forecast, analysts feel they get a forecast
from 75 percent of the companies they deal with, and I don’t think there
has been much change. I think there have been a few people that have had a
blackout since the SEC release, but not very many.
Financial Executive: I can only respond for my company in this
respect, but I would question the basic premise here. We don’t publish fore
casts, and we don’t comment on forecasts, and we try religiously not to direct
people in any particular way when they are building their own estimates of
the company’s future profits. I don’t know about other companies, but cer
tainly in our case there is no attempt to direct analysts in arriving at their
estimate.
I wonder if I could make one other point. I subscribe to the idea that
over the long term the price of a company’s stock is a function of what that
company does, rather than what it says it is going to do. Over the long term I
think that is how the market prices of stocks are determined.
Penn Central, for example, would probably have gone bankrupt, had
it provided forecasts or not; Penn Central’s stock would have gone down at
some point in time, whether forecasts were provided or not. Stockholders
would have lost on the Penn Central deal had forecasts been submitted by
the company—it just would have been a different set of stockholders who
would have lost than the ones who did lose.
Now, injecting the past into this situation, if you accept my premise
that the market prices are basically a function of what a company does,
forecasts will only have a short-term effect on the price of the stock, and
we will only establish a different set of winners or losers. If that is the case,
and if forecasts carry with them some of the weaknesses that have been
mentioned, this is one factor that leads me in the direction of saying, “We
better be very careful about moving in this direction,” because we are not
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really doing anything for the long-term development of the stock, and we are
just sacrificing one set of investors for another, or helping one set versus
another. And on this matter of uneven distribution of information I am
concerned about that too on an actual basis. I am concerned about an equal
distribution of actual information about a company. It seems to me that, if
we get into forecasts, we are going to augment the problem even more because
I think the sophisticated investor or the sophisticated analyst is going to have
an advantage over the individual investor.
Analyst: I would like to ask a question of those who do not publicly
forecast. Are they disturbed about bad forecasts which are circulating in the
“Street”?
If the analysts’ forecasts that also turn up in the services that select fore
casts from analysts are wrong, are you bothered by too-high forecasts, or toolow forecasts? Is that disturbing, and do you try to correct it, if possible?
I want to make one statement in this regard. I have heard a lot about
long-term investors, and one of the things that creates long-term investors is
understanding what underlies a company’s operations. I think that forecasting,
and being wrong, and then explaining it, does create much more of the aspect
in the investor’s mind that this is, in fact, a company which is looking over its
situation, understands what affects the company, and is willing to talk about
it. If there is an industry that has had the need to talk about what is in
fluencing it, I would say that it is the analysts’ industry.
If a company prepared a forecast that was so far out of line because
nobody knew what was going to happen that year, and then explained why it
was wrong, I think it has educated its stockholders—present and future ones.
And I am annoyed when I hear about losers and winners, and different
classes of losers and winners. That’s what we don’t want. We don’t want to
have losers who get wiped out so that winners can come in later. We would
like to keep those losers in for the time being, so that they too can be winners.
You don’t succeed in getting a long-term list of shareholders if you are going
to wipe them out every once in a while. And I think if you educate them to
what lies behind your earnings, we all will be much better off.
Financial Executive : When I talk about losers and winners, the ques
tion in my mind is whether the publication of forecasts, with the weaknesses
that go with them, might not create a more volatile situation than we have
right now. I think it could.
And if it does, then we are feeding the problem of the ups and downs
in the market, creating more losers, more winners, and more volatility than I
believe we have at the present time. I think that is a possibility.
Analyst: Why would a company’s forecasts tend to give the pro
fessional investor a further advantage over the so-called individual, or un
sophisticated investor? I didn’t get that point.
Financial Executive: I am thinking of our communication system.
The communication system will certainly get that data to the professional
investor very rapidly. I question whether it will get that data to the individual
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shareholder with the same speed. I am thinking of more than 50 percent of
our shareholders who are individuals, and I don’t know how we are going to
get that data to them as quickly.
And if our forecast is significant, it is going to be significant to the
person who gets it first; if there is one group of the investing community that
gets it before another group, I think there is an extreme danger that we are
going to work to the disadvantage of one and to the advantage of the other.
It is a communication problem.
CPA: I would like to ask the analysts several questions about the effect
of forecasting in prices. Does the fact that somebody is doing forecasting now
have an effect on prices or market action?
Second, if changes are the thing that affect it more than anything else,
does the fact that you are constantly changing your forecast really have an
effect on price, and on reliability? There are some businesses that are less
susceptible to forecasting than others and maybe they should stay away from
forecasts.
And, last, what is materiality in forecasting? The accountants worry
about materiality in the reporting process, but have the analysts defined
anything?
Analyst: In my paper there is a good deal of discussion, and also some
data, that indicates the significance of changes in forecasts and the effect that
they have on price; by almost every standard that I have become aware
of with respect to the definition of materiality, these changes in earnings fore
casts would have to be considered material. There is just no way of escaping it.
If I could control the passions of men, we would have no wars. And if I
could control the passions of financial analysts and investors, we probably
wouldn’t have as much emphasis on short-term forecasts as I think we, as a
group, give them.
I think the primary emphasis should be on longer-term consideration. I
don’t want there to be any doubt about that. But to jump from that point to
the conclusion that, therefore, we shouldn’t look at short-term prospects at all,
I think, is erroneous, because many times the beginning developments of a
longer-range deterioration in a situation come about in the short run, and, in
fact, the long run is made up of a series of shorter periods of time. So we
can’t disregard them, and it wouldn’t make sense to do so.
Periodic Forecast Revisions
CPA: One of the things in Mr. Gray’s paper was the difference between
corporate estimates and what actually came out. Does the changing of fore
casts during the year, as they relate to a company, tend to stabilize them or
does it tend to make them bounce around? Does this tendency cause an
analyst to step away from that type of a business? Or what is the effect of
constantly changing forecasts?
Analyst: Implicit to the data is the idea that, during the course of the
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year, those companies that have had the greatest changes between the earliest
forecasts that were made and the actual results, as a group, tend to experience
the greatest relative changes in market prices during the course of the year.
Therefore, I deduce that for those companies whose forecasts are being
changed during the course of the year, and where the cumulative net effect of
all those changes is very large, the impact on price is very significant. Where
net effect is smaller, the import wouldn’t be so significant.
Banker: One thing that distresses me in this kind of situation is the
inability to get information to future stockholders. I can control what goes
out to my stockholder by sending out a forecast announcement. I can send
that same release to the newspapers, and it might say that we are projecting a
25 percent increase in earnings, and it gets printed.
Three months later I revise this forecast and say, instead of 25 percent, it
is going to be 10 percent. I send the release out to the newspapers, and this is
just another bum forecast; it doesn’t get printed, because the same day they
received information from another company whose estimates are 50 percent
off and that’s newsworthy.
So I think that we have a problem of getting this information out to
the investor that we are trying to help. If we do it via direct mail, that is one
thing. But if we have to rely on the financial press sometimes that information
just isn’t going to get to the proper level.
Analyst: Stock prices respond to surprises. When it becomes evident
that a company’s earnings are going to be significantly different, that will have
an impact on the price of the stock, and the degree and the speed of that
impact will depend on how fast the word spreads.
So I would offer a friendly warning to the financial executive that, if the
day ever comes when his company reports lower earnings for a quarter without
giving advance notice, the stock may not trade that day, and when the next
trade is made, it may trade a third lower.
So, whether you forecast in a formal way, with actual earnings-per-share
projections, or whether you give a certain amount of preliminary information,
if you can contribute to making projections somewhat closer to the actual
reality and prevent sudden changes in expectations, I think you will come out
with less volatility in stock prices.

Responsibilities in Forecasting
CPA: There was a question on the table concerning auditor involve
ment in terms of our day-to-day activity with our clients.
We have been involved in forecasting, and evaluating management’s
forecasts, for as long as I have been in the profession, in terms of receivables
and inventory and depreciable assets and pension accrual, and all the other
things that are involved in cutting off the financial position.
We are involved much more currently in estimating with management
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the effects of their budget estimates, where they are going to get their money,
how they are going to apply it, and what their plans are for expansion and
contraction. Otherwise, we can’t plan an intelligent audit.
So, I would like to assure everyone that we are very deeply involved
in management forecasts.
Second, I read the Wall Street Journal every day, and I read ten, twelve,
or fifteen forecasts. And I don’t know the assumptions on which they are
made. I don’t know who is involved in making them. I have no idea whether
the management has been consulted, or agrees or disagrees with it.
I am appalled to hear that a management would let an obviously faulty
forecast ride in the public press without some sort of comment. There is no
professional responsibility for updating, and no professional responsibility
when the analysts are off. I wonder whether we shouldn’t be imposing some
sort of structured discipline over this whole procedure.
Whether or not the auditors publicly report on forecasts is far less
important than whether or not the companies and the analysts together take
the responsibility for putting them out, with proper disclosure of the functions
involved, and pledge to update them when the information is available.
CPA: I would like to know what the analysts think their responsibility,
or liability, should be on the forecasts that they make.
Banker: If I am going to have a forecast it is going to be more than
earnings per share. It is going to be cash flow, and show how debt could be
liquidated. If I am going to have that from the customer, I want the CPA
in on it.
I don’t necessarily want it certified, because I am going to make my
own appraisal of the validity of it, certified or not, but I am going to look
at it a lot harder if it isn’t certified.
And when I get the cash flow, I’m going to get a little sarcastic when
I look at the CPA. He has some numbers there, but doesn’t tell me how he
got them, and that doesn’t do me any good. I don’t have that much belief in
the CPA or in the borrower, but I’m going to look at that thing, and tear
it apart.
In the context of coming up with a one-number earnings per share, I
look at what I have been getting in the past and see whether it fits. If you
were also coming up with forecasts, it would be relevant to see to what
extent the forecast is met, and the comparison of past results as against
forecast.
Analyst: Most reports that the security analyst makes to investors are
forecasts, because this is what the investor wants; and, based on most statistical
studies that have been made, the dominant determinant of the value of the
company’s securities is based on the growth rate of the earnings.
So the analyst is comparing past results against forecasts all along. The
liability, of course, is the criticism and reaction that he will get from investors,
or from his client, when his forecasts are subject to substantial deviation from
reality.
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So, as a result, the investor is getting forecasts in one way or another.
But, I think, given the present informal and ad hoc way in which he gets
them, there is a clear discrimination between the professional investor, who is
getting this information very promptly, and the average investor.
Now, in terms of this concern that there be equitability in distribution of
information regarding forecasts to any and all stockholders of the company
who wish to have it, I think the present arrangement is quite discriminatory
to the small stockholder. If there were a more structured system it would be
to provide forecasts in the same systematic framework that the quarterly
earnings reports are transmitted to investors, where these forecasts would be
made and updated, so that everyone receives this information from manage
ment on a comparable basis.
Regulator: The New York Stock Exchange has just issued a booklet
which is an attempt on our part to try to see whether we could deal with the
problem of the large number of fairly good quality stocks on the Big Board
that are selling at relatively low prices and receiving little or no attention from
the investing public and the analysts, and so on.
At September 30, 1974, there were just a little over a hundred com
panies listed on the New York Stock Exchange that were selling above $30
a share, so the problem with the discussion here is that it is not representative
of either the 1,500 or so stocks that we have listed on the Big Board, or the
15,000 stocks that are subject to the reporting requirements of the SEC.
Most of the “large” companies don’t have to worry too much about
making forecasts or about keeping the public informed, because they are
widely enough held and there is enough market interest in them that the
analysts are forced to follow them. And, one way or another, they find a way
to keep them reasonably in line. As you know, there haven’t been any big
bombshells that have hit any of the companies that are represented here.
So this is not a typical group at all. And maybe we need to consider
whether a group like this shouldn’t take some leadership in addressing itself
to the problems that are presented in the marketplace by bad reporting?
When I say “a lot,” I am talking about, maybe 5 percent of the listed
companies, and an even smaller percent of all these publicly held companies.
So, bad reporting is just a small residue of bad performance that gets involved
in the apple barrel and spoils the whole thing.
Financial Analyst: Recently there was a comment about discipline
in giving a forecast. And I want to say that, yes, there should be discipline
and there should be an orderly process. If the forecast is done by company
management, it should be done in a businesslike way, stating assumptions,
expressing the economic outlook and so forth, and including working papers
and logical conclusions.
The analyst, if he is in the forecasting business, should be very respon
sible and logical about the way he does it. The Financial Analysts Federation,
almost two years ago, actually did a study on this. The study has everything
from legal problems and how they can be solved or looked at, to a hypothetical
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example of how a company might do forecasting and do updating during the
course of a given year.

Corporate Disclosure Problems
Chairman Burns: It is time, now, to turn to the second paper, by
Charles Werner, CPA. His paper is on the problems of disclosure to a com
pany and its auditors. I will give a very brief digest of some of the major
points in his paper, as well as the major points made in the critiques by Mr.
Lilley and Mr. Taylor and ask all of them to respond to my particular com
ments, if I haven’t done them justice.
In the Werner paper, the author feels that the benefits of disclosure should
be considered in light of the costs. Costs of disclosure are classified as out-ofpocket—tangible, that is—and intangible. The former include the staff time
required in the additional audit fee.
He feels that certain intangible costs are of greater concern. He includes
in this classification the probability of lawsuits. It would appear that they are
considered intangible because they are uncertain. If a judgment results from
a lawsuit, then a tangible cost is incurred.
Three examples are (1) losses from earnings forecasts, (2) segmented
reporting, and (3) related-party-transaction disclosure proposals.
He suggests that the problems with the cost-benefit analysis approach
can be eased by considering the impact of disclosure on a specific user group.
He considers this approach relevant to re-examination of existing disclosure,
as well as proposals for additional disclosure.
One of the major points of his paper is a proposal to set up several
levels of disclosure. He presents a three-level approach. First, there are
those that are universally applicable; second, those that are additionally
applicable only to publicly held corporations; and third, those that are special
ized requirements applicable to a public company with filing status and the
similar specialized requirements of other government or private authorities.
The author then discusses some of the problems involved in this approach.
In connection with this he mentions that the several levels of increased
disclosure might make current statements more readable. He mentions making
footnotes more understandable by making them longer. However, the author
feels there are limits, of course, to this particular approach of improving com
prehension through improving communication, and thus he proposes the
three levels of disclosure.
In discussing some of the problems involved in this approach, he em
phasizes the definitional and legal ones. He would modify the opinion para
graph of the auditor’s report.
He would also include those who only issue unaudited financial state
ments, arguing that auditors should have the right to omit the apt disclosures
for unaudited financial statements.
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He illustrates his proposal with the case of a creditor such as a com
mercial bank. This type of lender could readily accept audited statements of
a nonpublic company, which would include only those disclosures required by
universally applicable generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
Universally applicable GAAP would not include earnings per share, com
pensating balances, or price-level-adjusted statements.
Mr. Werner makes a distinction between measurement and disclosure,
and, seemingly, accepts the SEC dichotomy. He would classify measurement
principles as universal GAAP, but not supplementary disclosures. He feels
the largest problem in using this approach is the potential legal liability.
He then discusses the cost of disclosure. He considers indirect costs such
as educational programs to keep staff informed. Many disclosures, he con
tends, have inconsequential costs. Such include additional information about
inventory, depreciation, intangibles, and certain nonfinancial information,
such as the expiration dates of union contracts, marketing expectations and
related budgets, and information about new products. Neither the costs of
these nor the lack of auditability should be a factor, he contends, in dis
couraging their adaptation.
But those proposals that generate the most discussion, including price
level-adjusted statements and segmented reporting, he contends, are high-cost
proposals.
Finally, the author suggests that certain disclosures cannot, or should
not, be covered by the auditor’s attest function. The author then examines the
attest function regarding (1) contingent liability and (2) discussion of
alternative accounting methods. He closes by pointing out that professional
judgment is required in determining accounting methods.
At this point I will call on Mr. Werner to see if he wishes to elaborate
on my rather brief digest.
CPA: First of all, concerning longer footnotes, my point was that in
certain cases, if we are going to explain what something really means, we are
going to have to put in a lot more words. For example, we use “charging” as
a shortcut way of explaining some of the things we are doing. An accounting
policies footnote, for example, may say that a company has adopted full cost
accounting for oil and gas exploration. Most of us here know what that
means, but if we were to explain that, rather than use the exact short phrase,
obviously it would require a good deal of words.
Chairman Burns: Now let me try to digest the two critiques on the
Werner paper.
Mr. Taylor makes three major points in regard to the Werner paper.
The first one is that he was very impressed with the level-of-disclosure
proposal. In fact, I believe he referred to it as “brilliant.”
Second, he makes the point that the problem of litigation is not only one
faced by auditors, but is a very real problem without additional disclosure.
And his final major point is that he argues the possible importance of
disclosure as a major means of reducing public distrust in business.
Mr. Lilley’s critique on Mr. Werner’s paper is as follows.
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In response to Mr. Werner’s comment about indirect costs of disclosure,
including educational costs, Mr. Lilley suggests that a discussion of the specific
measures to be used for the education of corporate executives, analysts, in
dividual investors, and others might be helpful. He mentions that industry
and professional groups might experiment by developing syllabuses of edu
cational needs for themselves and attempt to stimulate educational institutions
to provide courses of instruction.
In regard to the levels-of-disclosure reporting proposal, and its intuitive
appeal, Mr. Lilley believes that “corporate complexity, rather than breadth of
the shareholder list, should be stressed in setting up rules for disclosure.”
His objections seem to be based upon the objections of the analyst to
the private company—or the obligations of the analyst to the private com
pany—and upon the obligations of the banker-lender. Anyway, he argues,
privately held companies sometimes sell out to public ones.
He finds Mr. Werner’s proposals for improved disclosure without pro
hibitive cost—those that were on inventory, depreciation, intangibles, and
selected nonfinancial data—as being highly constructive. On the contingent
liability issue, he offers his sympathy to auditors. If the auditor does not dis
close a contingency, he runs the risk that a claim will be later asserted. If
he discloses the contingency, his client’s contingent liability may be turned
into a real liability. Despite his sympathy, he does ask for particular examples
of where disclosure in an audited statement actually made a contingency into
an actual liability.
Regarding the impact of alternative accounting principles, where Mr.
Werner cites the AICPA position on the SEC view that the issuer disclose
the dollar income effect of the alternative, Mr. Lilley finds it hard to accept
the AICPA position in the five areas noted: investment credit, deferred R&D,
pre-operating start-up costs, inventory depreciation, and good will.
He doesn’t believe that the manager’s choice of a method is dictated
by the firm’s structure. As a financial analyst, he feels that investors should
resign themselves to using specialists, and he notes in closing that, after all,
disclosure is only one part of the investment decision.
Analyst: I would just offer one thought on this business about the
effect of alternative methods of accounting.
I feel that there are particular cases where management has a range of
choices, as in the case of inventory valuation. I really do not think that the
economic, or the company’s own, situation dictates use of LIFO or FIFO.
There are, I am sure, other situations where the company’s own situation
does dictate certain accounting methods.
CPA: I would like to point out that we are already in the three-level
reporting step. In unaudited statements in which a CPA is associated, we are
permitted to add one sentence to the standard unaudited disclaimer.
In the case of public companies, where you are dealing with a fourth
quarter interim report, it is required to be dealt with, if it is not otherwise
published, in a note to the annual financial statement. That is not required
for nonpublic companies.
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So we already do have stratified disclosure. The auditor is not calling
the shot that way in his report. That is just factual data.
Let us take a company in the business of selling and leasing construc
tion equipment where the manager likes to have information about how he is
doing in several lines of business, as well as how he is doing in the leasing
versus selling activities. He asks his CPA to put together financial statements
that include a lot of supplemental schedule information, but he doesn’t under
stand why he has to make what he tends to think of as compliance disclosures
required by GAAP.
Similarly, he feels that his local banker is much more interested in the
supplemental information than he is in all those footnotes required under
GAAP.
CPA: If someone doesn’t follow generally accepted accounting prin
ciples because it is inconvenient, then he shouldn’t be getting a standard
report. It is a special purpose statement where there can be no mention of
the application of generally accepted accounting principles. We can’t have
that confusion of dropping any requirements for proper disclosure under
generally accepted accounting principles. In my judgment, there can be no
exception to that.
CPA: I tend to agree and I think the important thing is that we
describe what we are doing. Several bankers have said that they have seen a
lot of substandard reports. I suspect that a lot of those substandard reports
are in the “different strokes for different folks” area. We are trying to respond
to a specific need.
Analyst: In our work we do quite a little private valuation work for
nonpublic situations. I would want to see the same kind of audit report that I
would get on a public company. Otherwise I would feel that there was
something missing.
I think the full report is a good discipline for the company, and since
they can’t necessarily foresee all the future uses of that report I think they
are better off to start out with a complete report.
Banker: I am aware that there is some work being done by the AICPA
on unaudited financial statements and the merit I see in it is that it will put
some rules down for reporting that is being done largely without rules now.
That should reduce what we now consider to be “substandard reporting.” It
may not flush out all of the problems that we have, but I am very much in
favor of this type of thinking.
My problem is with the enforcement mechanism, or some defects that
I perceive in the enforcement techniques. We have a problem and there is no
question about it.
CPA: The accounting profession does have an enforcement mechanism.
We have a practice review group at the AICPA so, if you see a substandard
report, you can write in about it. And if it is a violation of the AICPA Code
of Ethics, it can go to the Institute’s ethics division.
Banker: It sounds good on paper but I don’t think it works in the
real world.
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We have tried at the local level to talk with the practice review people
to work out some kind of an acceptable method of transmittal, or involve
ment, that allows us to work around our problems. We don’t seem to be
getting anywhere and part of the reason is because of lack of support from
the local banks. And there isn’t what I would classify as constructive reaction
on the accounting side.

Disclosure in Public and Private Corporations
CPA: I am on the AICPA Trial Board, which looks at the worst cases
in reporting. Proportionately, in the last year or two years, the number of
cases that we have looked at, or those that come up for some kind of action
against the individual, has increased markedly. The calendar is pretty well
cleared right now.
Banker: One of the problems is that we have to find a way to get more
information about that. I am not sure many bankers, including myself, are
really fully aware of what recourse we have.
CPA: Send a report in to the AICPA.
Banker: I have trouble with the concept of the level of sophistication,
and the amount of information going to users depending on their degree of
sophistication, which is answered in part by the assumption that, “If you are
sophisticated, you can go and get the 10-K.”
I am puzzled by this level of accounting, where you can’t go to the 10-K.
You have an audit, and the distinction is that with a public company you will
do a good job, and with a private company you are not going to do all those
things that are necessary for a proper audit.
If you are going to decide that you will include those things that are
material, whether the company is public or private, then I have no argument.
But if you are going to leave out anything, such as product-line information
and alternative accounting principles, just because the company is private,
that isn’t going to help the banker.
Now, if you say that the banker has inside information or he can get the
information, that assumes, then, that the accountant is going to quit furnishing
reports to the banker, and I don’t think that is what you mean.
CPA: Let me be explicit. I am not recommending any of these things,
and I think that my paper tends to be taken that way. What we are really
trying to do is to explore.
The fundamental question is, should we continue to explore? Is it worth
while?
CPA: It seems that we have to explore the question of whether the
investment decision process is different, or the lending decision process is
different, for the public company and the private company. Do you make
the decision in different ways by reason of the fact that one is public and one
is private?
Banker: Our investment decision is no different, public or private,
and we have the greatest enforcement mechanism that was ever invented.
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If we are not satisfied with the information, and if we are not satisfied with the
scope of the audit or the work that was done, we don’t make the loan.
We have maintained a very close surveillance of the CPA firms who
audit the companies that we lend to, and if we have small CPA firms where
we have less than complete confidence, then we have less than complete
confidence in the product they turn out, and that reflects itself.
As far as investment decisions are concerned, one has to look at the
purpose of the audit. If the company is completely private, then I would say
that the audit would be primarily done for the owner of the company, and
the auditor knows what he is paid for. And the only other one who would
have a big stake in it would be the IRS.
CPA: The indication, then, is that you need the same information.
Banker: We do.
CPA: Then it is a question of who presents it, how it is presented, and
how you get it. So, the answer is that you have to wrap it all up in financial
statements, what surrounds financial statements, and what is covered in the
auditor’s report.
CPA: One of the things that I was driving at is that a banker, who has
direct access to the management of that company, can get the information
he wants. So he is perfectly frank about what he needs to have before he
asks for it.
But suppose a small company, and at substantial cost, meets the require
ment to apply GAAP across the board. Couldn’t we let the banker do a little
filtering for us as to what he needs, but know that the report he receives from
us is less than a complete report?
Banker: I didn’t realize that the bankers have clout. I would say that
the number of times that a loan has been rejected, or an application for a
Ioan has been rejected, purely because the financial statements were sub
standard wouldn’t be very many. I just don’t think that happens. I don’t
think that banks, if there is a responsibility to do this, live up to that responsi
bility.
Also, I don’t think banks know, most of the time, whether a report is
substandard or not. But we make loans anyway. And I think that the loan
decision for a publicly held company—at least the way I practice it and see
it practiced in our bank today—is different than in the case of a small,
privately held concern. I think different weightings are given to the mix of
the knowledge of the people and the local environment and the financial
statements.
CPA: Is the difference solely by reason of size?
Banker: Yes, that certainly is a prime variable. I would have to
have somebody sitting right next to me while I was making the decision to
tell you how I got there. It’s just hard to put down. You ask how we make
decisions, but they are so situation-oriented that it is difficult to generalize.
But I am quite confident in my own mind that there is a major difference
between the balance of the information that is used in a small company loan
decision and for a large, publicly held company.
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Banker: I agree with a lot of what my colleagues have said.
First of all, in making a banking decision, we do want an audit, and
we want to know that it is a complete and proper audit. On the other hand,
if you have a lot of small companies, to whom an audit might appear to be a
burden, I am in sympathy with the idea of trying to set up gradations of
audits that would give us effective and reliable information.
But I do think the accountants expose themselves here in approaching
this problem, because there are many bankers who tend to accept an auditor’s
signature on a report, whatever he may say, as being a complete audit, and I
think we have to watch that danger.
Nevertheless, we have to make a number of loans on the basis of infor
mation that comes to us in less than complete audit form, and we do have
access to the customer. We can get the information we want. We look to the
accountant to help to verify the management’s information, as is done in the
public decision making process.
Banker: One other variable in the equation of decision-making, par
ticularly in the case of a small company in their local market, is the knowledge
that we have about the accounting firm itself. We attempt to do a lot of work
in a non-client environment, in attempting to get to know the local auditors,
their people, and their procedures. We are not terribly sophisticated in
knowing whether they do it right or wrong, but we certainly shouldn’t go
away without developing a feeling of relative confidence or relative lack of
confidence.
In those auditing firms with which we are familiar at the local level, we
rely on personal knowledge of the people involved and that impacts a lot on
the lending decision, whether we are dealing with an unaudited report or a
full certificate.
CPA: We are talking about the measurement standards for the financial
statements, and this matter of the level of disclosure is part of the standards
for the financial statements and really doesn’t have to do with an audit, or
even whether the financial statements are audited.
We hear a distinction made between a small company and a large,
publicly held company, and that highlights the question of where the dividing
line is. Is it between public and private companies? We have had some in
dication in the discussion that it isn’t. Is it between large companies and small
companies? We have had some indication that it is—but maybe it isn’t.
So it seems to me useful to try to draw these lines and understand the
differences in terms of these basic issues of size and quality of financial
statements, all of which is distinct from the question of audit—whether there
was one, or whether it was a good one.
Banker: Maybe I make the illogical leap from substandard reporting
to substandard auditing but, being cynical, I make that jump.
As to whether the distinction is between public and private or large and
small, I suspect pragmatically that the distinction is large and small, in terms
of the loan decision.
Analyst: I don’t draw a distinction that in a public company you are
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proliferating your ownership a little more broadly. And I think one of the
unfortunate things that financial analysts see is that this is not regarded as the
case very often; that the auditors are not working for the company’s owners.
They seem instead to have a very close relationship to the management, which
disturbs me, and I’m sure it disturbs other analysts. The corporate manage
ment forgets that it’s reporting to its owners.
We have to get down to the essence of this question, and say that the
financial analysts and the SEC are not satisfied with the level of disclosure.
It is owners who are asking for additional information.
Financial Executive: I don’t think a stockholder is the same as the
owner, or that a stockholder, vis-a-vis the professional manager of a large
company, is in the same relationship to it as is an employee.
It is my opinion that the management group in a corporation has more
of an investment, and generally its ownership of stock is greater, than most
of the individual shareholders. Individual stockholders come and go; they
may not be there tomorrow, they weren’t there yesterday. And yet, you say
they are the ones to whom all responsibility is owed.
Analyst: This is the essence of what we are talking about. The
proliferation and dispersion of power by virtue of public ownership is a
very serious problem. If we are dealing with the one-on-one basis of a
closely held corporation, the owner has a considerable amount of power in
dealing with the management. The banker has a considerable amount of
power because he either makes the loan or he doesn’t.
When you are talking about the shareholder who may be, of course, a
major institution and owning millions of shares, it is regarded as unimportant
by management, which sees itself as serving its own needs, and being selfperpetuating.
Fortunately, there has developed an element of government regulation
in the person of the SEC. The reason we have the SEC is to protect the
shareholder, as this dispersion of power he represents has proceeded. And I
suggest that either we begin to recognize this as a reality, or the votes that are
out there will begin to deal with this on a quite different basis.
CPA: I understand the point and I think that it is a very fine discussion
of absentee ownership versus present ownership, but I think we are digressing
a bit from the issue at hand, which is slightly more relevant to us.
We are concerned about financial reporting. The members of the
AICPA that can be classed as small practitioners have for some time now
been concerned about the burden of statement preparation and reporting.
And while I will agree that there is a high correlation between the inadequate
disclosures that are frequently made in the courts and bad auditing, the
people that are involved in these task forces at the AICPA are generally good
practitioners.
They know, for example, that they have to make these disclosures in the
reports, and what they are trying to do is alleviate the problem where they
believe the user is not really in dire need of all the information that would
otherwise be required.
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And so it is pointed out that if we were to increase disclosure, we
would probably have to create a new type of opinion that would make a dis
closure of the fact that not all the disclosures are there.
The real issue is whether this is going to be useful to the banker, or the
user, because these are not public companies. Will this be something that
they will be willing to accept, recognizing that they are getting something less
than full disclosure of all the things that would otherwise accompany a report
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. I
think that is the issue.
The small practitioner is trying to not only relieve his burden, but also
the cost thereof to the small businessman. I think we need help in this
respect.
Banker: I think the answer to that would have to be in the area of a
well-defined instruction of what the report was going to be. I don’t think you
can do this by being small, or private, or public, but there are many private
companies today who are very substantial and who are large borrowers of
money. We want to exempt them from a full audit.
At the same time, there are many small companies who are very large
borrowers of money. In certain types of industry we give very high multiples—
five times the worth of the companies—so the definition of large or small,
public or private, is not pertinent.
What it would take, I think, would be a well-defined statement of what
the various tiers of audit would be and acceptance by the banking fraternity of
that. I couldn’t comment today on what that should be because I am not
informed, but it is something that will have to be very clearly defined and
accepted before it is instituted.
Banker: Just to add further to those comments, something over 80
percent of the dollars we lend are to borrowers who borrow a million dollars
or more. In almost all of those cases we have audited statements, and in many
of those cases we use exactly the same raw materials for our analysis as the
Financial Analysts Federation members do.
But the other less than 20 percent of the dollars is something like 80
percent of the numbers. We occasionally take a survey, and in some of our
branches over half of the financial statements we use are unaudited or con
tain qualified opinions or disclaimers. The work of the banker sometimes is
measured by how he can respond to that situation—whether it is an endorse
ment or a guarantee or whether it is just knowing what the risks are—to offset
the lack of information or the poor quality of the information.
So my answer is that we have a need for information and to the extent
that we can enlarge and improve on the quality of the members we will all
be that much better off.
Banker: Just as another footnote, 95 percent of the banking losses on
loans today come from loans where the original amount was under $100,000.
We have been doing a study in our own bank on the relationship between
loan charge-offs, audits, and similar kinds of problems, and we are finding that
in some of our smaller loans made to companies whose accounting firms are
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of two, three, four, or five people in size, that we have had some significant
problems in terms of substandard reporting.
What we have done in several situations is told the branch to go back
to the local practitioner, sit down, and redo the audit; if after two or three
times he still can’t come up with a satisfactory audit, we tell him to either get
somebody else or, frankly, forget it.
We have also a problem in banking, as there is in the accounting pro
fession, in that we have had an enormous growth in our profession in the last
ten years. We have a lot of inexperienced lending officers, and in many of our
lending groups our knowledge of accounting is less than perfect, with bankers,
in many cases, unable to recognize a substandard audit.
Now that is our fault, and one of the ways we in the banking community
are trying to address that issue, because we have got a responsibility to the
user, is through a continuing education program. That is a long-range answer.
In terms of what responsibility the accountants have in their profession, it
seems to us that, since most of loan losses are in the area of smaller businesses,
and since it is such a really lengthy, delayed response between the time we
get the audit and the time something can happen on it, there has to be a
better mechanism, one where the lawyers are not going to be second-guessing
us every step of the way, in which we can frankly submit a report to the
appropriate professional group within our society without any significant
lawsuits.
And, our attorneys advise us that we have to be careful in this area,
because there will be lawsuits. You are talking about somebody’s professional
integrity.
CPA: I question, as others have questioned, whether we can draw the
line on the basis of public versus private or on the basis of large versus small.
If we can’t do it on either of those bases, then how can we do it, if we do it
at all?
It almost seems to me that if it can be done, it has to be on the basis of
ranking the importance of the disclosure, and we must consider that in relation
to the cost.
So that means to me, then, that, if we are going to do this in some struc
tured way, we have to find some way to rank the importance of the various
disclosure requirements set forth in GAAP.
Take earnings per share—that is not a very costly computation for most
private companies. It may not be too meaningful, but it isn’t very costly. So
at least you have two dimensions to consider.
Now, you can go to the other extreme of financial statements adjusted
for changes in purchasing power. That will be costly, and you have to ask
how meaningful is it?
If you go in this direction, somebody has a terrible burden of ranking all
these requirements in terms of relative importance.
Banker: If the FASB were able to establish two or three levels of
reporting as optional, then in the situation where there is a relatively small and
approachable user, if the bank didn’t want an audit, there wouldn’t be one.
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Allowing the company and its auditor to approach that major creditor
and discuss the option of reporting makes it a situation-by-situation judgment.
But the alternatives are there, and all parties concerned are aware of the
various options.

Maintaining Continuity in Disclosure Requirements
Analyst: It seems to me that this symposium should develop an
increased consciousness that disclosure should not continue to develop like the
tax laws. The way the tax laws develop, you keep adding more and you
never take any away.
I believe that there are a lot of people here who feel that disclosure is
developing just that way. You keep adding; you never subtract.
What we ought to structure is a scheme where you can make each piece
of disclosure pay its way. Each piece of disclosure that is asked for has to be
justified, not once, but always.
Banker: I can give you one example that meets that cost-benefit test,
and it is in the finance company area where the Robert Morris Associates and
the trade association of finance companies have worked out a four-page ques
tionnaire that supplements the audit and gives detailed information on the
make-up of the receivables portfolio, the losses, the losses reserves. This is
the kind of detailed analysis that the bankers need to justify the very generous
credit that is extended in relation to capital. These are prepared by the CPAs,
and they are covered by the opinion.
This kind of discretionary additional disclosure meets a specific purpose,
and I think it ought to be the guideline that is being looked for.
Banker: It seems to me that this is precisely what the FASB task force
is attempting to do: to back off a lot of this cumulative data that has been
building up and that is inapplicable and inappropriate.
Regulator: One of the disappointments to me, both in the papers and
in the discussions, is that we haven’t been able to get more into the question
of the costs and benefits of disclosure in any rigorous fashion at all.
The disclosure requirements that the commission puts out and, I think,
the disclosure requirements of the FASB as well, to a very substantial extent
are matters of faith. There is very little empirical evidence.
I have heard people say that we should develop a positive test to deter
mine whether or not forecast information is really needed. And I think it is
fair to say that I don’t know how to develop a positive test, because I don’t
think that you can just assess the market impact. And even if there is or
isn’t a market impact there is still a question of whether there can be a better
allocation of capital.
I continually want to find out more about costs and benefits, but I guess
I really find it difficult to know how to go about it. Perhaps there could be a
system whereby the resources of analysts could be pooled to deal with in
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formation. The problem is that the value of information to a particular
analyst may not be sufficient to warrant his buying it. Yet, in terms of a total
social benefit, it might be very beneficial to society to have it purchased, if
you could develop a system whereby, for example, all corporate information
systems were available to everyone who wanted to sit down at a terminal,
type out a request, and pay for it as he got it.
But I guess we are quite a distance away from that, and the problems of
inside information that would emerge from that might be pretty substantial.
CPA: The report of the auditor is not understood; the qualified report
of the auditor is certainly not understood; the consolidation policy is not
understood, and many of the liabilities are in the footnotes, and many of the
assets are owned by nobody and they are not recognized as assets. And the
liabilities are not recognized as liabilities.
And I am fearful that moving to some kind of additional language,
which will also be misunderstood, is going to create a great deal of confusion.
And I would like to make the point that there is no such thing as a 74 percent
audit at any time. You get it all, or you get nothing.
CPA: That is a very interesting point in relation to the distinction
between audited and unaudited.
If we are associated with the unaudited financial statements, we are still
charged with having those financial statements contain all the disclosure
required by GAAP. And we are supposed to get there by just simple inquiry
procedures. The plain fact is, Mr. Banker, that when you get an unaudited
report, we don’t know if all the disclosures are there. We really don’t.
Banker: I don’t believe anybody has really answered the question of
how to get rid of unneeded disclosure.
Analyst: The promising thing that was said here is that the FASB task
force is looking into this. My questions are what techniques will be used, how
broadly will the inquiries be made, and what kind of proof will be offered that
the pieces of information are either necessary or unnecessary?
CPA: What we are thinking about is putting together a discussion
group, very much along the lines of the FASB discussion groups, to lay out
the issues as we see them, take notes on them, and then figure out how to
circulate that to everybody who might be interested. And that is how we
propose to start.
CPA: It has got to be true that we are in a “state of indigestion” on
disclosures that are being made. Many disclosures are made for routine
purposes that few people want and, I take it therefore, don’t use.
I suggest that one could build a matrix that says, vertically, the amount
of management discretion that is important, and horizontally the amount of
change that is important. No discretion, no change—no disclosure. Lots of
discretion, lots of change—full disclosure.
When we talk about the level of disclosure regarding publicly held com
panies and the individual ownership, or small proprietorship, the fact is that
you probably need more disclosure at the individual level than you do at the
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corporate level, because there is more discretion, and there are more ways you
can distort the financials, if it’s your company, than you can with a major
publicly held company.
I think that these two guidelines should become our standards. We
might adopt the proposal that there is no absolute in accounting principles;
there are only conventions. And, therefore, we ought to play this accounting
game the way we play bridge—we announce our conventions, and thereafter
we stick to them. The absolutes are not as important as the consistency.
We look at the accounts from the standpoint of the owner, and we say
that he is the important person. I have a personal view that in the large
public corporations ownership is a fiction; it is a benchmark for preparing
the accounts.
It seems to me, that we do need a new measurement. And I suggest
that the measurement should be one that says there should be an initial dis
closure, and that initial disclosure should not be repeated, absent change or
absent discretion.
Banker: In talking about disclosure, it seems to me there are two
aspects. One is the quantity of disclosure, and the other is the quality of
disclosure.
I’m not casting aspersions on the methods of the CPA and how he does
his work, but there are only two ways to analyze a company. One is com
paring a company with itself, looking back into the history of the company,
and the other is by comparing this company with another company in the
same kind of business.
If you subscribe to this theory, then it seems to me that it would be of
tremendous help to bankers to develop standardized accounting procedures
by the type of industry.
If we are comparing a company in 1974 using the LIFO method of
accounting, when in 1973 they were using FIFO, we have no basis for com
parison. If we are comparing a company using LIFO in 1974 against a
similar company using FIFO in 1974, once again we have no basis for
comparison.
So, I believe you could perform a very real service by, first, developing
standard accounting procedures, before you worry about price-level account
ing, or anything else.
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Selected Aspects of Disclosure:
Problems and Benefits

Human Information Processing
and Financial Disclosure
By Jacob G. Birnberg, Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh
It could be helpful to review the human information processing (HIP)
literature and examine its implications for accounting, particularly in the
area of disclosure. To facilitate the presentation of some conclusions concern
ing financial reporting, this paper is organized into two broad sections. The
first section briefly reviews the literature, primarily concerned with its con
clusions and their explication for accounting. Thus, it briefly outlines the
theory of human information processing in a nontechnical fashion and dis
cusses its relevance to financial reporting. The more detailed arguments sup
porting the issues, detailed citation of sources, and other trappings of research
papers, are omitted from this section. They are, instead, presented in the
second section in a manner similar to the inclusion of a technical appendix
in a paper.
This approach suffers from an appearance of a paucity of support for the
first section. However it is hoped that, when balanced against the potential
for an information overload present in the alternative, it will turn out to be
a successful application of the issues subsequently discussed. The reader
should be able to select the portion(s) most akin to his needs.

Implications for Financial Disclosure

The issue of information load and, by implication, information overload,
is not new to accountants. Whether by good intuition, keen insight, adapt
ability, or luck, the accountant has developed a variety of methods for re
ducing the information load while, hopefully, having minimal effects on the
amount of information communicated. Four techniques are used:
1. Organization of information load

2. Aggregation
3. Format

4. Precalculation
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Organization of the information load refers to the development of a
relevant analytical structure and related set of definitions so that data can be
presented in an orderly fashion—a fashion meaningful to the user. Aggre
gation refers to the algebraic summing of elements within a category in a
manner consistent with the data needs of the user. The sum rather than the
elements are then presented within the organized information set. Format
relates to the manner in which the data are presented. The format should
be as consistent as possible with the processing capacities of the user and the
data needs of his model. Precalculation is the process of deriving from the
information set those outputs that are assumed to be useful either by normative
arguments such as profitability, or requests for disclosure, such as earnings
per share.
Each of these techniques is useful and reduces the mass of data that must
be communicated. As such they would appear to cope with some elements of
information overload on the user of financial data. However, demands from
users for new data are being made and suggestions for potentially useful dis
closure are being offered by the FASB, governmental agencies, analysts, and
academics. Thus, at some point, the accounting profession must recognize
that more data could hurt rather than help the user. It is that question—How
much information load can the user absorb efficiently?—and the related
one—How can the accountant best take advantage of the user’s abilities to
most easily communicate with him?—that are central to this paper.

The User
The users or consumers of financial outputs are not a homogeneous class.
They differ in their ability to handle abstract concepts, their expertise in the
areas of accounting and financial analysis, the data sources open to them and
their experience in dealing with the information available for financial deci
sions. However, for practical purposes we can assume that any user—an
analyst or the ubiquitous “man on the street”—
1. Is better able to process inputs in some forms than others.

2. Does become overloaded from the sheer volume of information provided
even when he knows what data he wants.
3. Tends toward habitual behavior, at least in the short run and, therefore,
may require time to adapt to new information and/or new ways of
presenting the old information.

4. Is likely to learn and adapt to new conditions in the long run.

5. Is functioning in an uncertain environment so that (a) he may request
more information than he needs in hopes of reducing his uncertainty and
(b) show less confidence in preprocessed data than in raw data, even
when the former is clearly more valuable to him.
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Obviously there are interpersonal differences among users that are quite
independent of prior training and experience.
1. The degree of abstractness (or complexity) involved in the user’s infor
mation processing.

2. The decision style of the individual, which affects the way he uses infor
mation and the amount of information he requests.

More abstract information processors will utilize information more effec
tively than their more concrete counterparts. Moreover, he is better able to
handle any given information load. Thus, at any given level of information
the abstract user will out-perform the more concrete one, and the abstract
user will be able to tolerate (utilize) larger information loads before becoming
so overloaded that his level of performance declines. (See Figure 1.)
Obviously, there is no reason to believe that people are truly either strictly
concrete or abstract. In fact, many degrees of abstract processing ability may
exist. If this is assumed to be the case, then Figure 1 would contain a family
of curves. Each one would be higher than the next, and with an optimal in
formation load moving progressively toward the right. If the abstract and
concrete curves are viewed as the upper and lower limits, the curves would
nest between them and their maximums would move from the maximum of
the concrete toward that of the abstract. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 1—Load Versus Use

Figure 2—Various Load Versus
Use Patterns

Decision-makers also vary in the way they approach the decision process.
Some are concerned only with ascertaining an ordering of alternatives. For
example, is A a better investment than B? Or how should we rank X, Y, and
Z as investments? The output of their decision process is simply an ordering
of alternatives. Like any ranking scheme, they should require less infor
mation than those decision-makers who concern themselves with a complete
analysis and rating of all the alternatives. The situation is analogous to two
completely different numbering schemes. The latter, a cardinal scale, requires
more data and/or processing than the former, which is analogous to a rank
order scheme.
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The User's Environment
Figure 3 shows the environment within which the ultimate users of finan
cial data function. Most of the items are self-explanatory; the brief statements
below, describing each, are intended solely to avoid unnecessary ambiguity.

Nonaccounting Data Stream. All data outside the formal accounting
system. Thus, a number such as earnings per share for a prior period is
part of the financial reporting system while forecast earnings per share is not.
Financial Reporting System. All data reported via the entity’s periodic
accounting reports. Thus, it would include data from quarterly reports
concerning quarterly performance.
Financial Press. All media reporting on business activities.
Analyst. Anyone who processes the information outputs from the
three possible sources (nonaccounting data stream, financial press, and
financial reporting system) and presents evaluative information derived
from that data.
User. Someone who utilizes the available information to make an
economic decision. Note that at least two types are available using the
Trueblood committee’s dichotomy. For practical purposes, the analyst/
user who acts upon his assessments (and makes them public as well) is
represented in both classes.
Consumer. Used as a shorthand for both analysts and users.
Figure 3—Financial Reporting Environment

Some Relevant Questions
The interaction of the human information processing model and the
environment in which financial disclosure takes place raises several questions.
Foremost among these are the following:

1. What effect does the availability of the processed financial data from the
analysts have on the extent to which the users utilize the remaining sources
of information?
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2. Are users able to control the information load by selectively sampling
from diverse sources? This would permit them to alleviate information
overloading.

3. To what extent is the accounting function servicing the user directly and
to what extent only indirectly, via the financial press and the media?
4. Are the more abstract users of financial reports found performing the
analyst’s function and the more concrete, the user’s (in the Trueblood
committee’s sense of the term) ?
5. In the long run, does the highly routine nature of the task performed by
user and analyst lead to learning that in turn reduces some of the in
formation load?

Present State of the Financial Reporting System

Overload
Information overload occurs when the human information processing
system receives so much data that it is not able to accommodate to it. The
demands that the information load makes on the processor lead to less than
optimal behavior and send the user beyond the level of optimal performance
into his area of “negative returns.” While it might be interesting to attempt
an analysis of current practice to ascertain where we are on the processing
curves (that is, the curves illustrated in Figure 1) such a study is likely to be
futile and frustrating. Rather, it is probably best to examine those indirect
indicators and the anecdotal information that is available.
In general, as far as the remote users of financial statements are con
cerned, it would appear that the level of information from all possible sources
(that is, the financial reports, the financial “press,” and the analysts) exceeds
the users’ needs. For example, most companies who offered their 10-Ks to
shareholders failed to elicit shareholder interest. Almost uniformly, only a
handful of the shareholders accepted the offer of a copy of the 10-K free of
charge when a postcard is returned to the company.1 Moreover, we have
no insight into who did request these copies; some may have been requested
by individuals or groups who usually availed themselves of 10-K data from
some other sources.
It is tempting to conclude that remote users of financial statements have
little interest in raw financial data of the same general type as is already
available in a more heavily aggregated form in the “press,” in annual reports,
and from analysts. If these users were near their point of maximum efficiency

1

For a summary of some firms’ experiences see the Wall Street Journal, 11 July, 1974,
P.l.
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they ought to have had some interest in the 10-K data. Given that they did
not, we can only suggest that one of two events occurred. The channel (data
source) may have been overloaded, causing the users to reject any additional
data despite our normative view of its relevance. They may have been so
overloaded already that they did not have the ability to use it. Alternatively,
they may have felt that the report had no net benefits to them. The cost of
postage and processing outweighed anything they could have expected to find
in it, even if they had not reached their points of maximum efficiency.
A second, and more anecdotal example, of overload may be present in
the Penn Central situation. One study has argued that skilled readers of
financial statements should have detected the decline of the Penn Central.2
History indicates they did not. For some reason, if that study is correct,
analysts failed to do their job. The possible answers range from incom
petence to massive information overload (that is, too many other companies
to worry about) to information overload vis-a-vis available financial data
about the Penn Central Company.
Similar arguments have been made concerning the current problems of
public utilities. Two analysts, with hindsight, suggested that the Consolidated
Edison annual report contained all the data needed to anticipate their (and
other utilities’) dividend problem(s).3 While their evaluation of the data may
benefit from hindsight, it is clear that the data were present and the bulk
of the financial community chose to ignore them, failed to recognize their
significance or may even have been unaware of their presence.
The above data are anecdotal and hardly constitute incontrovertable
proof that we are already experiencing information overload. However, if they
only indicate that we are approaching it, the arguments for more disclosure
rather than less on the basis that more is always better than less could be
improvident. Rather, the data might suggest that the test for disclosure is still
relevance. They may also question the wisdom of the efficient market theorist
who, in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of private information in his theories,
argues for more extensive public disclosure.
At this point one caveat is important. This argument and the research
on information overload have assumed that the added information contains
relatively small increments of information. By relatively small, we refer to the
total amount already available. Clearly, disclosing new information of great
relative importance (a potential “bombshell”) is a different question; such
data should be disclosed even in an overload situation. The relevance of the
overload argument in the event of a bombshell is that the human information
processing system will make a better decision but not be able to react as
quickly (efficiently) as possible.
2

3

S. Davidson, J. Schindler and R. Weil, Accounting: The Language of Business,
(Horton: Glen Ridge, N.J., 1974) pp. 50-51.
The original calculations were by T. O’glove and R. Olstein. Summarized in
W. Shepherd, ed., “Psychedelic Accounting,” Business Week, July 27, 1974, p. 57.
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Coping With Overload
As indicated at the outset of this section, the financial reporting segment
of the environment has attempted to use a variety of techniques to cope with
the volume of data that it produces. These devices undoubtedly reduce the
load on the processing system by making access to the data easier. There is
less noise to reduce, and less processing to be performed by the standard user.
The accounting structure as it now exists permits a gradual disaggregation
of the data, from the summary data through the financial statements and their
related notes. This “unfolding” of the relevant data on a given facet of the
entity permits the user to gradually pursue the point, terminating his search
when he feels he has “enough.” Moreover, by beginning with graphic
representations and numerical data and proceeding to text material, the
accountant is proceeding from what research has shown is apparently the
most easily comprehended information form—graphics and summary sta
tistics—to the least easily understood—text material.
However, any systematic attempt to deal with overload in this fashion
does so at the risk that the user will miss valuable data that is present at a
point in the process that is beyond his stopping point, for example, in the
detailed footnotes. It is probably this fact that causes the lack of confidence
in their own decisions exhibited by decision-makers who use only summarized
data.
In addition, the user can reduce the information load by being selective in
the data sources he utilizes. All users need not utilize all possible sources
of information. By being selective, they can reduce their volume of data inputs.
Because of the reduced load and redundancy in the sources, the user may move
back up the U-shaped curve toward his point of maximum performance be
cause of increases in his decision-making efficiency. The data that are lost
(unless they are “bombshells” as we described them earlier) were not being
properly utilized anyway.
In this fashion many nonskilled users are able to cope with the problem
of overload. They select particular sources and particular elements within
reports as relevant and reject others. Usually the sources are secondary
sources. Typically, they are analysts’ reports or comparable data contained in
the financial press. Whether the user is successful or not depends upon the
success of his sources (and, in turn, their susceptibility to overloading).
It is only conjecture, but any user of financial statement data ex
periencing information overload or a welter of data, substantial portions of
which are noise, may develop patterns or formulas for examining the data
available to him. These rules of thumb permit the user to cope with what he
believes to be the essential parts of the available data and reduce the problem
to one where the relevant data set is closer in size to the maximum the user can
process.
Such rules of thumb do have their limitations. Even when such filtering
rules are followed, the volume of data makes the process more difficult than if
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the set which the decision-maker utilizes was all the data available. He must
go through the process of sorting until he finds the data he needs.
Rules of thumb may work well in a stable situation where the user has
properly evaluated it. So long as the basic decision rule does not change, the
decision-maker’s approach should serve him well. Significant changes in those
properties he examines (for example, earnings per share or the annual rate
of growth in sales or profits) will be duly noted by the user and may cause
him to reconsider his evaluation. However, should a significant change occur
in some aspect of the entity’s financial condition that is not included in his
rule of thumb, the data are likely to go unnoticed. Even if they are included
in the data to be available to the decision-maker, they probably will be
ignored since the filtering rule that is used to cope with the volume of data
directs attention away from them. This might explain the problems present
in recognizing Consolidated Edison’s plight.

Who Are the Consumers of the Financial Reporting System?
The argument made in the previous section suggests that users select a
mix of information channels to suit their needs and capabilities. This is not the
only argument that can be made to suggest that all users do not use all
channels at all times. Issues of volume aside, users may prefer the reports
from analysts because of recasting of data and selectivity. The analysts may
serve as a filter for the user to reduce his load and require him to consult the
“raw data” of the financial reporting system less frequently. This is con
venient for the user if it is successful.
For accountants there are some important implications to the answer
of how the user receives the outputs of the financial reporting system—
directly or indirectly. If it is indirectly, through analysts, then the accountant
is addressing an audience that may be relatively homogeneous. If it is
directly, the users may be a heterogeneous group, and the accountant conse
quently faces more severe problems in determining the optimal possible in
formation load.
Consider the possibility that the analyst is the basic source of user’s
data. At the present time, we have no knowledge of analysts’ information
processing capabilities. However, if analysts are generally more abstract
information processors than are investors, then there is an increase in the
level of complexity possible before the processing system is overloaded. This
would mean that attempts to expand the volume of data disclosed could be
successful, for they would be addressed to the audience most able to utilize
them in an efficient manner. In that sense, it would be the best possible world
for accountants, for it would permit maximum detail.
However, it would suggest that the user—as opposed to the analyst—will
be overloaded, reducing his ability to utilize the accounting data. Indeed,
it suggests that, unless we design two different financial reporting systems,
pursuit of the concerns of the user (the philosophy of the Trueblood Report),
may reduce our ability to service the analyst, and vice versa.
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If the users and the analysts as groups are not distinguishable on the
relative abstractness of their information processing, the same question can
be posed in a slightly different fashion. Who should be considered in setting
the information load present in the outputs of a financial reporting system? In
any case, one group will benefit at the expense of the other. And, unlike the
previous section, the superior group is not constituted to service the inferior
group thereby sharing (selling?) some of their comparative advantage.
In any case, the problem of the optimal level of complexity is likely to
be a knotty one for accountants unless all the potential consumers of the
outputs of his information system have their point of maximum information
load prior to overloading in about the same level of complexity. Only further
research can clarify this point.

Other Information Processing Considerations

User Satisfaction
Despite the anecdotal data offered to show that the users of financial
data are not as yet gleaning the full benefits from the available data, we
witness a constant clamor for more data about various facets of enterprise
activities. Some undoubtedly reflect limitations in the current scope of finan
cial disclosure. Others may be less meritorious. The issue, simply, is how
can the argument of an overloaded system be rationalized against these
demands for expanded disclosure. If the consumer desires more information,
is it reasonable to conclude he is overloaded? Why not give it to him?
Unfortunately, while this argument is intuitively appealing, there is ample
evidence that people request more data than they need. Indeed, they will pay
for more data even if it will increase the overload on the system. The hope,
of course, is that the next incremental bit of information is the one that will
solve the problem for them.
Moreover, users of aggregated data have been shown to be more efficient
decision-makers, when the aggregation is done in a manner consistent with
their needs, than individuals receiving raw data. However, they are not as
confident in their decisions as their less-effective colleagues. Moreover, they
also reveal this lack of confidence by taking longer to make the same decisions
than those receiving raw data. All of this is inconsistent with one’s intuitive
evaluation that if you gave decision-makers what they need they will not only
make better decisions but also will (a) take less time, (b) be more confident
in their answer, and (c) be more satisfied with the data.
The import of these findings is clear. Dissatisfaction on the part of users
cannot be taken as an unequivocal sign of a flawed reporting scheme. Rather,
it is likely that financial disclosure will never satisfy all of its potential users.
It is somehow predestined that there always will be a vocal segment requesting
additional information. Thus, a critical examination of the relevance of
the data, as practiced by the FASB, is a desirable screening device. In con
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trast, any expansion of financial disclosure solely because it might help would
appear self-defeating.

The Effect of Changes in Disclosure Policy
If various studies are correct, one problem in changing the form and/or
scope of accounting disclosure is that there must be a lead time for the users
and analysts to adjust to the new format and/or technique. Often that time
occurs during the period when change is being advocated. The process and
explanation that justify the change also educate the consumer. They may
even serve to make him a more critical consumer of the currently available
data.
Two examples can be offered. Price-level-adjusted statements have been
discussed for generations. Their significance is (relatively) well understood.
If price-level-adjusted reports were to appear tomorrow, conjecture and
research suggests that they could be utilized effectively by the consumers of
financial data.4
A second proposal of much more recent vintage is that variability in
the accounting numbers be reported. That is, critical numbers in the financial
reports would be reported as interval rather than point estimates. Supporters
of this proposal argue that it would afford the user a more explicit statement
of the subjectivity inherent in the reported data.
Aside from the alleged merits of the proposal, studies have not yet shown
that consumers receiving such information are able to benefit from it. If its
proponents are correct, one obvious reason for the apparent lack of benefit
is that the consumer has not been educated to use the new data efficiently. As
a result, the reports utilizing interval estimates may be producing added
“noise” for the consumer rather than information. If that format were to be
adopted, education of the consumer would be necessary to achieve the
proposed benefits.5
A related problem present in human information processing concerns
changes in the format or method of disclosing data as opposed to the expansion
of the set of data offered. Individuals exhibit a persistence of set (“fixity”) from
one period to another. This means that the income statement is viewed as,
essentially, the same document summarizing the same categories of events
from one period to another. Should a major change occur in those events
that are included in the income statement, as was effected by APB Opinion
No. 30, there will be a time lag before the consumer of financial data will
recognize that the profit figure may have been calculated in a different fashion.
The existence of such functional fixity can delay the benefits from changes
4
5

See T. Dyckman, SAR No. 1, Investment Analysis and General Price Level Adjust
ment (Sarasota, Fla.: American Accounting Association, 1969). See pp. 11-16 and
particularly p. 17.
This may be an advantage inherent in the process by which changes in financial
accounting occur. The period between proposal and adoption serves to educate
those who are interested in the process.

260

in financial disclosure unless proper care is taken to publicize the change. In
that regard, it is more likely that specialists such as the analyst will adjust
more quickly to the change than will the remote user. The amount of “edu
cational material” they receive is significantly greater, not necessarily because
they are a preferred group, but because their livelihood depends upon it and
so they seek it out.

Summary
In balance there is reason to believe that financial disclosure as it now
exists presents a volume of data that to some degree impedes consumers of
the output of the financial reporting system. Whether the volume has reached
the point where it overloads the routine information processing is a ques
tion. However, the filtering of the data by specialists and the use of rules of
thumb would appear to make the system susceptible to those situations where
the relevant data are outside the set of data usually consulted in decision
making.
Aggregation, precalculation, and experimentation with new methods of
presenting the data either more simply or in a manner more easily com
prehensible have certain limitations. First, many consumers are capable of
processing significantly more data than others; thus, all people cannot be
satisfied simultaneously. Second, aggregation—even when beneficial to con
sumers—leads to feelings of apprehension and erodes users’ confidence in
their own decisions and the data. Third, since we do not know exactly which
data are needed—and it is probable that different consumers desire different
data—the financial reporting function is likely to produce “noise” as well as
information. This noise will also overburden the consumer.
Proposals to expand the information supplied to consumers should be
viewed critically. Indeed, some of the data currently supplied may no longer
be relevant. In this sense, the injunction of the Trueblood committee’s report
about relevance is appropriate.6 However, this should not militate against
the inclusion of new information where such information is necessitated by
significant changes in the environment.

Technical Discussion of the Issues
Human information processing is a new area of psychological research
that has not yet been extensively developed. In contrast with the area of
artificial intelligence (computer simulation of human thought processes),
relatively little has been done. The only exception is studies dealing with the
6

AICPA, Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements, Objectives of
Financial Statements, 3 vols. (New York: AICPA, 1973).
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essentially physiological area of perception. An overview of the area was
twice scheduled by the Annual Review of Psychology (in 1973 and 1974)
and twice canceled. At this point, there apparently are no plans for that
publication to review the literature in human information processing.
Fortunately, Schroder, Driver, and Struefert7 (hereafter referred to as
Schroder) did attempt to synthesize the literature as they saw it and formulate
a model of the information processing system. These ideas in turn have been
utilized by some accountants in their efforts to better understand the uses to
which accounting data are put.8 The material presented in this section flows
from the Schroder model and attempts to recognize those accounting works
that have drawn upon it.

Information Processing Model

Shape of the Curve
In general, the Schroder model argues that information, like any other
resource, initially should result in increasing returns to the decision-maker.
Given a particular problem, the decision-maker will make increasingly better
decisions as more information is provided. That is to say, holding the relevant
talents and skills constant among, say, five investors, one with more items of
information should make better decisions when compared to one with less.
In this context, information (or information load) refers to those data and
only those data which are relevant to the decision at hand. Data that do not
have any relevance to that decision are not counted in measuring information
load. Such data can affect the decision process as “noise,” but that issue will
be dealt with at a later point in the paper.
Thus, the general view of processing information load is similar to that
of the economist for any productive process. There exist during the initial
stage increasing returns to scale, that is, to the quantity of information. Such
a conclusion would seem to be intuitively correct from all the activities we
observe about us.
The real question, and one where our intuition may be of less assistance is
whether the analogous decreasing returns to scale are also present in human
information processing. According to the model used here (and supported

7

8

H. Schroder, M. Driver and S. Streufert, Human Information Processing, (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967).
See L. Revsine, “Data Expansion and Conceptual Structure,” Accounting Review,
October 1970, pp. 704-711; H. Miller, “Environmental Complexity and Financial
Reports,” Accounting Review, January 1972, pp. 31-37; San Miguel, “Human In
formation Processing and Its Relevance to Accounting.” Paper presented at AAA
Meetings in New Orleans, 1974; M. Driver and T. Mock, “Human Information
Processing, Decision Style Theory and Accounting Information Systems,” Working
Paper No. 39, Graduate School of Business, University of Southern California,
Los Angeles, Calif.
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by the research findings), “returns to scale” do flatten out and finally become
negative as the information load is increased. Apparently, you can get too
much of a good thing even when that good thing is data relevant to a decision.
Thus, Schroder hypothesized (and found support for) the inverted U-shaped
curve shown earlier in Figure 1.9

Information Overload
The concept of information overload is necessary for the better under
standing of the U-shaped curve. In the later stages, increments to the decision
maker’s data base result is little benefit to him and may reduce the quality of
his decision. The information processing system has reached the point where
for various reasons it cannot cope with the welter of relevant data being
provided to it. An overloaded information processing system reacts as the
acre of land does in classical economics—it yields negative returns.
The causes of information overload in the system are something that we
can only surmize with limited empirical data. However, since the causes
of the overload may affect our perception of its relevance for financial dis
closure, at least a brief discussion is desirable. Basically, the information
processor finds that more and more complex models are required to utilize the
expanded information sets. These models are simply complex relationships
among the data, but, as they grow in complexity, two things happen. One is
that less and less new information can be expected to be found in the new
data (decreasing returns to scale) and, second, the ability of the decision
maker to resolve discrepancies among the data inputs is sorely tested. The
decision-maker with large quantities of data may be trying to use too much
information and be following too many variables.10 When he is done, his
complex decision model may be inferior to a simpler model used when fewer
facts are presented (that is, he experiences negative returns).

Complexity of the Processor
Some decision-makers seem to perform consistently better with the
same data than others. While this could be due to chance, researchers have
found that people differ in significant ways. One of these differences, the
abstractness of their thought processes, leads some users to develop more
complex models than others. As the result they appear to be able to achieve
better results (decisions) with the data available to them than less abstract
decision-makers can. Figures 1 and 2 (page 253) show this relationship as
Schroder dichotomized it. Figure 1 shows the extreme groups. The upper
curve reflects the most abstract thinkers, while the lower curve the most
concrete (leastabstract).
9 Schroder, Human Information Processing, p. 37.
10 Ibid. pp. 40-41.
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From this relationship Schroder drew two conclusions. First, for any
given quantity of information—as measured on the horizontal axis—the more
abstract thinkers will perform better than a less abstract thinker. Second,
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that more abstract thinkers can absorb greater
absolute levels of information before overloading causes their decision quality
to decrease absolutely. That is, in Figure 2 the maximum point of each of the
U-shaped curves moves further to the right as we increase the degree of the
thinker’s abstractness. Thus, Schroder argued that abstract thinkers (the top
curve in Figure 1) will do better than concrete thinkers (the bottom curve)
at any given information load and they will accept larger quantities of infor
mation before they experience overloading (that is, a decrease in the absolute
level of their performance).
Empirical research into these two conjectures has shown mixed results.
Curves nested as in Figure 4, below, have been plotted from data on di
verse subjects.11 However, the dispersion of their maximum has not been as
great as expected. Thus, while decision-makers do differ in the degree of
abstractness and related decision-making performance, research thus far has
not confirmed the notion that abstract thinkers are better able to cope with
masses of data than concrete thinkers.
Further research into these questions appears relevant for accountants.
It could establish relationships that are valuable in the design of financial
reporting systems. Assume that they in fact are true. Once the sub classes
are established, the more abstract can be expected to outperform the less
abstract when the information load is held constant. Perhaps in the area of
financial analysis it may be that the optimal load for each level of abstractness
is significantly different. As a conjecture to illustrate the last point, we might
argue that the financial analyst is a more abstract thinker than the “typical”
investor and, because of training, experience, and so forth, is better able to
rationalize much greater information loads. Thus, the negative returns from
increased information loads may set in much later for the analyst. This would
be consistent with Figure 2. It is not known if this is the case. Miller argues
that it could be.11
12 If so, it would have significant importance for accounting
as was indicated in part I of this paper.
Figure 4—General Shape of Curves as Found Empirically by Schroder et al.
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11 Schroder, Human Information Processing, p. 40. However, see Revsine, “Data Ex
pansion,” and D. Wilson, “A Note on ‘Environmental Complexity and Financial
Reports’,” Accounting Review, July, 1973, pp. 586-588.
12 Miller, “Environmental Complexity,” pp. 31-37.
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Noise
Just as data relevant to the information processor’s task is labeled in
formation, data not relevant to that task has its own label, “noise.” Noise may
be correct, factual information, but in the case of the given information
processing system, it has no relevance to the decision at hand. It is the
perception of relevance to the information processing system that differentiates
between information and noise. Noise can be accurate, verifiable, objective,
and perceived as desirable by the collector of the data set and/or other users
of the set. However, to a particular given user, it is irrelevant.
Just as information can overload a system, noise can present the same
hazard. While we know relatively little about noise from empirical studies, it
would appear that noise in the data set ought to complicate the decision
process. As we will discuss later, the potential presence of noise could affect
the accountant’s decision in setting the optimal limit on financial disclosure.
Each element of data may be of positive value to the user and increase the
information load, or it may be of no interest to the user. In the former case,
there are costs and benefits. In the latter, only costs.
Unfortunately, the Schroder’s theory and the related research has done
little to enhance our understanding of how the consumer of the outputs of the
financial reporting system reacts to noise in the form of extraneous data. This
is likely to be an important issue for accountants unless all consumers require
the same data set. For this uniformity to exist, the accountant must not only
know the dimensions of the desired set, but all the users’ data needs must be
relatively homogeneous. It is hard to believe that either of these is the case.
One study that did attempt to examine the impact of noise on financial
decision-making by both students and business executives, found that noise, or
irrelevant data, in the form of additional footnotes to a set of financial state
ments, did affect the user’s ability to ascertain the needed information.13 The
noise apparently affected either his data-seeking or decision-making processes.
These results would appear to be obvious to a gestalt psychologist.14 He
would argue that the whole data set, not just those elements the consumer
desires, will affect his perception of the data. If this proves to be the case to
any significant degree, noise could be more than an inconvenience to the user.

Individual Differences

Some writers have stressed the desirability of a general information sys
tem capable of servicing all users. Others have stressed the problems in
13 J. Birnberg, J. Levey, and J. Rossell, “Some Effects of Subject Selection and Other
Variables on Behavioral Accounting Experiments” (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Uni
versity of Pittsburgh, 1973).
14 For comments in this vein, see K. Weick “Critique (of R. Barefield)” in T. Burns,
ed. Behavioral Experiments in Accounting (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University,
1972), pp. 258-259.
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herent in such systems. In this section, we will examine some of the sources
of individual differences and their relevance to the problem of financial
disclosure.

Abstract-Concrete
As was noted earlier, the Schroder theory allows for different levels of
complexity in the consumers’ processing of information as an integral part of
their theory. The data supporting this diversity is substantial. Unfortunately,
most of the experiments have yielded relatively crude measures of infor
mation load and, therefore, no discernable differences in the point of maximum
efficiency.15 Clearly, this deviation from Schroder’s theory could be significant
for accountants. Should these results persist, concern over the levels of com
plexity possessed by consumers becomes less significant, for they will all
gravitate to the similar levels of information load. For practical purposes in
ascertaining information load, we then could treat all consumers alike.
Existing studies focus on subjects in essentially constant environments.
Yet the theory would seem to suggest that the environment complexity and
the consumers’ processing complexity interact. Thus, an abstract information
processing system may react differently in a complex environment than a
simple one. Moreover, the effect of the complexity may be different for the
abstract processing system than for the concrete one. Since the financial
decision-making environment is essentially a complex one, it is necessary for
researchers to examine these issues.
Examining the effect of complex environments may yield insight into how
information processing systems function in financial analysis. The general
model suggests that the more abstract thinkers are better able to integrate
discrepant information and, thereby, outperform the more concrete consumers
of financial data. If financial analysis is truly complex and not just data rich,
this would mean that the consumer best able to cope with the problem is the
abstract information processor. If it is not, then the advantage may be with
the less complex processor.
Then, too, there is little research reported on how information processing
systems attempt to cope with overload. It would appear that at some point the
processor should attempt to resist the onslaught of information overload.
Exactly “how” could be useful information to the designers of financial
reporting systems.

Decision Style
Driver and Mock have integrated their separate lines of research in
decision-making to examine further the issue of decision style and human

15 Wilson, “A Note on Environmental Complexity,” pp. 586-588.
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information processing.16 Generally, they have found that there are differences
based on decision style on the amount of feedback data requested (purchased)
and also in the time required to make a decision. If further research were to
reaffirm these differences, it would again underscore the importance of know
ing the makeup of the various consumer groups.

Other Issues

Preferences for Input Formats
Beyond the scope of the particular model suggested by Schroder, research
has shown that particular kinds of input information are preferred (more
efficiently utilized) than others. For example, studies of managers revealed
that, in managers’ completion of their jobs, they had a discernable preference
for “current oral” information rather than formal written reports.17 The
method of communication had an impact on the data selected for the decision.
While the research technique underlying this finding may reduce it to the
level of “educated conjecture,” it does coincide with other findings cited below
about preferred formats for inputs.
Similarly, subjects performed better when given the traditional numerical
presentation of decision-oriented data than when the data were presented in
narrative form.18 A variety of dissimilar studies show that users have preferred
forms for inputting their data for decisions. Generally, information supplied
in a form closest to that in which the decision-maker requires it is preferred
(or at least leads to the best performance). Thus, numerical data, aggregated
and analyzed when desirable, produce better decisions. Perhaps the effect of
preprocessing the data before making them available to the user has the effect
of diminishing both the information load and the noise.
However, the preprocessing of the raw data to the point where they are
already tractable to the user is not without hazards. When, for example, the
user needs the mean and standard deviation of some small set of data to make
a decision, he makes better decisions when given the mean and standard
deviation rather than, say, all ten observations. However, he does so with
much less confidence in his decision than his colleague who has only the raw

16 Driver and Mock, “Human Information Processing”; as well as T. Mock, T. Estrin
and M. Vasarhelyi, “Learning Patterns, Decision Style and Value of Information,”
Journal of Accounting Research, Spring 1972.
17 H. Mintzberg, “Managerial Work: Analysis and Observations,” Management Sci
ence, October 1971.
18 K. Kelly, “A Study of the Impact of the Mode of Presentation of Information
on Decision-making.” (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh, mimeo, 1974).
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data and may never calculate the relevant numbers. This lack of confidence
could be relevant for financial disclosure.19

Multiple Information Systems
One element of the human information processing system that has been
generally ignored by others is the impact of alternative sources of information
on the decision-maker. Dickhaut did attempt a study of this type and rather
tentatively found that familiarity was a significant factor in the situation.20
When the subject was familiar with the sources, the existence of multiple
information sources was not harmful. Significantly, in his study he did not find
a situation where it could be concluded that the use of alternative information
systems yielded better results at the usual levels of statistical significance.21
The Dickhaut study is interesting, not for its result, but for the issues it
raises. How do people use alternative information sources as opposed to
expansion of the data from the same set? This could be called the overloading
of sources rather than information. Questions of this type are clearly relevant
in the environment described in Figure 3. Alternative sources do exist.
Fitts and Posner22 suggest that users would accomplish this by infor
mation reduction. This in turn may take the form of eliminating nearly all the
data from one source—for example, using the analyst rather than the financial
reporting system. It could also take the form of using systems for specialized
purposes.

Information Deprivation
The stress in this paper has been on overloading. However, it may be
worth noting that very little information also has adverse effects on the infor
mation processing system. One researcher found that for the more concrete
thinkers, the adjustment to new information after low levels of information
was difficult. Views were rigidly held and new information created “all or
nothing” kinds of change.23
Clearly, if the consumer of accounting data feels that his needs are being
grossly ignored, a significant underloading could occur. It seems difficult to
imagine a situation where it would be of the dimensions required to be con

19 N. Chervany and G. Dickson, “An Experimental Evaluation of Information Over
load in a Production Environment,” Management Science, June 1974, pp. 13351344, especially pp. 1339-1343.
20 J. Dickhaut, “Alternative Information Structures and Probability Revision,” Ac
counting Review, January 1973, pp. 61-79.
21 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
22 P. Fitts and M. Posner, Human Performance, (Brooks, 1968), pp. 123-145.
23 See Schroder’s discussion, Human Information Processing, pp. 62-63 or P. Suedfeld,
“Attitude Manipulation in Restricted Environments,” Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, vol. 68, no. 3, 1964, pp. 242-246.
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sidered deprivation. There undoubtedly have been times when this was the
case, but it seems reasonable to reject it at present.

Summary
This section has covered the sources underlying the ideas presented in the
Section 1. In general the research relied upon, while relevant to accounting,
is inferential so far as human information processing and financial decision
making are concerned. A significant amount of analysis and empirical
research is still needed before we know how the data are utilized by the
consumer.
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Discussion of
Disclosure Criteria
Carl L. Nelson, Discussion Chairman
A Framework for Setting
Disclosure Requirements

Chairman Nelson: How is the line going to be drawn between the
benefits of additional disclosure and its costs?
Well, I suggest that we shouldn’t draw the line in such a way as to make
the security analyst’s life easier. We shouldn’t draw the line on how to best
serve the individual investor or the institutional investor. We shouldn’t
draw the line on how to make the credit analyst’s life easier or to make
bank profits greater, or to simplify the task of the CPA, to increase his income
or to minimize his exposure to risk, or to make the life of a financial executive
easier, or to minimize the information going to competitors.
It seems to me we’ve got to go outside for the criteria, because, quite
obviously, there are going to be benefits, perhaps, to the security analyst—
his life may be a little easier—but the financial executive’s life is going to be
a little bit more difficult. So, therefore, if we are going to take that approach,
we can only do it on a political basis, and that’s the way, maybe, decisions
have been made in the past, and maybe that’s the way they have got to be
made in the future.
It seems to me that we have got to take a look at the benefit to society,
and I think maybe we ought to go back and take a look at Mr. Gray’s criteria.
Both Bill Gray and Ed Schoenborn talked about an allocation procedure.
I’d like to take a look at that allocation procedure.
I think, ideally, we can think of a banker’s role in allocation as decision
making about whether Firm A or Firm B is going to receive money. But the
security analyst, in his allocation role, determines whether Firm C or Firm D
has the brightest economic future. That is, if he decides that Firm C has the
brighter economic future, he makes recommendations. And if some credibility
is given to his recommendations, the price of C’s stock goes up. Firm C
finds it’s easier to raise capital; its cost of capital is less; it expands. Mean
while, D withers on the vine.

270

Thus, it seems to me that unless the disclosure affects the way capital is
allocated, there’s just no point to what we are talking about here.
Four factors determine the price of a stock according to Mr. Gray.
First is the earnings of the company. Second is expected growth in earnings.
Third is the extent of certainty, or the existence of uncertainty, about future
earnings growth. Fourth is the volatility of the earnings.
Mr. Gray says what we need is information so that we can estimate those
four factors.
And therefore, he says, we divide the kind of information that we need
into that which will aid in determining the sales characteristics (to determine
the growth) and the volatility. He says, for that, that he needs some infor
mation about the product mix. He needs some information about new
product development, about entry of the firm into new markets, about market
shares for major products, about major contracts, about order backlogs.
He needs information about the expenses, primarily, which of these are
fixed and which are variable. He needs to know something about the com
petitive environment because that will affect the revenue and the sales. And
he needs to know something about the accounting methods.
When Mr. Gray talks about earnings, I don’t think he means the net
income that’s the bottom line on the income statement at all. For instance,
a company retires a 5 percent bond with a market price of 35, as a result of
issuing bonds with a face value of 45 and an interest rate of 14 percent. As
I understand generally accepted accounting principles, if that bond was on the
balance sheet at face value—which it would have been approximately—the
company has got an income of $60 for every $100 of bonds outstanding.
I don’t think he’s interested in that when he’s talking about earnings. I
think what he is talking about is the same thing Roger Murray was talking
about the other day—a rather vague, nebulous concept which every security
analyst understands, but I have a little bit of difficulty understanding—earn
ings generating ability.
Now, I’d like to throw out those ideas that Bill presented and were
ignored by you yesterday, to see what your viewpoint is. First, what about
the other securities analysts? Is this classification that Bill made not, maybe,
one that you would have made, but is it a reasonable representation, a
repackaging of what your ideas are about the information you need—infor
mation on sales characteristics, expense characteristics, the market, the com
petitive situation, and the accounting methods of the firm?
Analyst: I think he is substantially correct, and you are too, with
respect to your notion of earning power. However nebulous, it is the basic
characteristic that’s being sought.
Analyst: When we talk about earning power, we are really trying to get
at the base of the company’s ability overtime, to pay out dividends? What
we’re looking to find here is not the unusual profit it is going to make on its
bonds, but, for example, what can General Motors make from selling cars,
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trucks, buses, and all the rest of the equipment they make? What is the
probability of their continuing to get the market share that they have today?
And then, you know, once you have the kind of earning power you are
looking for, what is the ability to finance that continued operation?
Then, of course, you add a third factor, which is risk. What is the un
certainty? What is the variability of that earning power? What risk is
attached to your forecast of it?
Analyst: I’d like to add one amendment to that. We’d like this kind
of information not for one company in isolation, but for companies relative
to each other, and relative to what’s going on in the general economy as well.
Chairman Nelson: Well, I wonder if the CPAs and financial executives
could step into the role of the security analyst and say, “If you were going to
perform your function in society, is this a reasonable or unreasonable
approach?”
I’m asking an impossible task, of course, for you to become instant
security analysts. The reason that I would like you to consider this is that I
think Mr. Gray deserves a tremendous amount of credit. You may reject the
idea, but it seems to me that the pattern he has suggested is the only sensible
pattern that I have ever seen on determining the question of what ought to be
disclosed.
Let’s take a look at Mr. Schoenborn’s list. That list is only illustrative,
but his problem, as I understand it, is to forecast the cash flows, and the
income, for which he says he needs consolidating statements. He needs
information about foreign exchange exposure, and not only about monetary
items, but about exposure of business to foreign exchange problems. He needs
information about commitments that are not liabilities under generally
accepted accounting principles. He needs disclosure of revenue recognition
policies, disclosure about the goals and objectives of the firm, and disclosure
of the effects of inflation on the accounting results.
Now, he receives more disclosure on the commitments that are not lia
bilities, at least for certain companies, than he got three years ago. From
some companies he’s getting some disclosure of the effect of inflation on the
accounting results. But, I wonder, how fast corporations have rushed in to
take advantage of the SEC’s suggestion that they report “inventory profits”?
Regulator: I think it’s hard to know what the impact of exhortatory
releases are; it’s not instantaneous. We saw almost nothing. We put it out in
time—we hoped to put it out in early January, so that people could at least
think about it when they were writing their president’s letters and other things
for the ’73 reports. It was probably a little late for those, and we saw
virtually nothing in response.
During the year, I have asked our staff to send up to me anything that
appears in a prospectus or a filing, or anything that they see, that represents
this type of disclosure. The examples I’ve received are very small in number;
I guess maybe I’ve got ten in my file.
CPA: I would like to suggest that there were inadequate guidelines in
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that release. We had great difficulty in determining what were inventory
profits that were not going to recur, because we don’t know about the com
pany’s ability to adjust its selling price to make them more permanent than
temporary.
Chairman Nelson: Well, my memory was that the guideline said it is
the difference between the replacement cost and the cost that was charged
to cost of sales.
CPA: I think it would be misleading to report all of that as non
recurring inventory profits.
Chairman Nelson: You are worried about the misunderstanding of
that?
All right. Now may I direct your attention again to Mr. Schoenborn’s
list: consolidating statements, foreign exchange exposure, commitments that
are not liabilities, revenue recognition policies, goals and objectives of the
firm, and effect of inflation on the accounting results. Are those reasonable
requests?
Financial Executive: I would say that both sales and earnings
requests are reasonable—not that we would be able to reasonably comply
with them. But I think earning power is a judgment, not an economic fact.
And he wants forecasts. Those are judgments too and not economic facts.
In his paper, Ernie Hicks had a very interesting question that wasn’t
addressed yesterday: Do we pay irrational reverence to financial statements in
general, and to notes to financial statements in particular? Time and time
again we hear that historical costs in financial statements do not reflect eco
nomic reality, and I think many of us here believe that. Financial statements,
however, are elements in ascertaining what economic reality may be. But I
don’t think we can spoon feed analysts our judgments.
Chairman Nelson: Well, I don’t think that analysts want to be spoon
fed. What they want is disclosure so that they can make their own deter
minations.
In other words, I don’t think an analyst would object to a profit on
bond refunding going in the income statement, provided it’s disclosed—
which it will be—so that he could pull it out.
Financial Executive: Mr. Hicks made another statement that I
think ought to be highlighted. Discussions of financial reporting are some
times impaired because there is not a common understanding of the relation
ship of financial information to the investor decision-making process. There
is not a conclusive, explicit description of how investors use financial informa
tion, how they are presumed to use it, or, indeed, even how they are entitled
to use it.
Chairman Nelson: I would assume that every one of us would sub
scribe to both of those ideas.
As I go through the papers, and as I listen to the discussion, one cost of
disclosure is that forecasts may be misleading—in other words, the cost is
that it’s going to lead somebody down the wrong road, to make the wrong
decision. Forecasts will reveal information to the competition, or to labor
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unions, or make contingent liabilities actual liabilities. And as a result of that,
the stockholders will be hurt, and as a result of that, the social interest will
not be upheld.
Disclosure, in fact, may be misleading. Referring to the effect of one
accounting method as it is compared with another, the point was made that
there is no inherent rightness in any given accounting method apart from
the circumstances in which it is to be applied. A specific illustration of that
was given concerning applying successful-efforts accounting to a full-cost
company.
And then there is one cost that I don’t think has come up in the dis
cussion at all, but on which we had a paper, and that is the costly fact that if
you give people too much information, it’s going to confuse them, and they
are going to make the wrong decision. One of the dangers that we are running
into is that we do have an overload of information.
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